UNEQUAL Worlds and the Roads Ahead
Unequal Worlds and the Roads Ahead
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Introduction

THIS VOLUME IS ANOTHER ROUND, as it were, of the roundtable-style discussions and presentations among the Fellows and resource speakers of the Asia Leadership Fellows Program in 2003 at the International House of Japan (IHJ) in Tokyo. The Program, jointly sponsored by the IHJ and the Japan Foundation, brought together eight individuals of disparate but similarly passionate political commitments—from Cambodia, China, India, The Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand—to engage the topic, Identity, Security, and Democracy. Thus we were indeed engaged, but so much so that we moved quickly from the cool, generic timbre of the words identity, security, and democracy to the much sharper, hotter register of the words, Unequal Worlds.

Hot but controlled: the qualifier, ‘and the roads ahead,’ came out of a commonly felt need to temper a critical stance with a will to articulate and push forward alternative futures. To various degrees, the Fellows from the 2003 were keen to assert hopefulness—as well as a creative openness to modulating personal strategies for realizing that hopefulness.

Interestingly enough in connection with this strategic modulation, four of the eight essays in this book are entirely different submissions from those we read during the public lectures at the end of the Program. Ham Samnang chose to put on record his experiences under the Pol Pot regime (after having managed to publicly speak the unspeakable in a retreat outside Tokyo, amongst the Fellows and the Program’s resource persons). Supara Janchitfah pulled together her copious notes from the field trip to Okinawa organized by the ALFP—notes which in her hands form an Impressionist picture of inequity within the Japanese body politic. Hamid Basyaib, too, pulled together his notes from various parts of Japan—notes which in his hands formed a personal meditation on what might Japan mean now, to those who live in the neighboring countries over which Japan has traditionally exercised power. And so, too, is my compilation of three texts (solicited by various parties in relation to the Program) an on-going personal conversation with that Japan of the mind—which is to say, a Japan that is shaping Asia powerfully as it re-shapes itself. A Japan, therefore,
which will be part of our lives whether or not we chose to be directly engaged by it in the future.

The other four essays represent (and are indeed parts of) sustained studies to which Chung Chin-sung, Yang Guang, Nakano Yoshiko, and P. Sainath have been devoting the large part of their professional lives. Chung Chin-sung presents in this volume her synthesis of the current state of affairs with regard to ethnic Koreans living in Japan, with emphasis on what, in her view, is an on-going breaking away from a long-standing fusion of identity with a sense of victimhood. Yang Guang’s work and substantial experience in China’s energy sector informs his paper, which foregrounds the necessity of skillful diplomacy and conflict-resolution agenda, on the part of China, vis à vis many troubled parts of the world. Nakano Yoshiko argues that a center-to-periphery model of economic flow is not adequate to the complexities encountered when one takes a very close look at the traffic of Japanese goods through huge regions of Asia. P. Sainath’s essay is a concise version of a much longer paper on what he terms—with accusatory intent—'market fundamentalism,' to him the most dangerous of fundamentalisms. These positions and arguments which have been on their minds for a long time, surprisingly come together in this volume as a unified call, on one hand, for a much greater sense of nuance and complexity than ever before, in studying and responding to regional and global developments; and on the other hand, for a clear-eyed acknowledgement of the political content and intent of scholarship and journalism.

It may hence be a matter of some curiosity—in connection with the work of engaging power relations, at the heart of what we do as intellectuals and professional witnesses to history and current events—that the Fellows from Cambodia, The Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia shifted to topics other than what we came to Japan with, and that the Fellows from China, India, Japan, and South Korea maintained their focus on their long-term intellectual projects. I do not regard this dichotomy as automatically signaling the difference between countries with and without great economic and political clout. The dichotomy may merely be a function of the kinds of individuals selected for ALFP 2003. However, from my perspective as editor of this volume, I do find the difference noteworthy in relation to the matter of strategic modulation. For it may well be that the nature and calibration of strategies of engagement in intellectual/activist arenas—even in a generous, collegial environment such as that created by the ALFP organizers for the Fellows—may have to be quick-silver, quick-witted, and visceral for those Fellows whose who belong to younger and perhaps unstable institutions, or to no institutions at all. And that
strategic modulation perhaps inevitably takes a more imperceptible style and momentum—even though no less impassioned—for those Fellows who belong to strongly established institutions.

Sainath’s is the introductory paper of this volume, in that it presents, in broad strokes, the compelling evidence that we may be moving inexorably into an age of inequality like no other. But it is also the case that Sainath’s paper shares and focuses the qualities of both the more academic papers and those of the Fellows who took a more visceral approach. Still, it is the last two essays in the body of the book, written by resource speakers Professor Takahashi Tetsuya and Professor Tanaka Akihiko, which actually represent the most riveting focal points of discussion during the ALFP Program. While each of the resource speakers moved the Fellows (in some cases, profoundly, particularly Professor Sakamoto Yoshikazu), the papers by Professors Takahashi and Tanaka serve best, I believe, to cue the readers of this volume as to the intense interest devoted by the Fellows to the troubling issues surrounding the Yasukuni Shrine and the official history of Japan as articulated in school textbooks. That intense interest is in turn a cue to the complex combinations of disaffection and respect—ease and un-ease—which Japan engendered among the Fellows. For shedding light on these issues, the ALFP owes Professors Takahashi and Tanaka a great debt of gratitude.

And: as for cues, the folio of images at the center of this volume was organized as a small memory bank that hopefully ‘articulates’ succinctly the thoughts that circulated amongst us during the 2003 ALFP, and the shared spirit of endurance through the extremely long and pitched battles we fight in our home countries. In the end, it is that spirit that bound the group. Plus, everyone’s distinct humor and sense of camaraderie.

The question might arise, therefore: what are the photographs of I-House doing in the ‘Museum’ for the Troubled Imagination, together with the some rather disturbing images? I-House is itself half a century old, and is part of the history of Japan that has occasioned the deepest concern among the Fellows. I-House—which, with the Japan Foundation has taken upon itself the challenge of creating a network of intellectuals in the region called Asia, to hopefully draw from a multipolar and multivocal transnational community in freshly conceptualizing nation, region and global relations—will inevitably have to itself be a topic for analysis. Not for causing the creation of images for the troubled imagination, for I-House has presented only the most elegant of images, especially to the weary agents provocateurs that we are as scholars, journalists, and activists. Rather, for being a representation of the beauty
of Japan, a face which may in the long run be the most difficult to analyze of contemporary Asian topics—all of which topics intensify those images for the troubled imagination. I-House has been an ideal quiet space for considering all kinds of seemingly intractable geopolitical difficulties. Is it therefore a sanctuary or a veil? More troubling: is it both? This work on I-House is not for the present volume, but it did begin, at least for myself, in the realization that the ALFP now has some fifty Fellows who have had the same experience of spatial beauty as talk transpired about various griefs in the world.

When Shimamura Naoko, ALFP Chief Program Officer, inquired if I might take on the privilege of serving as editor of this volume, I said yes for reasons that I was at that time unclear about. It is clear now, as I write: it is Shimamura-san, well-loved and deeply respected by all of us at the 2003 ALFP—as well as her colleagues at I-House, Sonoda Kihimiro and Sasanuma Mayuko, and her colleagues at Japan Foundation, principally Machimura Akiko—who represent the possibility that such clearly earnest initiatives as the ALFP of I-House, may mitigate some of the dis-ease in a world hurtling into all manner of heretofore unimaginable tragedies. To assist the ALFP Secretariat in creating a nuanced record of the 2003 Fellowship: this is necessary work, but it is also a reciprocation of respect.

Marian Pastor Roces
Editor
Our planet is not balanced. Too few control too much, and too many have too little to hope for. Too much turmoil, too many wars. Too much suffering.

James Wolfensohn
World Bank President

At the joint WB-IMF meeting in Dubai

“Markets are a great way to organise economic activity, but they need adult supervision.”

Depending on who you are, you might think this is Mother Teresa speaking. Or Sub-Commandante Marcos of the Zapatistas. Actually, it is the President of the World Bank speaking!

A few days after Wolfensohn said this, The International Herald Tribune reported that the International Monetary Fund, which bitterly attacked Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohammad during the East Asian financial crisis, now admits they were wrong: “The IMF has since accepted that Mahathir’s (capital and currency controls) formula worked.”

If they had only figured that out twenty years ago! It would have spared hundreds of millions of poor families a great deal of misery. Misery brought about precisely by the idea that markets could solve every single problem of the human race. An idea propagated forcefully and ruthlessly by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and The Wall Street Journal.

Any criticism of the Market as God these past two decades led to your being branded a heretic. The Market had all the answers. There was no miracle it could not perform.

Some, like prominent columnist Swaminathan Aiyer of India, argued that markets alone can save the environment. Others, like Time Magazine, asserted that hunger is a function of anti-market systems. Want jobs? Leave it to the Market. Time Magazine’s Charles Krauthammer has laid down that the market is in fact the lifeline for “previously starving Third World peasants.”
The Age of Inequality
Life in the Times of Market Fundamentalism

P. SAINATH

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In this vision, the market is not merely inseparable from democracy. It is democracy.

This was the baloney of the last fifteen to twenty years. In my view: sure you need the market. But the market as a tool, not as a tyranny. As instrument, not as ideology.

So: are the high priests of the Bank, the IMF and The Wall Street Journal sincere about this realization? That markets need adult supervision? No such luck.

One of the tenets of what I call Market Fundamentalism is that the preacher is always exempt from the practice. Iraq today presents a great example. The first declaration of the American-run Iraqi governing council was to throw open every single sector of the Iraqi economy to full foreign ownership.

At the same time, any Iraqi ownership was effectively pre-empted. Two local entrepreneurs, for instance, had set up the country’s first cellular phone network after the war. They were doing a thriving business when they were shut down physically, and the network building job was handed over to MCI of America, a company with no experience in that field and which only few months ago, was caught in the biggest accounting fraud in history.

So much for free markets. The Iraqi market is now free for American corporations ranging from Halliburton and MCI to scores of others. Halliburton is importing oil into Iraq—a country with the world’s second largest reserves of oil—at a cost of close to two dollars a gallon. It actually costs seventy-one cents a gallon in the region, but the Americans have established a very captive ‘free’ market. This ‘opening up’ process is almost like the Opium Wars of the nineteenth century.

The Growth of Inequality

Inequality is worse in today’s world than at any point since the Second World War. Inequality has grown faster in the last fifteen years than in the past fifty. The series of United Nations Human Development Reports (UNHDRs) since 1990 shows this very clearly.

Let us look into just a few of the dimensions of inequality. Rich/poor divides, resource inequality, income and consumption, access to health, or even just to water, or jobs. This crisis now affects most of the planet.

Of the many trends in globalization, the crucial one today is corporate globalism. A world driven by and for monopoly profits. Based on corporate greed rather than human need. It is a world marked by the collapse of restraint on corporate power, in every continent.
The income gap has more than doubled between the top twenty per cent of the world's population and the bottom fifth. By 1998, the top twenty per cent consumed eighty-six per cent of all goods and services. The bottom fifth made do with 1.3 per cent.

The world's richest two hundred people, according to the 1999 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme, "more than doubled their net worth in the four years to 1998, to over one trillion US dollars. The assets of the top three billionaires are more than the combined GNP of all least developed countries and their six hundred million people together."

What is being termed an 'economic recovery' in the United States, as Professor Paul Krugman of Princeton University points out, is a period in which the same economy has lost three million jobs. It has also happened in a period when the salaries of Chief Executive Officers (CEO's) reached their highest figures ever. (Jack Welch of General Electric, for instance, was compensated one hundred twenty-three million US dollars, and Richard Grasso of the New York Stock Exchange, one hundred forty million US dollars.) The number of Americans living in poverty rose sharply to 12.4 per cent of the population. And among minority African-Americans and Hispanics, that percentage is almost double.

Russia, once the second superpower, was subjected to 'shock therapy' and other doctrines of market fundamentalism. The former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics lost forty-two per cent of its gross domestic product in a spectacularly short period. A remarkable achievement. No country has ever done that without a famine or a war. Russia did it with just the help of Jeffrey Sachs and the IMF. Poverty in Russia skyrocketed, accompanying a rise in mortality rates and high levels of distress.

Each winter, hundreds die of the cold. In 2000 to 2001, well over three hundred died in Moscow alone of hypothermia. But in that same season, sales of Mercedes Benz cars in Moscow leaped by one-third. And Georgio Armani opened a new salon in the city, to be welcomed by old friends Versace and Bulgari who had already set up store there.

China, one of the most egalitarian societies in the world, now has countless dollar millionaires. Yet, the gaps between rich and poor, and between coastal and interior China, have grown worse. Also, the effects of certain kinds of development show up in other ways. Two giant and rapidly growing sectors catch the eye, writes Laurence Bram in The South China Morning Post, September 1, 2003. Both are misery-related. One, according to China's own People's Procuratorate, is corruption.
India has now piled up fifty million tons of food grain despite a severe, prolonged stagnation in agriculture. Why is there grain piling up? Because the purchasing power of the bottom thirty per cent in India has taken a huge beating. Why do they not have purchasing power? Because the entire complex of so-called market-based reforms are loaded against their interests. Family farms are dying. Investment in agriculture is down to zero. Rural credit has collapsed and debt has exploded. Many are losing their lands as a few celebrate at the malls. In March 2003, the per person availability of food grain was lower than it had been during the notorious Bengal Famine of 1942-43.

Thousands of Indian farmers have committed suicide since the late 1990's. In a single district of Andhra Pradesh, Anantapur, more than two thousand four hundred farmers have taken their own lives since 1997.

Elsewhere in India, like in Gujarat or Mumbai, the loss of countless jobs in industry is boosting religious fundamentalism. In the violence in Gujarat in 2002, in which over a thousand five hundred lives were lost, many of the rioters were retrenched workers from shut-down textile mills.

The huge new inequalities are feeding into existing ones: For instance, in a society with several kinds of gender bias, hunger hits women much harder. Millions of families are making do with less food. In the traditional Indian family, women eat last, after they have fed their husbands and children. With smaller amounts of food being left over now, poor Indian women are eating much less. The strain on their bodies and health is greater. Yet, health care is ever more expensive.

So what sort of a society are we building in the new, globalized India? We are closing small health centres—and opening super luxury hospitals that ninety per cent of Indians cannot afford.

We are shutting down primary schools—and opening colleges based on exorbitant donations for admissions.

We are closing libraries and opening multiplexes.

We are winding up bus depots and services—as we expand the airports systems.

Thousands of rich Indians now patronize weight loss clinics to shed some of their prosperity—at a time when the food grain available per person has sharply declined.

We are raising the salaries of CEO's, even as the already pathetic real wage of landless workers worsens for millions of them.

Would you believe that Afghanistan was the fastest growing economy in 2003? Not a difficult feat if the earlier growth was sub-zero. The Afghan economy grew at twenty per cent. But more than fifty per cent of that came from the opium crop. According to Antonio Maria Costa, Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna, more than ninety per cent of the heroin in the drug markets of Russia, Europe and Central Asia today originates from Afghanistan.

And what of Africa? Ask Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz (who was dismissed from the World Bank for heresy against Market Fundamentalism). As he points out, the African continent, subjected to forcibly imposed policies of the IMF, has lost nearly a fourth of her income. Meanwhile, African cotton farmers who grow the cheapest cotton in the world, go bankrupt as American cotton farmers get an annual subsidy of about a million dollars each!

So great is Africa's overall crisis that its skilled personnel are leaving in alarming numbers. According to The Financial Times of the United Kingdom, the whole continent in 2001 had just twenty-thousand engineers and scientists to serve a population of six hundred million. The result: there are more African scientists and engineers working in the United States than in all of Africa, says the Geneva-based International Organisation for Migration (OIM). This drain of skills is making poverty reduction almost impossible.

In Latin America, long the world's most unequal region, inequality rose sharply in the 1990's. The global NGO, OXFAM, records that in this part of the world, one hundred million people fell below the poverty line in the 1980's. So the shock of the 1990's came on top of that misery. In Mexico alone, an additional eleven million people fell below the poverty line between 1990 and 1996.

Food and Agriculture Organization Director General Jacques Diouf points out that worldwide, in the last fifteen years as rich countries increased subsidies to their farmers, poor countries went from being net exporters of food to net importers.

India is a classic example of engineered inequality. On October 21, 2003, The New York Times had a front page lead celebrating the birth of a class of people who spend their weekends at malls in India. It failed to mention that in the same year, India slipped three places in the human development ranking of the United Nations. We now stand at rank 127. This year's United Nations Human Development Report also shows that for the bulk of the Indian population, living standards are lower than those of Botswana or even the occupied territories of Palestine! So while some of the richest people in the world live in India, so do the largest number of the world's poor.
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We are raising the salaries of CEO's, even as the already pathetic real wage of landless workers worsens for millions of them.
We are closing fair-price food shops and opening food boutiques.

We complain of the century’s greatest drought—but build hundreds of water parks and golf courses.

Even in the basic needs of people, the divides are startling. My city of Mumbai faced severe water problems in the summer of 2003. You wouldn’t know this if you live in the rich colonies. But in the slums, perhaps half a million women line up for water every morning. From 1 a.m. at night, they begin positioning their buckets in line to stake their place in the queue. Often they don’t get the water they wait for, which is maybe twenty to fifty liters a day.

In and around the same Mumbai, in the same drought, there were twenty-four amusement water parks using fifty billion, and I mean fifty billion, liters of water a day for the entertainment of the rich. In the desert state of Rajasthan, plagued by a serious scarcity of water for five years, we are opening more water parks and planning lots of golf courses. A single golf course takes 1.8 to 2.3 million liters of water a day through the season. On that amount of water, any one hundred thousand villagers in that state could have all their water needs met for the entire season.

Worldwide, water is being shifted from farmland and food crop use to swimming pools, amusement parks, water slides, golf courses, and gardens. We go ahead with this even as we know ours is a century where wars will be fought over water.

Health and Living Conditions

As health care gets dismantled, or privatized and more expensive, there’s a lot of SARS-by-other-names waiting to happen. The number of deaths due to SARS worldwide was about eight hundred-odd. In four months, as the special section on this ailment of the World Health Organisation’s website shows, the number killed by tuberculosis in India alone is double that number each day.

But SARS got a lot of attention because it affected the elites, the flying classes. The same happened with the plague of 1994-95 in India. It killed fewer than any major disease in India, but it frightened the flying classes. Plague germs are notorious for their non-observance of class distinctions. They don’t require passports and visas. They board aircraft and fly Club Class to New York.

Why was China the worst hit? It has much to do with the economic philosophy of the past two decades. In China, you accessed your health care through your workplace, your factory or school, or related networks. This went up in a chain from bottom to top: the small medical post at the local level communicating a problem to the
laboratory at the next level. When thousands of these enterprises were shut down, millions lost their access to health care. Many of these dispensaries and hospitals ceased to exist.

When SARS broke out, China's early warning system had been dismantled. The Chinese were caught entirely by surprise. SARS cost the economy billions. Hong Kong, Singapore, and other cities also found themselves hurt by SARS.

As Isabel Hilton writes in *Newstime*, June 6, 2003: "Economic liberalisation meant the end of most of those work units. Nothing has taken their place and the services the units used to provide have lapsed. Responsibility for public health rests with local authorities which do not appear to have either the funds or the interest to maintain it."

"Economic liberalisation destroyed China's health service. Now it must rely on police, not doctors, to fight SARS. The state security apparatus, unlike the public health services, has maintained its investment and is trying to enforce travel and quarantine restrictions."

But why only China? Just glance at *The International Herald Tribune* of September 26, 2003. You have the French Government officially confirming that nearly fifteen thousand people had died from a heat wave in August. That is far more devastating than SARS. Those dying were overwhelmingly elderly, senior citizens. If it did not get the same media attention as SARS, this is because the wrong kind of people were dying. Not the Beautiful People or the flying classes, but mostly retired pensioners.

This was not the first year France has seen a heat wave. Health care had seen serious cuts in recent times, particularly affecting the elderly. Curiously, even the 'solution' to the crisis in the health system thought up by the French Government would place further burdens on ordinary working people. They are being asked to forego one national holiday to raise funds for health services for the elderly! Several French parliamentarians are now demanding a special debate on the so-called health reforms.

In America, tens of thousands of elderly, aging Americans are crossing the border into Canada in order to be able to buy affordable drugs. The same drugs are sold at both sides of the border, but in America, the corporations marketing them have total control over pricing. Now the American state and police are intervening. Not on behalf of the poor and elderly, but on behalf of the corporations. Police are raiding pharmacies and chemists in Michigan, confiscating genuine but cheaper drugs.

In Africa, thanks to the intellectual property arrangements presided over by
the World Trade Organization, the millions dying of AIDS were denied cheaper drugs. The American companies controlling the patents on the drugs threatened Indian companies producing the cheaper version with legal action leading to their closure. After an international outcry, a compromise was reached. But the drugs are nowhere near as cheap as they could have been. The profit of corporations took precedence over the very lives of poor Africans.

What SARS shows you, however, is that the sins we visit on the poor, the helpless, the elderly, will come back to visit us. China saved some money in shutting down health care for poor rural people. It paid billions in lost tourism and other factors due to SARS.

Health issues will be further complicated by the living standards built into the current dispensation. According to the latest report of the United Nations Habitat, one-third of humanity will live in slums by 2030. What do we call that? From Global Village to Global Slum? The Globalization of Squalor?

Imagine the kind of health complications we are looking at.

The Military Dimension
The military sphere is another arena of inequity. At no period of history has the gap between One Power and the rest been so enormous.

Yet, while the military dimension is overwhelming, it often turns out to be neither decisive nor final—as the Americans are finding out in Iraq. As Japan, too, will learn if she ventures into Iraq. With the greatest goodwill and respect for Japan, I would suggest that a nation knowing no war in fifty-eight years, might be courting complications that could prove traumatic and damaging, inviting problems that were never seen in half a century.

The increasing use of military force, coupled with changing geo-political realities, also raises anew the question of the bases in Okinawa, the uses of which could draw Japan into destabilizing conflicts that are not easy to foresee today. One protestor against the bases put into four words, what volumes of security studies do not honestly tell you: finally, bases mean war.

The 'Axis of Evil' idea of George Bush that now further destabilizes the Korean peninsula also sees military power as a decisive mechanism. This illusion has also led to the dangerous nuclear brinksmanship between India and Pakistan, and underscores Israel's brutality in the occupied territories. Meanwhile, an internal conflict of the Philippines is being globalized. The fraudulent globalism of our time promotes insecurity and trauma. It speaks global, but promotes local xenophobia and...
national chauvinism. All countries will have to cope, not excluding Japan.

Yet, the military dimension is built into and based on the inequalities we are talking about. In one sense, this is recognized by the Japanese Prime Minister's foreign policy adviser, Okamoto Yukio, in his paper in the foreign policy journal, *Gaiko Forum,* indicates. Yet, it is this dimension that is increasingly being resorted to in our time, and not just by the US. The 'free market' in Iraq is simply and plainly a military construct.

Crushing Afghanistan in military terms was easy. Now the United States has to face the reality that opium cultivation is higher than it ever was during the regime of the Taliban. And that Hamid Karzai is President of a few rooms of his palace in Kabul. Nothing else.

**The Privatization of Everything**

This is another central tenet of Market Fundamentalism. The privatization of everything— from industry to intellect.

The huge, rapid privatization in Russia—with rigged auctions and fraudulent sales—led to the rise of what even the government there calls 'Gangster Capitalism.' A battle now rages between elected government and Mafiosi-like oligarchs.

Meanwhile, in country after country, the privatization of basic services has caused unimaginable distress.

Yet, in many of these processes, Japan has remained relatively unaffected. The condition of the lowest twenty per cent of Japanese society would be far better off than that same section in, say the United States. Given this, while the inequalities grow worldwide, can Japan remain immune?

I hope Japan does. I doubt Japan will.

For one thing, Japan's national debt is three times her GDP and about thirty-six per cent of the total global debt. For another, new data suggest that even in this great and prosperous land, at least one-fifth of all households have, in the words of the daily *Asahi Shimbun*, "no financial assets—no savings, no insurance, no investments." At the same time, the value of assets for households that did have savings was at its highest ever, says the *Asahi Shimbun* section of *The International Herald Tribune*, September 24, 2003. So the gaps are showing. Both extremes were visible in the Public Opinion Survey on Financial Assets and Liabilities released in October 2003 by the Central Council for Financial Services Information, a unit of the Bank of Japan.

This situation of debt and savings can get more complicated. Especially if
one gets aboard that privatization-of-everything bandwagon. If Japan actually
privatizes management of her two hundred fifty trillion yen Postal Savings and one
hundred fifty trillion yen Simplified Insurance Cover, she could be asking for very
big trouble. Japan is not so special and unique that it will be spared what has
happened everywhere else, including in the United States. This, after all, is the Age of
the Mega Con.

Unravelling Time
What is happening? What will happen? What should happen? What can we do?

Wars will happen. War is an integral part of this form of globalization, not an
aberration. Wars will now result in seizing resources and looting whole countries. The
world’s second largest oil reserves now are reserved for a few corporations.

What will happen? As the United Nations Habitation report predicts, in less than
thirty years from now, fully one third of humanity, will live in urban slums. The vast
majority of these people will be not in Africa or Latin America but in our own Asia.

The worse the economic ravages, the greater the growth will be of
fundamentalism and neo-fascist tendencies. We are witnessing the greatest loot and
grab sortie in history. Not in one country, but in most.

The era of giant collapses has already begun. Enron and WorldCom produced
the largest bankruptcies in history, and ruined countless retirees whose pension
funds had been invested in them. To MCI goes the honour of the largest accounting
fraud in history. But we will see many more.

So What Can We Do?
We can abandon Market Fundamentalism for a course that places people, not profits
at the centre of everything.

The amounts of money required to address basic problems is smaller than
what many might imagine. As the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
has long pointed out: on an additional twenty-eight billion US dollars a year, the world
could provide basic education for every child, clean water and safe sewers to every
human being, and basic health and nutrition for everyone on the planet.

Too costly at twenty-eight billion? Well, every year, as the UNHDRs show,
Europeans and Americans spend between thirty-six to forty billion US dollars on
cosmetics, ice cream, and pet food alone. Twenty-eight billion US dollars is a tiny part
of the wealth of the world’s richest two hundred twenty-five individuals, who have a
combined worth of over one trillion US dollars.
Where does the public intellectual, or for that matter, any public-spirited human being stand on these issues? How does he or she respond?

Too many intellectuals are celebrating the new prosperity. The Indian Express newspaper writes editorials asserting Greed is Good. It speaks of the value of the 'Greed Dividend.' Too many have become private intellectuals, owned by corporations, monopolies and foundations. Call it privatization of the intellect and soul.

You would think that for something to be global, it has to be inclusive and encompassing. Oddly enough, the system we call global is in fact based on exclusion, not inclusion.

How does this system include or even need: cotton growers in Burkina Faso? Cane cutters in the Caribbean, fishermen in Bali or, for that matter, in Nova Scotia? Where is the place for small farmers in Bangladesh, poor peasants in Honduras, Cambodian woodcutters, Indian fishing communities, indigenous hunter-gatherers, Mexican textile workers, migrant labourers in the Andes, girl students in Afghanistan, wood craftsmen in Zambia, dam-displaced people in China?

How does our present globalism in any way heed these people or include them? When I look at the question that way, I see that it cannot be sustained for it excludes maybe two billion people. Maybe far more. But here's the Good News: the excluded are responding.

Bolivian indigenous people in November 2003 cancelled a corrupt gas deal with the United States. Then they cancelled their President as well.

In Venezuela, people saved the President they wanted—in a military coup supported by Washington and a coup which The New York Times wrote an editorial supporting, twenty-four hours before it collapsed. (The same people are all for democracy in Iraq.)

In Britain, a Prime Minister is on survival notice. In the United States, a President with record popularity ratings enters election year unsure of victory.

Sure, war is an integral part of our present order. Yet, there's a silver lining to the clouds of war. For the first time that I know of in history, huge, giant anti-war movements were on the streets before the war in Iraq began.

London saw what was probably its biggest anti-war rally ever—before the war began. It speaks so well of all the anti-war protests that they happened in the face of the most enormous barrage of pro-war media propaganda across the globe.

In Seattle, in Cancun, in Davos and New York. In Washington and Prague, in Genoa and Quebec, the numbers of the protestors grows, it does not diminish. In the World Social Forum at Porto Allegre, in a hundred other forums, people seek
Proposal to Leave Paradise

MARIAN PASTOR ROCES

1. In response to a death: Remarks on Asia

27 SEPTEMBER 2003. Two nights ago, the Palestinian writer Edward Said died. I remark his passing, because aside from mourning the demise of a man of unusual moral clarity, this moment gives us pause—to consider why so few have spoken, or are able to speak, against the current madness in the world, with Said’s grace, consistency, courage, passion, erudition, and tenacity. Said has been, for many public intellectuals, the epitome of the public intellectual.

I have, of late, been preoccupied by the question: what mitigates against the emergence of more Saids? What undermines the sustainability of resistance to fundamentalisms and neoconservatisms? I do not think that the reasons lie in the lack of brave, intelligent human beings. But I do think that far too little passion has been devoted to the conceptual framing of the intellectual’s activist tasks. It is paltry theoretical work that, to my mind, collapses sustained and nuanced ethical response to the human condition today.

Elaborate conceptual framing is certainly demanded by a program, for instance, that is tethered to the word ‘Asia.’

No urge or intent to locate Asia (perhaps especially in establishing a network of Asian intellectuals) is innocent of the ambition to extend reach—if only the reach of imagination. This is a cartographer’s impulse, a territorial one of course, but on a number of slightly differing registers: to find; to get a fix on; to slot; to get a picture, as in to echo-locate; to corner a piece of; to reckon; to resolve an indeterminacy; therefore determine; to espy; to point out, if only the territory of the individual soul. It is, curiously enough, an urge that operates on a doubletake, because that reach and that imagination actively seek to capture or fix a ‘sense’ that seems to issue from inside an Asianness that is most coherent from an outside. ‘Asia’ is hardly a meaningful construct in the daily lives of most of the billions of people who live in that transnational public unity against transnational corporate tyranny. Whether they are finding all the answers is another issue. The point is they are addressing all the right questions.

There are huge energies now unleashed in the global arena. From anti-war to social justice movements. The protestors at Seattle and Cancun are not anti-globalization. They are in fact, real globalizers. Only, they seek to globalise not greed but social justice movements. They globalize people’s cooperation against the exploitation of people. From political reform movements and minority rights platforms to basic struggles for democracy and human rights, it’s happening. Major battles are on for a radical redistribution of resources in several societies. All these are in the global arena. The challenge is how to marry these energies.

The choice for today’s intellectuals is really quite stark. Will the great changes coming upon us happen within our consent or outside it? With our influence and intervention, or without it?

Victor Hugo once said that there is no force on earth greater than an idea whose time has come. In today’s world, that time has come. And the idea is social, economic, political and gender justice.

Another world is possible. Other worlds are possible.

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Proposal to Leave Paradise

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landmass and its fringe islands. The term Asia is, rather, sign of a virtual reality. As that sign of desire, it offers its fullest coherence to those who parlay it to acquire cultural or financial capital for altruistic or cynical ends; not the least, the world’s myriad Asian art or Asian culture institutions; academic programs with an Orientalist genealogy; and foreign relations machinery still bearing features of colonial geneses.

I should recite a litany of Asias that are arrived at via different acts of locating. Asia: most useful foil to the dyadic frame that is the legacy of two millennia of seeking as well as fearing that supposedly incomprehensible East from a supposedly a comprehension-seeking Western perspective. Asia: the abstract territory to which someone in, say, Ulan Bator; or Zhang Jia Jie, Basilan, or Borneo’s Saribas River; or Baluchistan, is initiated into as soon as modernity is embraced. Asia: the place referred to in such shows as CNN’s “Inside Asia.” Asia: the scholar’s domain and the diplomat’s assignment, dissected by section, indeed by sectioning. Asia: adjective of hot property in the contemporary art market; something many folks want a piece of. Asia: that which becomes a sweet and pure well of memory for the migrant. Asia, therefore: a category that is global to begin with; a priori global. There is really no Asia that is exclusively local. There cannot be anything local that is that size or this plural.

All these Asias can only be conjured upon a claim to or purchase on intrinsic experience that is, however, extrinsically crystallized. Put another way: these are all Asias that are conjured along a territorializing impulse issuing from intense experiences of de-territorialization. An ‘Asia leadership’ exercise is necessarily imagined as a longing, because Asia is a place in the mind, inserted there by people, ages ago, who lived elsewhere; because Asia will be realized, as a phenomenological unity, we assure ourselves, by association with such robust words as ‘leadership.’

Asia is a kind of idea, therefore, like paradise, which seems vaguely lost, which always seems needing of recuperation, strengthening, and parlaying. But so long as it is that, it will continue to be vaguely elusive, hence only awkwardly useful in the languages for engaging tyrannies.

2. In response to a request, by the Japan Foundation Tokyo office, during the course of the Fellowship, for a brief essay on ASEAN: Proposal to Leave Paradise

18 OCTOBER 2003. It doesn’t deserve more than two seconds of attention, so I only mention Paradise, which the ad on CNN solemnly invoked, to set my tone: dismay. The full sentence—“Come, visit paradise under the ASEAN skies”—says to me that
whoever is running tourism promotion for the group is more than a bit exhausted. Not only is paradise a childish trope, it works only for cynics and despoilers. It begs the question: is there no decision-maker out there who can tell that this ad exhibits poverty of the imagination?

Which gives us to understand something about ASEAN: its intellectual infrastructure is poorly built.

I don't think it is unreasonable to conflate ASEAN itself with its silly ad. In the many decades of its existence, ASEAN has confined itself to tropes—instead of initiating, exploring, and supporting original thinking—about the nation-state in a profoundly troubled world. ASEAN enshrined non-interference in the internal affairs of each member state and in this wise assured the group's longevity. But it is a longevity achieved at the expense of the enriching process of crafting concepts of 'region' that are critically informed by tough examinations of concepts of nation. The nationalism that has persisted under the ASEAN skies are bizarre nativisms that function to consolidate the power of newly-produced elites, and to confine the various citizenries in exotic universes. (Exotic, for example, like the Malaysian bumiputri idea that collapses the category 'Malay' into the category 'Muslim'—a conflation which will not stand up to any social science scrutiny. Exotic, for example, like the Philippine idea of a nation born solely out of the ambitions of the so-called ilustrado, the late nineteenth century bourgeoisie that embraced the French Enlightenment—an idea that keeps silent about the role of any other, hypothetically more important, participants.) And if a regional group merely maintains the status quo on the level of hoary and unexamined mythologies, the design of supra-national systems will be no less witless.

ASEAN has not shown signs that it recognizes the twisted shape of the official self-definitions of its member nations and of its notion of regional community. (That its official come-hither ad does not recognize that paradise activates the colonial imagination, does not bode well for the collective ASEAN desire for a dignified, respected place in global politics and in the imagination of the world.) It has not because it cannot see how deeply embedded its political, educational, diplomatic, cultural and economic institutions are in the ethos of nineteenth century imperialism. At least part of the reason for the blindness is that the imperial West is always conceptually 'present' in the terms of definition. That West is present in the solemn articulations of 'Asian values,' for instance. The almost religious righteousness of the construction disallows any suggestion that 'Asian values' draws from the well of Western Orientalism.
Unlike the countries that now form the European Union—which were obliged by the traumas of their wars against each other to disavow nineteenth and early twentieth century modernities—the countries that form ASEAN are creating their modernities vis-à-vis their unshackling from the West. For this reason, the supposition that ASEAN may in the future become an 'EU' seems unfounded indeed: the unshackling maneuvers—the time-consuming efforts to differentiate 'East' from 'West'—orient the ASEAN nations towards the past, not the future. An EU-like future will require formulating concepts of the supra-national that are free of the extremely bipolar paradigms and mythologies that emerged from colonial times. That future will require formulating concepts that sustain populations and not just leaders. It will require positing the global and the local not as opposite terms, but rather, as deeply interwoven fields in which ideas, resources and human beings circulate in multiple directions. It will require ways of strengthening identity in terms of potential, rather than merely through the aura of antiquity. This sophistication is impossible if ASEAN continues to interpret non-interference as dictum against critical imagination.

As for Japan’s extraordinarily successful model of a nation-state built on an elite-enshrining mythology that seems impervious to examination: this very success unfortunately assures the primacy of unexamined concepts in (and in its relation with) ASEAN. Within ASEAN and between ASEAN and Japan, diplomatic politesse has a more shrouded quality than the ordinary veiled dialogue among diplomats. The politesse involves mute acceptance—indeed endorsement—of national self-definition by ruling elites. Moreover, Japan’s history of conquest of many of the ASEAN nations has deprived it of a moral voice to match its largesse. Japan’s investment in ASEAN has therefore been absorbed into stasis. The investment maintains the illusion of an EU-like future—which illusion will persist so long as the stasis characteristic of ASEAN prevents rigorous intellectual inquiries that reveal and analyze the cultural and historical differences between EU and itself.

This ‘proposal’ to leave paradise, the space of colonial imagination, is primarily directed at ASEAN. It is a proposal that, in practical terms, may be realized in terms of crafting stronger—that is, mutually supportive but also, mutually critical—links between and among the mass media, the academic world, political activists, and politicians. Very much in order would be a radical updating of the measures of excellence in work in the social sciences (anthropology, sociology, historiography, cultural studies), and impacting the field of International Relations with these more muscular disciplines. Such impact should upset the comfortable rhetoric of multi-disciplinarity, in order to recognize the vast divides separating the
leaders from the various populations of the countries in this group. Another realm that needs upsetting: the endless round of so-called multicultural projects, which are merely exoticizing art-making (in the visual and performing arts) rituals that have never been subjected to hard interrogation—partly because no original language for that hard interrogation has been developed for this region. All of which, finally, may lead to liberation from myriad fundamentalisms, which include, most importantly, jingoist, fundamentalist, or essentialist myths of nation.

Nonetheless, this proposal to leave paradise will not fly, without a Japan that deploys its strengths to exercise powers of critical judgement, firstly, vis-à-vis its own political and cultural institutions that maintain an ambiguity over the task of a full accounting of Japan’s historical culpabilities. The cultural and political capital that can be gained and consolidated with this full accounting may be able to allow Japan to develop a robust critique of the American empire. It is in this sense that Japan may ‘need’ ASEAN, and indeed Asia. Capacity-building for national and regional self-examination in ASEAN, in whatever ‘Asia’ may eventually mean, in Japan, and in the political ‘space’ they share—will require that the term ‘transnational’ be profoundly inflected with the idea of common good.

3. In response to a request by the Japan Foundation Office Manila, for a personal summary of my ALFP experience: Remarks about the ALFP and Architecture

29 JANUARY 2004. The Asia Leadership Fellow Program, 2003 edition, was remarkable for the quality of human encounter it made possible. Friends were made, and networks enlarged. It was also an exceptional experience in that intellectual work was human encounter. We all recognized an unusual generosity of spirit expressed in a Program design that allowed concentrated attention on the work of each Fellow. That spirit was palpable in the focus afforded by closed-in seminars with august interpreters of Japanese political life. (Indeed these were intellectuals who must be the moral conscience of Japan.) And it was obviously generosity, too, that sustained the lengths to which the Program staff went to make professional contacts in behalf of the Fellows, and to arrange for visits and meetings that spun us completely beyond the tourist track. Really: as good as it gets.

It seems niggardly, therefore, to slip into a nostalgic review of fun times, great places, and what-I-learned about-Japan; that is, reduce the Program to fluff. I think I would trivialize a Program that I now feel strongly about, if I do not instead seek some understanding of its architecture.
The Program is somewhat like the building and grounds of International House itself, which is redolent of the 1950’s. The International Style approach to the architecture of a residence/meeting place for intellectuals, preserves and makes an exclusive vista of an artifact: an Edo period garden of notable, if now sadly diminished, beauty. Largely owing to its almost museological relation to the garden, I-House has enjoyed a stateliness that has improved with age, as well as, surprisingly, from the signs of wear and tear. It is very graceful as an emblematic American recreation of Japanese space; the juxtaposition of its high modernity with Japanese history, gentle. The building and grounds were clearly intended to speak of blending, mixing, and supplementing. It articulates East/West; and Past/Present.

Yet I-House has been, also, part of a story of supplanting, overlaying, and erasing. Although I have no romantic sentiments whatsoever towards pre-American period Japan, it bears saying that that old Japan was museologized and rendered contained in and by such projects as I-House.

The Asia Leadership Fellow Program comes half a century after the architecture of this meeting place between American and Japanese academics and statesmen. (It is useful to note that the Haus der Kulturen der Welt in Berlin, Germany, was built during the same postwar period, with a similar interpretation of International Style; with a similar vocabulary of hybridization that glosses over the historical fact of American imperial presence.) The ALFP invests in the potential of organized encounter, in a setting that visualizes the potential of organized encounter. That the ALFP has an Asian, not cross-Pacific geographic compass means that another vector has been or is under construction: one that endeavors to replicate the beauty of I-House itself, so to speak, but this time with the multi-directionality of Asia raising the level of complexity of the enterprise. What deserves attention is that beauty itself, which is enchanting, which retains tinges of the edenic; but which also conceals asymmetries of power. Enchanting I-House was built when the United States imposed itself on Japan, an imposition that does not seem heavy-handed in a building that exalts bipolar Encounter.

I do not presume to divine the policy considerations that are expressed in the ALFP. However, having had the privilege of developing friendships with the Program staff, I daresay that a great deal of the design and flow of operations issues directly from the goodhearted and tough individuals who consist this staff. This accounts for that sense of beauty that recurs in all my recollections of the Program. On the other hand, these individuals work within a tradition, in which history circumscribes possibility. That history is carried forward silently by institutional frameworks that
tend to reveal its deep structure only in faint signs of power and powerlessness.

For example, among the Fellows of 2003, the individuals from Thailand and Cambodia, as well as myself, spoke of problems in our homelands. The Fellows from Japan and China addressed themselves to transnational, global issues. The Fellow from South Korea took up issues concerning Koreans in Japan, the paper also transnational, therefore, in its scope. So, too, the papers presented by the Fellow from India, who would pole-vault from local spaces of extreme detail to sweeping global assessments.

It became exceptionally clear to me that the intellectual life in politically powerful countries takes up and mirrors the scale of that power. Clearly, too, what we (can barely manage to) call intellectual life in poor societies seem scaled down, and confined, by that poverty. This asymmetry replicates the asymmetry that structured, but also is concealed by the architecture of I-House.

I keep asking myself why I chose to speak of Philippine problems during the Fellowship (following long-time practices of offering up our sorrows for the delectation of world audiences). I am not a Philippine Studies specialist, and did not have to chose to speak of an urban development project in Manila that I was recently involved in. And there was certainly no stricture in the Program to so confine my paper.

I had assessed (accurately, it turned out) that the language of discussion would be that of political science and journalism, and perhaps sociology. The only language in which I can confidently discuss my observations of global-scale institutions, is that of critical theory. The group did not share this language, because the present instruments of construction deployed by I-House and Japan Foundation tend to derive from political science, journalism, and sociology. This left me to write and speak anecdotally, in a narrative form that contrived a quasi case study, focusing on a topic that is entirely Philippine in its details and hence cannot be theorized without an inordinate amount of qualification; but can, however, be conveyed with journalistic techniques of reportage.

The shaping of the region vis-à-vis the world is being undertaken, at Japan’s initiative, in ways that (perhaps unwittingly) privilege a set of disciplines whose mature forms have emerged from modern paradigms operating in academic and political institutions that have not been re-examined for historical baggage. The lack of mastery of these disciplines in poor nations, simply means that there are enormous language barriers to breach. But more important, the lack of a critical stance in relation to these disciplines, means that the intellectual infrastructure being built
UNEQUAL WORLDS

may not be adequate to twenty-first century dilemmas.

