Asia Leadership Fellow Program

2011 PROGRAM REPORT

Asia in Dialogue:
Visions and Actions for a Humane Society

International House of Japan
Japan Foundation
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In 1996, the International House of Japan and the Japan Foundation jointly created the Asia Leadership Fellow Program (ALFP). The ALFP provides selected public intellectuals in the Asian region with the opportunity to reside for two months in Tokyo and to engage in collaborative exchange activities on common subjects pertinent to the region. Through such intellectual dialogue, the program seeks to create a close, personal, and professional network of public intellectuals in Asia who are deeply rooted in and committed to civil society beyond their own cultural, disciplinary, and geopolitical backgrounds.

Since its inception in 1996, the program has had over ninety fellows, who have come from diverse professional backgrounds, including academia, journalism, publishing, law, education, the arts, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and nonprofit organizations (NPOs).

The general theme for the 2011 program was “Asia in Dialogue: Visions and Actions for a Humane Society.” From September 12 through November 11, 2011, seven fellows resided mainly at the International House of Japan in Roppongi, Tokyo, and participated in workshops, resource seminars, field trips, and a retreat with scholars, journalists, and NGO/NPO leaders based in Japan. At the end of the two-month program, on November 8, a public symposium entitled “Beyond Conflict & Disaster: The Role of Civil Society in Asia” was held to report on the outcome of the collaborative interaction as well as on the professional interests of each fellow. This program report includes the reports submitted by the fellows after the program was completed, as well as a summary of the resource seminars and other activities in which the fellows participated.

The ALFP organizers firmly believe that the critical voices of its fellows, which challenge the status quo, as well as their proposals for alternative solutions, will lead to the development of new norms and value orientations in the region.

The International House of Japan
The Japan Foundation
Imtiaz Gul (Pakistan)
Executive Director and Founder, Centre for Research and Security Studies

Mr. Gul is currently the executive director of the Centre for Research and Security Studies, a research and advocacy organization focused primarily on security and governance based in Islamabad. As a journalist, he has been reporting for various media such as Deutsche Welle (1989–2009), CNN (1998–2000), Hong Kong-based Star World TV, NHK, and National Public Radio in the United States; he also regularly files for Foreign Policy, Wall Street Journal, and The Friday Times (Lahore) on issues such as militancy, border regions, Afghanistan, and Indo-Pakistan relations. Besides offering advice as a consultant to foreign diplomatic missions and development sector organizations, he regularly appears as an analyst/expert on Al-Jazeera. Mr. Gul published his first book, The Unholy Nexus: Pak-Afghan Relations Under the Taliban, in 2002. His second book, The Al-Qaeda Connection—Taliban and Terror in Tribal Areas (Penguin-Viking India, 2009), profiles the evolution and nature of militancy in the Pakistani-Afghan border regions and how they fell under the influence of Al-Qaeda.

Imai Chihiro (Japan)
Former First Secretary at the Embassy of Japan in Afghanistan

Ms. Imai obtained an M.A. in International and Public Affairs from the University of Pittsburgh in the United States. She has worked with Plan Japan, The Nippon Foundation, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japan Mine Action Service, the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters of the Cabinet Office, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for program formulation and management in various sectors. Ms. Imai’s main interest is community development, civil-military coordination, peacebuilding and conflict prevention and disaster response. Her hobby is traveling and taking photographs.
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Miryam Saravasti Nainggolan (Indonesia)
Board Chair, Pulih Foundation; Center for Trauma Recovery and Psychosocial Empowerment

Educated as a psychologist in the area of industrial and organizational psychology at Padjadjaran University and having a master's degree in social work from the School of Social Work, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Ms. Nainggolan started work on the faculty of the Bandung School of Social Work and Faculty of Psychology, Padjadjaran University, and then became a practitioner in the area of human resources, organizational development and strategic management. In 1998 she was selected as the Executive Director of the Indonesia National Human Rights Commission. Since then she has been active in human rights, conflict resolution, peacebuilding, transitional justice and interfaith/pluralism issues in Indonesia. Since 2004, she has been serving as a board member of the Pulih Foundation and the Tifa Foundation, as well as the Coordinator for the Center for Empowering Reconciliation and Peace/CERP. She conducts training in conflict transformation and mediation in post-conflict areas including Aceh, Papua, the North Moluccas and Timor Leste.

Jehan Perera (Sri Lanka)
Executive Director, National Peace Council

Dr. Perera was educated in Sri Lanka, Pakistan and in the United States, where he studied at Harvard University, obtaining Bachelor of Arts in Economics and Doctor of Law degrees. Besides the National Peace Council, an NGO that focuses on facilitating a people's movement for peace and a negotiated political solution to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, he is on the boards of several other civil society organizations, including the People's Action for Free and Fair Elections and Sarvodaya Legal Services, and has been a member of government advisory committees, including the Ministry of Human Rights and presently the Ministry of National Languages and Social Integration. He has written extensively about the Sri Lankan conflict and issues of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. He was awarded the inaugural Sakai Peace Contribution Award by the city of Sakai in Japan in 2008 and the Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti National Award for Peace, Tolerance and Harmony from the Inter Faith Harmony Foundation of India and the Non Violence Award of the Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation in 2007.

Elmer Sayre (Philippines)
In-House Adviser, Water, Agroforestry, Nutrition and Development (WAND) Foundation

Dr. Sayre’s work experience is varied and includes being an agriculture extension worker, a college teacher, a local consultant and an NGO adviser. He implements initiatives related to water system development, biodiversity, agroforestry, and ecological sanitation, promoting a culture of peace, micro-financing and rural organizing with emphasis on the poor mainly in Mindanao, the Philippines. His initiatives have won much recognition, including an award from the Bill and Melinda Gates Grand Challenges Explorations in Global Health for his work on ecological sanitation. He was an Endeavour Leadership Fellow in Australia in 2007 and a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow in Bellagio, Italy, in 2010. He has published manuals on community-based seedling nurseries and tree planting and on promoting a culture of peace in Mindanao, as well as a book on ecological sanitation. He is also a published poet and short-story writer.
Vuong Thanh Huong (Vietnam)
Senior Researcher, Director of Center for Education Information, Vietnam Institute of Educational Sciences

With more than twenty-three years of experience in education, Dr. Huong has participated in a variety of educational research regarding educational planning and management, education management information systems and comparative studies on education development between Vietnam and foreign countries. She has served as a leading consultant for a number of World Bank, Asian Development Bank and other prominent internationally funded projects in Vietnam. Furthermore, she has been well exposed to international practice and has developed efficient and fruitful relationships with international donors and national educational management units at different levels. She has written extensively on Vietnamese education and education management and has published several articles in the *Vietnamese Educational Review* and the *Journal of Educational Sciences* on education management, educational development issues in Vietnam and comparative studies of Vietnam and the world in education.

Zhang Yali (China)
Research Assistant, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

Dr. Zhang received her B.A. (English Language and Literature) from Sichuan International Studies University, and M.A. (International Relations) and Ph.D. (Political Science) from the City University of New York. She did her dissertation on welfare reform in China and its impact on the mobilization power of displaced workers during China’s economic transition in the 1990s. Her research interests include social movements, conflict resolution, political economy in post-socialist transition and transitional politics in China, and welfare development. She currently works for data compiling and drafting of the Repertoire of the Practices of the Security Council, mandated by the General Assembly in 1952, a constitutional and procedural guide to the proceedings of the Council since 1946. It presents, as comprehensively as possible, relevant data regarding the practices of the Council and the application of the UN Charter and the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.

*Affiliation and titles are those at the time of participation in the program.*
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<td>Sep 13</td>
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<td>Country Reports 1 (Elmer Sayre &amp; Imai Chihiro)</td>
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<td>Sep 16</td>
<td>Luncheon meeting with Akashi Yasushi, Chairman, International House of Japan</td>
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<td>Seminar “Japanese Politics and Diplomacy after the March 11 Earthquake” by Miura Toshiaki,</td>
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<td>Editor, Writer, Asahi Newspaper</td>
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<td>Sep 23</td>
<td>Discussion with Nitobe Kokusai Juku participants</td>
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<td>Sep 27</td>
<td>Seminar “The Change of Work Styles and Poverty in Japan” by Takenobu Mieko, Professor, Wako</td>
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<td>University</td>
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<td>Sep 28</td>
<td>Seminar “The Involvement of International Cooperation NGOs and Their Future Agendas in the</td>
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<td>Great Tohoku Earthquake” by Ohashi Masaaki, Chairperson, Japan NGO Center for International</td>
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<td>Sep 29</td>
<td>Seminar “The Culture of the Tohoku Area” by Akasaka Norio, Professor, Gakushuin University</td>
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<td>Seminar “Japanese Agriculture and the ‘Network for the Young Farm Generation’” by Miyaji</td>
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<td>Yusuke, President, Miyaji Pork Co., Ltd.</td>
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<td>Sep 30</td>
<td>Seminar “On Japanese Religion” by Kenneth Tanaka, Professor, Musashino University</td>
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<td>Maho, Program Officer, Sasakawa Peace Foundation</td>
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<td>Oct 5</td>
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<td>Suzuki Tatsuiro, Vice Chairman, Japan Atomic Energy Commission</td>
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<td>Elmer Sayre Workshop</td>
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<td>Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies</td>
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<td>Seminar “Introduction to Manga-Anime Studies” by Shiraishi Saya, Professor, University of</td>
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<td>Nov 10</td>
<td>Public Symposium “Beyond Conflict &amp; Disaster: The Role of Civil Society in Asia”</td>
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Global Geopolitics and the Role of Civil Society

IMTIAZ GUL

When the fellows of ALFP 2011 began discussing at the International House of Japan the role that civil society is playing in Asia and elsewhere, and how its function can be more effective, I offered a counter-argument: can civil society function effectively, particularly when the cause of political conflict or crisis is directly or indirectly related to global geopolitics? Can civil society or segments of it offset the fallout of conflicts triggered by geopolitical considerations? Cases in point are Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and Libya. U.S.-led interventions in these countries—military offensives, secret commando raids, and drone attacks on sovereign territories, mostly without UN approval, may have helped bigger countries achieve their objectives but at a high political cost; the majority of the population in these countries—perhaps with the exception of Libya—disapprove of the US-NATO military interventions. The majority public opinion looks at these interventions as a means to neo-expansionism; that is, a ploy to gain access and control over natural resources.

Let us have a quick look at the present day geopolitical landscape and its dynamics, which are determined by a) strategic considerations, and b) competing commercial interests of a few leading countries.

MAJOR GEOPOLITICAL PLAYERS

The United States tops the list of major geopolitical players (structural actors), followed by its leading NATO allies, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Italy. Saudi Arabia and the Russian Federation are the indirect pawns of this geopolitical chessboard.

US–NATO Alliance

TRIGGER GEOPOLITICAL PAWNS

In addition to these major powers, one has to keep in mind the countries that can be classified as the “geopolitical pawns” (trigger actors). The most important among these pawns are China, India, Brazil (three giants, but competing markets), Israel, Iran, and Syria.

At the heart of the interplay among these structural and trigger actors in the global geopolitics are certain “trigger factors” for geopolitics that can be listed as follows:

a) U.S.–Israel Alliance vs. Palestine/Arab countries
b) U.S.–India Alliance vs. China
c) Japan–U.S. Alliance vs. China
d) U.S.–Saudi Arabian Alliance (The United States punished the Taliban for human rights violations but is not unhappy with Saudi Arabia for lack of fundamental human and women’s rights.)
e) The United States vs. Iran (The U.S. ambassador to Islamabad told a conference in Islamabad on November 25, for example, that Pakistan’s “idea of importing gas from Iran is not a good one.”)²

MOUNTING PRESSURE ON NATURAL RESOURCES

A closer look reveals that at the heart of geopolitical alliances and the interplay among structural and trigger actors is the desire for strategic advantage and the protection of commercial interests. This obviously entails a quest for natural resources, such as energy and precious mineral resources.