This matter of radically different disciplinary languages—over and apart from the difficulties represented by language qua language—register the profound limitations of the Program. What is possible to discuss with some depth of understanding is of course circumscribed by the relative sophistication or coarseness of the mediation between languages. But, more importantly, languages are histories. The languages in circulation in I-House are intertwined in its institutional history and that of the Japan Foundation in relation to postwar Japan. If the ALFP is to gain in release from histories that have veiled (or indeed perpetrated) imbalances of power, it will have to pay very close attention to the trajectories of disciplines, the politics of language, and to the architecture of programs and buildings.
The Complex Meanderings
ASIAN DEMAND PROMPTS diverse Japanese products to cross borders. After spending nearly a decade in Washington, D.C., I moved to Hong Kong in April 1997, three months prior to its historic return to Chinese sovereignty. The first thing that struck me was the strong presence of Japanese products in the everyday life of the Hong Kong people—from automatic rice cookers in kitchens, to sweets and snacks in 7-Eleven stores, to Non-no fashion magazines at newsstands on Star Ferry Pier. Nearly one third of the giant neon signs shining above Victoria Harbour are Japanese corporate logos; the biggest of them all, 'Panasonic,' towers four stories high. My students at Hong Kong University grew up watching Japanese superheroes on Japanese TV sets, and many of them spent their teenage years going shopping at Yaohan stores in suburban malls.

Some Hong Kong critics call this ‘Japanization’ or even ‘Japanese cultural imperialism.’ This line of argument, however, only looks at the scale of Japanese influence, and does not consider the process of distribution and the role that Chinese intermediaries as well as consumers has played in it. The process of globalization is far more complex than a one-sided push from multinationals to their targeted consumers. While Japanese corporate ambitions and strategies do play an important role in the process, the view from corporate headquarters often overlooks ramifications that lead to unforeseen consumption and unauthorized intermediaries. In fact, those of us in Hong Kong often find Japanese products crossing borders with little or no executive decision having been made in Tokyo or Osaka.

My six years in Hong Kong opened my eyes to what our Fellow, Marian Roces, calls the 'ethnography of flow.' In this paper, I would like to shift the perspective from Japan to Hong Kong, and consider the flow of a few Japanese products – automatic rice cookers and transistor radios in the 1950's and 1960's, and TV drama series in the late 1990's. My central question is: who initiates transnational flow?
Eight Million Rice Cookers

One of the first Japanese products that Hong Kong people embraced after the Second World War was a National (Panasonic) automatic rice cooker by Matsushita. Mr. Wong, 45, who is a civil service officer, first saw an automatic rice cooker as a child in the living room of his landlady. The landlady’s family occupied one bedroom, while Mr. Wong’s family of four occupied another, and the two families shared a living room. Bill was fascinated by the landlady’s white machine that cooked rice without fire, and so he sat by it, and looked through the glass lid as the simmering rice filled the room with its warm aroma. It was not until Bill turned nine years old that his family bought a National rice cooker. “The feeling was quite special,” recalls Bill, “because it was the first electric appliance at home after our radio. We [finally] had the money to buy it. The feeling was ‘we are not that poor any more.’” In the 1960’s, to many working class families and immigrant families from China, a National rice cooker was the symbol of a better lifestyle.

Picture 1:
The first ad for automatic rice cookers in Hong Kong (1961)
"The word ‘automatic’ is featured in the white balloon."
The man who first imported Japanese rice cookers to Hong Kong is William Mong Man-wai, chairman of the Shun Hing Group, Matsushita’s sole dealer in Hong Kong and Macau for the last five decades. The group has 1,600 employees, and Mong, a billionaire, has donated buildings to universities in Beijing, Cambridge, and Hong Kong. Since Mong sold the first twenty-four rice cookers in 1959, Shun Hing has imported nearly eight million rice cookers to Hong Kong, where only 6.8 million people live. Placed side by side, their white line would run from Osaka to Hong Kong. The colony being a free port, a good portion of these rice cookers was re-exported to the Philippines, the Middle East, and China.\(^5\)

Mong was born in Hong Kong in 1927 to a family that has maintained strong business ties with Japan since the Meiji era. His paternal grandfather, Mong Fa-tong, moved from Guangdong Province to Nagasaki after the Sino-Japanese War of 1884-5, when British merchants established their trade route between Hong Kong/Shanghai and Nagasaki. Both of Mong’s parents, Mong Kwok-ping and Wong Fa-yuk, were born in Nagasaki around the turn of the century. After they got engaged and sailed to Hong Kong, Kwok-ping worked for the Hong Kong office of the Mitsubishi Corporation for more than a decade, and later established his own business in Hong Kong importing Japanese products, including Kao soap and detergents and Matsushita’s carbon rods for batteries.

When William Mong began his business dealings with Matsushita Electric Trading in 1953, National did not have much to export; it took a few more years before the transistor radio was invented. Being a free port without any trade barriers, Hong Kong was the showcase of the world’s leading manufactures in Asia: Hoover washing machines, General Electric and Italian refrigerators, and Telefunken, Phillips and RCA radios. Japanese products had a hard time competing against this range of Western brands, since their reputation for dependability was still well in the future. Indeed, Hong Kong people punned on the perceived shoddiness of yat pun fo (Japanese goods) with a slight change of pronunciation to yat bun fo to mean ‘day and a half break,’ a jeer at goods that would break down in a few days.

Memories of the Second World War were also a major obstacle for William Mong and his colleagues at Shun Hing. The Japanese had occupied Hong Kong for three years and eight months after Christmas in 1941, which led many Hong Kong residents to flee to their hometowns in neighboring Guangdong province, while anti-Japanese sentiment was no less strong among the refugees from mainland China who had newly arrived in Hong Kong after 1949. When Mong sought retail outlets for his vacuum tube radios in 1954, he often got a barrage of abuse from the shop owners:
“Have you forgotten the Chinese, the Japanese killed?!?”
“Japanese goods? Can't you even wait until the blood is dry?!?”
“Have you forgotten the War?!?”

As a result, when Mong took out a wall-sized advertisement for National radios in a major shopping district in 1956, he emphasized their affordable price:

Now you can afford a super radio National Radio.

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**Picture 2:**
National Radio ad in Mongkok, Hong Kong (1956)
By Nakane Kiyoshi

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**Chinese Business Networks**

1957 saw the opening of a new era for National, as they shipped their first transistor radios. With this new technology, National radios became truly portable and indeed were transformed into 'super radios' that hardly needed the additional bonus of an affordable price.

Battery-powered transistor radios were treasured in districts as yet out of reach of the electricity grid. These radios were unaffected by voltage changes, and so they also made a good souvenir for foreign tourists visiting the colony. These radios even made their way through re-export to neighboring countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia.

In 1956, the year before transistor radios made their debut, Nakane Kiyoshi was planning sales strategies for new radio models as a member of National's
overseas market survey team, he visited eight Southeast Asian countries. While he was making observations in Manila, the Philippines, he came across a National radio in a show window.

“That's funny,” I thought.

At the time, Matsushita was not exporting National radios from Japan to the Philippines. In fact, Nakane’s mission was to see whether there was any chance of exporting National radios to the Philippines. So what was a National radio doing in Manila? When Nakane made enquiries, he learned that the radio was knocked down in Hong Kong, entered the Philippines in pieces, and re-emerged as a National radio after factory re-assembly.

“We didn’t know that, you see. We didn’t know, so we were surprised that so many radios were going to Hong Kong, with its small market – but that was the explanation.

Then we came to feel, well, why not use this method?”

At this period, the pioneer in transistor radios, SONY, was concentrating on the American market, without much attention to Hong Kong or Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, Mong was skillfully using overseas Chinese business networks that extended through Southeast Asia to build markets. National transistor radios also flowed from Osaka through Hong Kong to Jakarta. Because they sold so well in Indonesia, Matsushita teamed up with a local Indonesian company to produce them there. In 1973, they built a factory in that country and began production of the transistor radio that had already proved to be such a hit. Yet the radios they produced did not sell or not well, because the human networks that were the key to distribution and sales had not been established.

At this juncture, it was Mong who bought up the Indonesia-made National radios. The idea was to import them into Hong Kong, have them reloaded into a ship heading back to Indonesia, and then try to sell them using his Chinese business network. The result? “They sold!” Mong smiles:

“It was because I had connections with sales networks in Indonesia. I did it by making good use of those.”
For a while, until National established distribution and sales networks there, Mong handled the export of Indonesia-made radios to Indonesia.\textsuperscript{6}

This, certainly, was an unusual arrangement for both Mong and Matsushita. But it illustrates how freely Japanese products flow from where they are available to where they are desired. Some radios that reached Southeast Asia were even used for international payment. Ukita Junichi, who headed Matsushita's subsidiary in Bangkok in the 1970s, recalls that, for barter trade between Thailand and Burma, some Thais offered battery-powered National radios in exchange for a few dozen water buffalos from Burma. Foreign currency was hard to come by. In addition, currency rates fluctuated, but the value of the radios did not. Therefore, battery-powered radios made a perfect alternative currency among traders. But who in Matsushita's headquarters in Osaka would have thought of this?

\textbf{Pirated Disks of J-Drama Series}

\textbf{Hong Kong}

A transnational flow involves intermediaries at various junctures. Many are authorized agents like William Mong, but some are unauthorized dealers of pirated products. In 1997-98, Japanese TV drama series featuring the lifestyles of Tokyo singles became immensely popular in Hong Kong without being on the air and without marketing campaigns. Most of my students had seen a popular series in 1996, \textit{Long Vacation}, long before they were broadcast in Hong Kong in October 2000. As soon as a hit J-drama series was broadcast in Japan, it became available in Hong Kong in the form of pirated video compact disks (VCDs) within a matter of days. And the disks can easily be played on a VCD player and a computer, allowing great flexibility in viewing schedule. These J-drama series provided an alternative for local primetime drama series that often revolved around family problems and legendary figures from ancient dynasties. For Hong Kong's young generation, the pirated J-drama series were digital fast food: pervasive, fast, cheap, often predictable but filling.

Who were the intermediaries in this informal flow? Hong Kong tabloids acted as an unauthorized intermediary. Here is an article that ran in a Chinese-language tabloid, the Apple Daily, which is the most widely read daily among students at Hong Kong University.\textsuperscript{7} On August 30, 1997, the Apple Daily introduces eight J-drama series that were scheduled to be aired in Japan—not in Hong Kong—during the coming season, starting in October. It gave a preview of each story along with pictures of the stars; it even included a summary of the titles in Chinese, the broadcast channels, starting dates, and the names of the actors and actresses.\textsuperscript{8}
This article serves multiple functions. We might say that the Apple Daily framed this J-drama article as a piece of show business news, but the readers reframed it as a buyers' guide for new video disks, and the pirated disk makers and dealers reframed them as industry news of what is to come.

China

By 1999, the informal flow of J-drama disks reached computer centers in mainland China. J-drama series that first became popular in Taiwan and Hong Kong gained popularity among the middle-class-to-be in major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Suzhou, and Guangzhou. As China shifted from a planned to a market economy, university students in metropolitan areas began to enjoy greater freedom on campus, earned opportunities to choose careers, and gained more control over their future. And as they began to search for new lifestyles and models, there came Japanese TV love stories featuring twenty-somethings. In the spring of 1999, a freshman in Nanjing told me that he saw Tokyo Love Story on pirated disks eight years after it was originally broadcast in Japan. He was taken by the lifestyle of fresh graduates from universities and saw some ten hours of programs over a weekend with a classmate:
“I don’t remember any parts of the story that impressed me. The only thing that I remember is the lifestyle of today’s young people in Japan. I had no idea how young people lived before I watched this TV drama.”

Unlike the Hollywood blockbusters and Hong Kong action movies that were popular on campus, Japanese shows featured characters of their generation, and offered a realistic dream of relatively affluent lifestyles. They also depicted Tokyo singles who spend their nights together, but may not spend their life together. This indeed was a new concept for many Chinese university students in the 1990’s.

The pirated disks of these drama series were immensely popular in China from 1999 to 2001. The boxes were standardized, and disks were openly sold and rented in video stores. As of April 2001, Shanghai video rental stores stocked over fifty titles of Japanese TV drama series. “The J-dramas are very hot,” said a shopkeeper in Shanghai. In Nanjing (formerly Nanking), there is a green campus that was occupied by the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War. One of the several video rental stores on campus stocked over forty pirated J-drama series. Among the items available was *Strawberry on the Shortcake*, whose final episode had aired in Japan only three weeks before.

These video disks have a distinctive mark of their intermediaries. J-dramas keep the original Japanese sound tracks and faulty Chinese subtitles in traditional characters (*fantizi*). These are the characters that have been staunchly preserved in Hong Kong after the handover, and are also used in Taiwan and overseas Chinese communities. China, however, uses a set of simplified characters (*jiantizi*) that were a product of the language reforms carried out beginning in 1955 for the development of mass literacy. The following box shows a line from *Tokyo Love Story*, “You regret this, don’t you?” in traditional and simplified characters.

---

**Traditional vs. Simplified Characters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traditional</th>
<th>Simplified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan, Hong Kong, &amp; Overseas Chinese Communities</td>
<td>Mainland China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

你也後悔，對不對？後悔什麼？

你也后悔，对不对？后悔什么？
Since the central government in Beijing strongly encourages the use of simplified characters, the subtitles in traditional characters suggest that the disks were produced outside of mainland China, and that people in Greater China served as intermediaries.

Who initiated the transnational flow in this case? Far from being corporate ambition and strategies pushed from the economic center to the targeted market, it was a complex combination of unforeseen demand, the greed of unauthorized intermediaries, digital technology, and a fear of being left out on the part of Chinese young people that initiated the cultural flow and kept it going. In addition, the young people had developed a familiarity with Japanese popular culture through the TV cartoon programs they grew up with, and this also provided the basis for them to enjoy these J-drama series. When the pirated disks crossed the border into China, Tokyo was not participating in that diffusion.

**Recent Flow of ‘Japanese’ Appliances**

I have discussed earlier how National radios and rice cookers went from Japan to Hong Kong, and then onward to where they were desired by means of Chinese business networks. Today, flows of ‘Japanese’ products do not necessarily originate in Japan. In fact, the flow of ‘Japanese’ electric appliances often starts in China and Southeast Asia, where many factories are located.

In Hong Kong, National rice cookers with the thermostat function are officially imported from Thailand. But similar National rice cookers produced in Hangzhou, China, also flow informally into Hong Kong. Since the Chinese model is more affordable than the Thai model, it leads to an ironic situation in Hong Kong where National rice cookers from China put pressure on the sales of National rice cookers from Thailand. ‘Japanese’ products flow from various junctures in multiple directions, posing challenges for empirical research on globalization.

**Shifting Perspectives**

Given the complex nature of transnational flows, where shall we stand when we observe them? We might start by breaking the habit of putting the economic power at the absolute center of globalization. In fact, the study of informal flow is possible only if we put Asian consumers and intermediaries at the center, and ask how and why they incorporated Japanese products at a particular point in time, and how the Japanese products interacted with other local and foreign influences.

This shift in perspective should help us break with concepts of Japanization.
as well as Americanization that assume a view from the center. But it requires
massive legwork: we need to listen to the voices of consumers and intermediaries,
project them against archival materials, and bring out complex layers of meanings. In
that sense, our work has just begun.

Endnotes
1 Refsing, Kirsten, Yoshiko Nakano, and Dixon HW Wong, Selling Japan in Hong
Kong: William Mong and the National Brand, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University
Press, 2003, pp. 81-82. (In Chinese; the English and Japanese versions will be
published in 2004).


3 Refsing, Kirsten, Yoshiko Nakano, and Dixon HW Wong, Selling Japan in Hong
Kong: William Mong and the National Brand, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University

4 Matsushita Electric Trading Inc., Matsushita Denki Boeki 50-nen no Ayumi [50
years of Matsushita Electric Trading], Osaka: Matsushita Electric Trading Inc., p.
168.

5 Refsing, Kirsten, Yoshiko Nakano, and Dixon HW Wong, Selling Japan in Hong
Kong: William Mong and the National Brand, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University

6 Ibid, p. 76-77. (In Chinese)

7 A Profile of New Full-time Undergraduate Students, University of Hong Kong,
Office of Student Affairs, Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 1997.

8 Apple Daily. “Japanese New Dramas Waiting to Explode in October: Kimura
Takuya and Matsu Takako will Knock you down again,” August 30, 1997, Section
C15.

9 Nakano, Yoshiko. “Who Initiates a Global Flow?: Japanese popular culture in
WITH RAPID ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, China has changed in many aspects. Among the latest changes is the widening gap between its oil demand and domestic supply, and China’s transformation from a net oil exporter into a net oil importer by the mid 1990’s. Therefore, to ensure the security of oil importation has become a big concern. With its growing dependence on oil imports, China is joining the international efforts in pursuit of energy security. By building its strategic petroleum reserves, investing in overseas oil production and diversifying the sources of oil supply, carrying out energy diplomacy and developing cooperation with the oil exporting countries, China is becoming an active partner for international oil security.

Part One: The Widening Gap
As Table 1 shows, the gap between China’s oil production and consumption has been widening rapidly since the early 1990’s. The reasons for this change can be found in both the demand and supply sides.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Consumption</th>
<th>Rate of Self-sufficiency (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>144.0</td>
<td>140.5</td>
<td>102.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>146.0</td>
<td>149.5</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>149.0</td>
<td>160.7</td>
<td>92.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>158.0</td>
<td>174.4</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>160.1</td>
<td>185.6</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>160.2</td>
<td>190.3</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>160.2</td>
<td>207.2</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>162.3</td>
<td>226.9</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: BP, "World Energy Statistics 2000"
The Demand Grows Rapidly

Although China’s energy still very much depends on coal that makes up three-quarters of its energy consumption and oil accounts for a modest percentage of twenty per cent, the demand for oil has been growing rapidly. The increased demand stems mainly from the development of transportation, energy intensive industries, agriculture, and a higher standard of living in the cities as well as at the countryside.

Generally speaking, this growth of demand is driven by the following factors, among others:

First, energy demand is closely related with the growth rate of GDP. The Chinese economy grew at an annual average rate of 10.3% during 1990 to 2000. Strong economic growth is the leading factor for the fast growth of energy demand.

Second, a developing country like China requires more intensive use of energy to achieve economic growth than a developed country. This is because—due to the existing structures of production—the economic growth of the former depends more on energy-intensive industries. Due to the existing technological levels, its energy efficiency is relatively lower. In the process of modernization, the developing country goes through the rapid transition from using traditional energies to using modern energies, including oil. As a result, the energy intensity—measured by energy consumption growth per one unit of GDP growth—is usually higher in developing countries than in developed countries.

Third, traditional energy, especially coal, has become the main source of air pollution despite its abundance. It is therefore a requirement of sustainable development strategy to reduce the proportion of coal energy and make use of cleaner energy, including oil.

The Constrained Domestic Supply

However, the domestic supply can hardly catch up with the rapid growth of demand as it is seriously constrained by resource endowment and production capacity.

A country without rich oil resources, China’s proven oil reserves account for merely two per cent of the world total. If we calculate these proven oil resources on the per capita basis, it represents only one-third of the world average. Should China and the world keep the current speed of oil production, the ratio of world proven reserves to annual production is forty-eight years, while the Chinese ratio is merely twenty years.

If we look at production capacity, the shortage is also evident. The Chinese oil industry saw a period of rapid development in the 1960’s and 1970’s, thanks to the
discovery and development of important oil fields such as Daqing and the North-China oil fields. In the 1980’s, some off-shore oil fields were put into production. With these discoveries, China not only achieved oil self-sufficiency, but also emerged as a net oil exporting country by the late 1960’s. Now, China ranks as the fifth oil producer in the world, after Saudi Arabia, the United States, Russia, and Iran. However, the growth of domestic production has slowed down since the 1990’s. Although new oil fields were discovered in the Northwest region of the country, the development of these new fields does not seem as easy as expected. Due to complex archeological conditions and the requirement of a huge investment, one can hardly expect that these new fields will replace the Eastern field as the major source of domestic oil supply, and fill the widening gap between domestic supply and demand in the predictable future.

**Import is Increasing**

Consequentially, since the 1990’s, the domestic oil production has been growing at an average annual rate of one and a half per cent, while the demand has been increasing at more than six per cent annually. The problem appeared as result of the unbalanced development of oil demand and domestic supply. In order to meet domestic demand, China lost its net exporter position and became a net importer by the mid 1990’s. The volume of imports has been increasing rapidly, from 2.9 million tons in 1990 to seventy million tons in 2000, representing roughly one third of the total oil consumption. This rapid change is shown in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Volume (Million tons)</th>
<th>Growth (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>5.97</td>
<td>104.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>11.36</td>
<td>90.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>15.67</td>
<td>37.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>12.35</td>
<td>-26.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>17.09</td>
<td>38.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>22.62</td>
<td>32.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>35.47</td>
<td>56.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>27.32</td>
<td>-23.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>36.61</td>
<td>34.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>70.27</td>
<td>91.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “China Costume Statistical Yearbook,” various years.

It would be difficult to accurately predict the future of importation, which depends on a variety of factors, such as the long-term growth rate of GDP, the change of the structure of production, the future development of transportation, income distribution, and so forth. Uncertainties exist and experts at home and abroad do not share a common opinion. According to the estimates of the International Energy Agency (IEA) for example, China’s oil consumption by 2020 will reach five hundred forty-one million tons, but only one hundred thirty million tons of oil would be produced domestically. China will therefore have to import four hundred eleven millions tons of oil by 2020, which will make up seventy-six per cent of its consumption. Chinese experts predict however that by 2020, the national oil consumption will reach four hundred million tons. Fifty per cent of this amount will depend on imported supply.

Despite the difference of quantitative prediction, one thing is clear: That is, due mainly to fast economic growth, the gap of domestic supply and demand will continue to widen, the imported volume will further increase, and the proportion of imported oil
to total consumption will be enlarged. By 2020, China will be the second largest oil importer of the world after the United States.

Table 2. China’s Oil Import 1990-2000 ( Million tons )

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Growth ( % )</th>
</tr>
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<td>34.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>70.27</td>
<td>91.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "China Costume Statistical Yearbook," various years.

**What is the Security Problem?**

As China is increasingly dependent on oil importation, it has become more and more concerned with the security of the international supply—because it has been proven that the security of an economy may be seriously undermined should the international oil supply go wrong.

Since the 1970’s, a lot of research work has contributed to the consensus that an oil crisis can produce negative effects on economic security. Experiences of the 1970’s to the 1980’s demonstrated that an oil crisis could affect national economy through many channels. On the demand side, the higher oil price may lead to the transfer of income of the oil importing country to the oil exporting country and to a higher inflation rate, reducing demand of domestic consumers. On the supply side, the rise of production cost may narrow the profit margin of enterprises, discouraging investment. The combined effects of a reduced demand and supply would result in lower, stagnated, or even negative growth of GDP, and a higher unemployment rate. Significant rise of oil import price would lead to higher cost of importation, aggravate the deficits in the balance of payments, reduce international reserves, devalue the national currency, and increase the foreign debt burden. Macro-economic policy will
be an embarrassment. Because if the government provides more subsidies and reduces taxes in order to stimulate investment, inflation will be aggravated. If it carries out fiscal and financial austerity policies in order to cope with inflation, it will further undermine economic growth and aggravate the unemployment situation. It is extremely difficult to deal with such a challenge in developing economies. Consequently, the threat to economic security becomes real.

In order to prevent and cope with any oil crisis so as to ensure that oil can flow into the international market in an uninterrupted way and at a reasonable price, the possible causes of such crises need to be identified. There is no doubt that threats and risks in this regard exist, but there seems to be no shared opinion on what the major problem is. It seems to me, however, that the depletion of oil resources is not yet an imminent problem. The political factors deserve more attention.

Is Depletion an Imminent Concern?

Although oil is a non-renewable natural resource, the depletion of this resource is not the most threatening factor to the international oil supply security, at least not in the predictable future.

First, there is still an adequate amount of this resource. According to a report released by the United States Geological Survey, only one-fifth of the known resources has been tapped, after more than a century since oil resources were exploited. The majority of oil resources of our planet remain intact.

Second, despite the continued exploitation, the increase of proven world reserves has exceeded the world production rate. During the last thirty years, 638.8 million barrels have been produced, while the total amount of oil reserves proven during the same period of time reached 1146.2 million barrels. Such a high supplementary rate naturally results in an increase of the proven reserves to annual production ratio, which rose from 30.1 years in 1971 to 42 years in 2000.

In other words, every year we find more resources than we tap all over the world. Scientific advances and technological innovation have played a crucial role in enhancing the efficiency of oil exploration and development. This is why the idea that oil resources would soon be exhausted has been proven wrong again and again since the 1970’s.

Third, scientific advances and technological innovation have also contributed to the reduction of the cost of production, continuously since the late 1970’s. According to an IEA estimate, by the end of 1990’s, the world average cost of oil production declined to less that ten dollars a barrel. If we compare this cost with the
international oil price level—which has been fluctuating between twenty and thirty dollars per barrel over the three last years—we can see that the oil producers can make a comfortable profit and there is still very strong incentive for investment in oil industries. Therefore, one should avoid having a static view, or underestimating the potential of oil exploitation and production.

Fourth, the end of the Cold War and economic globalization has provided strong stimulus to the development of the oil industry, by eliminating barriers to the cross-border movement of capital and technologies. An increasing number of countries have adopted opening up policy. The latest developments have demonstrated that, apart from the OPEC member states, Russia, Central Asia, West Africa, and Latin America, have all accelerated development of oil industries and emerged with greater potential for international oil supply.

**Political Factors That Deserve more Attention**

Before we talk about the real and imminent threat, we need to take a brief look at the feature of oil as a particular good. This is its demand elasticity. Because oil is a strategic and indispensable product, the demand on oil is relatively stable and therefore oil's short-term demand elasticity is very low. Should a disruption of supply occur and/or the price increase sharply, one can expect—instead of an immediate reduction of demand—a very strong psychological shock that leads to panic buying. And this is what we call an 'oil crisis.'

If we look at the past experiences shown in Table 3, fifteen disruptions of the international oil supply have occurred, in the period from the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry in 1951 to the war on Iraq in 2003. Not all that was because of depletion of resources and most of them are explained as conflict, invasion, and wars; or with political events such as nationalization, revolution, and so forth. It is true that at times OPEC's policy has played a certain role, but we have also noticed that in most cases, OPEC could succeed in promoting oil price only in the context of conflicts or political events. All of these events have taken place in the Middle East. Many of these disruptions have led to significant price increases, and some of them have led to oil crises.
Actually, what worries oil importing countries at the present time is that the principal areas supplying oil internationally are still rife with actual or hidden troubles related to religious and national conflicts, border disputes, and so forth. The newly emerged sources of supply—like the Central Asia and Africa—do not lack such actual or potential troubles. Needless to say, trouble in the Middle East still goes on, where the Arab-Israel peace process is suffering from a serious setback and the disruption of Iraq oil supply. Ironically, this country that possesses the world's second largest oil reserves now has temporarily become an oil importer as result of the recent war on Iraq. These troubles risk creating new disruptions of oil supply at any time. In addition, these factors may not only affect the producing countries but also affect the oil transportation channels such as pipelines and navigation lines. Because the international oil market is a unified one, should a problem occur in any place in the world, it may quickly spread and be felt in every corner of the market.

Part Three: Coping with the Challenge

With the factors of insecurity still existing, the question that arises is how China should secure its imported oil supply. In this regard, China is a late-comer importer of oil, so it may enjoy the advantage of being able to learn lessons and experiences from the early importers. We need to therefore take a quick look at the main approaches adopted by major oil importing countries, before discussing China. Obviously, ensuring the security of imported oil supplies involves many aspects. However, if we look at what the early importers have done, the following approaches are of basic importance.

**Building Strategic Petroleum Reserves**

Strategic petroleum reserves is a basic mechanism that oil importing countries have constructed since the first oil crisis in the 1970's. It consists of building a certain amount of oil reserves that the government of the oil importing country can utilize when an oil supply disruption occurs and/or the price is too high. For countries of OECD, the release of strategic petroleum reserves is to be coordinated by the IEA. Despite some differences in each country's specific system and in the specific names of such reserves, there are a lot of similarities. First, all the major oil importing countries have established laws for strategic petroleum reserves. Second, the actual level of reserves is usually much higher than the minimum standards, and this reflects the importance that oil importing countries attach to this approach to security. Third, most countries keep a certain amount of reserves under the direct

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### Table 3. Global Oil Supply Disruptions 1951-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Net Oil Supply Disruption</th>
<th>Duration (Months of Net Supply Disruption)</th>
<th>Average Gross Supply Shortfall (Million B/D)</th>
<th>Reasons for Oil Supply Disruption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March-Oct. 1951</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Iranian oil fields nationalized May 1(^{st}), following months of unrest and strikes in Abadan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1956-Mar. 1957</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Suez War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1966-Mar. 1967</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Syrian Transit Fee Dispute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June-August 1967</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Six Day War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1970-Jan. 1971</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Libyan price controversy and damage to Tapline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-August 1971</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>Algerian-French nationalization struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March-May 1973</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Unrest in Lebanon, damage to transit facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1973-Mar. 1974</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>October Arab-Israeli War, Arab oil embargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April-May 1976</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Civil war in Lebanon, disruption of Iraqi export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1977</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Damage to Saudi oil fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1978-April 1979</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Iranian revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.-Dec. 1980</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Outbreak of Iran-Iraq War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.-Oct. 1990</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Desert Storm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1999-Mar. 2000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>OPEC (ex. Iraq) cut production in effort to increase prices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Actually, what worries oil importing countries at the present time is that the principal areas supplying oil internationally are still rife with actual or hidden troubles related to religious and national conflicts, border disputes, and so forth. The newly emerged sources of supply—like the Central Asia and Africa—do not lack of such actual or potential troubles. Needless to say, trouble in the Middle East still goes on, where the Arab-Israel peace process is suffering from a serious setback and the disruption of Iraq oil supply. Ironically, this country that possesses the world’s second largest oil reserves now has temporarily become an oil importer as result of the recent war on Iraq. These troubles risk creating new disruptions of oil supply at any time. In addition, these factors may not only affect the producing countries but also affect the oil transportation channels such as pipelines and navigation lines. Because the international oil market is a unified one, should a problem occur in any place in the world, it may quickly spread and be felt in every corner of the market.

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Building Strategic Petroleum Reserves
Strategic petroleum reserves is a basic mechanism that oil importing countries have constructed since the first oil crisis in the 1970’s. It consists of building a certain amount of oil reserves that the government of the oil importing country can utilize when an oil supply disruption occurs and/or the price is too high. For countries of OECD, the release of strategic petroleum reserves is to be coordinated by the IEA.

Despite some differences in each country’s specific system and in the specific names of such reserves, there are a lot of similarities. First, all the major oil importing countries have established laws for strategic petroleum reserves. Second, the actual level of reserves is usually much higher than the minimum standards, and this reflects the importance that oil importing countries attach to this approach to security. Third, most countries keep a certain amount of reserves under the direct
control of government, or of a semi-governmental organization, while also requiring the enterprises to keep a certain amount of reserves as well. Fourth, not only crude oil is kept on reserve, but also the most useful oil products. Fifth, the reserve facilities are constructed to suit local conditions. They are either in the form of salt caverns, such as in the United States, or in the form of tank farms of different kinds. Sixth, the building of reserves is financed or subsidized by government. Seventh, comprehensive and detailed guidelines have been prepared for the procedures of release.

In practice, the strategic petroleum reserves were used when the Gulf War started in 1991 and it proved successful in resuming market stability rapidly.

**Diversifying the Sources of Imported Supply**

Diversification—avoiding over-dependence on one source of supply—has also been broadly used for the security of oil supply.

After the 1970's oil crisis, and especially after the Gulf War in 1991, there has been a general tendency on the part of the major oil importers, particularly the US and the European countries, to diversify their sources of oil supply from the Middle East, because almost all disruptions of oil supply since the 1950's have originated in this region. Presently, the sources of oil supply for the United States are distributed harmoniously in Latin America, West Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. The Middle East is no longer the major source of supply. The same is true for Western European countries, which imports, not only from the Middle East, but also from the countries of the former Soviet Union, and from Africa and America.

To some extent, these major oil importing countries have achieved progress of diversification, thanks to the overseas activities of their transnational companies. These companies benefit from government incentives in different forms, including loans and guarantees for political risk, and so forth, and bring an increasing amount of oil back home. This is what some scholars call an 'oil spread' strategy that consists of creating more sources of supply, especially beyond the turbulent Middle East and OPEC.

**Oil Diplomacy**

The security of oil supply is an important dimension of diplomacy for the oil importing powers. Since the 1970's, diplomatic efforts have been intensified, directed at establishing anti-cartel alliances, or resolving conflicts involving major oil exporters, or improving relations with oil exporting countries. Apart from the bilateral
diplomatic efforts of individual oil-importing countries, considerable diplomatic effort has been undertaken at the multilateral level. Although oil security may not be the whole concern of these diplomatic efforts, it is surely one of the major concerns.

The establishment of the IEA and the adoption of the International Energy Program in 1974 marked the formation of a collective security system of the major oil importing countries. In the framework of such a system, the OECD oil importing countries carry out cooperation in case of an oil crisis, by sharing not only information but also strategic oil reserves. In addition, members of this agency also carry out long-term cooperation in promoting energy conservation, alternative energies, energy efficiency, and so forth, in order to reduce the dependence on oil import.

Joint efforts have been undertaken in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, either under the auspices of the United Nations, or within the framework of the Middle East Peace Process that involves many countries and international organizations. It is a shared opinion that a more stable Middle East will contribute to the stability of the international supply. The UN has also given effort to ending major conflicts between major oil exporters, such as arranging the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq in 1988, ending the invasion of Kuwait, and imposing sanctions against Iraq. The European countries have likewise given effort to building closer ties with the Arab countries. The best examples of such efforts include the Euro-Arab Dialogue in 1970's and 1980's, and the Barcelona process initiated in the mid 1990's.

However, due to different strategic interests and geopolitical concerns, the powers sometimes do not share the same opinion and from time to time unilateralism has prevailed. This is the case for example in the disputes on the Iran-Libya Sanction Act in 1996, and the weapons inspection and war on Iraq in 2003.

**China Becoming a Partner**

While facing similar challenges, to some extent China's approaches for oil import security are similar to those of the other importers. While China is becoming one of the world largest oil importers, the strategic petroleum reserves almost do not exist there yet. Therefore, to build the reserves is the urgent matter of the moment. The Government has made the decision to build strategic reserves recently. China's diversification has made some progress, and now the imported oil comes from the Middle East, the Central Asia, Africa, Asia and America. However, it still largely depends on Middle East for over half of its oil imports. The overseas investment of Chinese oil companies has begun for many years but still remains limited and needs to be further expanded. Since the 1990's, China has been involved in a series of
multilateral diplomatic efforts, especially in the framework of the UN, in easing tensions in the Middle East and promoting the Shanghai Organization for Cooperation, as well as joining the APEC working group on energy issues.

Apart from learning from the early importers, it is equally important to stress the fact that at the present time, maintaining international oil supply security is no longer a zero sum game. The oil exporters are aware of the importance of price stability. They need expansion of the oil markets. They need foreign investment and technologies for the exploration and development of their oil resources. They also need to keep the oil price at a reasonable level in prevention of accelerated development of alternative energies and adverse impact on the world economy. In the context of globalization, the interests of oil importing countries and exporting countries are increasingly interrelated, and the degree of inter-dependence has been significantly enhanced. Therefore, it would be wiser to develop partnership among oil importers and exporters on the basis of mutual benefits in pursuit of win-win solutions. In this regard, a lot of opportunities exist for China and the oil exporting countries to develop cooperation.
The Search for Dignity
The End of Victimhood?
The Changing Self-Image of Koreans in Japan

CHUNG CHIN-SUNG

Historical minority

Almost all countries in the world have ‘minority problems’—reckoned in terms of ethnicity, religion, cultural practices, and so forth. In Japan, widely known as a homogeneous country, there are nonetheless many ethnic groups classified as minorities. Since the late 1980’s, a huge number of migrant workers came to Japan, mostly from Asian countries and some from Latin America, making Japan a more multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society than ever before. In this social process, a long-existing but less-publicized ethnic minority group rose to the surface of Japanese society. This is the Korean minority.

Korea and Japan are neighboring countries with historical relations of great time depth. However, after the huge influx of Koreans to Japan in the seventh century, there was no large population movement between the two countries until the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910. Many Japanese colonialists came to Korea, and many Koreans who were displaced by them went to Japan. During the Second World War, a large number of Koreans were also forcibly transferred to Japan to be mobilized in the labor and military forces, and for sex slavery. While most of the Japanese returned to Japan after this war, a considerable number of Koreans remained in Japan for various reasons, forming the Korean minority group (Diagram 1). This Korean minority has been alienated for a long time, not only from Japanese society, but also from Korea—because, until very recently, there was no population exchange between either North or South Korea and Japan, since the Korea-Japan normalization treaty of 1965.

In this historical process, the Korean minority has formed somewhat peculiar characteristics in comparison with most other ethnic minorities. The Koreans are categorized by the period of their arrival to Japan: ‘old comers’ who came to Japan during the colonial period; and ‘newcomers’ who came from the late 1980’s onward.
Their nationalities are also diverse, some being South Korean, North Korean, as well as naturalized Japanese (Diagram 2). For these various Koreans, including the third and fourth generations, keeping Korean nationality or identity remains a very important need.

Although Koreans can be classified as a national, linguistic, cultural, or religious minority, it is more important to consider their status as a 'historical minority.' The identities and movements of Koreans in Japan have been shaped by their historical experiences, and their efforts to overcome this history.
Recently, however, some signs of new identities and movements are becoming apparent among the young Koreans in Japan. They appear to be trying to overcome the mentality of victimhood, and to be searching for more positive roles for themselves, not only within Japan, but also for Korea, their motherland; and in the relations between the two countries.

In this paper, I analyze the new identities of the young Koreans in Japan, their efforts to play more positive roles than in the past, and the factors contributing to these internal changes. I used various statistics on Koreans in Japan and refer to academic discussions and papers. I also conducted in-depth interviews with Koreans in Japan, fully encompassing those with North and South Korean nationalities as well as those with Japanese citizenship. I visited various organizations of Koreans in Japan and Korean 'ethnic schools,' and attended seminars and events organized by Koreans in Japan.

**National Identities and the Struggles of Koreans in Japan**

Why have many Koreans in Japan persisted with their Korean nationality through the generations? What prevented them from acquiring Japanese citizenship? How have they responded to discriminatory attitudes in Japanese society? In order to understand these questions, it is necessary to unearth the historical roots of their sense of national identity.

Most Koreans in Japan who still maintain their Korean nationality say that: "We were deprived of our own country, nation and language, and forcibly transferred to Japan during the colonial era. After World War II, the Japanese Government had discriminated [against] us as aliens by changing our legal status so many times without due consultation. Under such inhumane treatment, keeping our Korean nationality had been the one constant that kept our dignity as humans alive."

Such indicators as this statement point to historical experience as the dominant aspect of the commitment to Korean nationality. Immediately after the Second World War, the Japanese Government declared that the Japanese nationality of peoples from the former colonies, including the Koreans and Taiwanese, remained in effect—unfortunately providing an excuse to suppress educational programs operated to sustain the ethnic personalities of Koreans and Taiwanese in Japan. However, in 1947, the Japanese Government changed its policy and declared these formerly colonized peoples aliens. The Koreans were obliged to write their nationality as 'Chosen.' It must be recalled in this connection that this change in policy happened prior to the establishment of the governments of North Korea and South Korea.
'Chosen' did not refer to any internationally recognized country. It instead referred to the region from whence Koreans came, in the legal sense. For the Koreans themselves, 'Chosen' did not mean a country that existed in reality but the sokoku, fatherland, the place from where they were transferred. Many of those for whom the word 'Chosen' had to be the mark of nationality—'Chosen' understood officially as the name for North Korea—still think 'Chosen' denotes a unified Korea, encompassing both North and South.

The number of Koreans in Japan who have changed their nationality from 'Chosen' to 'Kankoku' (South Korea) has grown, following the establishment of the South Korean Government in 1948, the normalization of relations between South Korea and Japan in 1965, and South Korean economic prosperity. The number of those who have opted for Japanese citizenship has likewise increased. However, all Koreans in Japan—regardless of their nationalities—have not forgotten their wounded pride during the colonial period as well as immediately afterwards, and maintain a preciousness about keeping their 'national identity'.

The importance vested in this identity has been sustained by continuous institutional and social discrimination against Koreans in Japan. Korean schools run along an ethnic-specific pedagogy were severely suppressed by the Japanese Government. For Koreans, entry into public housing has long been impossible. The opportunities for acquiring various licenses have been blocked. Most of all, social discrimination in the search for employment, and in seeking marriage to Japanese nationals, have made Koreans feel extremely victimized.

Aided by this strong sense of national identity, Koreans in Japan developed movements in opposition to such discrimination—re-strengthening their sense of national identity in the process. The thought of returning to Korea remained present in the minds of Koreans in Japan until the mid 1970's. However, the situation was complicated by the division of Korea into North and South—a development that influenced the division of Koreans in Japan into two representative groups: 'Soren' and 'Mindan'—the organizations supporting the North and South Korean groups, respectively—conflicted with each other, mirroring the conflicts between North and South Korea. Accordingly, their movements were closely related with their home countries. The harshest struggle between them concerned the maintenance of 'ethnic schools' where their children learned Korean language and culture.3

A group of Koreans sympathetic to North Korea returned to this country following negotiations between North Korea and Japan. They also worked for their home countries, sending money, supporting democratization movements,
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reunification, and so forth. Although they placed primary importance on the aim of returning to their home country, they also paid attention to reforming the discriminatory institutions of Japanese society.

Since the latter part of the 1970's, a new stream of the movements spread among the Koreans in Japan. Rather than the hope of returning to their home country, the movements began to be based on the thought of 'living in Japan together with the Japanese.' Thus, their movements focused on anti-discrimination measures in education, employment, housing, taxation, voting, and so forth. Movements against fingerprinting, and for the reform of their legal status, were the most representative of these groups. Conflicts between the groups with North and South Korean orientations had weakened by this decade, and cooperative activities between the two groups increased. More cultural and social activities were developed in addition to the politically oriented movements of the previous period.

These changes resulted from changes both within and outside the Korean community in Japan, as well as from changes in Japanese and Korean societies themselves. The second and third generations of Korean residents have played prominent roles in these movements. Generally unable to speak the Korean language (with the exception of those who attended 'ethnic schools'), they were already deeply rooted in Japanese society. To them, the idea of living in Korea was a foreign concept. Accordingly, the concept of their home country became more and more abstract. Economic prosperity and the growth of civil society organizations in Japan were other important factors in this development. Legal and institutional discrimination had been lessened, and some civil society movements began to pay attention to the problems of Koreans in Japan. New movements have developed with Japanese participation in activities involving both North and South Koreans. Social and political unrest in both North and South Korea at the time, and the failure of dialogue between the two, brought deep disappointment to the Koreans in Japan, which weakened their resolve to return to their home country.

Changes of Social Conditions in the 1990's

In the 1990's, the social conditions surrounding Koreans in Japan had changed dramatically. Multi-nationalization rapidly developed in Japanese society, and migrant workers and other foreign residents increased. Koreans who had consisted a substantial foreign sector in Japan in 1970 became a relatively smaller group vis-à-vis other foreigners in 2000. On the other hand, Japanese society became increasingly conservative as a result of a number of developments, among which are:
economic recession; the demand by neighboring Asian countries for Japan to acknowledge war responsibility; and the abduction issue brought up by North Korea. Nationalism was heightened at both institutional and psychological levels, and direct aggression against North Korean girls who wore Korean traditional attire became more frequent.

In this situation, the Koreans in Japan felt it necessary to rethink their position and roles in relation to other ethnic groups in Japan. At the same time, they became embarrassed as to how to respond to Japanese conservatism. It became impossible for Japan to be closed off from the issues arising from multinationalization, with the development of anti-discrimination movements for its inhabitants. Demographic changes within the Korean community itself also demanded a change in the manner of their response to changes in Japanese society. People of the first and second generations, who were most closely influenced by their home country, were reduced to only four per cent and thirty-five per cent, respectively, of the whole Korean population in Japan, while those of the third and fourth generations comprised forty-six per cent and thirteen per cent, respectively, in the year 2000. The relative isolation of the community also changed with the new influx of Koreans since the end of the 1980's. The number of so-called 'new comers' reached one hundred forty thousand in 2000. They came to Japan with the assistance of the network of 'old comers.' They, too, have had an impact on the lives of the existing Korean community.