At the same time, the need to protect and promote industries, as well as retain access to cheaper markets, that is, commercial interests, leads to an intense competition. This gives birth to the need for safeguarding access to markets, that is, keeping crucial seaways and highways—the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea—open through strategic alliances. How does this happen?

MILITARY BASES

Overseas military bases are thus used as an instrument for a foothold in regions considered crucial for strategic and commercial interests. The bases usually serve as an insurance policy for access to, and control of, resources, and the routes of their transportation. (U.S. military bases in Japan, South Korea, Guam (near the Philippines), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Afghanistan, and Europe inter alia are some cases in point). It leads us to conclude that geo-economics serves as the primary force behind geopolitics as pursued by the United States and other NATO member states.

This pursuit of strategic and commercial interests has also invariably given birth to a number of conflicts, most of them located in Asia, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East, and stoked unrest in several countries because of the unquestioned Western support for Israel (which is viewed by most Muslims and Palestinians in particular as an aggressor and usurper of Palestinian statehood), or for undemocratic or dictatorial allies, such as those in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar.

A cursory look at this conflict spectrum reveals that the US-NATO combine is common to most of them and the direct beneficiaries of their alliance turn out to be Corporate U.S., Corporate Europe, Corporate Japan, and the U.S./Western military industrial complex. In fact, former U.S. President D. Eisenhower had warned about this creeping influence of the U.S. military industrial complex back in the 1960s. In his farewell speech on January 17, 1961, Eisenhower had cautioned:

This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government… In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.

The interests of dozens of multinationals and their ingress into state affairs (as pointed out by Eisenhower) also play a crucial role in shaping the strategic policies of the United States and its allies.

In the context of multinational corporations and natural resources, especially oil, we must not forget that many U.S. energy giants, such as Exxon Mobil, have entered Iraq and signed lucrative deals with the authorities. This entry comes on the heels of a war that was based on allegations of Iraq possessing “weapons of mass destruction” and being state “sponsors of terrorism.” The same pattern has been followed in the Libyan intervention, which also leads to interests in oil, as Libya is one of the chief exporters of the commodity.

Also, the role of political lobbies and oil companies is nowhere as evident as in the United States: the Tea Party and the Israel lobby are perfect examples of how powerful interest groups have become in the current world. Hence, domestic politics is also directly impinging on geopolitics and making it more convoluted in nature, hopeless in prospects, and helpless in scope. In sum, one can foresee that the future of geopolitics is fraught with futility and ineffectiveness.

In this context, talking of global geopolitics and the ability of civil society to cope with, and overcome the consequences of those politics sounds like a paradox. Why? Let us first look at the phenomenon of civil society.

GEOPOLITICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Though the civil society phenomenon is a historic one, it emerged in its current state and nature in the post-communist era. Generally, civil society is meant to be “the arena, outside of the family, the state, and the market where people associate to advance common interests.” Now, looking into the nature of both the governing structures, one finds

that the new model of governance, that is of civil society, is totally in contrast with the existent one of nation-state structure which is the base of geopolitics; whereas the former strives for “respect for diversity” and “absolute equality,” the latter is for ensuring national cohesion at the cost of squeezing the rights of its subjects.

Despite the fact that a large chasm exists between the two entities, there is a need for convergence between these two concepts of service delivery: conflict resolution and nation building. The thumping role played by civil society during the tsunami in 2004, earthquakes in Pakistan (2005) and Haiti (2010), and the recent tsunami and earthquake in Japan suggests that it can be a burden sharer for the states, and a robust global partner in reconstruction of sites hit by natural calamities.

Likewise, the role of civil society in putting pressure on states to address urgent global issues of climate change, human rights, poverty, health etc., is another example of its burgeoning political clout. Although there can be a counterargument that states have not gone too far, as yet, in making an apparent difference in addressing these frantically taxing global issues, one cannot deny the importance of advocacy campaigns relating to these issues in getting increased recognition with the passage of time. So, civil society is out there to compensate for the vanishing political clout of relatively better and legitimate powers (the United States and Europe) in a political world where economic rivalries among major players have left behind the “to do good” aptitude of dominant political players with a certain set of interests that they perceive as crucial for their state.

Civil society, on the other hand, is often disadvantaged, if not marginalized, by its non-state, nongovernmental status, that is, limited administrative, legal, and financial capacity. It faces even greater limitations in countries such as China, Russia, Iran, and Israel or Kingdoms like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, or Qatar, where centralized governance structures or Western interests restrict or impede the functioning and promotion of civil society that includes media, nongovernmental organizations, and representative bodies of professionals, such as lawyers, academia, and doctors.

Second, state or states’ interests usually constrain civil society organizations, particularly in developing countries or nations with questionable democratic models, or those mentioned above. And these limitations make it difficult for civil society to deal with the consequences of conflicts generated by internal political dynamics (authoritarian, semi-democratic, or undemocratic governance and political structures) or those triggered by bigger powers in the name of their national interests.

The same happened in Iraq, and is happening in Pakistan—where Pakistani NGOs receive funds for human rights, democratization, and rule of law. Ironically, this social sector funding is not even 10% of what the United States spends on its military/security operations; yet, it creates vested interest within the country that at times is in conflict with the national interest. Some of the actions by the US-NATO troops based in Afghanistan (like the September 30, 2010 gunship attack on a border post that killed three Pakistani soldiers, or the November 26, 2011 attack on a Pakistani military post that left 26 soldiers dead) run contrary to the Western claims of respect for law and sovereignty of other countries, and undermine even good work that these countries conduct through the local civil society.

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Global Geopolitics and the Role of Civil Society

Events of the last two decades have increasingly fueled the allegation that the United States and its allies do tend to use the UN and/or the Security Council as “an instrument of war.” Drawing on several examples, particularly the first and the second U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, the Libyan uprising, and the ongoing civil rights’ demonstrations in Syria, Carla Stea points out that “since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Security Council has been in danger of becoming a political battering ram used for the purpose of ‘legitimizing’ the neo-imperial adventures, and the reassertion of Western dominance over former colonial territories in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.”

Stea also writes in her critique of the ever-growing influence US-NATO exercise within and over the UN Security Council:

Twenty-two years ago, as a result of the United Nations Security Council adoption of Resolution 678, which authorized the use of “all necessary means” to end the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and “approved” the launch of the first United Nations supported Persian Gulf War, former United States Attorney General, Ramsey Clark, who had witnessed the devastating consequences of that war’s saturation bombing of Baghdad, stated that “The United Nations, which was created to prevent the scourge of war, has become an instrument of war.”

CHALLENGES FOR CIVIL SOCIETY

When big powers use a multilateral forum such as the UN, this can limit the scope of work and extent of influence of civil society organizations, particularly in areas where the UN wants to intervene or its sanction is sought for intervention by big powers. Why? For the simple reason that the UN stands for values, such as fundamental human rights, sovereignty of nations, and democracy, but when it sanctions action in conflict zones, it runs the risk of allowing the United States and its allies to establish their writ over that particular region, at the cost of the very core values that the UN stands for.

Viewed against this backdrop, one may ask, what are then the real challenges that civil society in Asian countries faces? Perhaps we could list them as follows:

a How to surmount domestic structural hurdles (nondemocratic, authoritarian, or semi-democratic governance and bureaucratic structures at home)

b How to neutralize the impact of external factors, that is, major geopolitical players, such as the United States, NATO, and Russia, which are given more to their own strategic and commercial interests than to the long-term interests of the target countries that are directly impacting countries in crisis, such as Pakistan—which has endured thousands of deaths and billions of dollars in economic losses, but the United States and its allies are still not happy with it

c How to position itself while dealing with the consequences of geopolitics; that is, whether to become the mouthpiece and supporter of the majority in countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, or take handouts from US/UK funded organizations for democracy, rule of law, and human rights. (Does the US-NATO alliance care for these when it comes to their own national interests?)

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

With an ever-increasing network of civil society organizations across the globe and their ability to close ranks on national, regional, and international issues that concern lives of people at large, civil society can play an important role in accountability in the global governance system. Under its influence, we identify that civil society mobilizations have growing impact on political decision makers, such as the UN, the WTO, the EU, ASEAN, the World Bank, and the IMF, in favor of transparency, discussion, outside assessment, effectiveness, and integration of the societies. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also underscored that peace and prosperity can readily be achieved in the world through collaboration and active partnerships among govern-

12 Ibid.
ments, international organizations, the business community, and civil society. But the problem is that there is imbalance of power within the international organizations that are said to be key players in the decision-making processes of world affairs. Global governance institutions are generally dominated by the G-8 nations, resulting in decisions that at times are neither democratic nor representative of all members of the world organization. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that these institutions were created with collective responsibility to work for democracy, legitimacy, justice, self-determination, and other humanitarian concerns, and mobilize states and other actors to coordinate in mutually beneficial ways for political peace and economic progress.

Over the years, though, civil society in developing countries has a sense of alienation from global governance institutions like the UN and other global financial and regional organizations that rarely represent the interests of the millions of people who are affected by their decisions but who have no access to the decision making of these institutions. Civil society organizations, thus, become channels of contact at a national and transnational level with these institutions. They can demand accountability of the global governance system by giving a voice to the general public and can also work better in service delivery to marginalized societies. In this way, the democratic process can be promoted through the involvement of an effective and lively public opinion by their valuable input into the political system, which keeps national and global institutions under pressure for accountability, and so these institutions can get legitimacy at national and international levels.

CONCLUSION

Answers to the questions raised above are generally in the negative, but must we despond and despair, or should we draw optimism from the way civil society as a whole functions, for example in Pakistan? An independent judiciary, very vibrant, independent print and electronic media, a brave legal community (lawyers), hundreds of NGOs, trade unions, and dozens of political parties and groupings most probably offer us a reason to be optimistic about the role of civil society as a whole—it works as a bulwark, as a watchdog against state high-handedness, internal governance failures and shortcomings, and external influences.

Generally, it is a safe presumption that in the face of fierce competition for territorial influence and ever-shrinking economic resources, civil society faces daunting challenges all over, particularly in regions beset with political crises or natural calamities. However, we must also admit that despite limitations, civil society also contributes enormously in upholding, promoting, defending, and strengthening the democratic process.

Civil society responded to the Great East Japan Disaster, when thousands of volunteers—most of whom were well- and highly placed executives from the public, social, and corporate sector—flocked to the disaster-hit northern regions. Had it not been for these volunteers from all over Japan, the relief, recovery, and rehabilitation would have taken much longer.

Similarly, the civil society response to the earthquakes and floods in China, Pakistan, and the Far Eastern countries, too, offers examples of the supplemental role that civil society can play in conflict and calamity.

However, civil society in politically volatile and economically backward countries, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and parts of African and Far East Asian countries, will have to brace for survival in a world wherein competing commercial and strategic interests of the United States and its allies, China, India, and Russia continue to cast their shadow over well-meaning non-state, civil society movements.

A case in point is Pakistan’s civil society movement, which began in March 2007 with the dismissal of over five dozen superior court judges and culminated with their restoration two years later in March 2009. Lawyers and human rights organizations, as well as the private media, kept their pressure up throughout, thereby leaving little option for the government but to rehabilitate all the judges to their positions.

That is why, I would say, regardless of the internal limitations and irrespective of the external geopolitical factors, civil society as a whole can and must function as a watchdog as well as an agent of social transformation. Defending human rights, raising a voice for civil democratic liberties, and guarding citizens against an unbridled national and multinational corporate sector, civil society is thus an essential element of social change and should “pursue [its] goals through institutions and attempts to induce change in the moral behavior of state, global governance institutions and market based actors towards the common people of the society.”

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INTRODUCTION

During the ALFP 2011 program, I focused on Afghanistan in the context of US-NATO military interventions and the state-society relationship. Through the discussions with other fellows and the visit to Okinawa, I learned about Asian people’s perspectives on Japan’s assistance and how the Japanese experience of postwar recovery could be shared with them.