More importantly, dialogue and exchange between South Korea and Japan, as well as with North and South Korea, rapidly gained momentum in the 1990's. Through frequent communication between South Korea and Japan—especially given developments such as the Korea-Japan Joint Cooperation Declaration in 1998 and the joint holding of the World Cup by Korea and Japan in 2002—the Japanese conception of Koreans gradually changed. Co-activities of Korean and Japanese youth have formed through various agendas, where Koreans in Japan played important roles in bridging the two sides. Increase of communication between North and South Korea also significantly influenced the change of the operating context of the Koreans in Japan. Factors such as economic cooperation between the two parts, the pro-North Korean atmosphere in South Korea, and the 6.15 Joint Announcement of North and South Korea bridged the divide between the two Korean groups in Japan. It is of interest that Koreans in Japan with North Korean nationality worked as volunteers at the World Cup, ending up networking with Koreans with South Korean nationality, and discovered an important role for themselves in Japan.
Growth of Civil Society among the Koreans in Japan

In this situation, Koreans in Japan became more flexible with regard to the issue of nationality, and developed their civil society organizations independent from the government-oriented organizations. In time, getting Japanese citizenship was no longer regarded as a betrayal of Korean nationality.

The division between North and South Koreans in Japan has been dramatically reduced; accordingly, so have the influences of Soren and Mindan that used to encourage ordinary people to look exclusively towards North and South Korea. ‘Ethnic schools’ run by Soren at the present time have both North and South Korean students. Besides Soren and Mindan, various citizen’s groups have been formed, and many events enjoy the participation of Koreans with North and South Korean and Japanese nationalities, and of the Japanese. They are working not only on the political, cultural, and social issues—towards decreasing discrimination and consolidating national identity—but also volunteering to help the aged, and consolidating self-help abilities.

More importantly, various efforts are focused on bettering their own circumstances. Curriculum reform at the ‘ethnic schools’ is an important such effort. These schools have largely followed the curriculum enforced in Korea, for which reason these schools had been regarded as an isolated island in Japan. In particular, the schools run by the North Korea-oriented Soren had been regarded as places for brainwashing children to respect the North Korean system and leadership. These schools began to be reformed from the beginning of the 1990’s, by way of changes in the curriculum in order to adjust to the Japanese school system (and other changes such as removing the pictures of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Il from the classrooms). Soren restructured in more open and democratic ways, and became more independent of the North Korean Government. Another most important reform effort within the Korean community is the development of feminism. It is called ‘Zainich’ (meaning Koreans in Japan) feminism.' Various academic and social activities have been underway for reforming the patriarchal values of Koreans in Japan.¹

Searching for more positive roles

The strengthening of the civil society movement among Koreans in Japan, especially among the educated youth, became a basis for the formation of a consciousness oriented towards (and searching for) more positive roles to play in social development—to thus overcome the mentality of victimhood. It is now thought that in...
a globalized Japanese society, the Korean community—as the oldest national group—could play a leadership role among the various national or ethnic groups. That role is already being played by groups working for migrant workers from other origins, with the Koreans basing their activities on their long experience in the movements that fought for their legal status. Another group is networking with a Chinese organization, working against the discrimination policy of the Japanese Government toward 'ethnic schools.' The activeness and confidence of these Korean groups as bridges between Korea and Japan, draws from their fluency in both Korean and Japanese, and with their knowledge of both societies.

Among young Koreans in Japan, there is a word which means: 'two instead of half.' In the past, they regarded themselves as merely 'half' in comparison with Japanese or Koreans. In recent years, they have come to think of themselves as 'two' (those who know both Korea and Japan). This great positive change in their self-image comes with a renewed realization of the importance of Korean 'ethnic schools.'

Not surprisingly, the national reunification movement is among the most important current activities of Koreans in Japan, among both those with North and South Korean nationalities. Assisting in shortening the distance between North and South Koreans in Japan, as well as in increasing communication between North Koreans in Japan and the people of South Korea—the efforts for dialogue and communication between the two Koreas has gained in confidence.

Many intellectuals have been attracted by the current discussions about the role in East Asian affairs that may be played by Koreans in Japan. The discussions are closely related to criticisms leveled against nationalism, especially in Japan. Koreans in Japan are arguing the necessity of overcoming an exclusivist nationalism and sense of nationality. Corollarily, they seek cooperation in a broad regional way. They emphasize the possibility of Koreans in Japan performing as agencies for realizing these possibilities. On the other level, they are thinking about the networks of Koreans abroad which could contribute to the development of Korea, and the role of Koreans in Japan in this development.

Questions about nationality and identity
In order to fulfill these envisaged roles, should Korean nationality and identity be kept strong, or should they go beyond that? Or: should nationality and national identity be thought of separately? There is a discourse of disappearance (of Korean nationalities in Japan): all Koreans will get Japanese citizenship sooner or later. Is this true, and will their Korean national identity also disappear? In the course of the formation of
positive self-image, discussions on nationality and national identity have become even harsher among Koreans in Japan.

There are those among the Koreans with South Korean nationality—actively searching for new roles in Japan—who are saying that “Once they began to use their Korean names instead of Japanese names,” Japanese think [of] them as Koreans who temporarily visit Japan. It is mostly due to frequent exchanges between Korea and Japan nowadays. I came to think my identity or position as a Korean resident in Japan, neither Japanese, nor Korean.” Others say, “Because of [the] assimilation policy of the Japanese Government and severe discrimination of Japanese society, to live as second-class citizens would be more dangerous than to keep Korean nationality and identity.” They are enjoying communication with Korean society.

Keeping the North Korean nationality (Chosenseki), another group says, “Our fatherland is unified Korea, not divided North Korea. So until national reunification, we, Koreans in Japan, should keep 'Chosenseki,' and work for reunification.” Critics of the change to South Korean and Japanese nationality are leading the discussions on nationality. Others with North Korean nationality believe that North Korea has greater national legitimacy than South Korea, and express appreciation of the North Korean Government’s support for ethnicity-oriented education after the Second World War (which has assured facility in the Korean language and a strong sense of national identity). They maintain loyalty to a fatherland which is presently in serious crisis.

There are Koreans who have acquired Japanese citizenship but continue participating in the various activities of Koreans. Every year over ten thousand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Registered Aliens</th>
<th>Permanent Res.</th>
<th>Naturalized Korean Residents</th>
<th>Intermarriage with Japanese</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>680,760</td>
<td>642,727</td>
<td>4,608</td>
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<td>530,610</td>
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</table>

Source: “Alien Registration” (Registered Aliens/Permanent Residents) : "Vital Statistics" (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) (marriages)

Table 2: Naturalization and Intermarriage of Koreans in Japan 1984-2001
Koreans acquire Japanese citizenship, mostly through marriage. The ratio of marriages between Koreans decreased from 78.9% in 1965 to 12.7% in 1999. (Table 2) They maintain a strong Korean identity. They say that “I am Korean with Japanese nationality.” A famous singer in Japan, for example, says: “After I got Japanese citizenship because of the convenience of living, I came to realize my strong national identity of Korea.” He sings about the regret of Koreans in Japan. Thus, nationality and national identity are not always same, and a new category of Koreans in Japan with Japanese nationality has emerged. ‘New comers’ who came to Japan recently are also joining the group of Koreans in Japan, regardless of their nationalities.

Through these discussions, Koreans in Japan are developing a more flexible concept of nationality than in the past, and a more positive national identity. What may be expected is a small but solid group of Korean nationals in Japan, on the one hand, and on the other, a broader ethnic Korean community, including Japanese nationals. Because of ever-increasing intermarriage with the Japanese, an even broader Korean network will be formed in Japan.

Prospects
A new history is needed by the ‘historical minority,’ the Koreans in Japan, in order for them to overcome the mentality of victimhood and the pull towards an exclusively Korean national identity; to gain a more positive self-image; and to play more creative roles in the society of which they are part. Acknowledgement of Japan’s war responsibility is a crucial condition for such a history to be realized. Unfortunately, there is no sign that the Japanese Government is inclined thus. However, the above changes—including the multi-nationalization of Japanese society, and the dialogue and exchange between Japan and Korea—will pull them from such exclusiveness. Whether they wholly overcome the mentality of victimhood and find more positive roles depends on the possibility of Japan being a more open, egalitarian, and multi-ethnic society. Koreans could contribute to accelerating this trend once it starts. Efforts on the part of the Korean Government and of Korean society to give important attention to Koreans in Japan—and the improvement of North and South Korean relations—will likewise contribute greatly to the full development of this trend.

1 Among the Koreans who abide by a North Korean nationality, there is a group who believe their nation to be unified Korea (not North Korea) from where they were forcibly transferred. They are thus a people with no country.

2 ‘Chosen’ is a name of traditional Korea, which was changed into ‘Kankoku’ at the end of the nineteenth century. During the colonial period, Japanese Government used the country’s name as ‘Chosen.’
After the Second World War, support from the North Korean Government was strong, which made the movements for 'ethnic schools' and the repatriation of the Koreans with North Korean nationality stronger. Until the present time, the overwhelming number of the Korean 'ethnic schools' are run by the North Korean nationals.

They were communists, or those who were transferred from the northern area of Korea, and who could not return to North Korea immediately after the war because no formal relationships had been forged between North Korea and Japan.

More than 10 Japanese were abducted in the 1970s and 1980s to North Korea, and North Korean Government acknowledged the fact in 2002 when Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi visited North Korea.

When Korean President Kim Dae-Jung visited Japan in 1998, the two governments declared the “Joint Announcement of New Korea-Japan Partnership in the 21st Century.”

The leaders of North and South Korea met on June 15, 2000, and declared the joint announcement on the autonomous cooperation for national reunification, resolution of the issue of separated families, and so forth.

They are trying to analyze why the divorce rate is higher among Koreans in Japan than the average rate in Japanese society as a whole, or to examine dual oppression by gender and nation. (Table 1) A hotline for domestic violence was established by a group of Korean women in Japan.

Koreans initiated the formation of the network organization, 'Solidarity Network with Migrants in Japan,' inclusive of various ethnic groups in Japan.

Koreans in Japan usually use Japanese style names outside the home, hiding their Korean names.

In response to the demands of Asian victims, the Japanese Government has repeatedly maintained that Japan’s war responsibility was fulfilled with the several inter-governmental treaties including San Francisco Treaty of 1952, the Korea-Japan Treaty of 1965, and so forth.
THE KHMER ROUGE REGIME accused the previous governments of Cambodia of corruption, bribery, dictatorship, and injustice. They regarded them as leaches and parasites that sucked the blood off the people and the national economy. They waged an unprecedented revolution that took millions of Cambodian lives during their rule from 1975 to 1979.

This paper documents my experience of Cambodia under the notorious leader of the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot, who turned Cambodia into a massacre ground. I write it as the United Nations and Cambodia are establishing a tribunal to try those responsible for killing innocent people during this period. I write in the hope that this paper will be one of the million pieces of evidence that may lead towards justice for the dead and for the survivors. I believe that few truly understand the what happened in those years of darkness. My story is just one of a million others, who lost their lives, their families, and their friends.

It was at the Asia Leadership Fellow Program retreat at Shonan Village that I was asked to speak about my experiences under the Khmer Rouge. My heart was beating. I had to strengthen my resolve and spirit to speak about those experiences as best I could. It was hard to reflect, in public, about the sadness and horror, which I had kept in my heart for nearly twenty-three years.

As a victim of war, my story is not very different from that told by the A-bomb survivor who spoke to us Fellows at the Hiroshima Museum. What I found to be different was that my people were killed and my country destroyed by a genocidal regime of the mid 1970’s, a recent period and therefore hard to believe.

The nightmare begins
When I was growing up and learning my ABC’s, my country was already plunged in civil war. Cambodia was in turmoil after Prince Norodom Sihanouk, then head of state,
UNEQUAL WORLDS

was toppled in a coup d'etat on March 1970. American helicopters and military airplanes roared across the sky daily, bringing troops to war and wounded soldiers to the hospitals. At night, the bombs sparked in the darkness with different colors.

One afternoon in 1975, a shell hit the Boeung Salang commune, where I was visiting my uncle. Shrapnel sprayed against the walls and the nearby houses were in flames. We had to evacuate. Out in the street, I saw the thick black smoke and the red flames running into the sky which destroyed the neighbors’ homes. Thousands of people were fleeing, carrying their belongings on their heads and shoulders. Phnom Penh became the last battlefield between the Khmer Rouge and Lon Nol’s soldiers.

It was a few months later, on April 1975, during Khmer New Year, that the Khmer Rouge entered Phnom Penh with tanks and soldiers, wearing black clothes and carrying B-40 rocket launchers on their shoulders. With white cloths, people cheered and congratulated the victory of the Khmer Rouge over Khmer Republic of Lon Nol, which was backed by the United States. Some opportunists broke into the nearby stores to steal. I myself rushed with a crowd into a bookstore near Phsar Doeum Kor (Doeum Kor Market) and took some books. I loved reading. At school, I was at Grade 8 in which French was taught. I was already able to speak some French. Was I able to read books I took from the store? Did those who stole TVs or radio sets have chance to use them?

Early one morning, two Khmer Rouge men with AK-rifles had my mother (who had gone down to see what was happening) at gun point. “Go! Or I’ll shoot you.” “Leave the house now. US airplanes will drop bombs on Phnom Penh!” “Leave Phnom Penh for three days as long as we arrange everything properly” My family was forced to leave our home without packing. My mother forgot her gold earrings upstairs and begged the Khmer Rouge to find them. “No! Move, move,” they threatened.

Thousands of fleeing civilians were on the main streets of Phnom Penh. There were those with baby on one hand, the other balancing a package on the head. Sick relatives were carried in hammocks. We walked among them, direction-less. The war was over but why were we displaced?

Many were misled by the new regime of Pol Pot, which he called Democratic Kampuchea. Cambodians believed that by the term of ‘democracy,’ the government would consider the them as ‘masters of the country’ or ‘masters of their own destiny’ and that they would enjoy democratic rights.

**Autobiography under Pol Pot**

We temporarily stayed at a villa with dozens of families not very far from where we
lived, hoping that the Khmer Rouge would keep its word about letting us return to our homes. The next morning they pushed all of us to leave. Along the way, we saw corpses of civilians, and of Lon Nol’s soldiers. My cousin who had delivered a baby only twenty days earlier had to leave with us. We kept her in a small car, which we pushed from behind. Her husband, who was a policeman, was arrested that day. We kept this information secret until we arrived in Saang district, Kandal province about thirty kilometers south of Phnom Penh.

There, we had to perform our duty like the other farmers. Our rice stock became scarce; we had to mix it with red corn. I began to have diarrhea. My family sold clothes and gold or platinum in exchange for corn. Many died of starvation and disease. My uncle begged my mother and the whole family to flee to Vietnam. But no one agreed with him. If we had gone to Vietnam we could all have been safe. (I later found out that no one agreed with my uncle because no one in the family liked his Vietnamese second wife.)

In order to hide our family profile, we decided to move out from my mother’s native village. My uncle was one of Lon Nol’s soldiers. Later that year, sometime in October 1975, we moved out from Kandal to Battambang province, where we led our lives as slaves and animals.

We were taken to Battambang like pigs to the slaughterhouse. First, we were taken by boat, then by cargo train, after that by truck, and lastly by ox-cart to Trapaing Thmar or ‘stone pond’ village, Phnom Srok district. Along the way, I saw that hundreds of people had died in the streets and at the railway. Their bodies were rotten and stinking. I saw flies around their bodies; and worms. These images have not been erased from my brain.

When we arrived at the village, the locals came to welcome us. We were given a space near the cow stall under a wooden house. The cow dung and a muddy ditch smelled pretty bad. A few days later, we were given a wall-less wooden house nearby to live in. My uncle and his family were separated from us to live in another village.

The Khmer Rouge turned Phnom Penh into a ghost city and forced everyone to become peasants and laborers. No one knew who ruled the country. The peasants who lived under the Khmer Rouge control were considered ‘local’ and had the power to lead the newcomers. Those who lived in urban areas and had no experience in farming and rice cultivation were considered newcomers, were looked down upon, and forced to work very hard.

The Khmer Rouge intended to abolish social classes (regarded as feudal or capitalistic), in order to achieve their version of social justice. No oppressor class and
no suppressed class. The Khmer Rouge Constitution recognized only workers, laborers, and farmers. But Cambodia was ruled by a handful of Pol Pot’s colleagues. The country was like hell—like the drawings in the temples about kamma—from the beginning of the Khmer Rouge evacuation. We had to adapt ourselves to hardship, suffering, and horror.

The situation turned from worse and worst. The Khmer Rouge began to reduce the people’s rights to food, education, health, belief, mobility, and so forth. They abolished privacy and forced everyone to live and eat collectively. However, the difficulty and hardship the people went through was not all the same everywhere. The Khmer Rouge were very tough in some areas, and lenient elsewhere. At Trapaing Thmar village, the Khmer Rouge began to tighten their dictatorial rule from mid 1977.

In the Democratic Kampuchea Constitution adopted December 14, 1975, the Khmer Rouge eliminated all private property, turning everyone away from capitalism. The Khmer Rouge eliminated religion. There was no judicial power. There was a Ministry of Justice but the minister had no work to perform. The Khmer Rouge called their government Angkar, ‘organization.’ Angkar prevailed everywhere, dictatorially wielding life and death powers over everyone. The word ‘citizen’ was taken out of the Constitution.

Everyone had to learn to lie to survive. For instance, my father told the Khmer Rouge that he was a cyclo-driver (tri-wheel cart) in the Lon Nol regime. In fact, he was a village chief. We had to learn to live and eat like pigs; but we were worse off than pigs.

I performed the work of adults when I was only ten or eleven years old, joining the infant group. Everyday, we had to carry human stool piled in a barrel, for fertilizer. I remembered that as a child, my mother told me that “when you see a ‘cow’ you call it a ‘large dog’ and a ‘pig’ a ‘large rat.’ ” I learned to plant rice, which I had never done before. (I did not even know how rice stalks looked.) I got up before dawn to collect the harvested rice stalks from the fields, where the morning water soaked my trousers as I worked through the darkness. With no watch to check for the time for meals, I looked at the sun, or waited for the bell. The Khmer Rouge used the wheel of a car as a bell.

**Changes**

I missed Chinese noodles and French bread, which I used to eat every morning. I missed going to school and playing with my friends. I missed the cinema I used to go to with my family. I missed all the ritual celebrations in the wats (temples) with my parents. I missed the parties when all my relatives gathered and chatted. No more fun. Only rice fields and planting vegetables. Surrounding me were rice fields and black
crows, and Angkar. My stomach was always full of water. When I walked, people near me heard something like coins hitting each other in the pocket. My diarrhea persisted because I picked everything that I could eat to survive. My body became so skinny and exhausted, one could count my ribs. In Lon Nol’s time, my parents paid me for eating meals. (The more I ate, the more they paid me.) But during the Khmer Rouge days, we had no currency, and we did not have enough rice to eat.

I was born into a middle income family. My mother owned a large house in Spsar Doeum Kor, Phnom Penh. My mother had a lot to offer to me. I could live my life with her inheritance. In their early years, my parents worked very hard in Takeo as peasants, later entering Phnom Penh to engage in business. They were successful from the start. She rented two apartments to Chinese families, and she had other two pieces of land.

She had only me, a child to whom she gave birth when she was forty. My mother begged me from the Buddha in a temple in Takeo province. I was sickly since birth, sometimes near death. Then my mother realized that she had promised to buy offerings for the Buddha once she had me. I thus survived, with my name Samnang, which means 'lucky'. (You may find a lot of 'Samnang' in Cambodia, but their story may not be the same as mine.) Before she had me, she had adopted a child who later died from disease. Then she adopted my cousin, Ham Kim Eang, as her child.

My mother, who was a large lady, became skinny. My father, who used to busy himself reading the dharma books, praying everyday, was forced into hard labor. He became yellowish and his face and legs were swollen from lack of glucose and salt. He worked in a tobacco farm and had to carry water across a distance to water the plants. My mother took care of my cousin’s children and later joined my father at the tobacco farm.

One day I went out with other villagers to fish with our eyes on our necks (that is, with fear). My parents wrapped rice for me in banana leaves. While I was in the water, the black crows ate my food. I cried and blamed my destiny. My parents were starving to keep that rice for me, but the crows ate it all. I had to sleep with nothing to eat that night.

An intellectual bourgeoisie
The communism of the Khmer Rouge was established by an intellectual bourgeoisie. The likes of Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, Son Sen, and all Khmer Rouge top leaders were well educated in France, but they savagely led the country to holocaust. They separated wife from husband, and children from parents, creating mistrust
among them. They created a society full of fear, blood and tears.

In fact, the tragedy and suffering began in 1973 in the parts of the country that were under Khmer Rouge control during their war with Lon Nol. The Khmer Rouge not only bore rancor in relation to the old regimes but also with soul-less objects. They forced the monks to disrobe and destroyed the Buddha statues. They cut the heads off the statues in Angkor Wat. The Khmer Rouge rejected royalty, imperialism, and capitalism. They destroyed the temples, and wooden and stone houses.

"We unforgettably bear the rancor (because) we have been seriously suffered by the Imperialism and Colonialism of all forms, which have invaded, snatched away and robbed, destroyed and expanded (their territory and authority) into our country for centuries. We always bear class rancor against feudalism and capitalism, which suppressed, snatched away and robbed and killed our people for more than two thousand years and sold our country to the Imperialism for the interest of their class and that of their colleagues," wrote the Khmer Rouge in a textbook for the second grade, published in 1977."

As Harish C. Mehta wrote in his "Cambodia Silenced," scores of journalists, politicians, doctors, teachers, and artists were put to death by the Khmer Rouge, which unleashed a Mao-style revolution in Cambodia following the idea of creating a new classless society. Nearly all military officers and administrators from the Lon Nol regime were executed, and Chinese businessmen were placed in death camps. The Vietnamese community in Cambodia was also singled out for massacre.

My uncle’s second wife was taken in a truck with her three children away from the village. Days later we were told that they were all poured alive into a kiln.

The principal actors behind the genocide that killed about 1.5 million Cambodians were Pol Pot, an occasional journalist; Khieu Samphan, the former editor of L’Observateur; and leaders such as Ieng Sary, brother-in-law of Pol Pot. These men considered the press a Western evil and shut them down. They killed journalists whom they felt were ideologically impure and had corrupted the chaste Cambodian society. They also killed teachers, doctors, and artists, all of whom stood accused of being Westernized, and were therefore impediments to Pol Pot’s desire to create a new society. They only trusted the farmers and workers, most of whom were illiterate.

The sad irony was that while Pol Pot and his henchmen were busy murdering their countrymen, the outside world did not lift a finger to stop the genocide. Many foreign journalists, and some academics, did not believe that the genocide was taking place until terrified refugees fled to Thailand to relate tales of torture, starvation, and
death. *Time Magazine*, one of the first Western publications to break the story of the genocide, reported in April 1976 that about half a million Cambodians, or one-tenth of the country’s population, had been massacred, or had died of disease or starvation since the Khmer Rouge took power a year earlier.

The Khmer Rouge set about razing down the economy, banning business and money, shutting down enterprises and schools, and sending millions to work in paddy fields in a perverse effort to create a prosperous society. Buddhist bonzes were driven from their wats, disrobed, and sent to farms to grow rice after being criticized by state radio as parasites. Their wats were turned into granaries. The Khmer Rouge even burned books they collected from the libraries. While studying in Paris, Pol Pot fell under the spell of Mao Zedong of China, whose brutal cultural revolution he admired and desired to replicate in Cambodia.

The Khmer Rouge considered those who had some privilege (that is, those who had property to support their lives, such as a middle class house, a few hectares of lands, and so forth) as the enemy: leeches. Khmer Rouge radio in Phnom Penh broadcast everyday that the “people are the owners of the water and the owner of the territory of the entire Cambodia.” But in fact, only a handful of Khmer Rouge, including the families of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, owned the water and territory. The Cambodian people never became owners of the water and territory under the Khmer Rouge rule.

The Khmer Rouge recruited Cambodian boys of about eight years of age, brainwashed them, and turned them into militia, spies, torturers, and executioners. The Khmer Rouge also used human beings for their experiments. They let loose scorpions on women’s breasts, inserted hot irons into the rectums of men, and dashed babies’ skulls against tree trunks. Pol Pot banned money, blew up the Central Bank, and turned Phnom Penh, once a balmy French provincial-style capital, into a ghost town, expressing his zeal to create a new Cambodia free of all Western influence. Extramarital sex was punishable by death, and couples planning marriage without state approval had been executed.

**At the camp**

I was separated from my parents and sent to live in a camp in the middle of a forest. I do not recall when. What I could remember from that time was that the camp was built above ground, roofed with thatch, and without walls. Every night I heard the owls and wolves crying. We could not run home to see our parents. We had to sleep on the bamboo floor with only a *krama* as blanket and pillow. I had only the clothing I wore.
They were worn out. When I got home with the permission from Angkar, my mother fixed them for me.

I was later transferred to work as a cow keeper. My life was then better because I could find things to eat. One day, I was ordered to drive the ox cart to bring water to the rice field. The two big barrels that stood on the cart fell onto me because of the cart was so shaky. The two oxen were frightened by the fallen barrels and ran so fast they dropped me on the ground. One wheel of the cart ran over my right thigh. Fortunately, the oxen did not jump on me while they were running. It was about noon; I watched the sun right above my head. I cried out for help. No one was around, except the wind. My thigh became swollen and I had to walk back to the village. My mother was furious but could not spell it out. No Tiger Balm.

My suffering did not end there. Later I was hit on my back by a Khmer Rouge guard as I tried to pick a small potato left underground. I could not even cry. I knelt down on the earth. My mother was shocked to see me walking home with a tear. All of us cried. “I would cut their flesh one cut per day and salt the wound, if we could get them alive,” my mother whispered in my ear. Now my mother is aging, sick, and bedridden. Her two eyes are blind and she has had a stroke. Will she live to see justice?

One night I dreamt of flying to my Phnom Penh home. I kept the dream to myself because I thought it would be impossible to return. Every night at the camp I slept under the open sky on a pile of hay, using it as mattress and blanket. One day seemed to be one hundred days.

No one knew exactly what would happen to them the next day: death or life. We inserted ourselves into our hay mattress for warmth. I thought of the same night when we were in Lon Nol’s regime. I slept by my mother who always taught me some arithmetic. Before bed, she would give me homework and told me stories. Without this regime, I would have obtained my diploma by 1982. Those glorious days were gone. I remember what the Khmer Rouge told us in their regular meetings: “You don’t need any certificate or degree. The hoe and the bangki (a basket for holding soil) are your pens and books.” I got my diploma in 1987 as I had to step back five years to re-do my education in the People’s Republic of Kampuchea that toppled the Khmer Rouge.

The nightmare was almost over at that point. The next morning after that dream, I found my true dream when I drove the ox-cart home. I met my parents in the middle of the rice field. They told me that Vietnamese came to the village and the Khmer Rouge ran away.

When I returned from the Asia Leadership Fellowship Program in November, my family told me that the Khmer Rouge Documentation Center had informed them...
about my missing uncle. According to the Khmer Rouge file, he was arrested on
January 12, 1976 after we got to Phnom Srok. I saw him saying goodbye to my mother;
his sister "Angkar needs me to further my education," he told my mother. "But I feel
that something bad will happen to me," he added. After the Liberation in 1979 we had
not heard from him. We assumed he was missing. Now he is pronounced dead. He was
detained in the Toul Sleng prison known as S-21. One of his daughters was also
missing and we assumed she, too, is dead.

What was left behind after the Khmer Rouge? My parents have become weak
and run down. My cousin became a widow. In all, we lost three members.

The Roads Ahead: Justice?
At the Hiroshima and Peace Memorial Museum in Okinawa, visitors express their
hatred for war and their wish to prevent its return. Similarly, the Cambodian people
who suffered and who were looked down upon like animals by the Khmer Rouge did not
want Pol Pot's genocidal regime to return. Our family is considered among the
luckiest, in that we lost the least number of members. However, we all shared the
tragedy, suffering, and sorrow.

The Khmer Rouge regime not only failed to establish the clean, egalitarian, and
democratic society that it intended. It instead stupidly killed the innocent, as well as
the intellectuals who were the national pillars. The Khmer Rouge forgot that their
hated old regimes, colonialism, and imperialism, gave them their education.

The Khmer Rouge top leaders, such as Brother Number 1 Pol Pot, Former
Foreign Minister Ieng Sary, Former Head of State Khieu Samphan, all received
overseas education. At present, they all live happily and freely. But their hands are
stained with Cambodian blood. They have committed countless barbarous and
genocidal acts against their own citizens. They tortured and killed. They deserve
punishment. But what punishment?

One should not ignore those who were killed and tortured, and left to starve.
Without justice, they can not keep their eyes closed. The Khmer Rouge holocaust is
enormous and cannot be forgotten with just a few words ("let bygones and be
bygones") of the Khmer Rouge notorious leader Khieu Samphan. They must be tried in
an independent court and brought to justice.

A trial is an international instrument which is imposed on perpetrators, so as
to set the example that prevents the repeat the crimes. If asked whether a trial is
even, I would have to say NO. The crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge are too
enormous to be tolerated. But at least a trial will set an example that will prevent
others from following in Pol Pot's footsteps.

In the end, I pray to those who died, to live in peace, and to know that we are doing our best to find justice for them.

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I would like to thank my two cousins, Ham Kim Eng and Ham Kim Eang, who related their experiences to me.

Endnotes

1 Cambodia's education system in the 1960s and 70s was different from today. The primary school started from grade 12 down to grade 1 in secondary school.

2 My cousin, Mrs. Ham Kim Eang, told me this just a few years ago.

3 Phnom = mountain; srok = district

4 I was not aware whether KR had a school in 1977 as I was working very hard in the rice fields.

5 The KR compared hoes and bangki to pens and books, which students used during their study.

6 The message which KR means to kill somebody.
The Waiting & Watching

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Searching for Peace

SUPARA JANCHITFAH

WARS HAVE INDISCRIMINATELY DESTROYED livelihoods, traditions, histories, and environments—mankind’s legacy. For many Okinawans, war must be left behind. They wish to make their island peaceful once again.

PART ONE: The Pipe-dream Peace?

“Za-wa-wa… Za-wa-wa…” The salty breeze dances through the vast fields of sugar cane along the rugged shores of Okinawa. The pleasant, peaceful sound has for centuries lulled the hearts of the island people—until the day a troop of foreign soldiers stepped on the beach. The blanket of peace was torn apart, once and forever.

The playful dance of sugar cane leaves, and its rhythmic soothing chant, would be replaced by noise from gunfire, bombs, and air raids. It has not been quiet on the eastern shores of Okinawa, hosting Kadena Air Base, even half a century after the Second World War. An American military jet takes off from or lands on the runways every ten to fifteen minutes: the screeching, roaring noises of a war zone.

The short and painful history of American military forces on Okinawa begins in 1945. Okinawa was a major battlefield between American and Japanese forces, resulting in the deaths of almost one-third of the island’s population. Civilians were forced to participate directly in the war.

The Battle of Okinawa is also remembered as a time of violence against women and children.

After the Japanese surrendered and signed a treaty with the United States, American forces occupied all of Japan, Okinawa included. (Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution defines the right of occupation of Japan.) The American military bases in Japan were meant to prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism, asserts Colonel Ron Yowell, currently Assistant Chief of Staff of MCB G-5 at Okinawa.

The bases occupy about twenty per cent of the total area of Okinawa, seventy
five per cent of all US facilities in Japan and twenty-five per cent of the US forces in Asia. The bases are located on Okinawa’s most fertile land. According to Bruce R. Nelson, currently the American Consul for Public Affairs in Okinawa, the military bases in Okinawa are meant to protect Japan.

Almost everywhere in Okinawa—an island 1,515 kilometers south of Tokyo—people are crying out for peace. Most of them say they have had enough of war. The American bases have become a focal point for their anger.

There has been conflict between Okinawans and Americans since 1945. Issues surrounding land rental and development, cultural differences, and crime and violence, remain harsh reminders to the islanders that Japan is still very much an occupied nation.

The conflicts appear in different forms

Colonel Yowell said the American military wanted to return the land to the locals but as there were no plans for development, the American forces stayed where they were. “That is why we still have to pay the lease,” he added.

However, it is not the US Government that pays for the land it occupies on Okinawa. The Japanese Government pays the rent on the land. It spends about four million (3.988) US dollars per year to keep American military bases in Japan.¹

Officials at Camp Butler were not able to provide exact income and expenditure figures, but claim that the bases spend about 1.4 billion US dollars each year in Okinawa. Neither could they say how much the US or Japanese Governments allocate to run the bases.

That these American bases, Camp Butler and Kadena included, are almost completely closed compounds seems to contradict claims that the bases help support the Okinawan economy. The bases mimic small-town USA, with their own fast food places, laundries, shopping malls, and entertainment complexes. And they are all American-owned franchises. The postal outlets use the US Postal Service.

“We want them (military officials) to feel at home,” said Stephen A. Town, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff of Camp Butler.

Taking them to court

“We want them to leave our land,” said Chibana Shoichi, a Yomitan village leader. “The presence of military bases means war,” he said.

Recently, a group of Okinawan landowners appealed to Japan’s Supreme Court to overturn the Special Land Use Law. This revised law allows the ongoing compulsory
To Uehara, the current war against Iraq is similar to the war in Okinawa in one respect. "Ordinary people become victims of the war. In the war against Iraq, some Americans may think that they are going to liberate Iraq, but does America really want to liberate Iraqis or what is it actually doing?" she asked.

Students visiting the Himeyuri Peace Museum believe that the military should leave. "Wars aren't good and I think we should learn from the past," one student said. The same group of students from Hakodate City also visited Kadena. "We should not have American bases in Okinawa and anywhere else in Japan," many of them said.

Criminal History

Many islanders at the Okinawa Central Market say that their livelihood had been affected and human rights violated in the fifty-eight years since the Second World War. The air base produces high-level noise pollution. Car accidents are many, as are crimes committed by US military personnel. Many accuse the bases of environmental damage. Moreover, Japan's neighboring countries have also been affected by the bases, since the American military was dispatched to bomb Korea and Vietnam in early 1970's.

But most importantly, Okinawans feel that their own government is treating them unfairly. The decision to overturn the landowners' case is among the most recent events that continue to alienate Okinawans from Tokyo and the American military.

However, most Okinawans said they do not take these matters against the American people. It is the military bases that cause the problems. Okinawans expressed their weariness of the criminal behavior of the US military personnel, and ways the US military protects American suspects.

"Among thousands of crimes committed by American soldiers in Okinawa, many of them were outrageous crimes such as the rape of the twelve year old school girl by three US navy officers," said Takazato Suzuyo. "In past years, many women didn't dare report that they were raped."

Takazato, a Naha City municipal legislator, has been gathering data on Okinawan women who were raped by American soldiers over the past fifty-eight years. Takazato and seventy-one other Okinawan women organized the 'Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence' on November 8, 1995.

For Takazato, these incidents of rape and abuse take place within a situation of armed conflict—thus these incidents constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. "Our women agree that we can no longer tolerate this violence and violation.

Love-hate relationship

Although many groups in Okinawa want American bases removed from the island, some people need the business the bases generate. "We can sell products to tourists who visit the bases," said one vendor. A local tour guide at Kadena said his relatives work on the American bases, so he believes that American bases should continue to operate in Okinawa. "It helps generate income for Okinawans," he said.

But in an informal survey, most people on the street want the American bases out. "We do not want the Americans here because they do not respect us. Many of them are very impolite," said a bus driver. It is not only his generation that is discussing the problems caused by the presence of the American bases, he said. His teenage son and his friends are worried as well.

"We have had enough wars and loss," said a war survivor who guides student tours for the Himeyuri Peace Museum.

Uehara Tomiko, another war survivor, was mobilized as part of the Himeyuri troop of young women, to take care of injured Japanese soldiers during the Second World War. She does not want American bases here. "We do not mind how poor we become. We don't want American bases and American soldiers here in Okinawa," she said.

She said she was taught to respect and uphold the Emperor. "We have never questioned him and his role in the war. We never thought that Japan would lose the war."

But her first thoughts were not of the Emperor at the end of the war. "Although we were taught to respect and honor the Emperor, my thoughts were of my mother and the chance to drink a clean glass of water," she said.
To Uehara, the current war against Iraq is similar to the war in Okinawa in one respect. “Ordinary people become victims of the war. In the war against Iraq, some Americans may think that they are going to liberate Iraq, but does America really want to liberate Iraqis or what is it actually doing?” she asked.

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of our human rights. We have been petitioning the Japanese Government to consolidate the US bases and withdraw US military personnel, review the Japan-US Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement, and award full compensation to all victims, but to no avail,” she said.

Many Okinawans feel that they are a marginalized people in Japan. Takazato expressed her views metaphorically. “Okinawa is the prostituted daughter of Japan. Japan used her daughter as a breakwater to keep the battlefields from spreading over to the mainland until the end of World War II. After the war, she enjoyed economic prosperity by selling the daughter to the United States.”

Many Okinawans feel strongly that the central government have historically paid less attention to their plight than to other Japanese, and that they have been exploited. For example, there was a law promulgated during the Meiji Period that gave the privileged classes exclusive right to clear forests in Okinawa. Farmers were prohibited from freely entering the forests as they had done in the past. This enclosure of the forests was a prelude to the more extensive enclosure perpetrated by the US military after the Second World War. This is supported by the Japanese Government up to this day. Signs proclaiming, 'This sign marks the boundary of Kadena Air Base property. Unauthorized personnel will keep out by order of the installation commander,’ became a common sight in Okinawa.

During the Battle of Okinawa, many women died in mass suicides and murders. Mothers were forced by Japanese soldiers to suffocate crying babies as US troops approached hide-outs. Himeyuri students died while nursing Japanese soldiers. Okinawan women were forced into prostitution with abducted Korean women, and were known as 'comfort women.'

The suffering of Okinawan women did not end after the war, according to many researchers, including Takazato. The large number of documented rape cases, post war, support this claim.

Changing for Peace

Though the momentum has slowed, the peace movement in Okinawa remains active. They involve people from all walks of life, including women, youth, and the elderly.

The current protest is against the proposed US marine base on an offshore area of Nago City. Kinjo Yuji and the Protect Lives Inochi-O-Mamoru-Kai Association are at the forefront of this protest.

The fight is far from over, as the mayor of Nago City has already allowed the base to be built. Opposition is focused on the nature of the offshore area of Nago City as
a valuable and irreplaceable habitat for a number of endangered species, including the *dugong*, an internationally-protected sea mammal.

Protesters also claim that the proposed base would be another burden for Okinawans, who have already suffered so much as a result of the existing US bases. The construction of the heliport in Nago City would be a real threat to the peace and security of Asia as well as the rest of the world.

“We want to remove all these bases, not add one more,” said Kinjo. The Japanese Government did not listen to their protests despite opposition from sixty per cent of voters in that area, according to 1996 opinion polls.

“We want sustainable development for our community,” added Kinjo. They seek ways to avert the pollution of their water and air, the high level of noise pollution, soil contamination by hazardous chemicals, accidents and violent crimes committed by ill-disciplined soldiers.

“We have suffered enough. We don’t need any more bases!” he said.

“Give us back our peaceful island.”

**PART TWO: Peace in Perspective**

Not only the people of Okinawa, but numerous Japanese activists in the main islands, are working to make Japan a truly peaceful society. In recent protests against the government decision to send troops to Iraq, the Japanese clearly indicated their peace advocacy—and not a peace restored through force.

Although the Japanese Government maintains that the Self-Defense Force (SDF) in Iraq will only engage in humanitarian work, opposition arises from Japanese experiences with wars and the consequences of wars: death tolls, sickness, and life in harsh circumstances.

The Japanese also know what it feels to occupy, and to be occupied. National memories of events after the Second World War remain alive. However, many academics, activists, and journalists who advocate peace see the recent American occupation of Iraq as dissimilar to the American occupation of Japan after that war.

**A different foot**

Takahara Takao, Director of the International Peace Research Institute (PRIME) at the Meiji Gakuin University in Tokyo, said that the Iraq occupation cannot be compared with the US occupation of Okinawa and Hiroshima after the Second World War.
Moreover, in light of the nuclear capability of India, Pakistan, and Israel, Oba added: “I am afraid that Japan will do the same, as many political leaders are interested in revising the Constitution.” Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim... land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potentials will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

Oba said: “It is possible that Japan will change some policies to address the war on terrorism.” She said some newspapers revealed documents, found in 1994, indicating that the Japanese Government is interested in developing a nuclear capability. “Moreover, regardless of the legal obligation for a peaceful space program, Japan launched its first military satellite from Tanegashima in March 2003. It also dispatched troops to the Indian Ocean to support the US-UK war on Iraq.” “All these actions violate the Japanese Constitution,” said Oba.

Ironically, the war on Iraq has resulted in more attention being focused on civil nuclear systems that continue to produce Depleted Uranium (DU). Oba, who has been working on the nuclear issue for more than thirty years, said that “DU is an incorrect name. It should be called dirty, dangerous, and destructive uranium.” DU is waste generated by military and civil nuclear production plants. The nuclear enrichment plant at Rokkashomura has already generated more than seven thousand tons of deadly DU.

No, not ever

On the other hand, veteran journalist and nuclear issue expert Tashiro Akira said, “I firmly believe that Japan will not become a country with nuclear possession. Yes, we do have fifty-two nuclear power plants. If we have [the] political will to develop a nuclear weapon—it is possible. There is technology and nuclear fission materials. However, the Japanese has learned its lesson and will not entangle itself in such a difficult experience again.”

“Japan is the only country which has experienced atomic bombing. Even from the standpoint of national interest, it will only [produce] harm rather than benefit. It will also mean disaster for humanity,” he said. Tashiro is aware that some politicians seek ways to develop nuclear weapons in Japan, “but I think that public opinion will...”

A Nuclear Nippon

Japan’s fifty-two nuclear reactors are also a concern to many Japanese. Radioactive waste or spent fuel from these plants may be re-processed and used in nuclear weapons manufacture.

Director Oba Satomi of the Plutonium Action Group based in Hiroshima said that it is possible for Japan to have nuclear weapons. She pointed out that, after last year’s November elections, the broad-sheet Mainichi Shimbun reported that seventeen per cent of the newly-elected members of the Diet are interested in nuclear weapons.
Moreover, in light of the nuclear capability of India, Pakistan, and Israel, Oba added: “I am afraid that Japan will do the same, as many political leaders are interested in revising the Constitution.”

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Current Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro admits that Article 9 fails to reflect reality, noting that the nation has had its own military forces, the Self-Defense Forces, since 1954. "It is hard to support the argument that SDF are not military forces. And I don't think Japan should be left unarmed, either," the PM said. Amidst international criticism, PM Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine for the fourth time on January 1, 2004.

The Yasukuni Shrine enshrines about two and a half million Japanese war dead, among them fourteen Class-A war criminals, a category which includes Second World War Prime Minister Tojo Hideki. The enshrinement of war criminals at Yasukuni provokes great antagonism from Asian countries, which still regard the Japanese with bitterness over their wartime atrocities. On the other hand, many Japanese feel that they are true victims of the war, since Japan is the only country that was subjected to atomic bomb attacks.

For Takahara, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution need not be reinterpreted. "First, renunciation of war is the right thing to do. Second, the current wording leaves room for coast-guarding capability. Third, the Article obliges the Government to work towards more disarmament. Fourth, the very act of amending the Article requires a justification [for] convincing neighbours who had experienced Japanese aggression in the past. Otherwise, it could instigate arms race and tension in the region."

The debate whether Japan needs a Self-Defense Force or not is one hot issue in Japanese society.

Play friendly neighbor

According to Takahara, some coast-guarding capability would be necessary, "mainly for policing, not for destruction of the enemy, but for preventing and suppressing criminal acts. Current military capability exceeds real needs and violates the spirit of the Constitution."