One of Japan’s key foreign policy initiatives at the present time is its partnership with the United States in the war against terror in Afghanistan. Japan has been providing both financial support and human resources to enable a successful completion of this mission. In this paper, I will illustrate an aspect of Japan’s partnership in which I played a direct role on the ground in Afghanistan.

It has become clear that the Afghan war does not have a military solution. The United States is now reconsidering its strategy with two prongs of: (1) militarily contain terrorism and (2) win the hearts and minds of Afghan civilians. An experimental instrument for winning hearts and minds is called the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). This paper examines the PRT concept and assesses its compatibility with the goal of supporting governance and development in remote areas of Afghanistan. Also, based on my firsthand experience of working closely with one of the PRTs, I try to make suggestions about what could have been done better.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRT)

The key concept of PRT is to facilitate a partnership between civilians and the military, and to get them to work as a team in order to take comprehensive measures to promote governance, security, and development. A PRT consists of 100 to 200 military personnel and about a dozen civilian personnel.\(^1\) A PRT’s civil-military balance, operational method, and team size are significantly influenced by the security conditions of the PRT’s area of responsibility. Conceptually, a PRT’s ratio of military personnel is higher than that of civilian personnel in the early stages of the operation. As time goes by and the security situation is considered to have improved, the number of civilian personnel is expected to increase.

A PRT’s military component is under the command and control of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF), and the civilian sector follows the regulations of their own government. ISAF was created in December 2001 as an UN-mandated international force to create a secure environment in and around Kabul and to support the country’s reconstruction (UNSCR 1386). After NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation in August 2003, the United Nations extended the ISAF’s mandate to cover the whole of Afghanistan (UNSCR 1510). As ISAF’s provincial strongholds, 28 PRTs are deployed across 34 provinces of the country, as of December 2011.\(^2\)

Afghanistan has received “more than US$40 billion in foreign aid since late 2001.”\(^3\) Japan has pledged US$2.5 billion in total and has realized US$1.6 billion.\(^4\) Japanese civilians, such as nongovernmental organization

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1 Interview research at US CENTCOM, November 2005.
Asia Leadership Fellow Program: 2011 Program Report

(NGO) workers, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) experts, and embassy staff are involved in the application of the assistance on the ground. In spring 2009, the Japanese government dispatched a civilian team to a PRT in Ghor, a mid-west province in Afghanistan. I was a member of the first civilian team.

PEOPLE AND PROVINCE FORGOTTEN BY THE GOVERNMENT

Ghor is one of the most vulnerable provinces in Afghanistan. While it has been one of the cores of stability in the country, Ghor is at considerable risk of tipping over to the “zone of instability” due to extremely weak state institutions and their service delivery, low level of education, underdevelopment, strategic borderline position between the stable and unstable parts of the country, isolated geographic situation, and lack of public infrastructure. The situation gets worse because of natural disasters, such as drought, environmental degradation, and serious deforestation.

Ghor province has been lacking attention from the central government of Afghanistan and the international community. As a result, it is deprived of development assistance in comparison with the surrounding provinces. As the province is not the priority of the Afghan government, it lacks qualified and capable civil servants to serve in the provincial government and that, in turn, is seriously obstructing the delivery of essential services to the people. The majority of the population makes a living in subsistence farming, rain-fed agriculture, and animal husbandry. In an isolated province like Ghor, PRT (which works as a medium of assistance for development and governance) is supported by the local community. Compared to other PRTs operating in conflict areas, the local acceptance of the PRT has been positive in Ghor.

In the difficult circumstances highlighted above, Japan’s assistance can play a significant role in enhancing the good relationship between the local community and the PRT. When the security condition becomes worse, organizations tend to clamp down on “the freedom of movement, with deleterious impact on the ability to … work in the communities.”

The deterioration of the security situation prompts international actors to rely on “deterrence methods for maintaining security or protection, rather than ‘community acceptance’ methods.” In this context, PRT’s civil-military cooperation approach carries an advantage. Through the logistical and security support by the military section, the civilian component can access the outskirts of the province and the community.

STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP IN AFGHANISTAN

The fundamental challenge for Afghanistan is the “weak links between the state and society.” Having few formal channels to the periphery, “the government lacks the capacity to engage … with rural communities” at the subnational level. The majority of the rural areas have not been reached by aid projects. There are three reasons for this. First, the government is centralized and the disbursement of money is under the control of the line ministries. Second, there is a lack of political will to have processes that would ensure accountability in Afghanistan, given their cultural practices and traditions that encourage nepotism and unilateral decision making. Third, the local leadership is not engaged in the process of defining the priorities of the Afghan government. For improving subnational governance, the government’s accountability and service delivery at the local level are vital.

PRTs have been, by and large, successful in meeting their objectives of channeling economic assistance to grassroots communities through local entities. This was done in collaboration with embassy and aid agency personnel who formed the PRT civilian component. PRTs are able to deliver economic resources to the people at the grassroots level in a transparent and relatively cost-effective manner. Nevertheless, the PRTs have their weaknesses. They are less successful in connecting with the government officials between the national and subnational levels, and the weak ties between the government and the PRTs deeply damage state-society

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 9.
relations. Furthermore, “the perception that aid is being driven by foreign aims [and objectives] is undermining its effectiveness” as well as local acceptance.10

Despite the close working relationship with the provincial government and local NGOs, PRTs have not particularly contributed to the strengthening of the technical and financial capacities of Afghan institutions. Therefore, the whole PRT impact is limited and restricted by the capacity and reach of the local NGOs they have worked with. The bigger reach of the Afghan government system has been barely utilized. Even if the PRTs were able to connect with the provincial governments, it would be difficult to overcome the above-mentioned problems, including the lack of transparency, nepotism, and corruption, all of which are endemic to the current Afghan political reality.

The Afghan people’s priority is the provision of security and social services. Through the fairly successful service delivery, international intervention has raised people’s expectations. Not only providing the funds, but also meeting people’s expectations, calls for a cautious and gradual approach to programming, and ensuring the successful completion of the undertaken projects is very important. Because of the absence of a formal taxation system, particularly at the subnational level, the concept of self-governance is neither understood nor popular. Funneling more money from the air is not the solution to the poverty or the lack of social services on the ground. The concept of project execution with monitoring and follow-up activities should be mastered and disseminated by the Afghan people.

WAY AHEAD: TRANSITION AND AFTERWARDS

How do Afghans look at the assistance through military wings of the international community in the past ten years? Some Afghan public intellectuals say, “ISAF is not cooperating with our government while the mission statement says that ISAF conducts operations in support of the Government of Afghanistan.” Others argue that the Afghans cannot appreciate any assistance from the very people who point their weapons at them.11 Winning the hearts and minds of the local residents by military means is not a viable method.

While the international donors—mostly coalition partners in the U.S.-led “War on Terror”—use their development budget through PRTs for supporting the troops at the provincial level, the development opportunity is at the subnational level. In November 2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) speculated that “Afghanistan will face additional challenges as the international military presence is wound down and the government has to take over spending currently financed by donors. Foreign troops are expected to gradually withdraw by 2014.”12 Two years for the transfer of power to the local authority is a very short time. In order to avoid a civil war in future, some kind of agreement should be made between antigovernment armed groups and the Afghan government. The international community should be committed continuously to the future process, cooperate with the regions, and make sure the funds do not dry out once the troops leave the country.

The IMF further speculated that, in the near future,

Afghanistan’s security forces will have to take over more responsibility, leading to higher spending. At the same time, the government may lose revenues related to spending by foreign troops in Afghanistan. Moreover, it is likely that total grants decline from an estimated over 40 percent of GDP in 2010/11 to less than 30 percent of GDP in 2013/14.13

In the process of transition, the role of international actors would be changed from direct service providers to supporters of local capacity building. This process includes the phasing out of all PRTs. The Afghan government is also obliged to exercise its sovereign authority at both national and subnational levels.

Given the enormity of the gap between the center and the periphery, how to develop the capacity to deal with instability and insurgencies is the challenge that the current Afghan society faces. Another concern about the transition is the establishment of the financial ground of the central government. At an international conference held in Bonn, Germany, in December 2011, President Karzai said, “Afghanistan would need the

10 Ibid., 11.
11 Interview Research in Kabul, Afghanistan, April 2011.
13 Ibid.
financial support of other countries for at least another decade beyond 2014.”\(^{14}\) In addition, “Afghanistan estimates it will need outside contributions of roughly $10 billion in 2015 and onward, slightly less than half the country’s annual gross national product, mostly because it won’t be able to pay for its security forces.”\(^{15}\)

Currently, more than 90% of the Afghanistan’s national budget is met by assistance from the international community and only about 10% is from domestic revenue.\(^{16}\) A sound revenue source is relevant to the people’s trust in the central government. Unless their confidence in the government increases, tax income will not increase and structural dependency on foreign aid continues. If the fight against antigovernment insurgencies persists longer with the increase of personnel, then the maintenance cost of Afghanistan’s National Security Forces (ANSF) would be piling up. At the same conference of December 2011 in Bonn, the international community and Afghanistan agreed to dedicate themselves to “deepening and broadening their historic partnership from Transition to the Transformation Decade of 2015 [to] 2024.”\(^{17}\) The conference statement says that “common responsibility for Afghanistan’s future does not come to a close”\(^{18}\) when the transition process ends. Terrorism, “the main threat to Afghanistan’s security and stability … endangers regional and global peace and security.”\(^{19}\) Therefore, engagement of the international community in support of Afghanistan would continue beyond 2014.\(^{20}\)

In November 2011, Afghanistan’s traditional national assembly, called Loya Jirga, was held in Kabul to negotiate a security agreement that could maintain a U.S. military presence in Afghanistan after 2014, when most international forces are to leave. The assembly declaration emphasized that U.S. nationals who commit crimes in Afghanistan would not be immune from prosecution and the United States should stand for Afghanistan “if a third country tries to attack it.”\(^{21}\) The declaration also stated that the agreement should “be signed for 10 years initially, although that could be extended” and that ANSF “should take the lead in all military operations.”\(^{22}\) The assembly called for the Afghan parliament to approve the strategic partnership deal and said that the United States “should not play out regional rivalries on Afghan soil.”\(^{23}\)

The ANSF, constructed by NATO, requires “at least [US]$3 billion annually in outside funding to operate.”\(^{24}\) Meeting “Afghan demands for a multiyear commitment of U.S. resources” would be another challenge, “since the administration can’t bind appropriations by future Congresses.”\(^{25}\) From the viewpoint of the United States, the strategic partnership with Afghanistan offers “the best way to sustain a pro-Western Afghan government past 2014, and it can preserve the U.S. ability to strike quickly and effectively at emerging terrorist threats in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”\(^{26}\) Then, the questions for the Afghans are: (1) for how long they need such foreigners’ involvement and (2) how they would achieve provisions of security, justice, and social service in the future by their own initiatives.

### LESSONS LEARNED

What I would like to see happen in Afghanistan is solid capacity building and strengthening of Afghan governmental institutions and civil society organizations with regard to governance and development activities.


\(^{15}\) Ibid.

\(^{16}\) Interview Research in Kabul, Afghanistan, April 2011.


\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) Ibid.

\(^{20}\) Ibid.


\(^{22}\) Ibid.

\(^{23}\) Ibid.


\(^{26}\) Ibid.
Unfortunately, while I was there, the PRT mechanism provided little or no opportunity for direct Afghan participation. The civilian section of the PRT was international in its composition. In addition, the number of civilians in the PRTs was only a small fraction of the number of military personnel. There should have been greater efforts, from both the government and civil society, to develop alternative mechanisms that would have empowered Afghan civilians and helped them look at the security, governance, and development issues that PRTs were tackling.