Takahara says the Japanese Government must reduce armaments. The Constitution obliges the Government to do so. He says there is no need for the Japanese to press for the re-examination of the Japan-US Security Treaty. "The Cold War is over, and no military threat is foreseeable. Friendly relationships with the US is a necessity and a precondition for peace in the region, but the framework for that goal must be changed."

"For instance, a multilateral security assurance treaty should replace the old bilateral agreement," he added.

Possible, Probable

Okamoto observes that the probability of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons rests on the following points. First, the Japanese Government has never denied its option for nuclear armament, provided it does not exceed 'minimum defense capability.' Second, Japanese rocket technology has constantly been developed. It is a vital component of nuclear armaments. Third, Japan has enough radioactive waste that can be reprocessed to produce over ten thousand Nagasaki-type plutonium bombs.

He said that the possibility of Japan going nuclear depends on developments in regional and domestic politics. "Should a united Korea (South and North) develop nuclear weapons, the generally anti-nuclear Japanese media and public opinion will change overnight."

"Japan has always looked down on Koreans and regards South and North Koreas as underdogs," he added.

Let Nine be

To many peace activists, a factor that contributes to a peaceful Japanese society is Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. However, many existing realities seem to contradict the article. One such contradiction is the Self-Defense Force (SDF).
Current Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro admits that Article 9 fails to reflect reality, noting that the nation has had its own military forces, the Self-Defense Forces, since 1954. “It is hard to support the argument that SDF are not military forces. And I don’t think Japan should be left unarmed, either;” the PM said. Amidst international criticism, PM Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine for the fourth time on January 1, 2004.

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“For instance, a multilateral security assurance treaty should replace the old bilateral agreement,” he added.
Gabe is unsatisfied with the peace movement's efforts: "I think the peace movement has a negative impact on Japanese foreign policy. But it has given our policy makers a kind of caution or restraint."

"Any political movement for peace aiming to change policy rests on the caprice of public opinion. Any such movement cannot maintain a certain level of public support anytime."

He said that occasionally, the peace movement stimulates and mobilizes the public towards a certain direction.

However, Okamoto said that without the Japanese peace movement, Japan would have been much worse. "It is true that the peace movement has not produced enough results. Nevertheless it is because of these conscientious Japanese citizens that Japan has been regarded by its neighbors as a trustworthy counterpart in post-Second World War Asia."

"If the Asian people had known only profit-oriented capitalist Japanese and sex-intoxicated Japanese tourists, the image of Japan would have been far worse," he said. He said that peace activists have succeeded in one thing so far: containing the SDF largely within Japanese territory.

PART THREE: The Paradox of Peace

On the morning of August 6, 1945, Numata Suzuko was at work at the Chugoku Post and Telecommunications Bureau, when the atomic bomb exploded, scarring her for life. The aogiri trees outside her office were charred and appeared destroyed, but their struggle to survive encouraged her.

She lost one of her legs in the explosion. She learned later that she had lost her fiancé in the Pacific war. She was only twenty-one. "I thought there was nothing to do but take my own life. Just as I thought that, I looked at these trees and saw slender twigs growing out of the damaged trunks. If my dear companions, the aogiri trees, were going to fight to survive, I knew I had to do the same," she said.

Numata continues in that struggle, for life, for peace, and for a full understanding of the bitterness of war. "I don't want only to testify my experience during the war, but I want people to understand how peace is crucial in our lives as well. Moaning for the past is not enough. I want to look to the present and future and want to promote real peace on earth," she said.

Numata's travels as a peace advocate have given her to understand the sufferings of people other than the Japanese during the war. She shares her experiences with others.

Hiroshima for peace

The peace movement in Japan is very strong, particularly in Hiroshima and Okinawa. Tashiro, who lives in Hiroshima and keenly observes nuclear-related issues, said that the peace movement in Hiroshima has affected various fields inside and outside of Japan.

"Those who learned a lesson in Hiroshima have not achieved a goal free from nuclear weapons and wars on earth yet. But you cannot say that Hiroshima has not given much influence on the minds of individuals of the world," he said.

"A group of hibakusha, A-bomb survivors, have continuously given their testimonies to young and old, Japanese and non-Japanese, and influenced greatly [the] ways of thinking, and made them understand the meaning of living in a nuclear age."

Tashiro said that although peace groups—including that of the Hiroshima City Government—have been vigorously carrying out peace activities, these have not had enough impact on Japanese state policy.

Tashiro said: "I do not think that Japanese Constitution's Article 9 needs to be reinterpreted. It could be a model for countries of the world and most suitable for a country [which] has experienced the A-bomb disaster twice in the history of humanity." However, he says that it is necessary for the Japanese people to press for the re-examination of the Japan-US Security Treaty.

"For example, if the Treaty requires dispatching Japanese military forces to Iraq—as PM Koizumi thinks—then it should be re-examined. "Even as honor [to] the treaty, Japan must seek multilateral security treaties with other Asian countries and create confidence in the security of the region."

Gabe says that the Japanese Government has been reinterpreting the Constitution. "Now [the majority party] LDP is trying to revise the Constitution within three to five years. The revision is not needed."

Okamoto, former President of the Peace Studies Association of Japan, says that Japan should stick to Article 9 as it is. "This is the fundamental principle on which post-Second World War Japan has based its national policy. Instead of aiming to become an economic and military regional hegemony, Japan should seek to become a kind of 'middle-state' power such as Canada, Australia, or the Scandinavian countries," he suggested.

"In the mid-twenty-first century, China will have regional hegemony and Japan should play the role of good neighbour, not competitor," he said.
Gabe is unsatisfied with the peace movement’s efforts: “I think the peace movement has a negative impact on Japanese foreign policy. But it has given our policy makers a kind of caution or restraint.”

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Numata’s travels as a peace advocate have given her to understand the sufferings of people other than the Japanese during the war. She shares her
experience everywhere and creates networks. She said that ignorance leads to war. “I was so sorry that I did not have enough information during the war. If only I had enough information, I would not have supported such an aggression,” she confessed. Numata realizes that she was given only one-sided information.

Many Japanese peace lovers are humble folk, like organic farmers, housewives, teachers, and social activists. Their awareness is firm, however: that war brings no good; and that common people like themselves have nothing to gain from it, and will indeed be the first to suffer.

Numerous Japanese above fifty years of age experienced the atomic bomb, and are primary witnesses to the sentiments that shaped the spirit of their present Constitution, particularly concerning the avoidance of nuclear capability. These sentiments are not shared by many politicians and decision-makers today, however. In fact, there is a growing sentiment among the ruling elite that the anti-nuclear elements of their Constitution are out of date.

Those who disagree with peace advocates in Japan are not a silent voice in Japanese society at the present time. The visits of PM Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine is a case in point.

Before his visit in 2001, newspapers debated the pros and cons. The Sankei Shimbun described the plan to visit as “extremely regrettable. It must be said that PM Koizumi will lose the trust of the people... The people had much hope for the appearance of a strong-willed political leader. There is no mistaking the fact that a sense of disappointment will quickly spread.”

The Yomiuri Shimbun expressed support in an editorial titled “Moving Forward the Date of the Visit Was a Sound Political Decision.” The Yomiuri Shimbun noted that while trying to avoid worsening relations with China and the Republic of Korea, it was necessary to avoid the appearance of having bowed to foreign pressure on the domestic issue of paying respect to the war dead.”

Many politicians still believe that there was good reason for Japanese wartime aggression. Eto Takami, Minister for Administrative Agency, said in a talk to about fifteen journalists on January 11, 1996: “Let me teach you real history since you all belong to the young generation. We had done many good things during our colonial rule over the Korean Peninsula. According to international law, Japan's integration of Korea was lawful and right because Korea was underdeveloped and weak at that time;” he said.

The Yasukuni Shrine is one institution that educates the Japanese about the justification for the wartime aggression during the Second World War. The museum
conveys the message that those who volunteered to go to war went because they believed it was the only way they could save their country, hence their loved ones, from invasion. The *kamikaze* sacrificed their lives to destroy an entire enemy ship.

The museum offer visitors the official reasons for the Japanese wars of occupation. It says, for instance, that the 'liberation' of Korea was the intention in the Korean case. The section on the infamous 'Nanking incident' in China says that the people of Nanking welcomed the Japanese troops.

The messages in the visitor books reflect similar sentiments. "I just realized today how Japanese soldiers have sacrificed for us. I will continue visiting this Shrine and will bring my children here every year so they can learn how their ancestors have sacrificed their lives for them," said a lady who writes that she is pregnant and that it was her first time to visit the Shrine in late October 2003.

According to the Yasukuni Shrine website: “War is truly sorrowful. Yet to maintain the independence and peace of the nation and for the prosperity of all of Asia, Japan was forced into conflict. The precious lives that were lost in these incidents and wars are worshipped as the *Kami* (Deities) of Yasukuni *Jinja* (Shrine).”

The website also goes to great lengths to be inclusive of all Japanese, from the southernmost large island, Okinawa, to the northernmost, Karafuto (Sakhalin). The emphasis is on the sacrifice of life for nation. No explanations are at hand concerning Japanese aggression. Both the website and the museum use a shrewd logic. "Among the *kami* of Yasukuni *Jinja* are military nurses who in their red-cross insignia uniforms worked gallantly in the face of air raids on the homeland to save the wounded. They were 'the mothers and sisters of the battlefield.'"

Not a single word expresses sorrow for Japanese war crimes inflicted on the peoples of Korea, China, the Philippines, Malaysia and other Asian countries. The messages shift the focus to the unfair treatment of Japan. “Moreover, there were those who gave up their lives after the end of the Great East Asian War, taking upon themselves the responsibility for the war. There were also 1,068 Martyrs of Showa who were cruelly and unjustly tried as war criminals by a sham-like tribunal of the Allied forces (United States, England, the Netherlands, China and others).”

According to Henry Stewart of Showa Women's University, most Japanese textbooks do not mention 'Korean comfort women,' or the Nanking massacre. He said it is worrisome that many young Japanese do not know what transpired during the Great East Asian War.

Many Japanese history textbooks justify the invasion. According to Jennifer Thomas, "there has always been a conflict in education between the truth of history
and what is thought to be appropriate to be taught in schools.

Professor Ueda Kenji, President of Koku Gakuin University, argues that history textbooks cannot depict the story of Asian women who were forced into prostitution by the Japanese Army. "Imparting this story to students who are still young and immature has become a great problem… Isn’t it a fact that the West with its military power invaded and ruled over much of Asia and Africa and that this was the start of East-West relations?" He also argues that "Japan’s dream of building a great East Asia was necessitated by history."

Debates are on-going about the proper contents of history textbooks, particularly in relation to Japanese aggression during the Second World War. The Ministry of Education stated in 1963 that the Nanking massacre and mass rape in 1937 need not to be included in textbooks because “The violation of women is something that has happened on every battlefield in every era of human history….it is not an issue that needs to be taken up…”

But while there are many who rationalize the war, there are likewise many citizen groups denouncing it. When the Japanese Government approved a new high school textbook that was written by nationalist historians in April 2002, Tawara Yoshifumi of the the Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21, said the new history textbook, an older version of which is already being used in schools, was similar to the one that fueled debate locally and internationally in previous years. “It is a textbook that views China and South Korea as enemies in order to justify (Japan’s) war of aggression,” he said. There is no mention of ‘comfort women’ in this history textbook.

Numata is concerned that the younger generations will be sealed off from the facts and take peace for granted. She herself did not realize that some Okinawan villagers were forced by the Japanese Army to commit suicide rather than be captured by the American military. She did not know that many Koreans suffered the effects of the atomic bomb explosions in Japan, and had gone home with neither financial nor medical assistance. Many of them died in Okinawa, Hiroshima, and the Pacific. (Korea was incorporated into Japan in 1910, after Japan won in the Russo-Japanese War and was ruled by Japan for thirty-six years.) Numata said that imperial education had led her to believe that Japan entered the war for rightful reasons.

Although Numata and Oba belong to different generations, both are from Hiroshima and have joined hands with peace advocates. They have hope. “Now, more than ever, the anti-nuclear energy movement must join with the environmental, human rights, anti-war and anti-nuclear weapons movements,” said Oba.
They also look beyond Japanese’s boundaries. “It is natural and vital for us to coordinate these movements globally in order to achieve a sustainable and secure world free from the nuclear threat,” said Oba. In Japan, there are many grassroots groups working ceaselessly to stop nuclear insanity. These noble efforts are also frequently seen in many other parts of the world. “It is obvious that if all these activities work co-operatively, nuclear abolition is more likely to become a reality. If we trust and support each other, our dream of a nuclear-free planet will come true,” added Oba.

Numata’s journeys for peace continue. As she puts it: “Learning about the past has warned me about future. I have a strong mission as a war survivor to hand down the truth to the younger generation. The truth needs to be revealed [and] the peace movement must be strengthened by involving more people,” she emphasized.

References


*Reuters*, April 9, 2002.

This report draws from field visits and interviews (both personal and via e-mail) with: Oba Satomi, Numata Suzuko, Professor Takahara Takao, Tashiro Akira, Professor Gabe Masaaki, Professor Okamoto Mitsuo, Chibana Shoichi, Kinjo Yuij, Uehara Tomiko, and Honorable Takazato Suzuyo. It also draws from vox populi interviews in Japan.
Through the Yasukuni Glass
HAMID BASYAIB

AN INDONESIAN VISITOR, on his first trip to Japan to stay for two months, is perhaps destined to be bemused and impressed by the many things he would never have guessed about the place.

‘Attractive’ places

Okinawa, for example, is remarkably attractive. I found myself quickly becoming attached to this island on which stood two small kingdoms, subsequently annexed by Japan, to my mind likely because its face appears Southeast Asian compared to that of Tokyo. Okinawans have distinct cultural patterns, their dances and songs markedly different from those of mainstream Japan. During the Second World War, 250,000 Okinawans died at the hands of the Japanese.

Okinawa’s legal-administrative status is unique. Not only is one-fifth of its land an American military base, Japan itself maintains an embassy on the island. Muscular men, fair-skinned or African-American, show up in the shops or cafés lining the main streets: the United States Marines. As the media frequently reports, problems arise due to their presence—sometimes including the rape of Okinawan girls. But also, the marines’ generosity with money on occasion magnetizes local women. Some establish close relationships, which some hope to extend into marriage, which some consider a step up the social ladder.

The US Army flew fighter jets to combat, from Okinawa, during the Vietnam War of the 1960s. The island similarly served as launch pad during the Gulf War of 1990 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The San Francisco Treaty of 1951, the legal foundation for the presence of the US Military Base in Okinawa, the base cannot be used as a place to mobilize US troops to wage war in these places. These violations, at both the levels of the individual and of international law, explain why Okinawa remains a controversial issue in the search for a suitable relationship between the US

Endnotes

1 Chalmers Johnson, “Okinawa: Cold War Island,” Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999, p. 230. The number is derived from the following expenses: about $712 million for the land leased, $ 1.7 billion or Special Measures Agreement, $ 876 million in direct cost, $ 1.7 billion for facilities and new construction.


3 They participated in the World Women’s International Conference in Beijing that year.


6 That is, at the time of the interview, in November 2003.


8 Foreign Press Center, Japan, 2001.


11 Ibid, p.32

12 Reuters, April 9, 2002,
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World War.

The governments of the US and Japan appear to be assuaging the dissatisfaction Okinawans feel towards the US military presence and the ensuing complications, by constant infrastructure development on the island. Okinawa is the poorest part of Japan (although Okinawa’s per capita income is higher than Italy’s GNP), and the projects guarantee jobs and income, especially for the underprivileged.

Who spends for the US military bases in Okinawa? According to the 1951 treaty, the United States pays for the salaries of employees working in all the sectors of the military bases, which are scattered in several locations in Okinawa. Excluding salaries, Japan bears all costs. In any post-war treaty between a winner and a loser, the latter can only accede to the winner’s demands. The Okinawa experience proves that such treaties have wide-ranging and long-term implications. More than half a century since the San Francisco Treaty was signed, there are no indications that this scheme will end.

Hiroshima is likewise an absorbing site. Prior to the Second World War, it was in large part the site of Japan’s military industry, in this city led by Mitsubishi Corporation. The US dropped the atomic bombs to strike at the heart of Japan’s military might. It bears reiterating that Armageddon ensued: the raining bombs in 1945 destroyed the city beyond recognition. Today, the one silent witness of the destruction is the frame of the dome-capped building (designed by a Czech architect in the early twentieth century to serve as an industrial exhibition site) located a mere hundred meters from where the bombs exploded. That only one building is kept as a memorial reflects the conflicting ways the city’s residents respond to the question of memory.

The majority of the locals seem to want to totally forget the horrendous event by erasing any reminder of it. Other residents have a contrary view. To them, the event has to be remembered, not for the main purpose of lamenting—or allowing the festering of—an old wound, but to serve as a reminder that war, especially one that involves the use of nuclear weapons, will be catastrophic for humanity. The former exhibition building can be seen as a compromise between these opposing views.

The other memories of the bombing of Hiroshima are preserved in a splendidly built museum that provides complete information about the event, including life-size tableaux. In one part of the building, a metal wall stands tall and arches artistically. Displayed here are letters from the mayors of Hiroshima, from the 1960’s until today, each containing a similar call for nuclear disarmament. Almost all nations or governments known to be developing nuclear weapons, or to have even tested or is
testing them, have received such letters from the Hiroshima mayors.

Naturally, these are all noble efforts that appeal against repeating the catastrophe. But there is irony here: this example of human cruelty seems to me to be treated by the Japanese Government as a Hiroshima affair, not a matter for Tokyo. And what about Nagasaki, also bombed by the Americans? I am unaware of the reason the Fellowship program I participated in chose Hiroshima and not Nagasaki for a visit. Human victims still live in both places, suffering, for example, from deformities caused by uranium radiation from the bombs.

The Shrine

What captivated me most in Japan, however, was the Yasukuni Shrine. If Okinawa and Hiroshima are telling of aspects of Japan’s past (the impact still felt today, and will undoubtedly continue to be felt in the future), Yasukuni may be viewed as a complete dictionary of Japan. It reveals Japan’s cultural, religious, and military dimensions; its relationship with its former colonies; aspects of its Constitution law; and so forth. In other words, the Shrine encompasses all the layers of Japan’s history.

It is not a shrine in the usual sense. This is revealed when one visits the place, as I did twice. To me, the Yasukuni is a shrine devoted to Japan’s militarism—and not only in the context of the past—which takes advantage of the facilities of Shintoism.

Stretching across Ichigaya, in the middle of Tokyo, this Shrine is huge, and one-third of it is a military museum. The name of the museum is Yushukan, neutral in its literal meaning and explaining nothing: “a place to visit.” The content is far from neutral. Here is where the fires of Japan’s militarism are stoked—but in an attractive manner, and with artistry, not rigidly and ‘coldly’ as military museums are wont to be.

Through its sixteen galleries, Yushukan systematically narrates the history of military effort in Japan: the first formations, the various uniforms, and the evolution of weaponry and techniques of warfare. The museum also has a small theater showing a seemingly non-stop program of documentaries on the wars waged by Japan all over Asia, all of which reaffirm one outlook: that Japan felt compelled to liberate its Asian brothers from Western colonization. The Koreans and the Chinese are often unnerved by this permanent propaganda, which can be very effective in convincing the Japanese youth of their country’s innocence during the Second World War.

The daring feats of Japanese soldiers during the Second World War occupy a large portion of the total exhibition space. Gallery 1 opens with a big map of Western colonial territories in Asia. It shows the occupation of the Philippines by the United
have waged unjust wars. But by holding fast to this version, Japan solidly legitimizes its contention of 'just war.' The stronger the demand, particularly from Korea and China, the stronger the resistance from the Japanese side.

Visits and controversy

The current Prime Minister of Japan, Koizumi Junichiro, has visited the Yasukuni Shrine four times in the first three years of his incumbency; the most recent visit, in early 2004. No Japanese prime minister has visited Yasukuni as much. A large photograph of his visit, wearing religious clothing, is on display in one of the museum galleries, indicating that the museum has recently undergone renovation. (Two other photographs on display are of PM Nakasone Yasuhiro and PM Tanaka Kakuei during their visits.)

While these visits are explained as 'religious,' they are fraught with conflicting political overtones, which generate strong reaction in Korea and China. In 2002, I saw on television fifteen Korean youths in religious clothing, in pouring rain in the middle of the court of a Buddhist temple, in strong protest against one of Koizumi's visits. They made a vow and then cut their small fingers with a large cleaver. They then deposited their fingers inside the temple. The mixing of Shintoism and politics by PM Koizumi was matched by the mixing of Buddhism and politics by the Korean youths.

Anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea is increasing because emerging voices in Japan are calling for Japan to attack North Korea, regarding this communist country, with its nuclear capability, as a serious threat. On the other hand, South Koreans still regard the North Koreans as kin. Sharing an identical ethnicity, they are
separated only by ideology. Japan's adversarial stance towards North Korea, whose poverty engenders sympathies in the South, is thus considered an 'attack' against South Koreans as well.

Similar strong reaction surfaces often in China. During my 2003 visit to Japan, I noted the news that the Chinese Government cancelled its plans to have Japan build its 'bullet trains,' the shinkasen. As of this writing, it appears that China will opt for a French contractor, despite general acknowledgement of the technical superiority of the Japanese shinkasen. Although they are not as fast as the French product, they run more quietly, and, in its forty years of operation, the shinkasen never had an accident.

**Indonesia's Japan**

Hateful reaction to the Japanese does not exist in Indonesia. I hesitate to speculate why, except to observe that the Japanese army only occupied Indonesia for the relatively brief period of three and a half years, from 1942 to 1945. (However, many among the generation of my parents say that the Japanese caused far worse destruction than did the Dutch who occupied Indonesia for three and a half centuries.) Perhaps the lack of rancor is also because Indonesia received administrative and political assistance from the Japanese occupation troops when it was preparing for independence in 1945—assistance that included the draft of the Indonesian Constitution. Physical evidence of the Japanese Occupation is virtually non-existent today, except for the hide-out caves in the mountains or hills, as such one on the southern edge tip of Sumatra island which I saw when I was a child.

Popular Indonesian films depicting the cruelty of Japanese soldiers are few and far in between; far fewer than similar depictions of the Dutch soldiers. Still, in the 1970's, the film Romusha was produced, showing an important aspect of the Japanese Occupation: the forced mass labour of Indonesians. During my teens, I heard of this film that was never released and shown in theaters. Years later, a friend, a famous film and stage actor, told me that objections from the Japanese Government precluded the film's release. It is rumoured that Japan reimbursed the production costs in full and gave additional compensation. There was no public outcry, apparently because the Indonesian Government supported this suppression. The government urgently needed a good relationship with Japan because Indonesia was at that time emerging from a crisis brought about by the previous regime, which left a six hundred fifty per cent inflation rate.

The only significant and serious anti-Japanese sentiment was what came to
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be known as 'Malaria 1974' (an acronym in Bahasa Indonesia describing the day the incident took place, January 15, 1974). College students, followed by masses of people in Jakarta, burned Japanese cars and destroyed anything Japanese. The main issue was: Japan had returned to colonize Indonesia again. Where in the past it used military and political might, it was thought that the new colonization was via economic power. At that time, Japanese products were ubiquitous in Indonesia. On the main roads all over Indonesia, only a small number of American, German, Italian, and Australia cars. Almost all cars were from Japan, with Mitsubishi Model T 120 pick-ups dominating the scene, even in villages.

The 'Malaria 1974 Incident' was triggered by the arrival of then PM Tanaka, who was a military officer during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia. The situation surrounding his arrival was so turbulent that the PM had to be flown by helicopter to the airport to return to Japan. This incident was also colored by a clandestine struggle for power, principally within the closed circle of presidential aides, which nearly toppled President Suharto from his seat. This was the first major agitation against (former) General Suharto since he took power from President Sukarno in 1966. The drama ended with the arrests of several student leaders and hundreds of politicians and activists, and the firing of a number of generals who were charged with riding the students' movement.

Anti-Japanese sentiment practically disappeared after this event. Until the 1980's, when several activists, especially in Central Java and Yogyakarta provinces, raised the issue of the jugun ianfu, 'comfort women' (A number of former jugun ianfu demanded justice and compensation for their sufferings during the Japanese Occupation. Nevertheless, their numbers were of a much smaller scale in comparison with similar charges in Korea in which connection, thousands of graves in an Okinawa graveyard were to remain nameless as a sign of respect for relatives of the dead buried. Identifying the graves would reveal that that high numbers of Korean women buried there were jugun ianfu who were exported to Japan.

The 'Malaria 1974' incident is long forgotten in Indonesia, and the jugun ianfu issue never became a national issue. What remains is a long list of development projects in several Indonesian cities, often involving the creation of physical infrastructure using assistance or loans from the Japanese Government. A different kind of problem has emerged. For while news of corruption in the assistance and loan programs are hardly ever heard of, this does not mean such corruption does not exist. In insider circles, it is understood that Japan never broaches the subject of corruption among Indonesian officials because it does not want to damage the relationship
between the two countries, nor to disturb the projects.

The Japanese contractors of these projects confront such corruption, and may even be actively involved as perpetrators. It is bruited about that Western companies, particularly American, are often 'jealous' of their Japanese counterparts, and want the American Government to take a 'softer' stance in relation to corruption (that is, by not subjecting them to sanctions in the United States should they caught bribing Indonesian officials). The common belief is that it is impossible to do business smoothly in Indonesia without some form of bribery. It is in this connection that American companies find it difficult to compete with the Japanese in Indonesia. The perception is that certain corrupt practices that Japanese corporations engage in are tolerated within Japanese corporate culture. It is important to note that the United States is the number one investor in Indonesia, and that Japan is second.

Central issue

Protests from the Governments of South Korea and the People's Republic of China concerning the visits made to Yasukuni by PM Koizumi rest on a central issue. In their view, Japan not only refuses to admit to the unjust character of the wars it waged against its neighboring countries, but even honours and glorifies the atrocities by venerating the souls of its perpetrators. It is important to remember that, among the 2.4 million individuals interred at Yasukuni, fourteen belong to the category 'Class A War Criminals,' including the then Prime Minister, Tojo Hideki.

China and Korea (and as well as some sectors in Indonesia and the Philippines) are only asking for Japan to admit its culpability. Compensation is perhaps unnecessary. To these peoples, the issue is basic and simple: Japan waged an unjust war. To this simple issue, the solution is equally simple: Japan only needs to admit so.

But I understand that for Japan, such demand is far from 'simple.' It is a serious problem, deeply rooted in the culture and philosophy of Japan, hence the relation of this issue to the psyche of the Japanese people.

The philosopher Takahashi Tetsuya of Tokyo University explains the situation by focusing on the notion of kami. For the Japanese, the 2.4 million bodies at Yasukuni are kami. The word means deity, and is a fundamental concept in Shintoism (in which nature, too, is deified). The heroes at Yasukuni serve as protectors of the whole of Japan, ensuring the happiness and prosperity of its people.

Still, not all the individuals residing in that hallowed ground are Japanese. Approximately fifty thousand non-Japanese people fought on Japan's side (twenty-
eight thousand from Taiwan and twenty-one thousand from the Korean Peninsula) in
the Second World War. This creates yet another problem. The Japanese also accord
them respect (because they, too, are kami). But for the Taiwanese and the
Koreans—especially for the families of those buried at the Shrine—this situation is
shameful. To them, the circumstances of burial mean that these soldiers who fought
on behalf of Japan are traitors to their own countries.

The situation is further complicated by the Japanese concept of a 'dog’s death'
(as opposed to 'glorious dead')—a wasteful, very shameful death that is regretted by
the families left behind. If the Japanese Government admitted to the idea of an unjust
war (inflicted on China, Korea, Indonesia, and so forth), it would be tantamount to
stating that millions of Japanese soldiers died such a 'dog’s death.' It would be
impossible for the Government to face protests of this nature.

Moreover, the Japanese people were invited to go to war by the Emperor and
the Armed Forces of Japan, upon the motivation that it was a 'holy war' to defend
Japan—and to fight for freedom from Western imperialism for itself and their Asian
neighbors. It is almost totally unacceptable if now, after the sacrifices made in the
name of such noble purpose, those went to war were to be condemned in retrospect to
a 'dog’s death.'

This controversy could have been curbed if the fourteen Class A War Criminals
interred at Yasukuni had been moved to another place. There was in fact an attempt to
do this during the Nakasone administration (in the mid 1980’s). Possibly, this was at
the suggestion of China and Korea, in the spirit of the understanding that the
thousands of other soldiers interred at Yasukuni were only carrying out orders. The
fourteen were therefore to be acknowledged as masterminds. Both the families of the
fourteen and the Yasukuni Shrine administration, which insisted that once buried in
Yasukuni, nobody could possibly be moved elsewhere, rejected this proposal. In any
case, the Japanese Government could not impose a solution, because from the
perspective of the Japanese Constitution, Yasukuni is a religious entity and site, and
government cannot interfere in its affairs.

The constitutional dimension of the Yasukuni controversy developed in still
another direction, entirely concerning a problem internal to Japan, involving the
principle of separation of religion and the State. The Constitution upholds the
principles of secularism. These principles have been interpreted to mean that the
office of the Prime Minister, representative of the State, should not visit a religious
site such as Yasukuni in his capacity as head of government.

But did PM Koizumi in each of his visits to Yasukuni do so as Prime Minister?
As of this writing, this matter remains unresolved. PM Koizumi asserts that his visits have been as an individual, or as a Shinto devotee. He wore clothes in keeping with religious duty in all the visits. But for the Koreans and the Chinese, it is impossible to distinguish between Koizumi the ordinary citizen and Koizumi as Prime Minister. Besides which, he has issued statements that bear upon his position as head of state, at his every visit.

During his visit on August 13, 2001, for example, Koizumi said: “As I stand before the souls of those people who died in the war believing in the future of their country during those difficult times, I think again about how the peace and prosperity of Japan today is built on their precious sacrifice, and I come here to renew my yearly oath to peace.” This is, to me, a declaration that is too sophisticated, nationalistic and philosophical to be uttered by an ordinary citizen.

Who decides whether someone is a ‘war criminal’? A War Crimes Tribunal makes these decisions and this is always a victor’s court. It is easy to imagine an alternative scenario in which Japan won the Second World War; in which case General Douglas McArthur and his colleagues would have been brought before a ‘Washington Tribunal.’ President Harry S. Truman would have been among the accused, particularly for the truly horrendous crime of dropping two atomic bombs, slaughtering thousands of civilians, including women, children, and old people. The bomb victims who survive today, some horribly deformed, force us to remember: the charge against the United States for committing a crime against humanity can still be brought to an international court. Such crimes do not have a Statute of Limitations.

A related question: why was the victor’s court that was organized by General McArthur not consistent in charging war criminals in the Tokyo Tribunal? In anticipation of further inquiry, I note here that a document has a deep relation to the question. It is a reproduction of McArthur’s letters to the US President, containing suggestions for the conduct of the Tribunal, including allowing the Emperor of Japan to preserve the status of remain \textit{tenno}, an ‘extraordinary Emperor,’ who is ‘above all.’

It is clear to me that, based on the same principle and the charges applied to the case of PM Tojo Hideki, Tenno Heika also deserved a court trial. He was indeed the highest Commander of the Japanese Armed Forces. But it is also clear to me that the authority of the Japanese Royal Court was indeed remarkable. Even the left-liberal camps were not brave enough to touch this sensitive issue. The very critical Takahashi himself felt the need to justify the why the Emperor was not brought to trial. “You know,” he said, “soldiers everywhere abuse instructions that do not come from their direct superiors… The Emperor is only a symbolic Commander …” But
there is substantial evidence that the Emperor was not merely a symbolic Commander. He inspected the troops, planned strategy, and gave various instructions to the generals.

One possible reason: McArthur and the US Government precisely used the Emperor’s high authority—the core of Japan’s political system—so that the Prime Minister and the generals could be tried without difficulty. If the Emperor had been dragged into it, all of Japan would have risen up to oppose it, at a scale that would have been uncontrollable. McArthur considered the possible reaction that might be generated by a trial of Tenno Heika in his own capital city.

A second possible reason: had Emperor been tried, the kingdom would have ended, and the new power to fill the vacuum would have been the communists. Choosing the lesser of two evils has always been a pragmatic political stance—an attitude not exclusive to the United States.

With the Emperor escaping the noose of the Tokyo Tribunal, he became the only war criminal still in power through most of the twentieth century. That not one of the Japanese generals protested the special treatment demonstrated the high esteem with which the direct descendants of the Sun God was held among his people.

Furthermore, according to what has become public knowledge, not all of the culpable parties were taken to court. Those who escaped turned around and formed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which remains in power today without significant opposition. These public figures quickly transformed themselves into brilliant politicians who are not only adept at handling domestic affairs, but also skilful in international diplomacy, as shown impressively by PM Kakuei Tanaka.

This can perhaps explain in part why Japan’s military spirit continues to burn bright despite efforts to suppress it. The ruling party was indeed founded by the war cowboys. The attitude of Korea and China are often more hostile than friendly, and they continue to play the same old song obliging Japan to atone, and have kept quiet about the terrible suffering Japan endured at the hands of the Americans. Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the international community is growing increasingly unstable, including Japan’s immediate neighbourhood. North Korea is developing nuclear weapons. China is obviously becoming mightier, not merely economically but also in a military sense. And meanwhile, terrorist threats across all borders are intensifying.

'Normal' state
All the debates and concerns on Japan’s national political stage point toward one key
phrase: how to return Japan to a 'normal state,' meaning a country with an armed force beyond the 'self-defence troops' allowed by the Constitution. The avenue is constitutional change. Advocates of such change within the Japan's political elite are getting increasingly vocal; for example, former PM Nakasone (an ex-military officer assigned to Indonesia in the pre-war era), who until a few months ago led a strong faction in LDP. Nakasone complained that the Constitution created by McArthur was like 'distilled water,' with no sense of being Japanese. He was, of course, referring to Article 9, which forbade the Japanese Government from developing its military. Calls for its amendment are getting louder.

If that article is amended, Japan will undoubtedly accelerate to become a giant military power in the world, and this is what worries Japan's neighbors the most, considering Japan's history of aggression. To become a military power overnight is easy enough for Japan because it has everything (first rate personnel, high technology and advanced industry, and abundant funds). Even now, Japan's military budget, without much fanfare, is reportedly the third largest in the world.

Among the most vocal people insisting on amending Article 9 is Ishihara Shintaro, now the Governor of Tokyo, who made waves with his best-selling book, "The Japan That Can Say No" He claims to be upset with the endless discussions. Members of the Diet, according to Ishihara-san, are too talkative and slow. Obviously, the method proposed by Ishihara breaks the constitutional rules of the game, but the remarkable thing is that a high-ranking official such as he (perhaps a future prime minister) can speak this way.

Finally, in his own way, PM Koizumi, who is known as a conservative reformer, also expressed the importance of the amendment. In a nationalistic climate that is heating up, the elite needs to appear more nationalistic than other public figures. There is widening frustration in the Japanese community about the need to rediscover the nation's identity. Among the younger generation, psychiatrist Kayama Rika observes what she called petit nationalism, in contrast to 'traditional nationalism' (a nationalism that is directly linked to Japan's loss to the US-led allied forces). However, be it petit or traditional, both types come together in one platform: the necessity for Japan to become a 'normal state.' It is within this context that the intensifying nationalism inside the elite circle cannot be avoided, because it will define their political survival in the eyes of the voters come election time.

This nationalistic struggle seems to be taking place within the LDP, because the '1955 system' (referring to the year LDP first came to power) currently in place appears increasingly solid. This system is marked by the domination of LDP against
other camps known to be progressive, namely the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the Labour Union (Sohyo). All these opposition groups moved within this frame. In the 1980's, the opposition camp cracked, among other reasons due to the weakening of Sohyo. Since then, LDP domination became stronger and every effort to mend the fracture within the progressive camps was met with failure. New parties sometimes do appear, but they immediately fall out of favour or never reach a significant vote. “People tend not to believe political parties,” said Muto Ichiyo, a leading human rights veteran.

When will the on-going public debate reach its logical conclusion? Not improbably, in 2005, the year Japan will commemorate half-a-century of LDP domination in Japan’s political world. Perhaps the longing for change in 2005 explains why former PM Nakasone still insists on being in Parliament, despite pressure to withdraw by no less than PM Koizumi himself, one of the most important exponents of Japan’s political resurgence. Nakasone doesn’t have much time. Next year he will be eighty-seven years old.

As the part of the first generation of post-war leaders, he gives the appearance of wanting to be active in that historic decision: to sanitize the 'constitutional water' in Japan’s Constitution to reflect its ‘Japanese-ness’—so that Japan becomes a ‘normal’ country with military might. And he definitely will be supported by sixty per cent of the population who, according to one poll, want to strengthen the Japanese military; who also admitted that the war that Japan waged in the past was an aggressive one—but that Japan was forced into waging. In this view, the soldiers who lay at Yasukuni are victims.

With the purification of the Constitution, the Japanese Imperial Democracy will become perfect, a combination of American democracy and an imperial system, with emphasis on the Japanese uniqueness.

As with individuals, at certain points of a country’s journey, it needs to contemplate its form and existence: what it has done, is and will be doing. Other people can only hope: that during such contemplation, no neighbouring country is made nervous. A visitor from Indonesia who has observed the contemplation process for two months—while enjoying the hospitality, cleanliness, and impressive efficiency of his hosts in all the places he visited, while at the same time never encountering a soldier (much less an aggressive one)—probably is not among those who are worried.

But he knows: there are other apprehensive people.
This essay was written based on productive discussions during September-October with sources from the ALFP program 2003; they include: Fujiwara Kiichi, Kayama Rika, Takahashi Tetsuya, Ichiyo Tetsuya, Gavan McCormack, Lee Jon Won, Takeda Isami, Kurasawa Aiko; also the kind and understanding hosts: Shimamura Naoko, Sasamuma Mayuko, Sonoda Kimihiro, Doi Katsuma, and Machimura Akiko; also in-depth and more ‘liberal’ discussions formal and informal with my inspirational colleagues, Yang Guang, Marian Pastor Roces, Sainath Palagummi, Chung Chin-sung, Ham Samrang, Nakano Yoshiko, and Supara Janchitfah. But they are responsible only for the good aspects of the essay. All flaws and mistakes are my sole responsibility.
On The 'Yasukuni Issue'

TAKAHASHI TETSUYA

THE SO-CALLED 'YASUKUNI ISSUE' emerged in the 1980's when Nakasone Yasuhiro, Prime Minister of Japan at that time, paid an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine. This issue has since remained a key diplomatic issue among Japan, China, South Korea, and some Southeast Asian countries. It has again drawn attention with the recent official visits to the shrine by Koizumi Junichiro, the incumbent Prime Minister.

I would like to state my personal standpoint on this matter at the outset. I think that after the Second World War, the Japanese Government should have assumed the official responsibility, in a clear and categorical way, over the aggressive wars and colonial rule Imperial Japan inflicted on Asian countries between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. The failure to do so has caused lingering issues between Japan and Asian countries, as well as within Japan.

The Yasukuni Shrine was part of the system of Imperial Japan before and during this war. After the war, it represented an unresolved and unsettled area of concern. The issue has been raised vociferously, however, on a journalistic level in both Japan and in neighboring Asian nations—a level that mitigated against a full understanding of the real significance and the nature of the issue. It was in response to this situation that I developed a more in-depth discussion in my essay, “Nation and Sacrifice.”

The question of the appropriateness of enshrining the Class-A war criminals at the Shrine has been argued domestically and internationally. In contrast, the concern about the principle of the separation of state and religion has mainly remained a domestic issue, focused on the constitutionality of the prime ministerial official visits to the Shrine. The Japanese Constitution stipulates that the state and religion should be separated. I will consider these two concerns.

The Politics of Perspective
On The ‘Yasukuni Issue’

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The Enshrinement of Class-A War Criminals

More than 2.5 million officials and soldiers of the former Imperial Army and Navy of Japan are enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine. This number includes the so-called Class-A war criminals, who were convicted at the Tokyo Military Tribunal (1946-48). Some Japanese therefore aver that the Prime Minister's official visits to this place mean that the Japanese Government is averting and denying its war responsibility, or affirming the aggressive wars. Such criticism has also come from Asian countries, notably China and South Korea. I personally am opposed to the prime ministerial official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, where Class-A War Criminals are enshrined as kami, and I think it is reasonable that China, South Korea and other Asian countries denounce such acts. On the other hand, confining the Yasukuni issue to the Class-A war criminal case would paradoxically terminate the issue of Japan's war responsibility, but without full resolution. Removing the names of the Class-A war criminals from Yasukuni or enshrining them separately is difficult. Had it been managed somehow, the Emperor might pay imperial homage to Yasukuni. Not only would it interfere with the issue of separation of state and religion, it would also raise the issue of the Emperor's war responsibility. Although discussing the Emperor's war responsibility is considered a taboo domestically, and it is also a very sensitive issue between Japan and Asian countries. I believe that the Emperor is responsible for the war. Therefore, removing the Class-A war criminals from the list of deities of Yasukuni would attribute all the war responsibility to these criminals alone, exempting the Emperor, as well as other war criminals besides Class-A criminals. And Yasukuni Shrine itself, which was part of the system that led Japan to the aggressive wars in question, would be removed from the process of assuming responsibility.

Another important complication involved in the issues of Class-A war criminals and war responsibility, is that the Tokyo Military Tribunal only questioned Imperial Japan's responsibility of the aggressive wars after the Manchurian Incident (1931). However, Yasukuni Shrine had been deeply involved, since the beginning of the Meiji Era, in acts of aggression against Asian countries, including the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. Two problems stem from this fact. Firstly, diminishing the 'Yasukuni issue' into the 'Class-A war criminal issue' would leave unquestioned Japan's responsibility for its aggressive wars and colonial imperatives before 1931. Secondly, there is an issue concerning the nearly fifty thousand people who were mobilized from Japan's colonies at the time (Korea and Taiwan), who fought as 'Japanese' soldiers, who were killed in action, and who are now enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine. In my view, therefore, it is very narrow to limit the consideration of
the Yasukuni issue to the matter of the Class-A war criminals at the Shrine. I understand that this second issue arises in part from the diplomatic and deliberate compromises made by the governments of those countries that fell victim to an imperialistic Japan. Purely from a historical perspective, however, one should not forget that the so-called Yasukuni issue has many aspects that other than the Class-A war criminal issue.

**Separation of the State and Religion**

While questions concerning the separation of the state and religion are a domestic issue, it is a very significant one in the sense that it can advance the Yasukuni issue into a larger concern that is common to modern nation states. Based on reflections on the role played by State Shinto (and Yasukuni Shrine within that system) to mobilize people to war before and during the Second World War, the Japanese Constitution provides for the principle of separation of the state and religion. After the war, Yasukuni Shrine was made into a 'Religious Corporation,' with which the government can have no relations. It is for this reason that within Japan, the Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni has been regarded as unconstitutional, and has generated deep-rooted criticism. The visit is thought to have created a special relationship between the government and the Shrine.

I agree that the prime ministerial visit to Yasukuni violates the Constitution. It should be noted that lawsuits were filed around the country, on the constitutionality of the official visit to the Shrine by Nakasone Yasuhiro in the 1980's when he was Prime Minister. High Court verdicts have stated that a prime ministerial official visit to the Shrine is 'unconstitutional,' 'maybe unconstitutional,' or 'unconstitutional if continued.' From these precedents, it is expected that similar rulings will be given in the lawsuits filed in response to Prime Minister Koizumi's official visit to the Shrine (although there is no guarantee of this outcome). On the other hand, yet another issue will emerge, had the Court adhered to its principle. That is, there is the option of making Yasukuni Shrine into a 'non-religious' organization, so that the unconstitutionality of prime ministerial or Imperial visits to the Shrine would be rendered moot. Another possible settlement that is currently gaining strong support on both the governmental and non-governmental levels is the establishment of a 'non-religious national site of mourning.' So far as I know, the Chinese and South Korean governments have informed the Japanese government that they can endorse such a new non-religious entity. The number of people who think such a non-religious institution for mourning is acceptable—even though they are opposed to Yasukuni
Shrine—is increasing in Japan.