According to Barnett Rubin,

Foreigners … working in Afghanistan often complain that Afghans ‘lack capacity’ and suggest programs of ‘capacity building’ to enable Afghans to develop their economy and state. Such programs train Afghans … on the assumption that mastery of these [Western] standards and practices constitutes ‘capacity.’ Unfortunately, many of these internationally accepted standards and practices do not work very well in Afghanistan, since they presuppose a set of interoperable systems that do not exist. Hence the need to train Afghans to fill out project proposals [properly] … mutates into demands for a different type of education and legal system.27

At an international seminar held in Helsinki in September 2011, one of the speakers, Mark Sedra, stated that the lessons learned from the last ten years of foreign personnel presence in Afghanistan are “the need to better understand the local environment and the need [to] cooperate with all local actors, including political and religious leaders.”28 A Western model or structural system is not applicable to a country like Afghanistan, where the majority of the people are illiterate. Sedra also believes, “A long-term commitment to the reform process is vital for its success, and long-term solutions can only be found by listening to the locals, and by keeping regionalism and sustainability as goals.”29

The past ten years also provided Afghans with a lot of opportunities to work closely with foreigners. Along with the participation of Afghan intellectuals, now may be the time for Afghans themselves to review the past approaches of foreign aid, evaluate the performance of major programs, and discuss more suitable methods. Even if they do not find a solution to every problem that might be brought up in the review process, an Afghan-led attempt to analyze what has been provided to them and to bridge the gap between donors and the recipient in terms of how they see things would be valuable. If Afghans really want to take a lead in developing their own country, they have to remain positive and open their mind in order to absorb and utilize the experiences of other countries. Simply waiting for the donors’ proposals is no longer the way.

In the coming years, Afghan people will need to comprehend, propose, and engage in human resource development programs with their own initiatives. They will need to put forward their own views and alternative ideas. In this process, qualified and experienced Afghans who have lived and studied several years in other countries can play significant roles. On many occasions, Afghan people complained to me that Afghanistan is underprivileged and hopeless. In response, I asked them what exactly they had expected, in terms of improving the situation, and how they can be involved in the process of change. Most of the time, they searched for words but did not answer me. I believe that it is necessary for both donors and recipients to discuss a middle course that is more reasonable and functional. In order to conduct a productive discussion, donors should think about how they can downstage their technologies and the recipient should think about how they can absorb the donors’ ideas to establish their own methods. It will be a challenge for both parties to understand the differences they may find in their thinking and approaches to problems because of their respective cultures, histories, and sense of values.

COMPARING OKINAWA: LOCAL ECONOMY DEPENDENCE ON US MILITARY BASES

The field trip to Okinawa was the most impressive part of the ALFP 2011 activities. In five days, the fellows had meetings with public intellectuals and visited significant places, such as war memorials in the southern part of Okinawa’s main island and World Heritage sites.

29 Ibid.
The postwar development of Okinawa has some interesting lessons for Afghanistan. Of course, Okinawa’s position is different from that of Afghanistan because of the Japan-U.S. alliance. However, in the context of geopolitical importance in regional security, as well as of the coexistence with U.S. military bases and the state-society relationship, people have common challenges in their governance and development: prioritizing their needs, doing feasibility studies, and convincing the central government to allocate certain amounts of budget. For the people of rural Afghanistan, development or follows the path of dependency would be a case study for Afghanistan, while both (Okinawa and Afghanistan) are being affected by the interests of major geopolitical players.

In the postwar period, Okinawa spent 27 years under the U.S. administration and missed the opportunity of taking part in the rapid economic growth after its reversion to Japan in 1972. In order to facilitate the development of this island, the Japanese government set up the so-called Okinawa Development Plan. The plan, from 1972 to 2001, focused on overcoming the disadvantages of Okinawa and narrowing the gap between Okinawa and the mainland of Japan. Since 2002, the plan’s focus is to establish a self-sustaining economy by the initiative of the private sector. In the last 40 years, about 10 trillion yen was allocated to the development plan. Through such special measures, the social capital of Okinawa Prefecture became almost equal to the average of other prefectures in Japan.

On the other hand, establishment of a self-sustaining economy by the private sector has not shown much progress. Okinawa has a structural problem with an overreliance on public works. Indicators such as unemployment rate and prefectural per capita income show that Okinawa is the poorest prefecture in Japan. The third Okinawa Development Plan had been set to expire at the end of March 2012. As an alternative, the prefectural government of Okinawa is requesting the central government to provide financial assistance of 293.7 billion yen per year from April 2013. The premise is that the prefectural government can carry out more effective development according to the needs of the Okinawan people at their discretion. However, some people argue that the vision and strategy of the prefectural government are still vague and it is necessary for Okinawans to review the past development plans and make a reasonable plan that they can carry out with their own capacities.

CONCLUSION

Japan is given credit by the international community for its achievement of sustainable economic development in the last 66 years after World War II. However, for outsiders, it is less visible that Japan’s stability and prosperity are made up of the "colonization" of places like Okinawa and Fukushima. The issue of U.S. military bases in Okinawa has always been controversial in and outside Okinawa. In the discussions with public intellectuals in Okinawa and my colleagues from Asia, I had mixed feelings about Japan’s position in the current global geopolitics. In other countries, Japan’s assistance is appreciated but some intellectuals question Japan’s support to the U.S. “War on Terror.” In the contemporary global geopolitics, should Japan fully approve the US-NATO military interventions? If Japan approves, to which extent will it cooperate with the alliance’s interventions, such as the one in Afghanistan? Ultimately, what is the benefit for Japan—a country that has lived by the philosophy of disarmament for more than half a century, as stated in the Constitution, and has a history of recovering from the catastrophes of two atomic bombs?

While economic development has been achieved, Japan has no political power and role to influence, in any significant way, the military predominance of the US-NATO-led international community to change their policy. Rather, as a soft and middle power, Japan should assist developing countries, such as Afghanistan, through human resource development and capacity enhancement of local people. Not being subordinate to Western countries with a militarized mindset, as far as social development is concerned, Japan should support and induct Afghanistan (and other conflict-affected countries) into its program for human capacity development with the objective of establishing a social system that will culminate in the emergence of a strong civil society.