What the nature of such a mourning site would be is yet to be determined, and there are quite a number of matters that require consideration. Will the list of war dead include Class-A war criminals? What does ‘mourning’ actually mean? Would it connote a glorification and justification of the past war? Do you only mourn for Japanese war dead? These points still remain uncertain.

Mourning for the war dead as universal imperative

Without doubt, the Yasukuni issue is historically very specific to Japan in the sense that Yasukuni Shrine is closely related to the ideology of State Shinto, which is unique in that some people can aver that it is not a religion. Yasukuni also has a particularity in that the image and the nature of the Shrine are determined by the aggressive and invasive wars that the former Imperial Japan conducted. Despite all this, once the historical uniqueness of Yasukuni is removed, you will find a level of universality in the idea of a site for mourning for war dead. Institutions that commemorate fallen soldiers who fought for their own countries and died are widely seen in Europe and in Asia. The European nations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were repeatedly engaged in wars, and each country has created a mechanism like Yasukuni to mobilize its people to wars. Similar institutions also exist in East Asian countries today. Therefore, I think that this is something we can discuss as a common issue among modern nation states the issue of the mourning of the war dead and the institution/site for such a purpose. In a word, I believe that the act of honoring and hero-izing the fallen soldiers who died while defending the nation, functions as a mechanism to mobilize more potential soldiers for future wars. I do understand that a war of invasion and a war of self-defense cannot be discussed equally, and that one must make a distinction between them. Nevertheless, I would like to suggest that the meaning of dying for one’s nation in wars, could possibly be a common agenda amongst a number of concerned nations.

During the subsequent open forum, Hamid Basyaib pointed out that while honoring war dead as national heroes is universal, the deep relation of this impetus to religion is unique to Japan.

Dr. Takahashi responded by noting that although Hamid observes the uniqueness of the religious affiliation of Yasukuni Shrine, it needs emphasizing that this issue is complicated by the fact that the Yasukuni doctrines are not exactly religious. This ambiguity is seemingly very Japanese, but it actually has a clear political intention behind it. If Yasukuni doctrines or State Shinto were regarded as a
'religion,' Christians or Buddhists in Japan could not possibly approve of them because of the incompatibility with their own beliefs. The Yasukuni doctrines and State Shinto have therefore been considered more as an overarching national ethos, which one must naturally embrace once he or she was born as a Japanese. Dr. Takahashi further asserted that the fact that Yasukuni Shrine—whose doctrines were taught as the national ethic before and during the war—gained the status of a 'religious corporation,' further complicates the issue. He qualified that the rituals of mourning the war dead in other countries are not necessarily free from religiosity. He cited as examples, the Christian ceremonies held at Arlington National Cemetery in the United States, and the close link between the mourning rituals for fallen soldiers in the United Kingdom and the Church of England, whose Supreme Governor is the Queen herself. He added that when he visited the national cemetery in Seoul, he had the impression that Buddhism influenced the ceremonies. Following these examples, Dr. Takahashi pointed out that what is uniquely Japanese in the case of Yasukuni Shrine is not the religiousness of the rituals, but its peculiar religiosity itself. I assume that such a mourning system for the war dead that is related to a particular religion might also be witnessed in Asian countries.

Hamid pursued his point about uniqueness by observing that Japanese war heroes are worshipped as kami (gods), and that this phenomenon cannot be found elsewhere. And he asked for corroboration of the observation that Shinto, which used to be 'a quasi-religion,' was manipulated by the Japanese army to mobilize Japanese heroism, in this process becoming a 'sacred' religion.

Dr. Takahashi answered that Shinto is in a way, folk belief. According to Japanese mythology, the country was created by the kami (loosely translated as deities), and somewhere down the genealogical line emerged the first emperor, Jimmu. Therefore, some Japanese have believed that their emperors are the descendants of the deities. In truth, one aspect of Shinto has always been associated with the Imperial system. Dr. Takahashi added that on the other hand, Shintoism is basically animism, in which one finds gods in all living entities on earth. During the time of ultra-nationalism and imperialism, both aspects of the Shintoism were embodied in Yasukuni Shrine and State Shinto and manipulated to mobilize people to war.

Dr. Takahashi took the opportunity to comment on the inaccurate translation of the word kami into the English word 'god.' Applying the European Judeo-Christian concept of 'God' (that is, the absolute, monotheistic God) to the image of the gods worshipped at the Yasukuni would obscure the argument, he said. In Japan, just like in
ancient folkloric beliefs in general, the gods are animistic. Through history, following
the influence of China and Korea, that belief developed into the established tradition
of ancestor worship. Before the modernization of the country in the Meiji Era, it was a
common practice among the Japanese to yearly hold a memorial service for the
deceased until thirty or forty years after death. After that period, they were believed
to become kami, who protected the family as a guardian. So what we call kami is,
sacred as it was, fundamentally different from the one and only monotheistic God in
that everyone eventually became god after death. The Meiji government, in its process
of modernization, transformed and advanced this traditional ancestor worship into
State Shinto, in which the nation worships the war dead, so that they may protect the
country as kami.

Marian Pastor Roces asked about the concept of a nation-state and its
secularity. Historically, we can trace the continuation of God or some form of
relationship to God persisting paradoxically within a nation-state. It persists
precisely at the intersection where mourning and fighting have to happen in the past
and in the future. The nation pursues secularism, she said, but the nation is
constantly vulnerable to shifts back into the realm of the religious. And it makes
accommodations to the idea of God, but always awkwardly and always with some
violence. Marian hence asked Dr. Takahashi whether he would go so far to say that
nation as a concept is fundamentally weak, or almost impossible, and that it is
vulnerable to constant rejection by people who desire to return to some kind of
divine realm.

Dr. Takahashi asserted that the further modernization of nation-states
advanced, the more secular they became, and the more religions receded to the
background. In the past in certain religions, he said, people sacrificed their lives for
the sake of the idea of God and became martyrs. With the decline of religions in the
process of modernization, the newly emerged nation states became a new object for
martyrdom. Of course, religions were not renounced entirely. Religions, such as
Christianity or State Shinto, and the nation state as the new object of worship
remained loosely linked. In general, however, in the modern world, a secular nation
state itself has become God or the object of faith. That way, to sacrifice one's life for a
nation can be regarded as an act of martyrdom. Now this new religion called 'nation'
will also become secularized, and sooner or later people will realize that such a belief
toward the nation is also an illusion. How much it would be secularized or how soon
people would realize this, remains to be seen. Dr. Takahashi said that he personally
believes that the secular nature of the nation state should be maintained. Wars that
encourage people to sacrifice their lives for the sake of nation states must not be repeated, he added. Nevertheless, he also observed that human nature would, without fail, seek religion or something religious or transcendent. In reality, freedom of religion is mostly granted, and we are also witnessing a revival of religions that were once rejected in the process of modernization. The forcible suppression of the desire for religious belief will create a huge contradiction. He closed his remarks with the modern idea of a clear distinction that needs to be made between the secular and divine.

Yang Guan gave his impression of Dr. Takahashi’s presentation. He suggested that had the presentation been delivered in China, many in the audience would think that he deliberately over-complicated the issue. Yang said that many Chinese believe that the issue is neither religious nor domestic, but rather, international and diplomatic. To many Chinese the issue comes down to one demand: acknowledgement that the Japanese invasion of China was unjust. Hence it is unacceptable that the soldiers who fought for this unjust war are treated as national heroes or gods. To the Chinese, the Prime Minister’s visit to Yasukuni is a really serious matter, and must be considered in a broader context, notably, the representation of this part of history in Japanese textbooks, and the appropriate response to the comfort women issue. Chinese mistrust of Japan, Yang asserted, is linked to these issues: the Chinese people understand the current situation as an indicator that the Japanese people still think that the war was justifiable. Mutual trust between the Chinese and Japanese peoples may be assisted, he said, if the Prime Minister avoids visiting Yasukuni Shrine.

Dr. Takahashi responded to Yang by saying, firstly, that prior to 1945, all Japanese were thoroughly drilled in the notion that the Japanese Imperial Army was fighting a just war, and they believed it. It was not until after the war, he said, that they began to realize that they had been deceived, but even then, it took some time before a majority consensus formed around the acknowledgement that the wars in which Japan was engaged were invasive and unjust. The slowness of the process was in part because their own family members were killed in those wars. According to several opinion polls conducted in the 1980s, nearly sixty per cent of the Japanese people considered the wars between 1931 and 1945 to be aggressive. At the same time, however, about the same amount of people believed that the wars were inevitable, in relation to the survival of Japan. Dr. Takahashi expressed concern that these numbers might have changed due to the recent rise of neo-nationalism in Japanese society since the late 1990’s. Nonetheless he continues to believe that there is wide acceptance that those wars were aggressive.
What is problematic, he continued, is the fact that the group of people who think that the wars were justifiable—ten per cent of the population, twenty per cent at most—hold rather strong political power. These people without exception support the prime ministerial visit to Yasukuni Shrine, and what is more, they insist that Yasukuni should be nationalized, as it was in the days prior to the Second World War. The prevalent view among ordinary Japanese people, he reiterated, is that the wars in question were unjust, but inevitable. It must be noted that these people, the so-called middle-of-the-road type, tend to think almost innocently that it is rather natural for the Prime Minister to visit Yasukuni Shrine to pay respect to those who have sacrificed their lives for the nation. Yasukuni Shrine is taking advantage of this level of opinion, and through the Yushukan Museum, tries to promote the position that the wars were just. This, in Dr. Takahashi's view, is what frustrates the Chinese and Korean people.

The third group, including himself, he added, thinks that prime ministerial visits are unacceptable because Yasukuni played a critical role in the aggressive wars. This group demands that the Japanese Government assume full responsibility for the wars. But there are incessant conflicts among these groups holding different views in relation to the Yasukuni issue.

Supara Janchitfah inquired about the mechanism that made some Japanese believe that the war was justifiable.

Dr. Takahashi said that, firstly, there was the emotional factor. The bereaved did not wish to think that their family members died in vain; that, instead, their loved ones died meaningful deaths, defending the nation. If the wars were unjust, their deaths would be a waste. They therefore justify the wars to give the death of their family members some meaning. Another factor is theoretical: that while the wars against China and other Asian countries were unjust aggressive wars, the war against the United States and the United Kingdom in the Pacific War should be categorized as a 'liberation war.' Liberation, that is, aimed at emancipating Asian countries from European colonial rule. This notion has been persistent especially among Japanese intellectuals, and once, one Prime Minister stated that Japan's wars were twofold—the invasion of Asian countries and resistance against Western imperialism.

Dr. Takahashi said that he shares Supara's frustration over the persistence in Japanese society, after such a long time, of an attitude that tolerates a distorted point of view; indeed even 'going backwards' with the rise of neo-nationalism. He offered his insights into this persistence. The Yasukuni issue is most difficult to
resolve precisely because it is rooted in the nation-building process of postwar Japan. The banning of all military activity by the Japanese Constitution, now has to be evaluated rigorously. Unfortunately, however, the very political party [the LDP] that had constantly ruled Japan, has not necessarily been committed to the pacifism declared in the Constitution. At the time of the defeat after the Second World War, those powers—in political, as well as in journalistic, educational and academic circles—were not purged. With the outset of the Cold War, the United States, which has wielded an overwhelming influence on Japan, restored power to this prewar bloc. As a result, until the present day, there persists an almost unbreakable lineage between prewar and postwar political structures. The recent emergence of neo-nationalism and the discussion on the amendment of the Constitution to enable the Self Defense Forces to engage in militaristic actions overseas are inseparable from the United States’ global strategy. So I believe that unless such a structure is changed, there is little possibility for Japan to overcome the fundamental problems that postwar Japan faced.

In a broader sense, Dr. Takahashi reasserted, the root of all the ill-feelings lies in Japan’s failure to assume the full responsibility for the wars, and to properly apologize or compensate for the agony caused by Japan’s atrocious deeds during the invasive wars. This recognition of culpability must be the minimum condition to receive forgiveness, if any; to establish a correct understanding (or sense) of history; and to finally communicate respectfully with the people of these nations.

Concerning the Yasukuni issue in particular, one of the first things to be done to settle this issue within the framework of international relations, is to prevent the Prime Minister from visiting the Shrine. One way to do this is to bring a lawsuit on the unconstitutionality of the visit. If the Court rules against the visit, the Prime Minister must cease visiting the Shrine, and it would not invite any more foreign criticism against prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni. As I have repeatedly stressed, however, this is still far away from a complete settlement of the issue of Japan’s war responsibility. Nonetheless, drawing a clear line between religion and the state and preventing the Prime Minister and all the other ministers from visiting Yasukuni is the start of the best solution of all.

Secondly, he continued, to settle the diplomatic issue, Yasukuni Shrine should remove from its list the names of those soldiers from Taiwan and Korea who fought during the World War II and died as Japanese soldiers. Their souls are enshrined at Yasukuni—without the knowledge of the bereaved families— as Japanese soldiers
I would like to give you my personal view of the Japanese people's current state of mind with respect to nationalism, history, self-defense, and security issues; and the complexity surrounding these issues. Let me start with what we generally lump together as the 'history issue,' under which rubric lie many other entangled issues, manifested in various ways, notably, the recent prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Another manifestation is what we have come to call the 'textbook issue.'

Representation of history in textbooks

The most recent episode regarding this so-called 'textbook issue' involved the production of one such history textbook by scholars, journalists, and critics, who tried to give a positive inflection to the evolution of the Japanese history, particularly the modern period. This textbook received criticism from South Korea and China, as well as from various parts of the world, for its 'amnesia' concerning Japanese aggression, and for its 'biased view' in favor of Japanese nationalism. This textbook issue initially had a domestic character. The foreign dimensions accrued to the issue in due course. This issue has both substantive and procedural aspects. The substantive aspect concerns the interpretation of Japanese history, particularly that of the 1930's and the 1940's, after Japan invaded Manchuria and established Manchukuo, started a full-blown war (1937), and expanded the war into the Pacific by attacking the Pearl Harbor (1941).

The origin of this textbook issue is rather difficult to fathom because in the 1950's and the 1960's, the dominant view of modern history, shared by intellectuals and high school teachers, inclined toward a Marxist interpretation. After Imperial Japan's defeat at the end of the Second World War, most of the country's authorities were destroyed. The historians who became very influential in the 1950's tended to be those who 'loyally' died for Imperial Japan. Since the 1970's, some of the bereaved families and relatives of these soldiers have demanded the removal of their names from the list, because to them it is an unbearable humiliation. However, Yasukuni has refused to do so for the reason that they were 'Japanese' at the time of their death. For the Yasukuni issue to be resolved between Japan and Asian countries, this issue of Taiwanese and Korean soldiers should also be cleared up. For Yasukuni Shrine itself to remain existent in Japanese society, it should remove all the people who request to have their names unlisted, including ethnic Japanese soldiers.

There are some things that Japanese society as a whole can or should do. Asserting that more than sixty per cent of the Japanese people recognize the unjustness of the aggressive wars that were conducted by Imperial Japan, Dr. Takahashi added that such a position should therefore be reflected in governmental policy. Specifically, he said, the Japanese should not vote for politicians who do not hesitate to say that those wars were justifiable or that no apology is needed (since Japan fought the wars to liberate Asian countries). Moreover, 'nationalistic' textbooks justifying these wars, which became controversial in 2001, should not be tolerated.

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Knowing Other Viewpoints

TANAKA AKIHIKO

I WOULD LIKE TO give you my personal view of the Japanese people's current state of mind with respect to nationalism, history, self-defense, and security issues; and the complexity surrounding these issues. Let me start with what we generally lump together as the 'history issue,' under which rubric lie many other entangled issues, manifested in various ways, notably, the recent prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Another manifestation is what we have come to call the 'textbook issue.'

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in the 1960's tended to be anti-establishment, and many of them were orthodox Marxists and sympathizers of the Soviet Union. They tended to depict the 1930's and the 1940's as symptomatic of illnesses essential to capitalism. Their analysis followed the classic Marxist (Leninist) paradigm that proposes an evolutionary capitalist development that culminates in imperialism. To them, Japan represented the most corrupt form of imperialism; hence the 1930's and the 1940's were interpreted as the inevitable historical development of capitalism. They viewed the atrocities committed by the Japanese as the result of what they regarded as a historical system, concluding, therefore, that the capitalist system should be changed. This basic viewpoint remained prevalent in the 1950's through the early 1960's.

The bias of this view is evident in retrospect. To the liberals of the second half of the twentieth century, the events of the 1930's and 1940's were not the logical result of the corrupt system (i.e., capitalism). To them, these events were aberrations of Japanese history, in which the national system was kidnapped by the militarists. According to these liberal views, the 1930's were terrible, but not the inevitable result of the development of the Japanese history. Thus, criticism mounted in the 1960's and 1960's against the prevalent perspective carried by history textbooks. This was the beginning of the 'history issue,' to which very few people in countries other than Japan paid attention until fairly recently.

Japan's Ministry of Education was sympathetic toward the reaction against the Marxist-oriented history textbooks, and there were attempts to alter the tenor of these publications under the textbook screening system. These attempts became very controversial because to many Japanese—Marxists and liberals alike—the Education Ministry's screening seemed to be an attempt to control the interpretation of history. Hence: undue state intervention in the writing of history. There were a number of court cases in this connection, including the famous textbook controversies concerning Professor Ienaga. The domestic conflict was between forces trying to maintain a Marxist view, and other forces trying to change this view.

Two contrasting views were involved in the matter of change. One was the liberal view that tried to modify the Marxist perspective so that the 1930's and the 1940's are regarded as aberrations of Japanese history, but liberals also condemned imperialism. The opposing views posited that the events of 1930's and the 1940's, although deplorable, can be justified. Those who followed the latter view tended to perceive Japanese history mainly with respect to its relations with the Western powers. They argued that Japan merely undertook actions similar to the imperatives of Western imperialist powers in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries.
Indeed, even in the 1930's and 1940's, the United States continued to rule the Philippines as its colony. The logic was that the Japanese war against the US was not a war between a colonizing power against a country that is free of imperialism. They asked: what is the moral difference between the US and Japan?

These matters evolved, and in 1982, a newspaper reported that certain secondary school textbooks were forced by the Ministry of Education to change or replace the word 'aggression' by 'advancement.' That generated an enormous reaction in China. The Chinese Government accused the Japanese Ministry of Education of distorting history. The South Korean Government and media joined the Chinese critics, internationalizing the issue. Those who first started criticizing the Marxist view of Japanese history felt that foreign countries were trying to intervene in Japanese domestic affairs. Some, although not all, of these former critics of Marxism became agitated by this foreign criticism.

Three views were put therefore forward. Firstly, there was the aforementioned Marxist view that the 1930's and 1940's showed up the inevitable pathology of capitalist development. Secondly, there was the contrasting view that the imperialist activities of Japan in the 1930's and the 1940's merely conformed to international imperialism. Thirdly, a liberal view emerged that posited that the 1930's and 1940's were out of sync with world development; but that, nonetheless, what transpired were not inevitable consequences of Japanese history. The third view regarded the events in question as an aberration and deficiency of the state system that allowed militarism to take over.

Even to the middle-of-the-road liberals, however, criticism from China and South Korea often seemed too much, for they continued to believe that the controversy is an internal one. Moreover, some of those who were frustrated with foreign criticism argued that the critics did not really understand the Japanese system of textbook screening. The Japanese Ministry of Education screening system exists to simply check the factual aspects of textbooks. Deletions and changes were imposed on wrongly-written facts. But as for the interpretation of history, the government is pressured to act cautiously. In the most recent textbook case, which happened some two years ago, the Ministry demanded one hundred fifty or so factual corrections. These factual corrections did not assuage the Chinese and South Korean critics.

Another matter concerning the screening system is that this is not a system to select only one textbook. Any publisher can submit textbooks. And if I am correct, there are normally seven or eight companies that submit their own textbooks to the
screening system. After the Ministry checks the facts, the Board of Education of each district is entitled to select one textbook out of seven or eight for the district. The selection is not automatic. And this is not a system for writing a national history textbook. To some of those who are involved in the textbook writing process, foreign criticism appeared as though the textbook screening process were tantamount to the writing of the national official textbook.

The 'Yasukuni Issue'
The so-called “Yasukuni issue” was also an initially domestic issue. The Shrine itself was created after the Meiji Restoration (1868) for the enshrinement of those who died for the nation. During the American Occupation, after Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, the Shrine was transformed into a religious entity under the Shinto framework, that is, as separate from the state. However, because Yasukuni had long been regarded as the center where the Japanese paid respect to the war dead, national leaders continued visiting there even after the Occupation. Most of the Prime Ministers of Japan visited the Yasukuni Shrine, and even Hirohito, the Showa Emperor (1926 to 1989) visited in the 1950's. Prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni were not overly noted, and in the 1960’s and 1960’s, there was little foreign criticism.

Domestically, however, strong opposition developed in relation to the principle of the separation of church and state, which is guaranteed by the Constitution. A number of religious organizations, Buddhist and Christian, criticized the Prime Ministers' visits to the Shinto shrine. These visits, in their view, violate the constitutional ban against connecting church to the state. This controversy, however, had nothing to do with the enshrinement of the A-Class war criminals at the Shrine. The legal cases filed centered on the separation of church and state. Generally, in the 1950’s and the 1960’s, Prime Ministers visited the Shrine during its ceremonial weeks in spring and autumn. It was in 1976 when Miki Takeo, Prime Minister from 1974 to 1976, visited the Shrine, that a new element was added to the controversy. The Prime Minister's visit on the day of Japan's defeat of the Second World War connected the Yasukuni directly to the interpretation of Japan's history in the 1930’s and 1940’s.

In 1978, the Yasukuni Shrine decided to enshrine the A-Class war criminals, condemned by the Tokyo Military Tribunal of 1946-1948. In this connection, it must be noted that in Shinto, a form of animism, the deification of the enshrined is a different matter entirely; from, for example, the honoring of the dead in a Buddhist temple. In 1978, after some controversy within the Shrine—concerning the
question of whether or not those who were sentenced to death by the Tribunal should be regarded as victims of the war—Yasukuni determined that they are also victims, and the decision was made to enshrine them. Even after that decision, Japanese prime ministers continued visiting the Shrine, but there was no criticism from virtually anywhere.

In 1985, largely in order to resolve the on-going church/state separation controversy, Nakasone Yasuhiro, Prime Minister during this period, asked his Advisory Commission to recommend what form a visit to the Shrine might take that does not violate the Constitution. The Commission advised that if one conducts a Shinto ritual, that may be the violation; but if one just visits the Shrine and simply pays respect, there would be no problem. Those opposing prime ministerial visits to the Shrine strongly criticized this recommendation. The criticism was heightened with the reaction in China—criticism that did not center on the church/state separation controversy, but on the enshrinement of A-Class war criminals. The Prime Minister’s visit to the Shrine brought to fore the sensitivities within countries that fell victim to Japan, especially in China and South Korea. In the following September, students of Beijing University protested loudly against Nakasone, who, as a result, decided to put a stop to his visits to the Shrine. Nakasone, in later days, has said that he stopped visiting the Shrine mainly to protect his friend Hu Yao Bang, who was under a heavy attack by the conservatives in China. Hu became very close colleague to Nakasone during his visit to Japan in 1984. The Prime Ministers following Nakasone did not visit, until Hashimoto Ryutaro, Prime Minister from 1996 to 1998, visited on his birthday in 1996; and Koizumi Junichiro, the current Prime Minister, visited in August 2001.

To recapitulate the substantial and procedural aspects of the Yasukuni issue. Those who support prime ministerial visits to the Shrine often raise the question, as to why foreign countries only started criticizing the visits in 1985, not earlier; during the terms of most Japanese Prime Ministers, most of whom did visit the Shrine. The Yasukuni Shrine enshrined the criminals in question in 1978, after which, Ohira Masayoshi, Prime Minister from 1978 to 1980, and Suzuki Zenko, Prime Minister from 1980 to 1982, visited the Shrine, generating no criticism. Why China suddenly started criticizing in 1985, remains a question. Arguments have been put forward that some criticism may in truth have been generated by reasons not much related to the shrine issues. Still, those opposed to prime ministerial visits to the Shrine certainly did welcome foreign criticism. Once more, it bears noting that after China put forward its critical position in 1985, the Prime Minister stopped visiting
the Shrine.

Substantively, the issue per se of war criminals can also be very complex, because most fundamentally, there is doubt, among the Japanese, whether the Tokyo Military Tribunal was in fact legally justified. According to some, the criminalization of at least some Japanese leaders may have come about only from an emotional register. The legal question has emerged, however, focusing attention on how trials and executions of individuals can be justified, according to a code that was created after the facts of their war time actions. When Japan aggressed upon China in 1932, there was no internationally accepted criminal regulation to punish individuals. In 1928, the Paris Treaty that banned wars was signed, making it a violation of international law to wage aggressive wars, at least after 1928. Japan was a signatory to this Kellogg-Briand Pact. But this pact did not include a Criminal Code that stipulated punishment for national leaders who started aggressive wars. Under the current international system, a Military Tribunal is trying Slovodan Milosevic at The Hague, but there were criminal conventions before the Yugoslavian crisis. In the international legal system of the early twentieth century, the entity that should take responsibility for wars is a state, not individuals. Most fundamentally, there was doubt as to whether one could execute individuals on account of the act of the state. Then, of course, there were Japanese who agreed with some of those military leaders.

Moreover, the question has been posed, to wit: can it be said that all the A-Class war criminals are similarly responsible? There is at least one very contentious case. Hirota Koki, who became the Prime Minister in 1936, did not, in most historical accounts, play any role in starting the wars in question, either the 1937 Shino-Hirota Koki, who became the Prime Minister in 1936, did not, in most historical accounts, play any role in starting the wars in question, either the 1937 Shino-Japanese War or the attacks on the Pearl Harbor. He was a total civilian diplomat, but he was sentenced to death. There were other similar cases in the Tokyo Military Tribunal. Because of these cases, certain Japanese sectors resented Chinese criticism, are puzzled, embarrassed, and frustrated. This, in my view, summarizes the complexities involved in this set of issues.

The Security Issue

I suggest that the recent changes in Japan’s security policy is part of a normalization process, and do not indicate military expansionism. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is the most important part of the 1947 Constitution, which constrains Japan’s militaristic activities abroad. Occupation forces imposed this stipulation; and there was no official attempt, on the part of the Japanese Government to write this sort of sentence. I do not regard Article 9 negatively. The first line says: Aspiring
sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use if forces as means of settling international disputes. This is perfectly consistent with the United Nations Charter.

What can be controversial is the second sentence: In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. As a statement of an ideal condition of human affairs, this sentence might be construed positively. However, without a context of Japan in the late 1940's and the early 1950's, it would be difficult to conceive that any sovereign state can subscribe to this kind of Constitution. The normal idea of a sovereign state is that the country itself can decide on what forms of self-defense it requires. Precluding all the potential for war potential, to some international lawyers, seems meaningless, because if a country literally follows this sentence, it will cease to be a sovereign state.

This Constitution was created during the Occupation period, when Japan was firmly protected by the American forces, so it did not make any difference. Practically speaking, this second sentence did not pose much of a problem even during the Cold War, because as a front line of the Cold War in the eastern sphere, Japan was adequately protected by the United States. Very few countries demanded that Japan involve itself in any operations outside of this area. But what is really ironic is that it was the United States that wanted Japan to share the burden, while it was also the United States that created this Constitution.

Currently there are discussions about a constitutional amendment, but I think it would be a very difficult process, because this US-created Constitution imposes many checks in the process of arriving at revisions. A two-thirds approval in both Houses is needed in order to initiate a constitutional amendment process, after which the process will have to have majority support during a referendum.

What the Japanese Government has done, therefore, is to introduce an interpretation that can justify the Self-Defense Forces under the current Constitution. Because Article 9 explicitly states that 'land, sea, and air-forces' would never be maintained, the Government insists that Land-SDF, Maritime-SDF and Air-SDF are not the 'land, sea, and air-forces' and do follow the spirit of the Constitution. It is easy to simply ignore the Constitution, but Japan is under the rule of law and every Government has to pay respect to its legal system. So the Government says that because of this stipulation, the types of forces that Japan can have, and the types of activities Japan can conduct, are limited. The Government interpretation is that
Heights and East Timor. In my view, this evolution is consistent with Japan's aspiration to achieve international peace without becoming an aggressive force. Participation in United Nations activities is perfectly in line with the spirit of the first sentence of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. In this sense, I believe that this evolution is a normalization of the Japanese attitude toward security affairs.

The attempt to revise the Constitution can be interpreted differently, partly because there were different motives for revising it. One motive, which I think is declining, is to deny the imposed Constitution. There are people in this country who did not like the Constitution from the beginning because it was imposed by the Occupation forces. In their view, a nation should have its own Constitution. They demand the removal of the imposed Constitution and the writing of a new one. This view is declining simply because most of today's Japanese have been educated, made prosperous, live with freedom guaranteed under the current Constitution.

More arguments concentrate on the inconveniences that were created by the Constitution. Whether imposed or not, this was a document created in 1947, when Japan was devastated and no comparable life existed. As more people regard this evolution process to be normal, the second line of Article 9 becomes problematic. If the Government takes the strange interpretation forever, it will make for an unhealthy situation. And when one thinks of a country whose SDF has a military budget that is probably the third or fourth largest in the world—still insisting they are not 'land, sea and air forces'—the situation is rather hypocritical. If it is realistic to maintain a limited amount of military forces, then they should change the second sentence that does not deny the spirit of the first sentence.

In essence, I reiterate that these movements in security affairs and the possibility of constitutional amendment are not the indication of any military expansionism. The process is one of normalization, a natural effort to adjust the legal system to current modern reality. But the history issue is a very complex issue. I am not able to come up with any panacea with regard to this contentious situation, with its domestic and international dimensions.

Japan can exercise individual self-defense to protect itself, but collective self-defense remains prohibited. The original meaning of this interpretation is that Japan was not supposed to participate in a Korean War type situation; it cannot send troops to participate in a war in foreign lands. Legally speaking, however, this is a most difficult position, because Japan is an ally of the United States.

The question arises: If Japan is banned from engaging in collective self-defense, how can it be an ally of the United States? There is a legal magic that has made it possible. The Japan-US Security Treaty of 1960 offers a rather roundabout way of saying simple things. It says in Article 5:

"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes."

This is a circuitous way of saying that if Japan is attacked, the United States would protect Japan; but if the United States is attacked, Japan does nothing. This is largely because of the interpretation, on the part of Japan, that acknowledges the prohibition on collective self-defense. Although this treatment of alliance seems unfair to the United States, this was not much of a problem during the Cold War, because the United States could maintain military bases in this country. Geographically speaking, Japan is in a strategic position, a cap that stopped the Soviet Union's outward flow. The question is if it can be the basis of the alliance after the end of the Cold War.

Furthermore, because of the very harsh legalistic debate (concerning the ban on the exercise of collective self-defense right), the government's legislation bureau has maintained that Japan's participation in United Nations peace keeping activities must also be restricted. In my view, participation in United Nations peace-keeping operations has nothing to do with collective self-defense. However, the current legal interpretation limits Japan's participation in such peace keeping activities. In 1992, when the Cambodian Civil War ended, there was a drawing call for Japan to participate in the peace process in this country. The Japanese Government very slowly started creating a law that would enable Japanese to participate in Cambodian peace keeping activities. The end result was what was called the 'PKO Law,' which allowed for the sending of forces to Cambodia. After that, Japan sent forces to Mozambique, the Golan
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Annex A

2003 Asia Leadership Fellow Program

Schedule of Activities

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<td>15:00 Introduction Seminar</td>
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<td>18:00-20:00 Welcoming Reception</td>
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<td>10:00 Workshop I: Presentations by the Fellows (1)</td>
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<td>HAMID BASYAIB, “The Latest Portrait of Indonesia: Five Years after Reforms”</td>
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<td>Sept. 6</td>
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<td>Sept. 8</td>
<td>10:00 Workshop IV: Presentations by the Fellows (4)</td>
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<td>MARIAN PASTOR ROCES, “The Master Plan of the Cultural Center of the Philippines: Can An Egalitarian Vision be Designed?”</td>
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<td>PALAGUMMI SAINATH, “Mass Media vs. Mass Reality”</td>
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Annexes
### ANNEX A

#### 2003 Asia Leadership Fellow Program

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**Hiroshima A-Bomb documentary video showing**

**Orientation for the field trip**
**118 UNEQUAL WORLDS**

**Sept. 9 (Tue)**  
Field Trip to Hiroshima/Kobe/Osaka (Day 1)  
- Visit to the Peace Memorial Museum and Park  
- Testimony by an A-Bomb survivor, Ms. Matsubara Miyoko

**Sept. 10 (Wed)**  
Field Trip to Hiroshima/Kobe/Osaka (Day 2)  
- Seminar on Hiroshima and Media Coverage by Mr. Tashiro Akira, Senior Staff Writer, *The Chugoku Shimbun*  
- Meeting with Mr. Shibutani Fukio, an organic farmer in Kobe  
- Visit to the Takatori Community Center

**Sept. 11 (Thu)**  
Field Trip to Hiroshima/Kobe/Osaka (Day 3)  
- Visit to the Osaka Museum of History  
- Observe situation of the homeless in Kamagasaki and Nakanoshima  
- Briefing at the Osaka Municipal Government

**Sept. 12 (Fri)**  
Field Trip to Hiroshima/Kobe/Osaka (Day 4)  
- Visit to the Osaka Human Rights Museum  
- Visit to elementary and middle schools in the Korean community at Tsuruhashi  
- Discussion with the local residents  
- Return to Tokyo

**Sept. 16 (Tue)**  
Visit the Japan Foundation Asia Center  
Workshop V: Discussion on Future Direction of Collaborative Interaction (1)

**Sept. 17 (Wed)**  
Core Seminar I: "Transnational Civil Society in the Age of Globalization" by Professor SAKAMOTO YOSHIAKU

**Sept. 18 (Thu)**  
Core Seminar II: "The Fate of Illiberal Democracies" by Professor FUJIIWARA KIICHI, University of Tokyo  
Additional Workshop on the public symposium

**Sept. 19 (Fri)**  
Workshop VI: Discussion on Future Direction of Collaborative Interaction (2)
Sept. 22 (Mon)  Core Seminar III: "The War on Terror and Human Security: The Global Fascism and the Criminalization of the Informal Communities"
By Professor MUSHAKOJI KINHIDE, Chubu University

Sept. 23 (Tue)  Visit to the Waseda Hoshien for P. SAINATH Photo Exhibition (optional)

Sept. 24 (Wed)  Film screening of "A" directed by Mr. MORI TATSUYA

Sept. 26 (Fri)  Weekend Retreat in Shonan (Day 1)

Sept. 27 (Sat)  Weekend Retreat in Shonan (Day 2)

Sept. 28 (Sun)  Weekend Retreat in Shonan (Day 3)

Sept. 30 (Tue)  Film screening of "A2" directed by Mr. MORI TATSUYA

Resource Seminar I: "New trend of Religion in Japan and the Role of Media: in the case of AUM"
by Mr. MORI TATSUYA, film director

Oct. 1 (Wed)  Resource Seminar II: "Nations and Sacrifice"
by Professor TAKAHASHI TETSUYA, University of Tokyo

Oct. 3 (Fri)  Resource Seminar III: "Nationalism and a Discourse on Japanese Uniqueness"
by Professor GAVAN McCORMACK, Australian National University

Oct. 6 (Mon)  Resource Seminar IV: "Petit Nationalism Syndrome-The Rise of Nationalism among the Younger Generation and its Socio-Cultural Background"
by Professor KAYAMA RIKAI, Kobe Design University
## 120 Unequal Worlds

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| Oct. 7 (Tue) | Resource Seminar V: "Post-War Social Movements in Japan with a Special Focus on US Military Base Issues"  
by Mr. MUTO ICHIYO, Co-President, People's Plan Study Group |
<p>| Oct. 9 (Thu) | Workshop VII: Introduction to Okinawa Field Trip                        |
|           | Meeting with Dr. Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi, Member, House of Representatives   |
| Oct. 10 (Fri) | Field Trip to Okinawa (Day 1)                                           |
|           | • Briefing/Discussion at the United States Consulate General in Naha    |
|           | • Visit US Marine Corps Bases (Camp Butler &amp; Camp Foster)              |
| Oct. 11 (Sat) | Field Trip to Okinawa (Day 2)                                          |
|           | Lectures/Discussions:                                                  |
|           | • &quot;Japan-US Security Treaty and Okinawa&quot; by Professor GABE MASAAKI, University of the Ryukyus; |
|           | • &quot;Anti-base Movement in Okinawa from the Women's Perspective&quot; by TAKAZATO SUZUYO, Naha Municipal Legislator; |
|           | • &quot;Environmental Issues in Okinawa&quot; by Architect MARKISHI YOSHIKAZU    |
|           | • Discussion with members of Inochi o Mamoru-kai (anti-US Heliport citizens in Nago); |
|           | • Visit to the 'Elephant's Cage' &amp; meet with Mr. Chibana Shoichi       |
| Oct. 12 (Sun) | Field Trip to Okinawa (Day 3)                                          |
|           | Visit to sites related to Battle of Okinawa                            |
| Oct. 13 (Mon) | Field Trip to Okinawa (Day 4)                                          |
|           | Wrap-Up Session at the University of the Ryukyus                       |
| Oct. 16 (Thu) | Workshop VIII: Discussion with Mr. KATO MIKIO                         |
| Oct. 20 (Mon) | Workshop IX: VCD/Video showing on Gujarat &amp; Nagasaki                   |</p>
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<td>Oct. 21 (Tue)</td>
<td>Visit to Yasukuni Shrine Yushu-kan Museum</td>
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<td>Oct. 22 (Wed)</td>
<td>Resource Seminar VI: &quot;Fundamentalism&quot; by Mr. OGAWA TADASHI, Director of Planning Div., The Japan Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 23 (Thu)</td>
<td>Resource Seminar VII: &quot;Japan and International Media&quot; by Ms. DODEN AIKO, News Broadcaster, NHK/ Ms. ITO MISAKO, Editor-in-Chief, Gaiko Forum</td>
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<td>Oct. 28 (Tue)</td>
<td>Public Symposium: &quot;Unequal Worlds &amp; the Roads Ahead&quot; (Day 1)</td>
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<td>Oct. 29 (Wed)</td>
<td>Public Symposium: &quot;Unequal Worlds &amp; the Roads Ahead&quot; (Day 2)</td>
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<td>Oct. 31 (Fri)</td>
<td>Resource Seminar VIII &quot;Knowing Other Viewpoints&quot; by Prof. TANAKA AKIHIKO, Professor, University of Tokyo</td>
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<td>Evaluation Session</td>
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<td>Farewell Dinner</td>
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ANNEX B.1

SUMMARY, CORE SEMINAR 1
"Transnational Civil Society in the Age of Globalization"

By Sakamoto Yoshikazu

PROFESSOR SAKAMOTO FOCUSED attention on what, in his view, are the fundamental problems of the contemporary world, setting his sights on global military, economic and cultural structures. He observed that within the dynamics of globalization are inherent contradictions that simultaneously give rise to close interconnections and divisive fragmentation. These contradictions affect security, identity and democracy (the ALFP 2003 theme), collectively an interrelated problematic.

World military structure
Professor Sakamoto first took up the issue of security in connection with the emergence in the world today of a unipolar hegemonic military power structure. He cautioned against thinking that this emergence of a world empire—built on unilateralism—to be merely a product of the Bush administration, or of the neo-conservatives of the United States. To him, this development reflects a structure of contradiction which came into being through the historical development of the modern world.

On the one hand, he said, modern history has seen the growing concentration of technologically advanced weapon systems, in the hands of a decreasing number of powerful states. However, this increasing concentration of advanced military technology has inevitably been accompanied by the worldwide diffusion of less-developed, sometimes second-hand, military technology. Today, this concentration/diffusion dynamics operate within a global hierarchy of weapons systems, at the bottom of which an enormous quantity of the lower-tech, small arms proliferate.

The diffusion of modern low-tech arms and the concentration of military high-tech arms are two sides of the same coin. The United States is confronted with two forms of diffusion of arms; namely, terrorism, and the nuclear proliferation. In this contradiction that is inherent in the structure of the global military hierarchy, the domination by hyperpower at the top is inevitably countered by the forces at the
bottom. It is evident today that neither side of the contradiction will bring about increased security. Professor Sakamoto asserted that unless the apparent global military order (which in reality is a global military disorder) is put under an international disarmament regime based on democratic equity, transparency, and accountability, this concentration-diffusion dynamics can only aggravate global division, fragmentation and insecurity.

**World economic structure**

Professor Sakamoto then took up the increasing economic disparity on a global scale—a condition which to him is an inevitable consequence of global capitalist marketization. The international liberal market economy is likely to reduce the incidents of war or armed conflict, a) between the countries which are at a relatively equal level of development; or b) between the more developed, on one hand, and on the other, the less developed, which are closing in on the former, according to the logic of free and fair competition.

Professor Sakamoto does not think that a large amount of aid necessarily contributes to the alleviation of poverty in the South. He notes the many cases in which such aid has aggravated corruption, internal disparity, and the continuation of dictatorial or authoritarian regimes. Yet, decrease in aid does aggravate the North/South gap: the simultaneous presence of a level of affluence that is unprecedented in history, and of the poverty, hunger, and malnutrition suffered by one tenth of the world’s population.

To Professor Sakamoto, the problem is not only in the presence of this economic gap, but more importantly in the absence of a political and moral framework for addressing the situation. However, he reiterated that the persistent lack of interest on the part of the people in the North, does not necessarily imply that they are terribly selfish and inhumane, with little sense of compassion. The primary reason for the general lack of interest is not subjective sensibility but objective structure.

According to the logic of capitalist development that has brought about the affluence of the North, there is no economic necessity to save and help the starving ten percent of the world’s population. For the world capitalist market economy, these people are structurally dispensable and disposable. If they die from hunger, there will be no adverse effect on the capitalist world. Indeed, the world capitalist market economy might even be better off if it could save the expenditure on development aid for people whom capitalism does not need for its efficient productivity. This, therefore, is not merely a matter of economic disparity, but of global democratic
accountability—bringing to question the very nature of human beings, a question which should transcend national boundaries and geographical distance.

The market economy, science and technology, and dehumanization

The dehumanizing and alienating impact of the globalized capitalist market economy is not the exclusive condition of disadvantaged people (internationally and intranationally). People in the North are similarly afflicted.

The immense good brought about by scientific development has come at the cost of the environment. Technological advances have likewise contributed to and further widened the distance between the rich and the poor. What is remarkable, he notes, is that the quality of the human condition has similarly been diminished among the so-called advanced societies as well as the poor societies—even as the sophistication of science increases.

Universality of human rights and diversity of cultural values

Finally, concerning the values of universal validity, which provides the foundation of human identity, Professor Sakamoto took up two issues that have a crucial bearing on civil society, namely, the universality of human rights and diversity of cultural values.

The universal character of the idea of human rights is generally accepted as articulated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948 by an overwhelming majority of the member states of the United Nations, including the socialist states. However, the UN member states in 1948 did not include most of non-western nations, which were still colonies that the time of ratification. It was thus inevitable that the peoples of the Third World will regard the idea of human rights as of essentially Western origin, alien to their indigenous values. This applies to the Japanese experience.

Western ideas and technologies were introduced into a modernizing Japan. Finding no linguistic equivalents in Japanese for a number of Western concepts—among which was the concept of human rights—new terms were coined. Professor Sakamoto observes in this connection that there is no denying the Western origin of many modern ideas. However, the assertion about the specificity and originality of respected non-Western values had a pitfall, just as a naïve affirmation of the universality of Western values had served to justify Western colonialism and cultural domination. Insisting on the specificity of non-Western local cultures tended to legitimize authoritarian, repressive regimes in many parts of the world.
In his view, cultural relativism can mean two different, or even opposing, notions. On the one hand, it implies the denial of the universality of cultural values, among others the idea of human rights. This, he believes will lead to anarchy in world value systems. And there is a danger that what is right will only be determined by the use of might, and cultural relativism in this sense will end up in nihilism (a Hobbesian state of value).

On the other hand, cultural relativism with its rejection of cultural imperialism (i.e., that culture should not be located within the framework of a hierarchy with Western culture at the head) - may allow for the recognition of distinct systems of equal value. The question then arises: on what grounds can different cultures be considered of equal value? To Professor Sakamoto, the only tenable answer is that every culture should be treated as equal. Insofar as each culture embodies the life of human beings who have equal rights, it is possible to accept diversity.

Therefore, if a culture denies the fundamental equality of human beings, it lays itself open to international criticism from the viewpoint of universal equality of human rights. It is for this reason that Professor Sakamoto is skeptical of the validity of the notion 'Asian Values.' In the first place, what is meant by 'Asia' is unclear, for the idea of Asia was created and defined by Europeans.

Still, apart from these qualifications, it seems obvious to Professor Sakamoto that while cultural diversity has to be acknowledged, commonalities must similarly be recognized, sub-nationally, nationally, regionally, and globally. And those values that are shared globally point to universal human rights, which form the core of global human identity.

It was in this connection that Professor Sakamoto critiqued the idea of the 'Clash of Civilizations' put forward by the American writer Samuel Huntington (in a book of this title) in 1993. He contested Huntington's assertion by observing the confusion of three different dimensions: difference, conflict, and violent conflict.

Although there are obviously significant differences among the cultures of civilization, difference is not the same as conflict, much less armed conflict. The question that can rightly be asked in social scientific terms is: under what conditions will groups of different cultures come into conflict, and under what conditions will the conflicts between these groups turn into violent conflict? The process is of course complex, but one thing is clear to Professor Sakamoto: the shift from difference to conflict, and from conflict to armed conflict cannot be accounted for in terms of cultural difference, which remains the same, a constant. Thus, the reason for the shift
from difference to conflict, and from conflict to armed conflict should be identified politically, economically. In fact, there are a number of instances where people of different cultures or religious backgrounds live together peacefully. At the same time, no one can deny that innumerable ethnocultural groups did and do engage in conflict, war and, deadly struggle.

Professor Sakamoto gave reasons which to him are 'fundamental.' First, there is often the historical legacy of the system of political and economic domination/subordination, or antagonism, which was forcibly established along the lines of ethnocultural division under the constraints of low productivity and the scarcity of resources. What is of crucial importance today is not so much the reality of a zero-sum game in the past, as it is the memory and myth about such past reality. Memory and myth are invoked to rationalize new patterns of political and economic contradiction, such as the inequality resulting from capitalist economic development.

Secondly, if disparity exists within an ethnocultural group, the discontent or the sense of insecurity caused by the internal disparity tends to be externally diverted by ethnocentric extremist elements, whether in power or alienated, through the manipulation of ethnocentric myth and symbols, in which context other ethnocultural groups are presented as the enemy. These ethnocentric extremists are generally small in number at the beginning, but their influence, particularly the emotional appeal, grows—depending on what the structural cleavages are. In the process through which ethnocultural difference turns into ethnocultural conflict, there is always an element of what Benedict Anderson called the 'imagined community' involved.

The 'imagined community' dwells in the minds of a people, despite the inevitable inequalities and conflicts of interest within the ethnocultural group itself. The internal structure of the group is such that there are always fictitious elements in the concept 'ethnic group,' a term (like 'culture') that presupposes homogeneity and the common interest. But there are always elements of fiction involved in this notion of ethnic group or cultural group. Collective identity tends to conceal internal inequality and inequity.

Conversely, to the extent that the internal structure of each group is democratized, and made more egalitarian, the incidence of violent conflict between the groups can be minimized. Ethnocultural difference and diversity will remain in a democratized world, and it may cause a certain degree of tension all the time. But tension, short of conflict or armed violence, can be a source of creative interactions, just as diversity of opinions is the source of creative democratic dialogue. If there is
no diversity of values or cultures in this world, it will a horrible dis-utopia.

Professor Sakamoto concluded his seminar by offering some thoughts on civil society and the role it should play as a foundation of democratic, political processes. Civil society, he asserted, is based on the mutual recognition of the universality of fundamental equal rights of human beings, and in that sense, the fundamental homogeneity of human being, excluding no one as the other. Civil society is thus based on the recognition of the diversity of values and cultures, interrelating human beings by defining human identity as multilayered and hybrid.

Both democracy and civil society may be conceived in terms of Jurgen Habermas' "Unfinished Project." There is no end to the project of creating civil society and democracy, because these developments call for a continuous critical self-transformation of our own way of living, not as objects or commodities, but as active human subjects.

Q&A

In the discussion session that followed, Supara Janchitfah inquired after mechanisms civil society which can have a voice in inter-state cooperation. She commented that in her country, Thailand, civil society or the NGO movement is regarded by government as a "state enemy"—that which stands in the way of the development. Professor Sakamoto cited history in his response. He observed that Europeans, who have a history of violent conflict, have managed to stop the killing, consolidate, and eventually create the European Union. Even in Thailand, Professor Sakamoto assured Janchitfah, NGO's are now playing much greater roles than half a century ago, when students were complaining about the absence of a Constitution. Thailand today is very different, he asserted, in terms of the presence and empowerment of the people and civil society. Concerning the interrelation between the empowerment of civil society within an individual state, and cooperation among states, Professor Sakamoto again referred to Europe, where the strength of civil society is stable. Only fifty years ago, it was totally inconceivable that Europe may
have a single parliament, directly elected by individual voters. While the power of the European Parliament is still limited, a process of growth is underway.

If one looks at problems from a slightly broader historical perspective, indicators of change (however small it may seem) take on more important meanings. It has already become almost common sense in Western Europe, and perhaps in so-called Eastern Europe in the near future, that no government can ignore civil society now; and that cooperation between government and civil society is vital.

Professor Sakamoto also added that in any discussion of international cooperation, one should be clear about whose interests the discussions are focused on. In saying that says civil society can promote international cooperation, he insisted that this is not in the interest of international elites. Civil society may stand against the interest of the existing elites, but in many cases elites are much faster in developing international ties.

Concerning Janchitfah's statement about the Thai Government's antagonistic attitude toward the civil society, Professor Sakamoto said that that is understandable: every society goes through this process. Democracy and civil society have unending struggles. He continued by recognizing the negative nature of the Thai Government's perspective, it is also possible for NGO's to consider a re-conceptualization of the concept of 'development.'

Responding to P. Sainath's expression of discomfort concerning the dichotomy of the capitalist-based market economy versus a democracy-based civil society, and also about the whole concept of civil society, Professor Sakamoto stressed that what is important is to have some standard or criteria in criticizing civil society. Civil society has to be defined and redefined constantly.

With regard to Yang Guang's question of whether a desirable world structure is 'regionalization,' as opposed to multipolar or unipolar power configurations, Professor Sakamoto argued that it depends on various conditions. Unipolarity, which tends to be danger of becoming an unstable system when there is a serious conflict of interest between major powers, can also be something positive if unipolarity means an emergence of a world federation or government. Likewise, a multipolar system, which is usually preferred to unipolar system, can easily be exclusive. In discussions
of world structure, small powers are often disregarded. Professor Sakamoto thus argued that the security and the peace of the world should not depend on what kind of power structure is realized. Rather, discussions should not be confined to states as actors, or big states exclusively. There are many other actors, including corporations, which sometimes perform positive functions in terms of maintaining the status quo (which is far preferable to large-scale wars) and NGO's and civil society, which every government must pay attention to.
ANNEX B.2

SUMMARY, CORE SEMINAR 2
"The Fate of Illiberal Democracies"

By Fujiwara Kiichi

CONSTANTLY IN USE, the word 'democracy' seems to be well understood everywhere. Professor Fujiwara Kiichi began his lecture by remarking on the variability of this term. "Democracy is such an abused word," he began, "it is so difficult to reach into its substance."

The word, he notes, was introduced early to Japan and to other Asian nations, where various meanings and inflections were in use in different periods. He cited the use by José Rizal, among the leading nationalists of the Philippines at the end of the nineteenth century. In Rizal's use, 'democracy' meant the Filipino's right to independence. Rizal was not talking about the rule of the law or a form of governance. 'Democracy' was a magic word for Rizal; indeed for the people of the would-be Republic.

Moving to an Indonesian example, Professor Fujiwara cited Kartini, a major Indonesian writer best known for the letters she wrote while she lived in self-imposed exile for about a year before she was to marry. The letters touched upon 'democracy.' Again, the word meant independence; specifically, 'independence from others.' This usage did not refer to a particular political substance or institution.

Professor Fujiwara then brought up Fukuzawa Yukichi, "very possibly the best known political intellectual in Japan." A rather controversial figure, Fukuzawa argued in his famous essay "Datsu-A Ron," (which may literally be translated as "getting away from Asia") that Japan should separate herself from Asia and stand alone in its pursuit of modernity. Westernized intellectuals in Japan see in Fukuzawa's work a "Japan neglecting her Asian neighbors." But this may not exactly be the case if one takes a closer look, Professor Fujiwara observed. Fukuzawa wrote as part of a pursuit of political liberty in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; a pursuit for which he did not find parallels in the other Asian countries. "Fukuzawa's ideal modernity was essentially a confrontation between the state and society, [implying the] need to construct civil society." Professor Fujiwara added that Fukuzawa thought that Japanese modernity itself was dictated by the needs of the market and military power, and was not so much a modernity from the perspective of political liberty.
In Professor Fujiwara's view, "Here was blatant prejudice, for Fukuzawa did not pay attention to the liberal movements in the Philippines and Indonesia," adding that "there were quite a lot of liberal movements during this period." Fukuzawa discusses 'democracy' as something being pursued by the Asian neighbors. But, "this is quite absurd," says Professor Fujiwara, "because he argues that Asian neighbors are pursuing democracy but not political liberty. This is just one example of the rather numerous uses of the word 'democracy' as being almost synonymous with 'political independence' [but] with little relationship to civil liberty." 'Democracy' was an anti-colonial word circulating at the end of the nineteenth century.

Professor Fujiwara observes "a remarkably different picture" in contemporary Asia. "Take a look, for example, at the statements made by [Malaysia's former Prime Minister] Mahathir Mohammad or [Singapore's Prime Minister] Lee Kuan Yew [who put forward] an argument that puts democracy as something Western and alien to Asia — the famous Asian Values theory." In this connection, 'democracy' is thought to be at variance with concepts held by Asia nations.

Having noted the versatility of 'democracy,' Professor Fujiwara moved on to "the basics of democracy." He described present-day use: "When we use the word 'democracy,' on the one hand we usually mean political institutions, a form of government, rule of law, political participation, things that are incorporated into a certain political institution that is called 'democratic.' So let's call this democracy a 'procedure' or 'institution.' Democracy as a form of governance. When we apply the word democracy to Japan, for example, we usually mean democratic institutions, a form of governance. We are not usually arguing about the democratic ideals or norms. On the other hand, there is another use of the word 'democracy' as a political ideal: that governance should be accountable and responsible to the people who live there. [That is:] power to the people."

He then shifted his discussion to the Japanese situation: "Democracy has these two souls: on the one hand there is an actual form of governance and political institution, and on the other hand there is a political ideal. The relationship between these two has always been rather tense, and quite contradictory in some ways."

The succeeding section of his seminar dwelt on European history where 'democracy' did not refer to 'nationalism' nor 'national independence.' Democracy — essentially a word used by the socialists in Europe — was deployed as part of a discourse in the interest of the working class. Professor Fujiwara qualified that by 'socialists,' he refers to Social Democrats, in whose vocabulary, 'democracy' was connected to the struggle for universal franchise for landless peasants; which was in
turn part of the ambition for full-fledged socialist states where it was hoped that the will of the majority, particularly of the poor, would be reflected in the governance. “Here, democracy was an extremely revolutionary word.”

In the early part of the twentieth century, it became clear that the right to vote given to individuals did not necessarily mean that the poor can achieve a revolutionary ‘poor man’s government.’ "It simply means that everybody has one vote, but there will always be political leaders, association groups who would put all those forces together and built up a political capital. To this extent, then, universal franchise actually simply means a road to a stable oligopoly of political power.” Professor Fujiwara noted the idea, circulating at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, of a desired ‘democracy’ that will bring about political freedom; which dream was, however, thought to be vulnerable to thwarting by the liberal elites (who, it may be assumed, will not give up their political rights).

Oligopoly or oligarchy would not and did not simply vanish. That a revolutionary situation did not materialize may have had to do with what is indicated by statistics. Historical developments proved that simple expansion of political participation need not lead to either political instability or a full political representation. Professor Fujiwara then observed:

"Now, from this place, we have two ways to go. On the one hand we can simply denounce this whole enterprise of democracy as bourgeois thing, and argue that this whole process only aids the interests of the ruling class, the land holders, the capitalists. This was a very persuasive argument in the twentieth century where legal democracy after all was limited to a certain number of countries. And when it was achieved, it only produced conservative results. The real democracy should not be limited to simple political procedures... On the other hand, simple democratic political procedure does not guarantee social justice, social equality, or political equality at all. It merely means that there is an opportunity which may actually be better used by those who have far more capital, far more access to political power, and far more access to mass communication."

He then offered a brief discussion of the American experience in this connection. Noting that the United States is the only Western state where ‘democracy’ was described—and was achieved as—a form of governance since the early nineteenth century, Professor Fujiwara further notes that these developments were not accompanied by the discussions about democratic ideas following the tradition of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and other French intellectuals. Nor were these developments connected to the socialist inflection attached to democracy in the nineteenth century.
Europe. Professor Fujiwara synthesizes the American developments in comparison the those in Europe, thus:

"In the US, democracy in many ways was a way to contain political participation into a form of political constitution. This was a period when the upheaval of the American Revolution against the British led to very severe political instability in US. And the only way to get out of it was to incorporate political participation that had become so widespread during the Revolution period into a form of Constitution that would guarantee the rule of states within that union and also within an individual and within the society. The point I'm trying to make here is that the principle that rules American democracy was extremely eighteenth century and extremely liberal in many ways in the classical sense. If you compare this to democratic ideals pronounced in late nineteenth century Europe, there's virtually no discussion about social equity in Hamilton or the founding fathers of American democracy. In fact they could not argue about the equality so easily because many of them were really slave-holders. So the interesting thing is that the very archaic form of liberal democracy installed in the US in the very early period, was quite distinct from social democracy that was the main argument in the late nineteenth century Europe. There's a major demarcation between democracy-a-la-America and democracy-a-la-Europe."

Professor Fujiwara believes that it is for this reason that 'democracy' in the US has a conservative undertone. Talk of 'democracy' is deeply connected to talk about the founding fathers.

Democracy and Asia
Noting that there are more 'democracies' now than at any time in the past, Professor Fujiwara however observed that in the 1960's, one witnessed more authoritarian regimes in Northeast and Southeast Asia, citing President Pak Jung-heui and President Marcos of the Philippines He also noted the major breaks in the time-line, observing that the Philippines' Marcos was deposed in 1986; that the Thai junta was formed to retreat from politics in 1992; and in 1998, President Suharto left political power. He added: "There is every reason to doubt the substance of democracy of all those three cases."

However: "If we describe the form of governance in the three countries, you simply have to call them democracies. In fact, they are much more democratic than Japan in many ways. The Philippines have the rule of law, which is eagerly defended by a great number of lawyer politicians in the national assembly. In Thailand, you have
the freest press of all you can have in Asia in many ways; free to the extend that all those unsubstantiated statement can appear on the press. In Indonesia democratization is on the verge of being reduced into a state of nature. To keep democracy as a stable state of affairs (that does not mean simple state of nature in the Hobbesian manner) is the major challenge in Indonesia. So at least we can never call these governments undemocratic."

That Malaysia's Mahathir Mohammad and Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew have been arguing against 'democracy' may be seen as "a remarkable sign that shows how democratic this region has become." He qualifies however that, "Having pointed out that there was a remarkable shift toward democratic form of governance, democratic institutions, I think it is only fair to say that in Seoul, Manila and Jakarta, democracy is not exactly a magic word now. It does not carry the high hope that characterized the word in 1986 in Manila, in 1987 in Seoul, in 1992 in Bangkok and in 1998 in Indonesia. In fact, the sovereign fact is that democratic institutions may not deliver what was hoped for by a large member of the society. In many ways, what we are observing now is what happened in Europe in the twentieth century. You have democratic institution, but it does not deliver social equality, does not deliver full political freedom, it's something of an elitist institution, which maybe quite apart from the interest of the people."

**Illiberal democracies**

Turning then to his main topic, Professor Fujiwara discussed four types of illiberal democracies that have been the subject of discussion and debate amongst political scientists. He qualifies that he uses 'democracy' to mean political institutions.

One kind may be described as 'exclusive.' It is one in which certain social groups are *de jure* or *de facto* (by institutional means or by informal means) excluded from the political process. He noted that there is a "ridiculously large number" of exclusionary institutions.

'Tutelary democracy' is another illiberal form, where certain political groups retain veto power over key political decisions. A caretaker or watchdog of the political process is central to this variant. This watchdog intervenes into the political process every time it thinks that the process is against their favor. The military is usually such a watchdog.

In many newly-born democracies, a transition to 'delegative democracy' may be observed. "The argument goes like this," according to Professor Fujiwara, "once you start a democratic government, the first thing you have to face is the confrontation
between the Congress and the president. The president and the congress are both elected by popular votes. They have their equal protect in their political bases, and they fight.

Finally, he cited (and he said, “I abuse the words 'illiberal democracy'”) 'tamed democracy,' where democratic institutions permits the same group of political leaders to govern the country. He cites Japan, ruled by the Liberal Democratic Party since 1955, as a classic case in point.

Professor Fujiwara went into extended discussions of each of these variants, referring to specific historical experiences in a number of countries in Asia.

**Democratic ideals and democratic institutions**

He said he went into the extended discussions to assert that it has historically been the case that the distance between democratic ideals and democratic institutions can be extremely great indeed. He added that most observers hope that these illiberal modalities would simply represent transitional phases that will disappear in the future. But: “I seriously doubt that.” Taking Japan as an example, he notes the strength of the tamed democracy.

He concludes: “What this means is that you simply do not get a choice in elections. The right thing about intellectuals or scholars here is that our role is to open questions, not offer answers.”

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1 José Rizal became a martyr after he was sentenced and executed by the Spanish colonial authority in the Philippines. In the aftermath of his death transpired a major peasant rebellion on the island of Luzon that would subsequently be called the first Philippine Revolution.

2 Professor Fujiwara explained that before marriage, during the period of Kartini’s life, the daughters of Indonesian aristocrats had to be secluded to secure virginity.
Q&A

In the discussion which followed, Nakano Yoshiko spoke of her response to the experience of visiting the Kansai area with the other Fellows, specifically, the earthquake-devasted sites around the Nagata area of Kobe, and the Kamagasaki area where day laborers and homeless Japanese congregate. She said: "What struck me while walking around these neighborhoods was that seem to find only two kinds of posters: one from LDP and the other from Komeito. From what I understand is that they are really conservative parties although I completely understand that their spectrum is basically the same as many other parties, as I gather from your seminar. I wondered: what is going on here?" Professor Fujiwara responded by saying that the voting behavior of minorities and the marginalized in Japan needs to be studied very carefully, but that from current data, their votes as more pragmatic and practical than what outsiders might assume. For one thing, they need jobs and money. The Komeito and LDP are the two parties that have very strong local chapters, which respond to daily complaints from those who are living there.

Asking about 'naturalized Koreans,' Ching Sun Chung inquired further about the vote in relation to this particular minority group. Professor Fujiwara observed that naturalized Koreans who can vote have voted LDP. Chung wished to know about sources of this kind of information, and Professor Fujiwara said that surveys have been conducted by social and political scientists. He added that there is no government survey. Continuing with his observations on Koreans in Japan voting patterns, he said that the Socialists used to have strong support, and there were certain groups whose socialist history comes from the days of the coal mines in Kyushu. The marginalized keep on voting conservatives.

Supara Janchitfah asked Professor Fujiwara for comments in relation to the way Thailand seems to be following the versions of state-creation articulated in Singapore and Malaysia. In response, Professor Fujiwara firstly observed that the trend is likely to continue. He thinks there will be greater concentration of power in the Executive. "Tight now under a democratic institution you have a de facto monopoly of political power in the office of the Prime Minister. This is not exactly a rare case. This is a kind of what I call delegative democracy or delegation that takes place within democratic processes." He added however that this trend may go on for a considerable time, but might, on the other hand, easily collapse. Janchitfah inquired after the possibility of
arresting this trend, to which the response of Professor Fujiiwa observed that he believes that the next political battleground is going to be about the distribution of financial resources between national government and local governments. As more political movements and NGOs give up their attempts to change national politics, and as they put more emphasis on local politics, the real battleground would be the distribution of financial resources between the center and the local. In some ways, actually, that is exactly what is taking place in Japan right now, he said.

Ham Samnang inquired about the major components that constitute democracy. He cites his context in Cambodia, which nominally is a democracy, but with the same person getting the power to lead for more than two terms: "can you call this country democracy or not?"

Professor Fujiiwa said: "By any twist of definition, I would not call Cambodia democratic." He qualified immediately: "Here I'm not using the word 'not democracy' as a criticism because Japan may have a democracy which does not really count as much. But having said that, to define a democracy, we would need full political participation and the right of association. Also, election."
ANNEX B.3

SUMMARY, CORE SEMINAR 3
“The War on Terror and Human Security: Global Fascism and the Criminalization of the Informal Communities”

By Mushakoji Kinhide

PROFESSOR MUSHAKOJI started by presenting the concept of ‘human security’ as defined by the Report of the United Nations Commission on Human Security. It states that human security (or people’s security) is economic, political, and military security; and the empowerment of the most insecure people, not just those of the rich and the powerful.

While recognizing the role played by Osama bin Laden in the mobilization of American public opinion for the war on terror, Professor Mushakoji emphasized that the 9/11 attack only triggered off what had long been planned, that is to say, a war on terrorism. He asserted that the post-Cold War United States needed to create “new threats” to build up its military armaments. They hence developed new dangers, namely: transnational criminal organizations engaging in such activities as human trafficking and drug smuggling, and terrorism.

Professor Mushakoji argued that it is both interesting and strange to see the US persisting in its military advancement at the expense of the other nations' raison d'État: democracy. Despite the democratic principle separating police and military forces—to avoid militaristic dictatorship—the police and the US military began to merge in the early 1990's in order to tackle external threat. Professor Mushakoji remarked that in the US presently, a strong state and a neo-liberal economic theory coexist. The liberal tradition allows states to play only a minimum role and give the free market full freedom (i.e. the 'Night Watchman State'). Professor Mushakoji is of the opinion that the problem resides in the application, by President George W. Bush, of the nineteenth century 'night watchman theory' to the US. America has thus become a very strong global night watchman; indeed, with the very strongest nuclear capability.

Professor Mushakoji further stated that this phenomenon is not necessarily a US invention, but emerges out of the global economy. Describing this global economy as neo-liberal, he points out that it has been in the cause of 'informalization'—in the sense that the new constitutionalism is based on the neo-liberal global economy, or what Stephen Gill calls 'disciplinary neoliberalism.' The latter term means that all the rules and principles that used to support welfare are now geared toward protecting
the free market. The rural economy, not receiving support from the state, becomes more and more informal, generating migrants who move to the North by way of informal channels and create informal settlements (i.e. slums) in the big cities of the North. Huge informal networks are being created in this manner.

These informal networks tend to be regarded in the North as criminal in shape. But Professor Mushakoji argues that what is truly criminal is the exclusionary nature of formal structures. Those who have been neglected and eliminated by the state, who are moving to the North as illegal and smuggled migrants or trafficked women, are the source of profit for transnational criminal organizations. Since it is difficult to spot and control these transnational organizations, among other practices, the victims of such crimes are treated as criminals and often prosecuted as such.

This criminalization of the victims of criminal organizations has been developing very rapidly since the 1990's, adding another source of insecurity. There are a growing number of surveillance systems identifying and profiling 'possible' suspects of terrorism, not only in the United States but also in other parts of the world, including Japan.

The problem with this approach is that human insecurity in globalization and informalization creates a vicious cycle. The greater the pressure the formal police and military place impose on the informal communities, illegal migrants and so forth—the stronger formal control becomes; and the stronger formal control gets, the greater the sense of insecurity for more people. Professor Mushakoji suggested that the ideal way to locate a terrorist suspect is to gain support from the informal communities themselves. To do so, governments need to build mutual trust and communication with such communities.

The present situation, however, is quite the contrary. Neither the states (nor civil society) nor the informal community trust each other, as a result increasing the sense of insecurity and mistrust on both sides.

Professor Mushakoji believes that communities should instead be built on an acknowledgement of needs, rationality, and gender/class equality. Coincidentally, the UN Report on Human Security emphasizes that a people's sense of security should not only be based on individual security, but also on that of the community or group. One must strengthen the sense of security of a community and eliminate the sources of insecurity felt collectively, particularly in informal communities.

At this juncture, Professor Mushakoji contrasted the UN Report and the so-called Bush Doctrine (the US national security strategy). First, the Bush Doctrine
argues that "we" are experiencing a historical moment of peace, because all the big powers that used to confront each other are now united and following the lead of the US in fighting the common adversary (i.e., terrorists). In contrast, the UN Human Security Report says that globalization is creating a very insecure world. A mere look at the big powers might actually give us the impression that we are in an age of peace, but a closer observation of the people living in different communities will reveal extremely high levels of the sense of insecurity.

Secondly, the US national security strategy argues that the current threat to civilization is from sinister and irresponsible people who have access to science and technology; access which heretofore was the exclusive prerogative of those who thought themselves responsible: the civilized. Thus, the US has a mission to unilaterally and preemptively eliminate the potential sources of threats on the other side of civilization. The UN report on Human Security is critical of this position, and asserts that what is called a 'war on terror' only recognizes short-term reaction, failing to take into account the system of state terrorism. Moreover, many individuals have been mistakenly treated as terrorists. In the confusion, many of those who live in conditions of great insecurity seem indistinct from terrorists and criminals.

Finally, this Bush 'doctrine' sees poverty as a source of terrorism, and terrorists as those who 'mistakenly' resort to terrorism to relieve poverty. Instead, it insists that free market competition is the only way to eliminate poverty because by free competition, the quality of life of economic actors is raised—as a result poverty will be eliminated. On the other hand, the UN Report, while recognizing that the beneficial effects generated by the market economy, asserts the need for its regulation, in order to assure the welfare of the disadvantaged.

Professor Mushakoji also maintained that global alliances are indispensable in the pursuit of human security, and that they will have to be multilateral, for human security can only be built with the cooperation of different states and the UN. Yet, not only should alliances be ‘top-down from the UN’—citizens should also work with those living in insecurity. In other words, the efforts to realize security should be multilateral, as well as multilayered.

In conclusion, Professor Mushakoji offered three recommendations, as to how to promote human security within the terms set forth by the UN Report on Human Security.

Firstly, the informal communities in the South which are increasingly insecure within the global economy, and the informal and insecure communities in the North built by a growing number of migrants and trafficked people, should be
transformed into secure communities, and the people living within these communities empowered.

Secondly, the current heightened levels of mutual feeling of threat and mistrust between civil society and the so-called illegal migrants must be alleviated. There should be a common sense of security between the least insecure informal societies and civil society—in order to build mutual trust and common security. Also, such mutual security should be built among communities in the South with different identities.

Thirdly, a new theory of development and peace must be based on the networking of security communities, formal and informal. Professor Mushakoji urges the development of democracy based on the participation of people, but not merely in terms of creating political parties and having elections.

Professor Mushakoji added as an end note that work towards human security should always be combined with human rights advocacy and human development. Unjust regimes, he cautions, have been known to emerge from work that focuses exclusively on human security.

Asked to articulate his definition of terrorism, Professor Mushakoji observed that sometimes, terrorists create greater insecurity by their self-sacrificing themselves, ironically to increase the level of security for those whom they love. Part of terrorism is self-sacrifice. However, he continued, terrorism cannot be looked at in any positive ethical or moral way, because that self-sacrifice leads to greater levels of insecurity.

Professor Mushakoji thinks that asking about the causes of terrorism is not a legitimate question. It is a question that should be always asked together with another: what rationale does big power have to maintain nuclear capability? There are many types of violence used by state and non-state actors, among which is terrorism. Terrorism does not work in a situation where nation-states have adequate legitimacy, because then people would rely on the state to protect their security. Presently, however, all the institutional states as protectors are losing their capacity to protect their own people.

When people cannot seek protection from the state, they will rely on other communities—religious communities, for example. Guerilla activities and terrorism are other avenues. Although Professor Mushakoji denounced these strategies, he also observed how states are increasingly irresponsible in this respect; and how they do not really have the power to protect their people. Poverty, he asserted, cannot be viewed as exclusively the cause of terrorism.
ANNEX B.4

SUMMARY, RESOURCE SEMINAR I
"New Trend of Religion in Japan and the Role of Media: The Case of AUM"

By Mori Tatsuya

PRIOR TO THE SEMINAR by Mori Tatsuya, the Fellows had the opportunity to watch “A” (1998) and “A2” (2002), both Mori works. He began by describing the various reactions (in his view, often over-reactions) he faced with the release of both “A” and “A2.” Such reactions may be in summarized by the fact that about half of the invitations he received for screening or giving lectures on the two films had been cancelled. Even the screenings or lectures that after all were realized, had met with interventions from various groups, including the police force. Mori asserted that this attitude from Japanese society is likely the same reaction it is showing toward the cult which calls itself Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth).

Mori argued that Japanese society has changed since the 1995 Tokyo subway attack by some followers of Aum who used the lethal gas sarin. Increasingly, the Japanese feel threatened by imaginary enemies, and they seek answers in increasing militarization or severe forms of surveillance. The ultimate form of crisis management, according to Mori, has been to create an imaginary enemy and preemptively attack that enemy. This is what Americans did after the 9/11 terrorist attack. Many Japanese criticize the Americans for the way they have changed after 9/11, but they do not realize that they have been reacting in the same way since the subway Sarin gassing, Mori asserted.

In the same vein, he believes that the Japanese are becoming much less tolerant toward criminals and crimes, and they tend to fall into the dualism of good versus evil, not seeing the ‘gray zones.’ In 1999, a heated debate took place in and outside the Diet on whether or not a Subversion Protection Law should be created to regulate the activities of Aum. The bill was dismissed at that time, reflecting the opinion that it was going too far. Two years later, however, a new bill to "regulate the activities of groups that have committed a random mass-murder" (the so-called Aum New Law) was introduced in the Diet, and it was solely intended to hinder the activities of Aum (or Alef, as it calls itself now). Although the contents of the bill are a re-wording of the Subversion Protection Law, this time the bill was passed into law with overwhelming support.
Mori said that many people who have seen “A” or “A2” are surprised to see how peaceful and good-natured most of the Aum followers are. People tend to or wish to believe that Aum followers are villainous and bloodthirsty murderers. To him, it is of great importance to seek the reasons why such good-natured people end up committing horrible acts. He also argued that when humans form a certain group, there are moments when the rules and interests of that group prevail over the feelings and minds of each member of the group. Corporate crimes and wars are good examples of such moments. Mori repeatedly stressed that imagination—that is, an ability to imagine that the most vicious criminal or terrorist is also a human being—is vital in the process of confronting the danger of such collective outrage.

Mori believes that hatred reincarnates and perpetrates itself. In hating something or someone, people reject seeing the object of their hatred. With the object of hatred unseen, it increasingly grows mysterious and threatening—further escalating the level of hate. Mori’s documentaries on Aum seek to address this escalation.

Mr. Mori also shared with the Fellows some of the inside and sequel stories to the films, and the technical element of the shooting.
ANNEX B.5

SUMMARY, RESOURCE SEMINAR III
“Nationalism and A Discourse on Japanese Uniqueness”

By Gavan McCormack

PROFESSOR GAVAN McCormack expressed the opinion that Japanese society is sick. The ailment may be observed, he suggested, in a series of outrageous statements, made by prominent political figures in Japan in the year 2003. “It’s no big deal not keeping a promise.” (Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro on his not having kept his platform: 27 January) “Koreans during the war asked to have their names changed to Japanese names. It was their wish to become Japanese.” (Aso Taro: 31 May) “Gang rapes are OK because it shows young guys are in good shape.” (Ota Seiichi: 26 June) “Women who don’t even produce one child, after rejoicing in their freedom, have come asking to be looked after for taxes.” (Former Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro: 26 June). The latter former PM also said, in 1999, that Japan is a land of gods centered on the Emperor.

Professor McCormick argued that such crisis proportions of political, economic and social irresponsibility in present-day Japan is a consequence of the distortions on the post-1945 Japanese psyche produced by a system that has consolidated the principles of cover-up, irresponsibility, and forgetfulness.

In order to present a fuller picture, Professor McCormack first referred to the rise of neo-nationalism in Japan in the 1990's, which has been made manifest in various campaigns implemented by a number of powerful political, academic and media organizations. The introduction of a new history textbook which tried to “instill a sense of national pride and the sense of ‘correct’ history and return to the pure, bright, superior Japanese identity of former years” (1996), and the reinstatement of the national flag (Hinomaru) and anthem (Kimigayo) as officially sanctioned national symbols (1999), are among the expressions of this neo-nationalism.

These neo-nationalist revisionists have also campaigned for educational and constitutional reforms to recover what they believe to be the ‘true’ Japanese spirit of ‘What is Japan?’ and ‘Who are the Japanese people?’ They hence criticize the Fundamental Law of Education, which was adopted in 1947 by the General McArthur-led occupation forces for being a universalist, rights based formula.
There is a hearkening back to the model of the Imperial Rescripts of Education, a sacred text issued by the Meiji Emperor in 1890. The revisionists of the 1990's stresses morality, patriotism, discipline, self-sacrifice, tradition, and community service. The major promoters of the revision, i.e. the major neo-nationalist organizations, wish to purge the current constitution of the pacifist constraint of Article 9, so that Japan can possess and employ armed forces just like other 'great powers.'

Common to these campaigns is the strong belief that Japan should eliminate the polluting influence of foreign cultures that corrupt the true Japanese spirit, and return to the 'pure' Japan. In fact, this current of thought dates back to the seventeenth century, when a group of scholars called the 'Mito School' regarded Chinese civilization as an alien, polluting substance on the pure essence of Japanese-ness. In reconsidering the answers to "What is Japan?" or "What is Japanese-ness?" they have thought it necessary to get rid of such this polluting influence.

This idea of 'pure Japanese' was to be reinforced and developed by the nineteenth century, into a notion of Japan as a distinct, divinely chosen, superior people, united around a semi-divine emperor. Nineteenth century Japan also decided to define its identity as non-Asian, or "datsu-A" (that is, 'getting away from Asia,' or 'rejecting Asia').

Until the 1930's, Professor McCormack maintained, this ideology of Japanese uniqueness and superiority had been at least functionally successful, helping the Japanese state survive in a dog-eat-dog imperialist world and then to grow industrially as a united economic unit. Morally, however, it failed to articulate a message of universal appeal to the peoples of East Asia. The empire failed to achieve any moral congruence and in 1945 it collapsed.

Returning to his main argument, he suggests that the ailment of Japanese society today is at least partly rooted in this ideology of mono-culturalism—which had totally failed, but was retained after 1945. Paradoxically, it was preserved principally upon the demand of General Douglas McArthur.

For in exonerating the Emperor of war responsibility, the Allies after 1945 preserved a core of irresponsibility at the heart of the old system; that is, in the person of the Emperor. Washington even rebuffed moves from within the Japanese establishment to have the Showa Emperor abdicate to accept responsibility for the war. The occupation forces were of the opinion that US national interests would be best served by subscribing to the emperor system and the related notion of Japanese distinctness and uniqueness. Their argument was that, so long as enough people in
Japan can be persuaded that they possess a unique, superior, non-Asian Japanese identity, in which the Emperor is a symbol of organic wholeness, linchpin of monoculturalism, source of racial and cultural purity, and quintessence of Japanese-ness, there is no fear of the emergence of any Asian community or commonwealth from which the US might conceivably be excluded. So long as that is maintained, Japan can never threaten the US by the creation of an alternative pole in the global system. Thus, the US Government, then and since, has aligned itself with Japanese nationalists and neo-nationalists in insisting on Japanese cultural uniqueness.

Professor McCormack also pointed out that it is truly paradoxical that while Japanese neo-nationalists stress the symbols of national identity—as if that identity were sovereign and indivisible, if not indeed sacred—they are either blind to or positively supportive of the contrary process of deepening subordination to the US in military and strategic matters. Japan’s neo-nationalism is therefore essentially a pseudo-nationalism, located not at the level of policy or substance, but in rhetoric and symbolism. He acknowledged that all nationalisms are, after all, constructs of the imagination; but he adds that few are as much a product of a nation-state structure as split and compromised as is Japan’s.

It is in this context that Professor McCormack believes that the Bush administration today steps up the pressure on Japan to revise its Constitution, to expand its defense horizons to support ‘coalition’ operations as a fully-fledged NATO-style partner, and most recently to send the Self Defense Forces to Iraq and to pay the twenty per cent of the bills for the occupation of Iraq. Japan’s dependent incorporation in the US military strategic frame has tightened with the Guidelines legislation in the 1990’s, the Anti-Terrorist Special Measures Law in 2001, and the Emergency Law which was passed by eighty per cent majority in the Diet.

For the Pentagon, it remains fundamental that Japan continues to rely on US protection. Any attempt to substitute for it, an entente with China in particular, would “deal a fatal blow to U.S. political and military influence in East Asia” (Rand Report, 2001). In other words, for Washington, the thought that Japan might one day begin to ‘walk its own walk’ is a nightmare comparable to, if not worse than, that of 9/11.

The emergence of a cooperative and harmonious twenty-first century Asian commonwealth, Professor McCormack reiterates, will be blocked so long as Japan’s identity continues to be defined in terms of the same, unique, imperial distinctiveness originally articulated in abstract terms in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, then constructed in highly concrete terms by the Imperial Japanese Army in the 1930’s and 1940’s, and slowly revived from the late twentieth century. Such an
identity, thrust upon Japan after 1945, continues to serve both Japan's neo-nationalists and US policy makers.

At the end of his presentation, Professor McCormack made reference to proposals made by a number of intellectuals who are trying to transcend and counteract such expressions of neo-nationalism. One of them is the idea of creating an EU-style Asian community. For example, Wada Haruki, Professor Emeritus of the Tokyo University, proposed the idea of an 'East Asian Common Home' in 1990. Wada had been searching for a vision in the postwar period that would offer a way out of the Asian region's one hundred eighty years of warbeyond the existing superpower nuclear confrontation, the militarized division of Korea, and the frozen confrontation between Japan and Russia over the 'Northern Islands.'

Kang Sang-jung, a Japan-born ethnic Korean scholar, offered an elaboration of Wada's vision in his statement to the Diet's Constitutional Research Commission in March 2001, in which he called for transforming the existing dependent relationship with the US into a pact between equals and balancing it with a web of Northeast Asian linkages around which a European-style East Asian community would slowly cohere, integrated around steadily increasing flows of capital, technology, labor, and culture, marked by region-wide, infrastructural projects designed to seal the unity of the region, including new communications (undersea railway tunnels, fiber-optic and satellite-based intelligent communications), and an opening of all states to the languages and cultures of their neighbors.

Such discussion is commonly presented as blocked by the North Korean problem, and to an extent, it is true, Professor McCormack agrees. North Korea is a huge problem. But the block in question is less an effect of the problems with North Korea than it is a symptom of Japan's deep-seeded sense of its identity as superior and non-Asian. On the contrary, the Japan that Kang and Wada envisage would be not mono-racial and mono-cultural, and instead multi-racial and multi-cultural. When Wada, Kang and others talk about the 'public,' they are not talking about the ethnically-defined racial-national community of the modern Japanese state to which conservatives and neo-nationalists cling so tenaciously, but they are imagining a truly radical new identity.

If such an alternative vision spreads and gains adherents, the evolution of modern Japan might in the long term come to be seen as a process stretching from the *datsu-A* (getting out of Asia) of the 1880's to *datsu-nichi*, getting out or going beyond the well-established traditions of Japanese identity as unique, superior non-Asia. The challenge that intellectuals face now is to generate such an understanding of past
history, present political, economic and cultural understanding, and aspirations for the future, that could be shared by people across the existing nation-state frontiers. The imagining of such a new community has at least begun.

1 Professor McCormack believes that the wave of neo-nationalist and neo-conservative revisionism is still strong. In 2001, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) adopted its 'Education Reform Plan for the 21st Century,' and since then the Minister's advisory body has formally recommended revision of the Fundamental Law of Education. Once adopted, public spiritedness, morality and love of country will be incorporated as objectives of the education system.

2 With regard to this argument, Arthur Stockwin, Former Director of the Nissan Institute, St. Anthony College, Oxford University, later asserted that the decision of McArthur to keep the Emperor was rather a reasonable one; Had the Emperor been abolished, the occupation exercise would have been imperiled by a backlash against it.
ANNEX B.6

SUMMARY, RESOURCE SEMINAR IV

“Petit Nationalism Syndrome – The Rise of Nationalism in the Younger Generation and its Socio-Cultural Background”

By Kayama Rika

PROFESSOR KAYAMA RIKA first characterized some of the recent phenomena that are particularly apparent among young Japanese in terms of: an overt exhibit of pride and affection in things Japanese; an innocent embrace of the national anthem (kimigayo) and the national flag (hinomaru); and the affirmation of a nationalistic view of Japanese history. Statements made by certain well-known figures that praise the wars Japan conducted against Asian countries, or a manifestation of such a view in a new textbook which has tried to ‘adjust’ the ‘self-abusive’ view of Japanese history, have gained support among some of the youth of Japan. An increasing number of people are likewise favoring the revision of the Constitution in order to enable Japan to possess an army.

Professor Kayama labels these phenomena as the rise of nationalism. However, she argues that what is being witnessed now is different from ‘traditional’ nationalism. Rather, it is, in Professor Kayama’s coinage, petit nationalism—a symptom in the psychological sense that issues from one’s personal sense of risk, and a tool to restore his or her sense of security. She further asserted that such a sense of insecurity is also manifested in the sharp increase in crime rates, in the open call for economic sanctions or actual military attack against North Korea, in an extremely low tolerance toward mentally-handicapped people who have committed crimes, and in an abnormal cry for authorities to impose surveillance systems. In sum, the Japanese sense of insecurity appears to have made them more vulnerable and at the same time aggressive. They have adhered to the idea of being ‘different,’ 'abnormal' or 'marginalized.'

Professor Kayama draws from her work in psychiatry to arrive at 'treatments' or solutions to the pathology of petit nationalism. She qualifies that not everyone who suffers from psychological distress or from a sense of insecurity express themselves in this manner. (Some commit suicide, for example.) But she suggests that petit nationalism can lead to traditional nationalism. She furthermore suggests that as a first measure, Japanese youth have to be made to realize that their nationalistic sentiments issues from personal fear, low self-esteem and sense of insecurity. Then, the next step will be to learn to see things from wider historical perspectives.
ANNEX B.7

SUMMARY, RESOURCE SEMINAR V
“Post-War Social Movements in Japan, with a Special Focus on US Military Base Issues”

By Muto Ichiyo

1945-1952

Mr. Muto Ichiyo’s seminar was deeply informed by his role as Co-President of the People’s Plan Study Group, from which perspective he regards the years between 1947 and 1952, during which the world witnessed the beginning of the Cold War (1947), Revolution in China (1949) and the outbreak of the Korean War (1950). He describes this as a transitional period for the Japanese peace movement. Japan had been militarily occupied through these historical events. However, the American military presence in Japan drastically changed its significance with the outbreak of the Cold War.

Immediately after the end of Second World War, the American interest and mission in Japan was to control Japan and make it peaceful by deterring it from becoming remilitarized. Drafting of a post war Constitution was one of the steps towards demilitarization. The famous Article 9 renders all militaristic activities unconstitutional. After the outbreak of the Cold War and the Korean War, however, it was no longer in the American interest to simply disarm Japan.

During the Cold War period, the American bases and military presence itself became an important part of the arch, stretching from Korea, passing through Japan (Okinawa), Taiwan and to Southeast Asia, to encircle the Communist China. In Mr. Muto’s synthesis, re-arming Japan as a part of the American reserve, under such circumstances, became an American concern. Suddenly, General Douglas McArthur ordered the establishment of a new military force, called the National Police Reserve, which later developed into the Self Defense Forces of Japan.

While the main body of the American military was fighting in Korea, Japan was fully mobilized to help the war effort. The National Railway was used arbitrarily for military prerogatives, and the best part of train cars were set aside to carry munitions and military personnel. Military bases were also mobilized for the war, particularly the ones in Kyushu, such as Itatsuke Base near Fukuoka, which was used as a launching base of bombing operations.

It was this extraordinary situation that triggered a peace movement in Japan,
according to Mr. Muto. Their main concern was to protest against Japan’s involvement in Korean War, and to protest as well the willing support of the Japanese Government for an American war. This peace movement was escalated as a result of the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, which put an end to the US Occupation of Japan and made Japan an independent nation once more. (Some Southwestern islands, including Okinawa, remained under the US sovereignty).

The Peace Treaty stipulated that all foreign troops should leave Japan within ninety days. Simultaneously, however, the Japan-US Security Treaty which was signed, provided that American troops would stay in Japan permanently. This contradiction marked the beginning of the long postwar political, militaristic and, ideological process for Japan.

Mr. Muto thus described the peace movement of the 1950’s as mainly an anti-base movement. It was inspired by the promises of the Constitution and their strong belief that Japan must be peaceful, free from military bases, and that the postwar Japan must choose a new course distinct from the imperial course which Japan had followed since the beginning of the Meiji Era.

This public belief and efficacy in the correctness of this choice (pacifist course) was reinforced immediately after the occupation was ended. During the occupation, people were not allowed to openly talk about the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Mr. Muto noted that all the writing and references to the bombs and their effects were deleted after strict censorship by the American occupation forces.

In 1952, however, with the end of the occupation, the Japanese people were barraged with information about what actually happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and about the atrocities caused by the bombing. A greatly shocked people strengthened their belief system in the pacifist Constitution.

Then, in 1954, the US carried out an H-Bomb experiment in the Pacific near Bikini Atoll. A tremendous amount of radioactive ashes fell out and one Japanese tuna fishing boat was showered the deadly ashes. This triggered an anti-Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs movement in Japan, whose products are the two organizations, Gensui-kyo and Gensui-kin, that continue to exist today. Although the anti-nuclear movement and anti-base movement shared a common ground of constitutional pacifism, they were slightly different in that the anti-A and H-bomb movement was from the beginning extremely cosmopolitan.

The idea was that they were determined that this tragedy should not be repeated again on any people in the world. Hence, the people of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki were not moved towards anti-American sentiment. Instead, from the beginning their appeal was that all kinds of nuclear weapons be prohibited, and that they should be the last victims.

This anti-nuclear movement spread horizontally and rapidly around the country, and in 1955, one year after the Bikini Incident, a national council against A- and H-Bombs was organized, joined by all the political parties, including the Socialist Party and the Communist Party. It was also in 1955 that the first world conference against A- and H-Bombs was held, allowing the victims, who had been hiding due to the lack of correct information, to come out and restore their will to live.

**Early 1960’s**

In 1960, the Japan-US Security Treaty was revised for the worse, prescribing a greater Japanese responsibility in the American military strategy. A major political movement was formed against this, and hundreds and thousands of people demonstrated at the Parliament, calling for the ratification of the treaty. They totally paralyzed the police control, and even a major crash occurred around the Parliament, claiming the life of one female student.

Mr. Muto asserted that this movement in a way crystallized the value of peace and democracy, which was rooted and fostered during the Occupation, and found its full expression in the aftermath of the occupation. They treasured peace because they did not wish to repeat the war experience and they cherished democracy because during the wartime, the military, with so many prerogatives, had behaved with great arrogance, and there was no freedom of expression because of the censorship by the military police (*Kenpei*).

In a word, they were against the resurgence of the bitter experience and the dictatorial regime of the prewar time. This is partly because of the fact that at that time Kishi Nobusuke (1958-1960) was the Prime Minister; and to the eyes of the people of this period, this seemed to symbolize the comeback of the past. Kishi, having served as the Minister of Commerce and Industry in the Tojo Cabinet, which started the Pacific War, was arrested as an A-Class war criminal. With the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, however, he was released and he went up so rapidly to the position of Prime Minister.

Mr. Muto pointed out that in Japan the past is preserved by the fact that the Emperor system was maintained and manipulated by the United States after the war, and also the fact that postwar Japanese politics was controlled by right-wing
politicians. Kishi’s becoming the Prime Minister is a symbol of the linkage between the prewar and postwar days.

Latter Half of the 1960’s and the Early 1970’s

Since the latter half of 1960’s, another phase of social movement developed, that is, the anti-Vietnam War movement. Students, women and minorities joined and added a new voice to the movement. While the peace and democracy ideology was against the comeback of the past, that is, to protect what they had gained in the postwar period, the struggle after 1965 was more radical and they questioned the status quo. People at that time, particularly young people, wondered why Japan should be a part of America in Vietnam War.

The Japanese Government was fully and totally with the Americans. War supplies went from Japan to the American forces. All the services and military bases were used to help the American soldiers fighting in Vietnam. Most people felt that was an unjust war, hence, to the activists of this period, what they had was already culpable.

Also, while the peace and democracy movement was a little conservative (they became more and more so as their war memory faded), the movement of this time was more action-oriented. Their argument was that if they did not do anything they were already a part of the war, so they had to change the machinery that was helping the US.

This attitude was shared not only by the anti-Vietnam war movement, but also by students’ revolt. That was the simultaneous phenomenon engulfing half of the world, mostly in the so-called industrialized world. In a narrow sense, it can be called a 'New Left Movement.'

In a broader sense, various movement arose, one of which was the Beheiren (Peace for Vietnam Association). They acted individually or in small groups, so they were different from organization-oriented big movement; rather, it was a coalition of the Communist Party, Socialist Party and Labor Union. Movements of this period were all spontaneous movement like this, and people who participated in it did so at their personal responsibility.

That is when various other issues at last came into the perspectives of the Japanese social movement, such as what Japan did to Chinese and Koreans in the past (The comfort women issue was first discussed during this period). In a sense, it was the time of reconsideration and reflection.
The 1990's

When the Cold War ended, everyone expected the arrival of peace. But in reality, Mr. Muto said, we are witnessing an acceleration of militarization both in Japan (especially Okinawa) and the United States. Since 1996, when the Japanese Prime Minister and US President Bill Clinton issued a joint statement, post-Cold War military arrangement was put into gear. It is the so-called US-Japan Joint Defense Guideline, under which Japanese obligation to cooperate with American military operation, mobilizing Japanese resources, personnel, administrative services, and so forth, were defined. This led to a series of 'bad' laws, passed between 1999 and 2003. In the past few years, these steps were taken one after another very rapidly, and there has been a rise of right-wing political elements; they justify what Japan did in the past and thrust national pride forward.

The American strategy, which is basically to establish America's unilateral domination in the world, has been a wave the Japanese right-wingers wish to ride. They are trying to achieve some strategic goals that they had had for a long time, but have not been able to achieve. To them, now, particularly after 9/11, is the time when anything can be carried forward this drive and carried through.

\footnote{Yoshida Shigeru later said in his memoir that the Korean War was a Heavenly Gift to Japan, meaning that it was how the Japanese economy and the Japanese big business came back. It was called Special Procurement; Americans obtained all the necessary war materials from Japanese factories and for this purpose, \textit{Zaibatsu} (big family combine which was dissolved under the democratization process) was revived.}
ANNEX B.8
SUMMARY, RESOURCE SEMINAR VI
“What is Fundamentalism?”
By Ogawa Tadashi

BASED ON HIS recent publication “What is Fundamentalism?” in which he used 'fundamentalism' as a comparative keyword to examine the interrelations between religion and society in different cultures, Mr. Ogawa Tadashi illustrated how fundamentalism is usually used as a descriptive term specific to a historical religion or sect. But it can also be used as a theoretical concept in a comparative sociological study of religion and politics.

Mr. Ogawa first sounded a cautionary word against the injudicious association of the word 'fundamentalism' with prejudice against Islam. Indeed he pointed out that 'fundamentalism' was originally part of the Christian theological vocabulary.

The specific example Mr. Ogawa used to make his point was Shinto fundamentalism in Japan, which originated in the seventeenth century, established by Motoori Norinaga in the eighteenth century; and was manipulated by the Meiji Government to enhance national prestige and to justify its outward advancement in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries.

In order to better examine the social changes of this period, Mr. Ogawa discussed the roots of Japanese culture, based on two theories, namely a 'diffusion' school and a 'nativist' school. Diffusion theory interprets Japanese culture as rooted in ancient China and India, and in modern times, in Europe and the United States. Mr. Ogawa is of the opinion that for a long time, Japanese power elites had often been experiencing an identity crisis, characterized by an anxiety centered on the suspected inauthenticity of Japanese culture; that Japanese culture was merely adopted from the great civilizations. On the other hand, nativism insists that Japanese culture is unique and original, and there has been a pure, inherent Japanese culture since time immemorial. The proponents of this theory maintain that foreign cultures, such as Confucianism, Buddhism and Christianity, caused the collapse of this pure Japanese culture.

Pursuing the purity of its originality and denouncing foreign cultures as polluted, uncivilized and sinful, is one of the characteristics of fundamentalism, said
Mr. Ogawa. One can recognize a similar argument in Christian, Hindu or Muslim fundamentalism. Mr. Ogawa then examined Japanese (Shinto) fundamentalism from this perspective.

Nativism emerged and functioned to support Japanese nationalism in the eighteenth century. Motoori Norinaga, an important yet controversial scholar of this period, whose academic work is at the root of Japanese fundamentalism, was the highest authority of the Kokugaku school (study of Japanese classical literature). With Confucian philosophy, which was imported from China, being the dominant ideology during the Tokugawa Shogunate, the scholars of Kokugaku, with Motoori as the central figure, tried to cast light on the long-forgotten Japanese classical literature, and insisted that the Japanese people should return to their own pure and clean thought prior to supposedly polluting or poisonous influence from overseas.

As the Tokugawa Government eroded under pressure from Western powers in the late nineteenth century, Kokugaku became most influential in the nationwide grass-roots protest movement against such foreign powers. Kokugaku maintained that the Emperor had been the guardian of the nation and the source of tradition since time immemorial; hence the Emperor should have the ultimate sovereignty over the country. Under such a circumstance, Kokugaku came to be recognized as an anti-Shogun/pro-Emperor political, revolutionary ideology, the sense that they worked to subvert of the Tokugawa government.

Originally, Motoori’s academic motivation was to seek a national identity of Japan during the process of modernization. In 1791, he published Kojiki-den, an annotated edition of the classic literature Kojiki, which recorded the lineage of the Imperial household and ancient mythology and had functioned as a sacred Shinto text. The Meiji government manipulated such mythology (e.g. the Emperors being the descendants of the Sun God) to promote nationalism, and it was used to justify Japanese aggressive actions in and outside the nation.

One can find another common feature of fundamentalism in Motoori’s argument, and that is, rejection of the interpretation of sacred texts. One of the important characteristics of Motoori’s narrative in Kojiki-den was the rejection of interpreting the Kojiki text. He criticized interpretation (of holy texts) for being artificial and slick and for being a bad habit of Chinese scholars. Since Kojiki is a holy text, it should not be interpreted, and should be read literally. According to one study of fundamentalism, one of the common properties of fundamentalism is the ‘infallibility’ of sacred texts, such as the Koran or the Holy Bible, as being true, particular and accurate. Fundamentalists are steadfastly opposed to a scientific
approach and interpretation, developed by secular properties and critiques. They insist that if but one single error of a fact or principle is admitted, nothing will remain certain.

Mr. Ogawa pointed out that ‘Shinto fundamentalism’ shares some characteristics of fundamentalism, but what is truly unique about Japanese fundamentalism is that it does not collide with the theologies of other religions.

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2 Until the end of World War II, Motoori had been regarded as an academic sacred cow that allowed no criticism. In the postwar Japanese society, however, people began to criticize his ideology for being the cause of Japanese militarism.
MS. DODEN AIKO’S SEMINAR synthesized some of her experience as anchorperson of a weekly program ‘NHK World Network,’ which is the first program of the NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) to devote all its airtime to international affairs. She first showed a recent clip from her program, explaining each segment and intentions; and she briefly introduced the nature, composition, and the operations of the NHK. Ms. Doden also made reference to two distinctive features of Japanese media organizations, namely, the ‘club’ system and the ‘lifetime employment system.’

She took as an example the program “Voyage to the Future” in which forty-two children from seven Asian countries went aboard on a ship to learn about environmental issues in Asia, by conducting research in each country prior to the voyage and sharing the findings with the children from other countries. Ms. Doden, who was involved in this program as a presenter, emphasized that it is time for NHK and the mass media in general to start playing a positive role in civil society. She believes that since journalists are almost the only ones who have access to people from all walks of life, they should actively provide opportunities for learning. Television journalism cannot afford to be dedicating all its assets and energy to news reporting and producing documentaries, especially when competition exists between print media, other TV organizations and cyberspace journalism.

Ms. Doden said that as to the substance of news reporting, there is no governmental censorship or anything of that sort. Responding to Mr. Hamid Basyaib’s comment that oftentimes “bad news is good news” for the media, and sometimes the media hides real problems for the sake of competition with other media organization, Ms Doden admitted that this is a fundamental dilemma in journalism; she herself is always confronted with that quandary. When she proposes to cover the aftermath of some incident or event that caught big media attention, her boss often declines that proposal for the reason that it is not newsworthy or would not attract much audience anymore. However, Ms. Doden believes that the post-conflict phase is the time when attention is most required, and thus she is trying to return to that place even after all the cameras have left and after the “heat is over.”
The discussion session was joined by Ms. Ito Misako, Editor-in-Chief of the Gaiko Forum. Gaiko Forum was launched in 1988, combining some of the publications that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had had and has been attempting to present a mutual and open stage where various kinds of opinions towards Japanese diplomacy can meet, from the bureaucratic and diplomatic perspectives.
ANNEX C

ALFP Public Symposium Program
Unequal Worlds and the Roads Ahead
October 28 & 29, 2003
Lecture Hall, International House of Japan

October 28 (Tuesday)

Opening Remarks
Komatsu Junetsu, Managing Director, JFAC

6:10-7:00 Presentations (I)
"Predator or Protector: The Military of Indonesia and Democracy"
by Hamid Basyaib, Writer/Researcher, AKSARA Foundation

"Media and Democracy: Cambodian Perspectives"
by HAM Samnang, Assistant Director/Senior Research Fellow,
Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP)

7:00-7:20 Q & A

7:20-7:35 Coffee Break

7:35-8:25 Presentations (II)
"In Search of the 'Minority Reports'"
by Supara Janchitpha, Reporter/Writer for the Bangkok Post

"Oil Gap and Partnership"
by Yang Guang, Professor and Director-General, Institute of West-Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Science

8:25-9:00 Q & A / Open Discussion
Moderator: Isizuka Masahiko, Managing Director, Foreign Press Center; Program Committee Member, Asia Leadership Fellow Program

October 29 (Wednesday)

Summary of previous day
Isizuka Masahiko, Moderator

6:10-7:00 Presentations (III)
"The End of Victimhood?: Changing Self-Image of Koreans in Japan"
by Chung Chin-sung, Professor, Department of Sociology, Seoul National University

"Japanese Lifestyle, Asian Desires: From Rice cookers to Pop Culture"
by Nakano Yoshiko, Research Assistant Professor, Department of Japanese Studies, University of Hong Kong

7:00-7:20 Q & A
7:20-7:35  Coffee Break

7:35-8:25  Presentations (IV)
"Museums and Empire: An Early Twenty First Century Sketch"
by Marian PASTOR ROCES, Critic and Independent Curator;
President, Tao, Inc

"The Age of Inequality: Life in the Times of Market Fundamentalism"
by PALAGUMMI Sainath, Free-lance Journalist

8:25-9:00  Q & A / Open Discussion

Closing Remarks
KATO Mikio, Executive Director, IHJ
It was in 1953, eight years after the bombing, that Ms. Matsubara's life became somewhat more bearable after she went through twelve cosmetic surgeries over a seven-month period with the help of a Christian society. These operations enabled her to open and close her eyes, and to straighten out her crooked fingers, and she was able to start working as a caretaker for sight-impaired orphans. In 1962, Ms. Matsubara took the role of mother for the three children of her brother, after he and his wife passed away, and since then she had worked at the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation for 27 years until her retirement in 1993. Since 1993, Ms. Matsubara has visited nine Western and Asian countries to convey her A-Bomb experience. Even now, nearly sixty years after the bombing, Ms. Matsubara and other A-Bombs victims are continuously haunted by the effects of the atomic bombing, both mentally and physically. Although Ms. Matsubara had her breast cancer removed in 1988, she lives with the constant fear that the polyps that were later found in her stomach may develop into cancer, or that a different form of cancer might develop. Currently, nearly ninety thousand people in Hiroshima, including Ms. Matsubara, are still suffering from the effects of radiation.

"In a sense, for the Hibakusha, every day is 'August 6.' We have not escaped the war, nor will we ever. It's always with us."

Ms. Matsubara concluded her presentation with a determined stance that as one of the survivors who experienced the horror of nuclear weapons, it is her mission to devote her life to telling her A-bomb experience to people all over the world. She also told the Fellows that the Hibakusha must rely on younger generations to pass on the experiences of the A-Bomb victims, most of whom will be dead within a decade or two, and to prevent the evil of nuclear weapon froms being repeated.

After a brief question and answer session that followed Ms. Matsubara’s testimony, the Fellows were guided through the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park by Ms. Unezaki Masako. The sites and monuments visited include the A-Bomb Dome, which is registered on the World Heritage List; Aioi Bridge, which was the original target of the bombing; the Monument in Memory of the Korean Victims of the A-bombs; the Children's Peace Monument; the Flame of Peace and the Cenotaph for the A-bomb Victims.
It was in 1953, eight years after the bombing, that Ms. Matsubara's life became somewhat more bearable after she went through twelve cosmetic surgeries over a seven-month period with the help of a Christian society. These operations enabled her to open and close her eyes, and to straighten out her crooked fingers, and she was able to start working as a caretaker for sight-impaired orphans. In 1962, Ms. Matsubara took the role of mother for the three children of her brother, after he and his wife passed away, and since then she had worked at the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation for 27 years until her retirement in 1993. Since 1993, Ms. Matsubara has visited nine Western and Asian countries to convey her A-Bomb experience.

Even now, nearly sixty years after the bombing, Ms. Matsubara and other A-bombs victims are continuously haunted by the effects of the atomic bombing, both mentally and physically. Although Ms. Matsubara had her breast cancer removed in 1988, she lives with the constant fear that the polyps that were later found in her stomach may develop into cancer, or that a different form of cancer might develop. Currently, nearly ninety thousand people in Hiroshima, including Ms. Matsubara, are still suffering from the effects of radiation.

"In a sense, for the Hibakusha, every day is 'August 6.' We have not escaped the war, nor will we ever. It's always with us."

Ms. Matsubara concluded her presentation with a determined stance that as one of the survivors who experienced the horror of nuclear weapons, it is her mission to devote her life to telling her A-bomb experience to people all over the world. She also told the Fellows that the hibakusha must rely on younger generations to pass on the experiences of the A-Bomb victims, most of whom will be dead within a decade or two, and to prevent the evil of nuclear weapon from being repeated.

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ANNEX D.2

ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS

Seminar on Hiroshima and Media Coverage

By Tashiro Akira

THE FELLOWS VISITED Mr. Tashiro Akira, Senior Staff Writer and Special Project Editor of the Chugoku Shimbun, at the headquarters of the newspaper in downtown Hiroshima. Mr. Tashiro first gave the Fellows an overall profile of the Chugoku Shimbun and its history since its establishment in 1892. Like any other media, the Chugoku Shimbun was forced to serve only as propaganda for the army and the government before and during the war period, being put under strict censorship. Being only nine hundred meters away from the hypocenter at the time of the atomic bombing on August 6, 1945, the headquarters of the Chugoku Shimbun was completely destroyed, and one hundred thirteen of its employees were instantly killed. Although it resumed printing the following November, the Chugoku Shimbun was not allowed to tell the truth about the atomic bombing, especially about the effects of radiation, until 1952, when the Occupation by the US forces ended. Since then, the Chugoku Shimbun has served as a key player in the reconstruction of Hiroshima. Having learned a great lesson from the war and the bomb experience, their principles after the war have been based on the establishment of world peace, construction of a democratic nation, and the enhancement of local culture. While placing great importance on the locality of the newspaper, when it comes to the nuclear issue, the Chugoku Shimbun tries to project its voice as a universal message from Hiroshima to the rest of the world.

Mr. Tashiro's presentation had a special focus on depleted uranium. In the past sixteen to seventeen years, he has mainly dealt with nuclear and disarmament issues. While many of his peers continue to dig into the truth about the consequences of Hiroshima/Nagasaki, Mr. Tashiro has tried to connect the issue of Hiroshima with the present world situation. Visiting various places, his main interest has been the issue of depleted uranium (DU). Mr. Tashiro has reported on the DU issue over the last decade, visiting more than fifteen countries, including the United States, the former Soviet Union countries, Great Britain, Iraq, Kosovo, Serbia and Okinawa, Japan. His series of reports have been published as several books both in Japanese and English, one of which is “Discounted Casualties: The Human Cost of Depleted Uranium.”
Depleted Uranium (DU) is a by-product of the process by which uranium 235 (U-235), the isotope used for nuclear weapons and nuclear reactors, is separated from natural uranium. The highly radioactive isotope U-235 accounts for less than one percent of mined uranium; nearly all the rest is depleted uranium (or U-238). Since its first accumulation in the early 1940's, more than seven hundred thousand tons of DU have been produced in the United States alone, and it continues to accumulate. DU's higher density compared to iron or lead gives the projectile fired from a tank or aircraft carry enough kinetic energy to blast through tough armor. And due to its pyrophoric nature, it burns on impact easily and can set the target on fire. Furthermore, DU is easy to process and endless quantities can be obtained free from the Department of Energy, which controls DU and considers its use in munitions to be "utilization of waste material."

It was during the Gulf War in 1991 that DU was first used in war. To investigate the effects of DU, Mr. Tashiro visited battlegrounds in Iraq and Kuwait, as well as production and testing sites of DU rounds in the US; he also interviewed many Gulf War veterans in the US and the UK. In the case of the Gulf War, the Pentagon has admitted the use of three hundred twenty tons of DU in Kuwait and southern Iraq.

The US and the UK governments have been denying the effect of DU on the environment and on the human body, but the deadly impact of DU can be witnessed in various places. Invisible particles of DU are inhaled, and go through the lungs to other parts of the body. Alpha rays do not penetrate the skin, but once it goes into the body, its toxin strongly affect human cells, inducing cancers. The DU used during the Gulf War not only affected the soldiers of Iraqi and multinational forces, but they also had fatal effects on the citizens of Iraq and the family members of Gulf War veterans.

In Iraq, there are about two to three diagnoses of leukemia per day in one hospital, especially in southern Iraq. Here, a diagnosis of cancer is tantamount to a death sentence because hospitals lack sufficient medical facilities and medicines. And even though children with leukemia have lower immunity due to such insufficient medical care, the hospitals cannot provide them with proper ICU care or bone marrow transplants; they can only provide chemotherapy to prolong their lives a little. After the Gulf War, the cancer rate among children, as well as among adults, has risen four to five times as high as before the war. Women are developing breast and ovarian cancer.

Birth defects in newly born babies are another common effect of DU. One of the Iraqi Gulf War veterans was a truck driver, and his baby born after the war was deformed. In one hospital, they deliver eight hundred to one thousand babies each month, and every week one or two seriously abnormal or deformed children are born.
This phenomenon can be witnessed not only in Iraq but also among the American Gulf War veterans in the US.

Mr. Tashiro introduced two cases of American Gulf War veterans and their family members who have suffered the after-effects of DU. During the Gulf War, both of the veterans served in an army tank unit, and their duty was to load DU shells onto the tanks and to check inside destroyed Iraqi tanks to check for survivors. When doctors later tested the urine of these soldiers who served in tank units, DU was detected.

The baby born to one of these veterans and his wife lived for only twenty-seven minutes. While still in his mother’s womb, his kidney swelled to nineteen centimeters, preventing other organs from developing properly. They also have a daughter who was born after the war, and she has impaired hearing. This is not unusual among American Gulf War veterans. The other veteran went back home with all his belongings that he was using on the battlefield, and that had apparently been covered with depleted uranium particles. Immediately after he returned, all the family members started to feel sick. His wife especially felt sick; they much later found out that it was because the semen of her husband was contaminated with heavy metal caused by DU. Abdominal pain, miscarriage, severe menstrual pain, headache, and other symptoms have plagued her, and now she is unable to leave their house.

To Mr. Tashiro, although DU is completely different from A- or H-Bombs, in terms of its power, DU is also a weapon of mass destruction. It is radioactive, and it has long-term effects, not just on those who were on the battlefield, but also on the people living near battlefields, and people around the returned soldiers.

Depleted Uranium was also used in Kosovo (1995, 1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). Unlike the time of the Gulf War, when the US and the UK used DU in Kuwait and a lesser-populated area of southern Iraq, they used DU in populated areas, such as Baghdad and Basra, during the Iraq War in 2003. Mr. Tashiro thus fears that in several years, people in these areas will be severely affected by DU, and if this is the case, US will not be able to deny the negative effects of DU any longer.

Now, more and more people are aware of the dangers of DU, and on March 2, 2003, six thousand people from Hiroshima and other parts of the world gathered in Hiroshima, and formed a ‘Human Sign’ that says ‘No War, No DU!’ The picture of the Human Message appeared as an advertisement in the March 24 issue of the New York Times with the message: “Hiroshima says NO to more Hibakusha (radiation victims). The White House’s denial of the radioactive and toxic effects of DU is FALSE.” The US Government has become more sensitive towards this issue because of these
campaigns in Japan and Europe. Last February, the EU passed a resolution not to produce or use DU.

The questions from the Fellows concerned such topics as the nuclear power industry in Japan, the possibility of alternative energy resources, and the possible use of nuclear weapons in future terrorist attacks. Responding to Ms. Marian Roces' question whether he sees any strategy or possibility to make the US government listen, Mr. Tashiro emphasized that the only ones who can change the US diplomacy and domestic policy is the American people. But he also said that we, as 'concerned citizens,' can ignite change through interaction, sending messages, and having dialogue.
ANNEX D.4
ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS
Visit to the Takatori Community Center

THE TAKATORI COMMUNITY CENTER (TCC) was established immediately after the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake in 1995, when it was called the Takatori Rescue Camp. During this earthquake, two-thirds of the city area of Kobe was destroyed, mainly by fire, and many people lost their lives. But TCC's beginnings as a rescue operation has mutated into today's multidimensional assistance center addressing the problems endured by multi-ethnic communities in a Japanese city.

The meeting with Mr. Hibino Jun'ichi, Director of the TCC, began with the viewing of a video clip that was taken soon after the earthquake. Much of the damage—and the location of TCC—occurred in Kobe City's Nagata Ward. One finds in this area a large proportion of foreign residents (ten per cent of the population). The two biggest groups are Koreans and Vietnamese, who came to Japan during the Second World War and Vietnam War, respectively.

While the suffering caused by the earthquake affected all—Japanese and foreign residents alike—the foreigners had to cope with the additional difficulties imposed by the language barrier, and by political and administrative discrimination. The TCC took on the task of addressing these difficulties, along with other aspects of the work to rebuild the city. In an effort to provide a friendly environment for these minority groups, the TCC provided for greater access to vital information in the relevant languages, and took on an advocacy role in their behalf in representations with the government.

A number of non-government organizations operate out of the TCC. 'NGO Vietnam in Kobe' is a self-help group that provides information and a counseling service for Vietnamese residents in Kobe; offers elderly Vietnamese people a place where they can be immersed in Vietnamese culture; and gives Vietnamese language lessons for Japan-born Vietnamese. FM YY is an FM radio station that offers local information in multiple languages. 'World Kids Community' one of whose activities is to get children of different cultures involved in the whole process (planning, filming and editing) of video documentation of their own communities, with the hope that through making a video, the children who are relatively new in the community will be able to express themselves. FACIL is a multilingual center which creates jobs for the area’s foreigners as translators or interpreters in order to facilitate the creation of a multilingual environment in the community. And 'Tour de Communication'...

ANNEX D.3
ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS
Visit to Shibutani Fukio, organic farmer of Kobe

THE VISIT with Mr. Shibutani Fukio, who has been practicing organic farming since the early 1980's in his ancestral land in the suburbs of Kobe, was an introduction to the realities of shifting to environment-friendly methods. Mr. Shibutani came from a lineage of farmers, who have been cultivating the same acreage for generations. As a young farmer, he mainly cultivated tomatoes in a greenhouse, using chemical pesticides. Moreover, he grew produce out of season to meet consumer demand, resulting in less and less fertile land, and production that became increasingly difficult. Mr. Shibutani took up organic farming as resolution to this downward spiral. Today, his yearly harvest includes approximately forty to fifty different kinds of vegetables and fruit, which he supplies via direct sale to a modest number of customers who live in the outskirts of Kobe—many of whom he knows personally. It is his ambition “to supply all the different vegetables that a family needs”

The variety includes: green peppers, eggplants, pumpkins, cabbage, lettuce, snow peas, soya, watermelon, beans, peanuts, onions, potatoes, radish, carrots, celery, and figs. To fertilize the soil, Mr. Shibutani mixes chicken droppings, rice bran, and tofu.

Mr. Shibutani did not paint a too-rosy picture in the personal narrative he shared as the Fellows sat around the receiving room of his traditional house. Nor did he overly accentuate the difficulties, which are clearly many—in a country in which only one per cent of the food supply is from organic farms. His account of his experience as an organic farmer provided ample detail of his troubles with insects and other challenges to the logic of organic farming. Even now, Mr. Shibutani admitted, there are times when he is tempted to revert to pesticide use, particularly when harvests are severely compromised. His resolve to persist with organic farming appears to come out of a clear sense of the proper scale for his operations. Firstly, his farming activities are defined by the number of members of his family who assist in all aspects of work: four individuals, consisting of himself and his wife, and his son and daughter in law. Secondly, the relatively small size of his farm—four acres planted to vegetables and about a thousand square meters planted to rice for family consumption—means that control over the quality and quantity of harvest can be tackled at this personal level. Thirdly, this scale of operations makes it possible for him to discuss directly with most of his buyers what they want. And fourthly, he can have a maximum of five harvests a year out of one hectare.
ANNEX D.4

ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS

Visit to the Takatori Community Center

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specializes in computer classes and PC recycling, with a special focus on utilizing computers and the Internet as a means to facilitate communication between foreign and Japanese residents and to overcome differences regardless of their nationalities or languages. The Fellows also had an informal meeting with the staff members of the Asian Women's Empowerment Project, which seeks to support women's careers in Asia by creating jobs for women who used to work in Japan—mostly single parents with children born between them and Japanese men. Unique to this project is its design that allows these women work in their home countries, mostly in handicrafts, to enable them to earn a living and to be with their families at the same time.

ANNEX D.5
ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS
Visit to the Osaka Museum of History

LOCATED AT THE CENTER of Osaka, the Osaka Museum of History has recently enjoyed a major design upgrade, and presently exudes the qualities of state-of-the-art museum display and communication techniques. The scope of its narrative is vast—the history of Osaka City from the archaeological through modern periods. And, with huge picture windows framing the Osaka Castle and other nearby Osaka spaces of vital import, the museum reiterates this vastness.

Bracketing a day of visits which was to start with this museum and ending in walks through areas of Osaka teeming with the homeless, Professor Nagafuchi Yasuyuki of the Nagoya Technology of Institute gave the Fellows a short introduction to contrasting views of Osaka City. His brief contextualizing remarks invited the Fellows to focus some attention on Osaka City history vis-à-vis other narratives that are not represented within the museum. The disparity will be substantial, he suggested, between the museum's glorious rendering of the past, on one hand, and on the other, the reality of homelessness outside the museum walls. The Osaka City Museum of History makes little reference to marginalized communities and victims of discrimination.

The museum tour winds through galleries organized along a chronology, guiding visitors through a storyline that shows Osaka moving steadily from one colorful historical period to the next.
ANNEX D.6
ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS
Visit to the Osaka Human Rights Museum

THE MAIN EXHIBIT HALLS of the Osaka Human Rights Museum opens with a life-size tableau with mannequins representing leatherworkers. These are, among other reasons because of the supposedly 'unclean' nature of their task, buraku, members of the bottom layer of Japanese society. This tableau introduces the different types and forms of discrimination in Japan, among which is discrimination against these buraku, Korean residents, ethnic minorities such as Ryukyu (Okinawans) and Ainu peoples, and the physically disabled. The displays also convey the level of contribution these marginalized people have made to the economic prosperity of Japan, invisibly and voicelessly, at the expense of their extremely hard labor; and how they have fought for their rights. The exhibits also shed light on human rights violations based on gender, age and pollution-caused diseases.
ANNEX D.7

ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS
Visit to the Kamagasaki and Nakanoshima areas to explore the issue of homelessness in Japan

THE KAMAGASAKI DISTRICT of Osaka City serves compellingly to provide a gist of the increasingly difficult problem of homelessness in Japan. And Mr Yamada Minoru, Director of the 'Kamagasaki Shien Kiko,' aka 'NPO Kamagasaki,' an organization supporting the homeless people in Kamagasaki, —who coordinated and accompanied the Fellows' visit to this district—gives dense detail to this gist, derived from his decades-long activism on the labor front.

Kamagasaki, located on the south side of Osaka City, is the biggest yoseba in Japan. A yoseba is an area where day laborers are concentrated, many of whom reside in apartments, or in doya or cheap hotels, while searching for jobs as day laborers. Having developed from a 1960’s slum, Kamagasaki became a central site for recruiting day laborers during the booming postwar economy, as well as in relation to the World Exposition which was eventually held in Osaka in 1970, which generated great demand for construction workers. Kamagasaki drew countless people from all over Japan. But after economic momentum slowed, so did the demand for construction workers decline. Day laborers, who were considered as the cheapest labor force that could be 'used up' during economic growth—many people literally died after hard labor—were first to lose their jobs. Many of these jobless people remained in the Kamagasaki district, and it has since been functioning as a kind of 'safety net' the unemployed. The government now regards Kamagasaki as a place to oversee marginalized and excluded people.

Currently, approximately thirty thousand day laborers stay in an area of 0.56 square kilometers in search of jobs, and twenty-thousand of them live in Kamagasaki. Their average age is about fifty five, and most are single men. Those who cannot afford to live in the doya or the apartments are forced out into the streets. According to 2003 statistics, about five thousand homeless people live in this district.

With the recession which started in the early 1990's, increasing numbers of jobless and homeless people have moved to Kamagasaki, which has now it has exceeded its carrying capacity. About ten thousand people are in need of jobs every day, and there are only two thousand job openings daily. Those who do not get a job for
in a day either collect cans or cardboard boxes, or they do nothing. Some of the homeless have, as a result, moved out of Kamagasaki and are resettling in other areas.

With the help of NGO's and NPO's, such as Mr. Yamada's NPO Kamagasaki, the municipal and the prefectural governments are taking some measures to generate jobs for the people in Kamagasaki. A street cleaning project, for example, involves people over fifty-five years of age.

The Nishinari Labor and Welfare Center, under the Osaka Municipal Government and administered by the Osaka Prefectural Government, is described as an 'extra-departmental body.' Under current Japanese law, the day laborer market is illegal, hence any assistance to the homeless by way of day jobs is technically outside the pale of the law. The scale of the problem of homelessness has however impelled some form of intervention. The vast and bare concrete building that houses the Nishinari Labor and Welfare Center also holds other facilities, such as the Airin Employment Security Office and a medical center. Those who fail to secure a job for the day have taken to using the ground level of the building for sleeping, and simply living out the hours.

Walking through the district to look into the doyas, one comes upon a park that appears overwhelmed by cardboard shelters and other makeshift shanties. Adjacent to this park is a night-time shelter, which was built at the initiative of the NPO Kamagasaki with financial support from the Osaka Municipal Government. The shelter holds bunk beds for six hundred people, with twenty showers. It is open from six in the evening to five in the morning, when the Labor and Welfare Center opens. Since the 'ordinary' residents living next to the shelter insisted that no windows be built on their side of the narrow shelter, the air circulation is inadequate, and it gets extremely hot during summer. The architecture, therefore, had to accommodate the sensitivities of the neighborhood.

Prior to visiting Osaka City Hall to meet with the officials in charge of the issue of homelessness, the Fellows walked through Nakanoshima, where those who have been pushed out of Kamagasaki had set up some six or seven hundred tents along the riverbanks facing City Hall, in order to lobby the local government to create more jobs, and provide places to live and food to eat.

At City Hall, two officials from the Health and Social Welfare Division explained the governmental measures addressing this problem. Homelessness has become so obvious, government has had to treat it as a citywide issue in the last five to six years in Osaka, which holds one-fourth of all the homeless population in Japan. In 1999, a citywide Commission on the 'homeless issue' was organized. An Advisory
Committee and the Center for Job Training were created, conducting circuit counseling sessions and building temporary shelters. The government now also offers public assistance. Currently, ten per cent of the homeless in Osaka are covered by a governmental subsidy. The Osaka City offers a hundred eighty-one cleaning jobs daily for people over fifty-five years of age and the Osaka Prefectural Government offers similar jobs for a hundred and four individuals daily, generating a total of two hundred eighty-five cleaning jobs daily. They also create repair or maintenance jobs at public facilities to promote the employment of homeless people.

Mr. Yamada emphasized that although homelessness is primarily a function of joblessness (i.e., unemployment), and of restructuring or aging—depression and isolation are substantial dimensions of the problem. Jobs are not the only solution. He believes that the entire socio-economic system in Japan should be reconsidered and reconstructed. Nevertheless, he asserts that creating legal jobs is the essential immediate step to take. If one is to be self-supporting in a real sense, he or she needs to have a job, a place to live, and medical care. Government intervention, in his view, should be planned along these lines.

The officials emphasized the significance of the involvement of and cooperation with NGO’s and NPO’s in this area of concern. While the government is required to be fair and take actions only on demand, it recognizes the importance of answering individual needs. To fill those gaps, they ask for NGO and NPO support. Mr. Yamada added that there are areas or domains of action that only NGO’s and NPO’s can undertake.
ANNEX D.8

ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS
Visit to the elementary and middle schools in the Korean community at Tsuruhashi, Osaka

TSURUHASHI, OSAKA CITY, has a large population of ethnic Korean residents. Nearly three hundred fifty primary school and kindergarten students—including those of South Korean origin—study at Ikuno Korean Primary School. The principal, Mr. Hyeon Cheolnam, summarized the school history, in relation with the history of Korean residents in Japan in general. He gave emphasis to the substantial difficulties Koreans in Japan encounter, for the sake of acquiring an education that places importance on Korean language, culture, and identity. He cites the long-standing sense of deprivation suffered on account of the loss of nation and ethnicity, and added that it is the prevailing belief that education will restore something of what was lost.

At the Higashi Osaka Korean Middle School one block away, some ten students were selected to join the Fellows for lunch. After the informal conversations with the students, the school principal, Mr. Pu Yong Uk. Mr. Pu joined the group to also offer a situationer on Korean ethnic-specific education in Japan. Mr. Pu once more emphasized experiences of great misery ("beyond description"); of having been treated as worse than slaves during the Japanese colonialization of Korea. He reiterated: that Koreans have taken the trouble, despite discriminatory conditions, to maintain their own schools, for the singular purpose of preserving their identity.

Mr. Kwak Chinung took the Fellows through a nearby section of the Ikuno Ward of Osaka called Tsuruhashi Korea Town, where one-fourth of the total of one hundred forty thousand residents (or thirty-five thousand people, are of Korean origin)—ranging from first to four generation. Mr Kwak is the Secretary General of an NGO that has taken on the task of fostering ethnic pride among Koreans in Japan. Tsuruhashi is has the biggest Korean population in Japan, partly due to Osaka’s history as an industrial town that drew and Koreans overseas labor in the past. This migrant population size is also partly because there was a liner, named ‘Kimigayo-maru,’ that operated between Osaka and Cheju Island, Korea.

Mr. Kwak and Ms. Ko Jeongja—a lecturer at the Osaka Industrial University, a second-generation Korean in Japan, born and brought up in Ikuno—provide substantive overviews at the end of the visit. Ms. Ko gave synthesized of the nationality issue and the legal status of the Korean residents in Japan. The Korean
residents in Japan retained Japanese nationality until 1952, when the San Francisco Peace Treaty annulled it (even after they were registered as foreigners under the Alien Registration Ordinance in 1947). Nevertheless, in reality, differentiation existed. While Japanese people were classified as naichi-jin (people of inner territory), the others (people from Korea, Taiwan, South Sakhalin, the Kwantung Leased Territory, and so forth) were classified as gaichi-jin (people of external territories). The 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty for the first time made a distinction between 'Hanguk' (South Korea) and 'Chosen.' Hanguk was a 'nationality' and 'Chosen' became an area of birth. To be categorized as 'South Korean,' they had to change their legal status from 'a person from Chosen' to 'South Korean.'

Mr. Kwak then gave a brief presentation on the present situation of Koreans in Japan and their identity issue. There are approximately five hundred thousand registered Koreans (both from South and North Korea) at present. Including non-registered individuals, the number should be doubled. According to one estimate, there may be about 1.6 to two million people of Korean origin in Japan. In the legal sense, despite the 1995 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, there is no legislation in Japan to support the human rights of foreigners. Ethnic education that would nurture identity is not protected by laws. Socially, however, with more than one hundred eighty-five million foreigners, Japanese society—which has traditionally been very exclusive—is gradually fostering a more accepting atmosphere towards foreigners as their neighbors. In 2002, there was a debate whether or not to give foreign permanent residents suffrage at the municipal level, and sixty to seventy per cent of those polled answered positively.

Finally, Mr. Kwak briefly reviewed the currents of Korean social movements in Japan, to wit: the movement against systematic discrimination in late 1945-late and the 1970's; the diversification of the movement (to include educational and human rights issues, and so forth) in the 1980's and 1990's; and the generalization of Koreans in Japan as a part of the foreign residents in Japanese society.

Ms. Ko observed that education has taken on a symbolic status. Many students of Korean high schools also attend night schools, take correspondence courses, or take 'daiken' (university entrance qualification certification examination) to be qualified for applying to Japanese national universities. For these students, maintaining their Korean identity and surviving in Japanese society are equally important. Many parents send their children to ethnic-specific schools so that they will not feel the need to hide their identity.
ANNEX D.9

ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS

Discussion with the local residents of Tsuruhashi on the maintaining Korean identity in Japan

THE KOREAN RESIDENTS in Japan (often referred to as zainichi Korean) came to Japan variously. The greatest number—more than one million—were forced to come to Japan as laborers during the period of the thirty-six year colonial rule Japan imposed on Korea, from the time the former annexed the latter in 1910. There were also people who had no choice but to move to Japan, because they had lost their heads of family. As a result, at the time of Japan's defeat in the Second World War on August 15, 1945 (the day is called 'Liberation' by Koreans), there were approximately 2.4-2.5 million Korean residents in Japan. By 1947, about one and a half million people returned to Korea, while more than five hundred thousand Koreans remained or had to remain in Japan.

The Koreans who remained in Japan initiated ethnic-specific education for their children in order to restore their sense that the language, names, history and geography that they felt they were robbed of during the colonial period. Starting from 'open-air classes' in 1945, there were five hundred forty one Korean schools nationwide attended by fifty-eight thousand Korean children in 1947. In 1948 and 1949, however, the Japanese Government ordered all Korean schools to be closed. Despite strong protest—symbolized by a famous protest rally organized by the Korean people in Hyogo in 1949—all but a few Korean schools were closed down by the end of 1949. In the early 1950's however, soon after the end of the Korean War, the Korean residents in Japan started a movement to reopen Korean ethnic schools, and in 1952, Higashi Osaka Third Korean School became the first to be reopened at the present site of Ikuno Korean Primary School. In 1955, the 'Chongryon' (General Association of Korean Residents in JapanNorth Korean origin) was formed, and under its guidance, a nationwide movement for reopening Korean schools started. Their slogan from this period was: "The rich should offer their money, the wise their wisdom, and the powerful their labor." By 1960, there were one hundred sixty-three thousand Korean schools attended by forty thousand students.

The Japanese Government never changed its policy towards Korean schools after closing them down nor after reopening them. Ordinances were repeatedly
ANNEX D.10

ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS:

Briefing and discussion on the United States military presence in Okinawa, at the Headquarters of United States Marine Corps and at the US Consulate.

At Camp Butler, the headquarters of the Marine Corps, the Fellows were shown a video program entitled "Reaching Out to Okinawa," which was produced as promotional material for the US military bases on Okinawa, primarily addressing Japanese citizens. The video stressed the importance of the US military presence on Okinawa for security reasons. Okinawa's geographical proximity to East Asian countries, where—from the US perspective—possible threats may emanate, makes Okinawa a 'keystone' for regional security and stability. The video insists that any failure on the part of Japan to cooperate with the US military would undermine its commitment to regional security. It also emphasized the economic, educational, communal, cultural, and environmental contributions of the US military to Okinawa. It made a point to say that the US military annually spends $1.4 million in the local economy, and that the bases are the second largest employer on Okinawa.

Colonel Ron Yowell, Assistant Chief of Staff of MCB G-5, in a briefing, said that US Government's post-Cold War attempts to downsize its military power have not been successful, partly due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On the contrary, the US military is now approximately three times busier than at the end of the Cold War, because regional and national conflicts and competition for resources did not vanish with the fall of the Soviet Union. In this region, for instance, there are threats posed by China and North Korea, Colonel Yowell said. Japan is a suitable nation for hosting the US military because, firstly, Japan and the United States are allies; and secondly, Japan is politically and economically stable. Echoing the message of the video, Colonel Yowell stressed the economic contributions of US military to Okinawa, as well as the environmental strategies being taken to preserve Okinawa's natural heritage.

Colonel Yowell believes that anti-base feeling is strong only among a minority of the Okinawan people. He believes that the US military presence is accepted locally, and that the Japan-US alliance itself has support. He furthermore expressed the opinion that "most people are fond of Americans," and that they merely want the bases reduced. He cites the following figures: forty to forty-five percent of the Okinawan population are in favor of the US military bases.

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issued—and bills introduced and passed into law—that for a long time would prevent schools that promoted and provided Korean ethnic education from being acknowledged as regular schools, or even as 'kakushu' schools ('miscellaneous schools').

Currently, Korean ethnic schools are categorized under 'miscellaneous schools,' meaning they are not accredited as 'regular schools.' This status deprives them of governmental subsidies and of the right to apply for national-funded schools. These schools are not allowed to use the term 'Elementary School' or 'Junior High School.' It was only seven years ago that the students of Korean ethnic schools finally became eligible for the student discount for commuter passes. Four United States Sub-commissions on human rights have urged the Japanese Government to certify Korean schools as regular schools to no avail, while accrediting 'international schools' as regular schools.

But the Korean residents in Japan have managed to maintain their schools. Since Korean ethnic-specific schools receive no governmental subsidies, the parents of students are financially burdened to keep their children in these schools. The curriculum and the textbooks are all designed by Korean teachers. This pedagogy regards both North and South Korea as one nation, and therefore they educate the students as 'Koreans,' not as North Koreans or South Koreans.

The students of Korean ethnic schools became targets of harassment or violence every five years or so for various political reasons. After the 'abduction issue' became a high-impact problem between Japan and North Korea, and ever since the Japanese media labeled North Koreans as 'evil,' Korean residents, particularly female students, have experienced both overt and invisible harassment nationwide. Some students felt forcibly discouraged from wearing their traditional Korean-style uniforms for fear of being harassed.

Outrage against private and institutional discrimination have kept the Korean residents of Japan focused on the survival of the Korean ethnic-specific schools.
ANNEX D.10

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people wish for either reduction or a total removal of the US bases, and twenty to thirty per cent of them think the status quo is fine.

Mr. Stephen A. Town, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff of Camp Butler—in a brief ‘windshield tour’ around Camp Foster—pointed out the features of a community which functions as a support base, hosting a residential area for two thousand Marine Corps personnel and seven thousand family members; with schools, public facilities, hospital, shops and restaurants, and so forth. The public and recreational facilities, shops, and restaurants are identical to similar establishments in the United States. Mr. Town explained that by doing so, they are creating a homelike environment on the base, a zone of contentment that hopefully has a deterrent effect with regard to the potential for crime and misdemeanor. Mr. Town also made a point of the strict regulations imposed upon the soldiers stationed in Okinawa, and about the reduced statistics on crimes committed by US military personnel.

Mr. Bruce Nelson, Officer of the Public Affairs Section of the US Consulate General in Naha gave a briefing that covered the demographic, geographical, political, and economic status of Okinawa—positioned as the “Keystone of the Pacific.” The Okinawa bases are to provide deterrence and permit active, cost-effective engagement with regional partners, given the lack of a collective security structure in the region, according to Mr. Nelson.

In Mr. Nelson’s view, Okinawans have ambivalent views toward US bases: while they are agonized by the presence of the bases, they are also economically dependent on them. Mr. Nelson also touched upon the local media and the role that the Consulate General is playing in Okinawa.

At the end of the discussion, Mr. Nelson reluctantly admitted that few US soldiers are actually ready to sacrifice their lives to protect of Japan and its people. Thus, to the US, the revision of the Japanese Constitution is more than welcome, so that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces could be more involved in military actions in cooperation with the US military.
ANNEX D.11

ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS

Lecture and discussion on “The Japan-US Security Treaty and Okinawa” by Professor Gabe Masaaki, at the University of the Ryukyus

PROFESSOR GABE MASAAKI of the University of the Ryukyus presented an overview of issues concerning the US bases in Okinawa, in five dimensions, namely: occupation area; investment; size; free use; and host nation support.

The landing of the US forces on Kerama Island on March 26 marked the beginning of the Battle of Okinawa that lasted for three months. It was also the start of the US occupation of Okinawan land. The US military came ashore on Okinawa’s main island in April, and on June 20 of the same year, after devastating battles swept the island, the US declared the defeat of the Japanese Army and the occupation of the entire island of Okinawa. The suicide of the Japanese commanding general ended the three-month Battle of Okinawa. Since then, the US government has invested substantial financial resources in Okinawa to rebuild the land—not only US bases and roads—but all the infrastructure in Okinawa, including sewage and electricity, was also constructed by the US with American taxpayers’ money. Even after Okinawa reverted to Japanese sovereignty in 1972, the US military bases remained in Okinawa, and they were reluctant to give up what they had built, investing their own money.

Another factor that makes Okinawa the best possible location for the US to maintain its bases is Okinawa’s geographical and demographical dimensions. The size of the island (0.6% of Japanese land), the population of Okinawa (1.3 million people), the size of the US military operation, and the number of Americans (fifty-five thousand, including families and dependents) make Okinawa an ideal setting. It is big enough to build bases in and to secure a labor force, and small enough to make Americans a major presence in the area, creating a comfortable living environment for them. The US forces also prefer to remain in Okinawa because of the privilege and special status they enjoy there. Usually, when US military forces are stationed in foreign territories, their actions and operations are restricted by local legislation and regulations. In the case of Okinawa, however, due to its occupation history, they have a completely free use of their bases, with no intervention from the Japanese Government over their operations. Naturally, they have to follow local regulations.
Ms. Takazato focused her presentation on actions against the United States military facilities waged by groups of Okinawan women. She spoke with emphasis on the prevention of violence against women. She began by citing the United Nations Women's Conference held in Beijing in 1995, where the Platform for Action was signed and adopted. Prior to this conference, she recalled having checked the draft of the Platform; and recognized that among its twelve categories (including women's rights, media and environment, and women's health categories), one clause specifically states that violence against women during conflicts and war will be regarded as war crimes. This was acknowledged in the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 1993, as well as at the General Assembly of the UN in December 1993. However, Ms. Takazato said, her group observed that a position with respect to the particularities of the situation of Okinawan women “was missing.” While the Platform for Action described the many conditions suffered by women in zones of conflict (including violence against women under foreign occupation, invasion or colonization), there was no mention of violence against women under long-term military presence.

Ms. Takazato pointed out that despite a strong request addressed to the Gender Equality Bureau of the Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, the term ‘long-term military presence’ was not included in the final draft of the Platform. Okinawan women took one year to prepare for the Beijing Conference, carrying eleven workshops which were all related to women’s condition in Okinawa (aging, environmental, and peace issues, among others). Ms. Takazato herself prepared for the workshop on ‘Military Sexual Violence against Women.’ Back from Beijing, their delegation was confronted with the incident in which three US soldiers allegedly raped a twelve year old girl.

She narrated what transpired after that incident: “It was not the first case and we knew it was not going to be last, so we decided we would no longer stay in silence, because silence in a way complements violence. So we committed ourselves to rallies, gatherings and protest marches. We also organized the group, 'Okinawa annex D.12. ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS.'

Presentation by Takazato Suzuyo, "Anti-Base Movement in Okinawa from the Women's Perspective"

outside the bases, but the Japanese police have no jurisdiction over crimes committed on the bases or those committed between or among US soldiers.

The Government of Japan (GOJ) financially supports the operation of the US forces in the name of the 'Host Nation Support' concept. More than fifty percent of the US military operation in Japan is absorbed by the GOJ—making it the largest contributor to the US military forces, of all American allies in the world. Japan also provides military cooperation to the US forces. The Japan Air Self Defense Forces (SDF) and the Maritime SDF are closely connected to the US military operation. A careful analysis of what the US military possesses (strategic bombers, for example) and what they do not (surface-to-air missiles, for instance) in Okinawa, however, reveals that the mission of the US forces in Japan is not to defend it, but to deploy them to other areas in case of emergency.
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She narrated what transpired after that incident: “It was not the first case and we knew it was not going to be last, so we decided we would no longer stay in silence, because silence in a way complements violence. So we committed ourselves [to] rallies, gatherings and protest marches. We also organized the group, ‘Okinawa
Women Act against Military Violence.' On one occasion, we held a gathering that around three hundred women attended. When we were divided into small groups for discussions, some women testified for the first time that they had been raped, or they knew someone who were raped and committed suicide afterwards. For a long time these tragic incidents had been kept secret as personal matters. So when these stories came out, we felt the urge to listen to these women. The rape case of the twelve year old girl caught much worldwide media attention. Many journalists came to Okinawa, and some of them asked me how many cases like this we had had. Having been a social worker for seven years, I have met many women who worked as prostitutes during Vietnam War, and I heard their experiences, but I could not just give [the journalists] data: how many and how much. This led us to work on a listing of the incidents of abuse. Just then, we planned to go to the US, because we wanted the American to know what their troops were doing on foreign soil. Also, I wanted to know how much they really knew the truth. So we organized a group of thirteen women and visited four cities in the US."

The data sheets Ms. Takazato showed the Fellows were initially prepared for that visit. At the start, the data gathered from newspaper and magazine articles, and personal allegations, comprised only six pages in chronological order. She continued: "We needed to work on this was because we as women, even men I think, knew that anonymous crimes had occurred in the past. That number is far beyond other crimes. Because of the SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) and Japanese Criminal Law (which provides that sexual assault as an offense is subject to prosecution only upon complaint or shinkoku zai)—and also because of our patriarchal system—rape crimes were often concealed or trivialized, and the victimized women were even accused for being raped. It also had been the case that raped people, especially women, felt ashamed to report to the Police or appeal to the Court. So the number of rape incidents which should be the highest... remained the lowest and invisible."

Since the year of reversion (1972), the Okinawa Prefectural Government has issued a booklet annually, entitled "Present Condition of US Military and the Problem" (Okinawa no Kichi no Genjo to Kadai). Ms. Takazato notes that, "In that booklet, the personal crimes committed by US soldiers were not listed as their official crimes or accidents." She points out the reason: "It is because the SOFA states that official crimes or accidents should be committed during on-duty hours, meaning that crimes committed during off-duty hours were considered as personal crimes. Therefore, even the Prefectural Government only listed down the on-duty accidents and crimes, such as air pollution, life ammunition drill accidents or military vehicle crimes, but not the
individual military soldiers' crimes.”

In December 1995, however, following the outcry generated by the rape of the girl, this booklet was revised precisely to encompass off-duty criminal behavior: Ms. Takazato commented further that today's statistical record on military-related crimes is accessible only as issued by the Okinawa Police Department every year; and that according to this information, US military personnel have only committed to three to five cases a year. “Which is far from reality,” Ms. Takazato said. But: “When those journalists asked me what the official data was, I had to say three to five rape cases a year according to this official data… and they would say Okinawa is the safest place!” These circumstances made clear the urgency and importance of working on the compilation of data.

Citing a parallel situation, Ms. Takazato stressed the numbers of women kidnapped and raped in Iraq today: during the month of August 2003 alone, 400 cases were counted. “Since Iraq is an Islamic country, those who were raped—and their family—feel shame. Some were even killed by their fathers, and some cannot report… The others hide in their houses, unable to appear in public or go to school. This is exactly what happened during and after the Battle of Okinawa—which lasted for three months. On March 26, 1945, the US military first landed on the Okinawa Island. On that very day, a rape case occurred on the island.”

“As you can see from the list of crimes, the three-month battle was not just about shooting. Women's bodies were also battlefield. They were raped and kidnapped, and it would continue very severely during and after the Korean War. By the 1950’s, they had already started constructing military bases in Okinawa, and troops were deployed from Okinawa to Korea.”

Ms. Takazato asserted “When they came back, they were so cruel, and their cruelty went into the local community. Crimes occurred not only around the base areas, but also all over Okinawa Island. If you look at the newspapers of this period, you can find three or four incidents in one paper. Rapes occurred at random, including the rapes of a nine-month-old baby girl and a mother carrying her baby on the back. Most of the women were kidnapped by groups of two to six soldiers, armed with guns or knives. They even brought women to the bases, where a bigger group of more than twenty soldiers was waiting to rape the women.” Many rapes resulted in pregnancies. The mothers of these mixed-race babies were divorced by their husbands, among other tragic developments. Ms. Takazato says that in most cases, the perpetrators were not found.

She relates: “During the Korean War period, in small communities, boys took

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turns to warn the whole village that soldiers were coming...and the women would hide inside the houses. Some women even had a place to hide under the floor. Many women in Okinawa went through such an experience...they still feel that it is a personal tragedy. During the three-month Battle of Okinawa, about one hundred ten thousand Japanese military personnel were stationed in Okinawa to defend the southern-most boundary of Japan. For these troops, a total of one hundred thirty-three military brothels were constructed. As the troops moved, they also took these women and used nice houses of ordinary people as comfort stations. It is assumed that around a thousand Korean women were brought to Okinawa to work as comfort women. Some were brought from China with soldiers. We don’t have the exact number of how many of these women were able to return to their homes alive. Also, about four hundred to four hundred and fifty Okinawan women were used as comfort women, and they were those who used to be state-legalized prostitutes. We used to have a huge prostitution industry in Okinawa. In 1944, almost ninety per cent of Naha City was completely burned and devastated, including traditional legal brothels (tsuji). Until that time, only officers used those places, but after the whole area was burned, these women were taken to various areas all over Okinawa, and some places had both Korean and Okinawan women as comfort women.”

At the Cornerstone of Peace (Heiwa-no-Ishiji) in Itoman, Ms. Takazato said: “you will see some blank stones with no names. These are for those Korean women who were forced to work as comfort women. Since they were forced to use Japanese names, their true names are not remembered. Because of such an awful, cruel situation, leaders of villages have felt the need to build some boundary to avoid violence. Starting in 1959, along the US military bases, brothels were built, and the ones who were pushed to work as prostitutes in these places were the women who lost their family and became orphans; women having been raped and now carrying babies; and widows whose husbands died during the war”

The situation persisted during the Vietnam War, when anonymous women worked as prostitutes “Although the war itself took place in Vietnam, actually all the Asian countries in a way were forced to serve as ‘rest and relaxation’ (R&R) areas. When the soldiers came to Okinawa from Vietnam alive, they were so relieved, and at the same time angered and frustrated, they vented this frustration on women. So those days there were many brothels, and women took twenty to thirty customers a night. On paydays of the soldiers every other week, they had to take more customers. During Vietnam War, many women were raped and murdered, and some were found dead in ditches and rooms. I heard from many witnesses that many women were
almost choked to death, because after coming back from Vietnam, soldiers would have nightmares and their hands instinctively went to the women sleeping next to them. Even during the daytime, it is said that for women, going to the toilet alone was a suicidal act, because they would likely be raped.

Ironically, “ordinary people’s lives became a little bit safer compared to right after the war, thanks to these women.” A 1969 survey estimated that seven thousand four hundred Okinawan women between sixteen to sixty years of age—of a total island population of nine hundred thousand—worked in the sex trade. The calculations for the period indicated that, if one woman earned twenty dollars per night (from five dollars per session), the total amount of the earnings from prostitution would have been well above the income from sugarcane or pineapple production. “The whole society of Okinawa was fed by these women. They were the ones who were pushed into frontline to earn dollars and defend other society members. Women who lived in those times are still suffering from trauma, and some cannot even sleep with the fear of violence.”

With the improvement in the economic condition of Okinawa in the last quarter of the twentieth century, and with the change in the US military changed their military system from conscription to voluntary enlistment, the social conditions took on a different complexion. The so-called ‘poverty draft’ which recruited African Americans, Mexican Americans, and Puerto Ricans, generally could not afford to go to brothels. “So they just get junior or senior high schools girls…Soldiers stationed in Okinawa go to discos or public beaches and make friends with local girls, but it actually means they are trying to get free sex and free food…One time in 2000, two women became intimate with a soldier and they were staying at his room, and while one of the women went to the bathroom, his roommate raped the other girl. In this case, the woman who was raped did not want to report because she was so ashamed. But her friend reported it to the military police; they did not want to report it to the Japanese police. This went to the military court, and the criminal was sentenced four years in prison. This was one of many examples, and we don’t know what’s really happening inside the base. Outside of the base, the SOFA is still preventing US military personnel from being prosecuted. If majority of the crimes are happening to women, the SOFA should say something about how to accuse criminals or how to protect women. But it is an unequal agreement and it fails to do so. Because of this, even if a crime is reported, the Japanese police cannot arrest the suspect. In 1995, when the rape case occurred, US and Japan agreed that in case of severe crimes, they would accept the arrest of suspects before they were entitled. Still, they are so reluctant to
Ms. Takazato ended her presentation with comments about the unchanging potential for violence against women, despite the enormous changes in circumstances from the period after the Second World War and during the Vietnam War; on one hand, and today. She cites the final report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) which she says does not have any provision whatsoever for the reduction of troops. She was unequivocal: “We feel that the first thing to be done to avoid violence is the reduction and withdrawal of the US troops. Whenever an incident occurs, the US military promises that they will retrain their soldiers or they would give discipline. But how can they keep these promises?”

The large numbers alone, in her view, mitigate against keeping those promises. The concentration of troops (twenty eight thousand, with sixty per cent from the Marine Corps) is already potential for social tension. “Since eighty per cent of the Marine Corps are aged between eighteen to twenty-two, their first military training is being conducted in Okinawa, lasting for six months.” Ms. Takazato does not believe there is a real possibility of complete discipline, particularly because the SOFA allows these soldiers to retain special status.

“We urge that the SOFA be revised, especially from gender perspective,” Ms. Takazato asserted. “We see what’s happening in Okinawa is linked to what’s happening in Iraq now.”

“It is a chain of violence. We need to stop the impunity of the soldiers. How many troops has the US government sent to foreign soils after the end of the Second World War? How many crimes have they committed? Yet, they have never officially taken their crimes. So we feel that the International Criminal Court, from which the US government withdrew, should play a more vital role”
ANNEX D.13

ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS

Lecture on “Environmental Issues in Okinawa” by Architect Markishi Yoshikazu, and discussion with members of the lobby group Inochi o Mamoru-kai

PRIOR TO MEETING with the members of a lobby group based in Henoko, Nago City, the Fellows had an opportunity to learn about base-related environmental issues in Okinawa, courtesy of Architect Makishi Yoshikazu, member of the Okinawa Environmental Network. He focused his presentation on issues surrounding the relocation of the Futenma Air Base. Architect Makishi asserted that the relocation of the Futenma Air Base in order to modernize and reinforce its function had long been planned by the US military (FROM the 1960’s), who thus took advantage of the SACO (The Special Action Committee on Okinawa) Final Agreement in 1996 to further accelerate the plan. The new heliport, once completed, will deploy MV22-Osprey tilt-rotors, which has a five-times longer flying range, twice faster in velocity, and three-times in load capacity than current helicopters. Architect Makishi emphasized that not only will the heliport destroy the habitat for dugongs and the coral reef, it will also greatly increase the danger of air accidents. The MV22-Osprey is notorious for its high crash rate.

The Fellows then headed to Henoko, Nago City, located on the east coast of Okinawa Island, to observe the planned site for the heliport and to meet with the members of the lobby group headed by Mr. Kinjo Yuji. At the makeshift bayside office of what is known as 'Inochi o Mamoru-kai'—a citizens' group formed to stop the construction of the planned heliport off Henoko Bay—Mr. Kinjo and his members expressed exasperation at the fact that their homeland has been figured as the 'Keystone of the Pacific' against their interests and wishes. They are also against the US military plans to build yet another base on their land.

Asked about their specific future plans or possible solutions, Mr. Kinjo did not hide his feeling of helplessness. More than half the population of Nago City voted against the construction of the heliport in the 1996 referendum, despite the campaign waged by the national government in behalf of the plan. But the result of the referendum has had no legally binding effect under the current Japanese Constitution. Speaking for the mostly elderly lobby group he heads, Mr. Kinjo offered the opinion that they should not place high expectations on younger activists, who
"ULTIMATELY, bases mean war," when asked why he persistently opposes the US bases.

Mr. Chibana Shoichi is a Yomitan Village Assembly member, who owns a small piece of land (two hundred thirty-six square meters) on what is now the site for the US Navy’s Sobe Communication Site, commonly known as the Elephant’s Cage. The lease of his land expired on March 31, 1996, but the US military has kept occupying the land until now. As a countermeasure against Mr. Chibana and some other landowners’ repeated appeals to the courts, the Japanese Government revised the Special Land Use Law in April 1997, enabling the US military to provisionally occupy land without the permission of the landowners, in order to fulfill its obligation under the Japan-US Security Treaty. What this revision implies, however, is that from April 1996, the Japanese Government had illegally occupied Mr. Chibana’s land for one year. According to the current plan proposed by the Japanese government and the US military, Mr. Chibana’s land should be returned to him in one and a half years, and he already has a development plan (agricultural and residential use) for his land. However, Mr. Chibana said that the past has taught him not to be too hopeful that things will go as planned.

The meeting with Mr. Chibana and the Fellows was held at the open land outside the 'Elephant’s Cage.'
ANNEX D.15

ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS

Visits to historical sites related to the Battle of Okinawa

THE FELLOWS SPENT a day visiting several sites related to the Battle of Okinawa, guided by Ms. Une Etsuko, a 'Peace guide.' Between visits, Ms. Une briefed the Fellows about the historical background of Japan's colonial rule and its having been caught up in aggressive wars. She was particularly keen to narrate, from an Okinawan perspective, how her home island was used as a bulwark against the US Army and as the only Japanese battlefield in the Pacific War.

Haebaru Army Hospital, Haebaru
No sooner had the US Army landed on Okinawa Island in late March, 1945 than the students of two girls' high schools were mobilized as the Himeyuri Troops, to serve as nursing aides: attending wounded soldiers, removing dead soldiers to the exterior of the caves, and carrying food and water. The 'hospital,' within forty to fifty natural and man-made caves, had three main surgical facilities, and the Himeyuri students labored there until the end of May, when they were forcibly ordered to disband right after the Japanese forces decided to retreat further south.

Very few of the girls survived.

Abuchira Gama, Itokazu, Tamagusuku Village
In Okinawa, there are countless natural caves, called gama, which were used as shelters, temporary hospitals, and evacuation quarters during the Battle of Okinawa. Abuchira Gama in Itokazu is one such cave, where some of the Himeyuri troops worked as nursing aides. As more and more wounded soldiers were brought in, the civilians were pushed closer to the entrance. Abuchira gama is preserved as it was during the war, enabling visitors to gain some understanding of the horror of the lives inside the gama. The gama remains pitch-black and moist. What was the hospital area, mortuary, kitchen, storage, the isolation ward for soldiers with psychological traumas, shelters for civilians, and so forth, is empty, but redolent of the most intense suffering.
ANNEX D.16

ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS

Wrap-up session at the University of the Ryukyus

THE FELLOWS HAD an open-ended discussion around the agendas that Professor Gabe suggested: firstly, an Asian perspective on the US military presence on Okinawa (and in Japan in general); secondly, security initiatives from Asia at a grassroots level; thirdly, the Fellows' impressions of the Japanese strategy in 1945 and on the Battle of Okinawa, and fourthly, ways of linking the present and the past for the future.

Professor Gabe repeatedly emphasized the question of why only Okinawa must host bases; why not other areas in Japan, or even in other countries in the region. If the people in Asia truly feel that the US presence is important for the region, they should also contribute by sharing the social burdens hosting these US bases—a sentiment shared by many Okinawans.

Professor Ohashi Masaaki pointed out that although it is important to share this burden, it is also true that Okinawa directly and indirectly depends on the base economy. The Japanese Government is making a great investment in public enterprises or infrastructural construction in Okinawa. Professor Ohashi argued that the very fact that the current Governor of Okinawa was elected—an individual who is well-known as a confere of the central government—might indicate how the Okinawan people feel, i.e. they do not wish to lose the benefits and privileges. It might be said, he added, that the people in the mainland Japan are 'buying' security literally with money.

Professor Gabe remarked about the tact and skill of the Japanese Government in relation to its strategy with the ODA. He also agreed that many Okinawans do have ambivalent views toward Americans and the Untied States. As Ms. Uehara, one of the survivors of the Himeyuri Troop testified, the American soldiers treated Okinawan people as human beings, but it is also true that they did cruel things. Nevertheless, there is a general understanding among Okinawans that the bases may be inimical to them in the long run. And, "We have never been asked to accept these bases," Professor Gabe added.

Citing the deaths of the Himeyuri girls as case in point, Marian Pastor Roces pointed out the gaps in the notions of security—supranational, national, sub-
national, personal security—because it is through at these gaps that people's lives are sacrificed. What notion of security, for example, rationalized the deaths of these girls? Pastor Roces also also pointed out that when 'identity' is discussed, it is almost always in terms of national identity, but she insisted that that is not sufficient. The 'in-between-states' of identity do not come into view. But it is precisely at these blind spots where people are sacrificed, because their security matters less than national security or national identity. In the case of Okinawa, Okinawan security or identity appears to matter less than Japanese security or identity.

Yang Guang offered that the peace movement in Okinawa needs more dimension, because at the present time, the focus seems narrowed down to the base operations and land right issues. Yang suggested that the Okinawan people should firstly look with greater depth at the historical background for the US military presence in Okinawa—and not just after 1945. Secondly, he suggested strategic thinking towards contesting or removing the rationales that give legitimacy to this military presence. He added that an economic dimension to the movement is also in order, because the reduction or removal of these bases will mean the creation of strategies to revitalize the regional economy and secure an alternative employment system.

P. Sainath remarked that at present, there is no Asian perspective on the US military presence in the region. He suggests that all the bases have to be seen as a part of a vast networks of bases, and that the Okinawa bases must not be seen in isolation. Sainath argued that it is vital to determine how these bases or networks of bases are changing and how their relative value and significance are changing with the rapid changes that are taking place in this world, especially in Asia. There is need to ask whether the bases matter differently now, i.e. whether they gain an additional value or decline in value, in relation to geopolitics.
MR. KATO MIKIO, Executive Director of the International House of Japan (IHJ), held an open discussion with the Fellows, in which he expressed his personal views on such matters as the notions of identity and leadership and social change in Japan. The Fellows showed greatest interest in Mr. Kato’s retelling of the history of IHJ, which was incorporated in 1952, and his personal commitment in his 44 years of affiliation with IHJ since 1959.

Concerning identity, Mr. Kato argued that in Japan the notion of ‘self’ is “very weak,” varying according to relationship or situation. In fact the highest state of (spiritual) enlightenment is the total effacement of self, he added.

Mr. Kato cited his favorite philosopher Lao-tzu on leadership. An ideal leader, he suggested, is someone whose presence is barely known, and when his or her aim is fulfilled, followers will say “We did this ourselves.” He admitted that this kind of leadership does not prevail in Japan. But he emphasized that a leader should merely be a spokesperson of an institution, leaving internal matters in the hands of the followers.

Mr. Kato also touched on the change Japanese society has witnessed since the end of the Second World War. After achieving great financial affluence by following Western models, Japan of the present time does not have any model to follow. He also believes that Japan has lost its national purpose, and that it is time for the country to reinvent itself. In his synthesis, Japanese society—which used to be a government-centered society—is shifting itself toward a more multi-polar society. One indication is the fact that the Great Hanshin Earthquake gave the impetus to the central government to make it easier for private sector (NPO’s and NGO’s) actors to be established as a legally acknowledged institution.
ANNEX D.18

ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS
Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, Yushu-kan Museum

INTENSE DISCUSSION on the Yasukuni Shrine and the controversial visits to the shrine by prime ministers during number of seminars, ultimately demanded a visit. Yasukuni Shrine, founded in 1869 to commemorate the spirits of those who died for the nation in various wars during the Meiji Restoration, has enshrined over 2.46 million fallen soldiers as deities.

A museum curator guided the Fellows through the Yushukan War Memorial Museum, renovated in the previous year. They went through the display of relics of the war dead and articles related to a series of wars beginning from the Edo Era through the Pacific War. The timbre of the museum exhibit is consistently nationalistic, and every single item in the museum justifies the wars which Japan has conducted as "inevitable acts for the defense of the nation and for the prosperity of the Asian region." It makes heroes of the fallen soldiers.

The following comment, which Yang Guang made in the ALFP Public Symposium that took place one week after the Fellows’ visit to the Shrine, well demonstrates the nature of the museum: "War responsibility, which is the root of the mistrust between Japan and some Asian countries including China, was not clear at Yushukan Museum. Everything is reduced to an incident; hence no war responsibility is involved." For example, Japan obviously invaded China from 1931, but the Sino-Japanese War is merely cited as the 'China Incident' at the museum. Yang also pointed out that (West) Germany succeeded in changing its identity and opening a bright future not by denying, but by accepting its war responsibility.
ANNEX D.19

ACCOUNTS OF VISITS AND BRIEFINGS

Visit with Mr. Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi

THE FELLOWS VISITED Mr. Yamaguchi Tsuyoshi, Member of the House of Representatives, on the last day of his first term as a Member of Congress; the Diet was to be dissolved the following day. A foreign service officer prior to his election (serving in China, Pakistan and the United Kingdom), Mr. Yamaguchi pursued his new career after acknowledging that politicians ultimately have more power than diplomats to effect change. He aid that he realized that regardless of hard work among diplomats, final decisions are made by the legislators in the National Diet.

Joining the ranks of the decision-makers was to Mr. Yamaguchi vital, in light of his opinion that Japan is facing a number of pivotal decisions.

Mr. Yamaguchi had a critical view of some of the policies of the Koizumi Administration and of the Liberal Democratic Party, particularly those that he believed were focusing almost entirely on the privatization of several key public corporations, namely, the Japan Highway Public Corporation and the Japanese Postal Service. He was of the view that more pressing issues need greater attention, such as security, economic and educational issues. Moreover, privatization, in his view, is inappropriate, and not in Japan’s national interest. Mr. Yamaguchi also emphasized the importance of building an European Union-style Asian community for the peace and prosperity of the region, in which Japan should serve not as a leader, but as a "coordinator."

The Fellows’ questions focused on Mr. Yamaguchi’s stand as well as the debates taking place in the Diet on various issues, including the issues of Okinawa, the Yasukuni Shrine, the Sino-Japanese relationship, Taiwan, the dispatching of the Self-Defense Forces to Iraq, and so forth. He asserted that the Japan-US Security Treaty is critical to Japan, thus the 'Host Nation Support’ status is a necessity to keep the US bases in Japan. Responding to P. Sainath’s question about what threats he sees against which he would want the US bases and whether this kind of an alliance is contradictory to his vision of an Asian Community, Mr. Yamaguchi cited North Korea as a potential threat to Japan and insisted that the US can exercise a stabilizing effect on the state of current affairs. Marian Pastor Roces argued that such an Asian
Community should be imagined from outside the perspective of the US, for it to work.

Regarding the Yasukuni issue, he expressed his opinion that going to the Yasukuni Shrine to pray for peace is all right, although a national non-religious institution like the Arlington National Cemetery is preferable. Yet, he believes that Prime Ministerial visits to Yasukuni do not mean that Japan will be remilitarized.

Asked about the debates on China, Mr. Yamaguchi noted that the main focus now is the Chinese economy becoming bigger. Since much production is being shifted to China due to its cheap labor, the Japanese people are losing jobs. However, some pundits are arguing that in the future, the security issue may be a big problem between Japan and China.

Concerning the Self-Defense Forces, Mr. Yamaguchi maintained that Japan should be able to engage in collective self-defense, but in order to do so, it is not necessary to revise the Constitution. All that is needed is to have a different interpretation of the Constitution.

He ended his session on the positive note that Japanese politics will change in a few years. It is going to be more policy-oriented.
ANNEX E
The Asia Leadership Fellow Program
Fellows, 1996 to 2003

1996
Ignas Kleden (Indonesia)
Wan A. Manan (Malaysia)
Arnold M. Azurin (Philippines)
Kwok Kian-Woon (Singapore)
Kasian Tejapira (Thailand)

1997
Goenawan Mohamad (Indonesia)
Ota Yoshinobu (Japan)
Ishak Bin Shari (Malaysia)
Kuo Pao Kun (Singapore)
Laddawan Tantivitayapitak (Thailand)

1998
Liu Xin (China)
Endo Suanda (Indonesia)
Diana Wong (Malaysia)
Sylvia L. Mayuga (Philippines)
Janadas Devan (Singapore)
Suwanna Satha-Anand (Thailand)

1999
Ayu Utami (Indonesia)
Ohashi Masaaki (Japan)
Cho Hong-Sup (Korea)
Marites Danguilan Vitug (Philippines)
Teo Soh Lung (Singapore)
Sanitsuda Ekachai (Thailand)

2000
Urvashi Butalia (India)
Faruk (Indonesia)
Kumaoka Michiya (Japan)
Park Won-Soon (Korea)
Saree Aongsomwang (Thailand)

2001
Huang Ping (China)
Mahendra P. Lama (India)
Shimada Kazuyuki (Japan)
Ryu Jeong Soon (Korea)
Ann Lee (Malaysia)
David M. Celdran (Philippines)
Anek Nakanutara (Thailand)

2002
Hu Tao (China)
Vinod Raina (India)
Kinoshita Reiko (Japan)
Maznah Binti Mohamad (Malaysia)
Nguyen Thi Hieu Thien (Vietnam)

2003
Ham Samnang (Cambodia)
Yang Guang (China)
Palagummi Sainath (India)
Hamid Basyaib (Indonesia)
Nakano Yoshiko (Japan)
Chung Chin-Sung (Korea)
Marian Pastor Roces (Philippines)
ANNEX F
The Roll of Resource Persons

SAKAMOTO YOSHIKAZU
Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo
“Transnational Civil Society in the Age of Globalization”

FUJIWARA KIICHI
Professor, University of Tokyo
“The Fate of Illiberal Democracies”

MUSHAKOJI
Professor, Chubu University
“The War on Terror and Human Security: The Global Fascism and the Criminalization of the Informal Communities”

MORI TATSUYA
Film Director, creator of the documentaries “A” and “A2”
“New Trend of Religion in Japan and the Role of Media: In the Case of AUM”

Takahashi Tetsuya
Professor, University of Tokyo
“Nations and Sacrifice”

GAVAN McCORMACK
Professor, Australian National University
“Nationalism and a Discourse on Japanese Uniqueness”

KAYAMA RIKA
Psychiatrist/Associate Professor, Kobe Design University
“Petit Nationalism Syndrome: The Rise of Nationalism in Young Generation and Its Socio-Cultural Background”

MUTO ICHIYO
Co-President, People’s Plan Study Group
“Post-War Social Movements in Japan With a Special Focus on US Military Base Issues”

OGAWA TADASHI
Director of Planning Division, The Japan Foundation
“Fundamentalism”

DODEN AIKO
News roadcaster, NHK/Ito Misako, Editor-in-Chief, Gaiko Forum
“Japan and International Media”

TANAKA AKIHIKO
Professor, University of Tokyo
“Knowing Other Viewpoints”

Interview with HON. YAMAGUCHI TSUYOSHI
Member, The House of Representatives
TAKAZATO SUZUYO
Naha Municipal Legislator
“Anti US Military Base Movement from the Women’s Perspective” (In Okinawa)

The Fellows furthermore went as a group on field trips organized around their suggestions and common interests. These sites were:

**Field Trip to Hiroshima/Kansai**
September 9-12, 2003
Moderated by Nagafuchi Yasuyuki
Associate Professor, Nagoya Institute of Technology
and Ohashi Masaaki
Professor, Keisen University

- Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum
  (with a testimony by A-Bomb survivor, Ms. Matsubara Miyoko)
- Organic Farm in Kobe, owned by Mr. Shibutani Fukio
- Takatori Community Center in Nagata, Kobe
- Kamagasaki/Nakanoshima in Osaka on the issue of homelessness in Japan
  Guided by Mr. Yamada Minoru
- Korean schools in Tsuruhashi Korean Town

**Field Trip to Okinawa**
Oct.10-13, 2003
Organized by Gabe Masaaki, Professor, University of the Ryukyus, and
Architect Makishi Yoshikazu, Okinawa Environmental Network
US Marine Corps Base (Camp Butler, Camp Foster)
US Consulate General in Naha
Meeting with Anti-base activists
Sites related to Battle of Okinawa

**Visit Yasukuni Shrine**
with a special focus on Yushu-kan Museum
Oct. 21
ANNEX G
Profiles of the ALFP 2003 Fellows

HAM Samnang (Cambodia)
Assistant Director/Senior Research Fellow
Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP)

Research Interest: Media and Democratization in Cambodia

Mr. Ham is one of the few Cambodian journalists and now researchers who can write in a critical way. He is currently the Assistant Director of the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), an independent, neutral, and non-partisan research institute based in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Besides conducting research, he facilitates conferences, seminars, and workshops within and outside the country, and he himself has been invited to numerous conferences abroad. Before joining the CICP in 2002, he was an associate editor of the Cambodia Daily (the only English-language daily in Cambodia) and has been active in writing about the mass media in Cambodia and about Cambodia’s democratization. His responsibilities at the Cambodia Daily included reporting and helping expatriates in their Khmer communication in the Khmer cultural/historical context.

YANG Guang (China)
Professor and Director-General
Institute of West-Asian and African Studies
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Research Interest: China’s Energy Security—with a Specific Focus on Oil Supply

Since 1978, Mr. Yang has been a researcher/professor at the Institute of West-Asian and African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, where he currently serves as the Director-General; he is one of China’s leading scholars in Middle Eastern Studies. He has published numerous articles and monographs on development, economics, and energy issues in Middle Eastern countries. His recent publications include “Development Report for the Middle East and Africa” (Social Scientific Documentation Publishing House, 1997-2003) and “The Social Security Systems of the West-Asian and African Countries” (The Publishing House of Reform, 2000). He also serves as executive president of two national associations, namely the Chinese Association for Middle East Studies and the Chinese Society for Asian and African Studies, both of which have hundreds of members. He received a master’s degree in law from the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1999. Having studied in Paris and Wisconsin, USA, in the 1980s, he has a good command of both English and French.
Mr. Sainath, one of India’s leading journalists based in Mumbai, is committed to shedding light on marginalized people living in rural areas, and to bettering their condition through his reportage. After receiving a M.A. in history from Jawaharlal Nehru University, he launched his career as a journalist at the United News of India in 1980. Later he joined the Blitz, a major South Asian weekly in Mumbai, where he worked as deputy chief editor for ten years until winning a Times of India fellowship in 1993 and setting out on two-year-long travels to the ten poorest districts in India. His reports during this period were published as the award-winning book *Everybody Loves a Good Drought: Stories from India’s Poorest Districts* (Penguin, 1997). In the last decade, he has spent on average three-fourths of the year with village people, sending articles to various newspapers. The photographs he has taken in rural India have resulted in several highly acclaimed photo exhibitions. He has received numerous awards both within and outside India, including the Amnesty International Global Award for Human Rights Journalism in its inaugural year (2000).

Mr. Hamid is one of the leading Muslim intellectuals who speak, with a great deal of courage and determination, for a radical reexamination of Islamic precepts, including the issues of Islamic law, an Islamic state and personal freedom. Currently, he is a writer and researcher for the Aksara Foundation, a non-profit organization contributing to the peaceful development of an intelligent and interactive civil society in Indonesia. Before joining the Aksara Foundation, he had been editor-in-chief of several magazines and daily newspapers since 1983. Not only is he a contributor to newspapers and magazines, but also he is often cited by the media for his insights into Indonesian politics. He has published several books on world and domestic politics. He conducted his graduate study at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Gadjah Mada.
Ms. Nakano is currently a research assistant professor in the Department of Japanese Studies of the University of Hong Kong, where she has initiated a number of innovative teaching programs in business, communication and media studies. She received her Ph.D. in sociolinguistics from Georgetown University, and has worked as a researcher for documentary programs produced by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation). Her firsthand experience as a researcher for award-winning media programs is well-reflected in her later work: a co-edited volume Reporting Hong Kong: Foreign Media and the Handover (Curzon, 1999) provides an in-depth look at how the international media reported this Asian milestone, and her recent articles consider Japanese pop culture on Chinese campuses. She was an Abe Fellow in 2000-2001, a prestigious fellowship awarded to academics and professionals who are committed to research on pressing global issues.

Ms. Chung is a well-known sociologist in Korea whose publications are also esteemed internationally. Having received her Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Chicago in 1984, she has taught sociology at several universities. She has also dedicated herself to gender and human rights issues on both the governmental and non-governmental level. She has served as a member of several Advisory Committees for women’s issues for the Korean national government, and also has been active in NGOs in such areas as the “comfort women,” those women who were drafted for military sexual slavery by Japan during the World War II. Wartime violence against civilians is one of her main interests, and she has published numerous books and papers on this matter both in Korean and English. Currently she is serving as an Alternate Member of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.
Ms. Roces is an independent curator and critic who works, lectures and writes internationally. Her theoretical work is grounded in the politics of cultural representation, mainly in museums, but also in relation to larger agendas dealing with indigenous cultures, the traumas of modernization, and power as it operates in urbanization. She is also the president of Tao, Inc., a corporation specializing in the development of museum and exhibition projects, and cultural planning and management, focused by a social justice agenda. Her recent curatorial work includes “Sheer Realities: Body, Power and Clothing in 19th Century Philippines” (Asia Society, New York City, 2000); “Laon-Laan,” which deals with the politics, science, and culture of rice in the Philippines (National Museum, 2003); and “Science Fictions,” a major international exhibition of contemporary artists who are critiquing the orders of knowledge promoted by specific sciences (Earl Lu Gallery, Asian Civilizations Museum, Singapore Art Museum, and the Esplanade, Singapore, 2003).

As an investigative reporter/writer for the “Perspective” section of the Bangkok Post, Ms. Supara conducts in-depth research and interviews, with special emphasis on environmental and social issues. She holds a master’s degree in Rural Development Management from the University of the Philippines, and before joining the Bangkok Post in 1993, she had been involved with NGOs in the fields of community development, agricultural and rural management, and women’s development. She has spent years working in the field to gain a deeper understanding of conflicts caused by governmental development and the people’s perspective on its effects. Among numerous honors, she recently received the 2001 Human Rights Press Award from Amnesty International Thailand for her outstanding and consistent reporting on human rights issues, including the rights of children, tribal people, refugees and women. She also won the Reuters Fellowship, which enabled her to conduct research at the University of Oxford in 1999-2000.