33 Interview research in Naha, Okinawa, October 2011.
Struggling for Conflict Transformation, Peace, and Social Harmony in Indonesia: What Can Be Learned From Japan

MIRYAM SARAVASTI NAINGGOLAN

BACKGROUND

One thing that sticks to Indonesia is how it is a plural and multicultural country. With a population of 237,556,363, Indonesia consists of 300 different ethnic groups, each of which has its own traditions and customs as well as languages and different religions. This unique condition becomes an asset for the country and is maintained by the national motto: Unity in Diversity (Bhineka Tunggal Ika). However, on the other side, this can also be a potential conflict if the nation has no capability to manage differences.

The history of recent social conflicts in Indonesia can be traced to 1998 when Soeharto, the second president of Indonesia, fell from power. He took power in 1966, established an authoritarian “New Order” regime, and retained it for more than three decades. During the Soeharto era, most conflicts erupted suddenly and very violently, and they often happened between the state and communities, such as the disputes between the military and religious groups (Tanjung Priok, 1984) and the disputes concerning the implementation of a military operation zone (in Aceh and Papua). These mostly centered on the issues of injustice and human rights violations. With his power, however, Soeharto successfully suppressed almost any conflict—as he feared that conflicts could trigger tensions stemming from issues of ethnicity, religion, race, and intergroup relations (usually known as SARA).

Soeharto’s fall was followed by the rise of both public pressure and demands for democracy. At that time, Indonesia was rapidly slipping into political chaos, and violent communal conflicts—which mostly had to do with ethnic and religious issues—began to erupt across the nation, as seen in central and western Kalimantan (where people faced ethnic issues) and in Ambon, Halmahera, and Poso (where religious issues existed). These conflicts caused the loss of thousands of lives and internal displacement of hundreds and thousands of people. Such circumstances led many people, from both the government’s side and the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to take action to resolve conflicts and transform the lives of people into peaceful and harmonious ones.

FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION

In the book, The Peacebuilding Toolkit: Learning from Good Practice: The Experience of Indonesian Peacebuilding Practitioners, conflict is described as “a situation in which there are two or more social groups with incompatible objectives using diverse strategies so that there is no conformity or harmony between them but instead controversy that leads to disputes.” Conflict is a reality in life that we cannot avoid, but can be solved in nonviolent ways, and in certain situations, it might even result in a better condition of life for the parties involved. Furthermore, having resolved disputes can enhance the capacity of groups in the community to handle conflicts when they occur. Conflict, however, becomes a problem if one or all the parties involved start using violent strategy in the win–lose paradigm. That is when conflict resolution and/or conflict transformation come in.

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1 2010 census.
2 SARA is an abbreviation of “suku, agama, ras, antar-golongan (ethnic, religion, racial, and inter-group).”
3 The Peacebuilding Toolkit: Learning from Good Practice: The Experience of Indonesian Peacebuilding Practitioners, (Jakarta: Catholic Relief Services, 2003), 29.
Conflict resolution is a wide range of methods of addressing sources of conflict—whether at the inter-personal level or between groups or states—and of finding means of resolving a given conflict or of continuing it in less destructive forms than, say, armed conflict. Forms of conflict resolution generally include negotiation, mediation, diplomacy and creative peacebuilding.\(^4\)

Conflict transformation is the process by which conflicts... are transformed into peaceful outcomes. It differs from conflict resolution and conflict management approaches in that it recognizes, contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes. The very structure of parties and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflicting relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflict. Conflict transformation is therefore a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict.\(^5\)

A study by Dadan Umar Daihani the conflict map in Indonesia in 2002–2007 found that the main sources of conflict in this period were: separatism, intra- and inter-religious, ethnic, local politics (between the community and local government or between central and local authorities), local and national elections, county extension, intergroup (political groups, inter villages, gang), migrant issues, natural resources, and land disputes (between communities, community group and companies or government).\(^6\) Most of these conflict issues are still coloring the lives of Indonesian people. Certain conflicts, such as land disputes and issues of local politics, are even increasing.

As for the types of conflict, there are two types in Indonesia: horizontal (intergroup conflict in the community) and vertical (conflict between the community and the authority/government). Based on these categories, Daihani has studied the trend of horizontal and vertical conflicts from 2002 to 2007 and computed data that shows how frequently horizontal and vertical conflicts occurred in 31 provinces in Indonesia, as we can see in the tables below.

![Graph showing conflict trend from 2002 to 2007](image)

**TABLE 1.** Conflict Trend in Indonesia from 2002 to 2007.\(^7\)

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5 Ibid., 9.
7 Ibid., 4.
TABLE 2. Rank of Conflict Frequency per Province in Indonesia from 2002 to 2007.8

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TABLE 3. Rank of Conflict Frequency per Province in Indonesia from 2002 to 2007 (continued).9

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8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 5.
Through the long process of democratic reform, “the Indonesian government … successfully negotiated several peace agreements and brought an end to mass human rights violations.” By the end of 2005, some cases (most notably Ambon/Maluku, Poso, Central Sulawesi, and Aceh) had been resolved and peace agreements were signed. In the case of Aceh, “negotiations took place in an international spotlight, largely because of the December 2004 tsunami.”

The peace negotiations aimed to end hostilities among parties involved in the long-term violent conflicts. For instance, the conflict in Aceh that began in 1970 after “a declaration of independence by an Acehnese separatist group known as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement, or GAM)” was a “conventional civil war.” The conflict between the GAM and the Indonesian military “resulted in thousands of killings, disappearances and other serious human rights violations.”

However, in the peace negotiations for both Maluku and Aceh, for example, the justice issues have been marginalized. Although “truth seeking, justice and reconciliation mechanisms appear in the final [peace agreement] texts, there was surprisingly little dialogue on the relevant mechanisms and options,” and consequently, the role of the “transitional justice mechanisms” was unclear. Furthermore, since the peace agreements were signed, the truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) or the human rights court (HRC) has never been implemented. It can be said that the government of Indonesia has victoriously resolved the conflicts, but not fully succeeded in transforming these conflicts from negative destructive power to positive constructive social and political power, from violent conflicts into peaceful outcomes. In addition, the community has not been empowered to deal with horizontal conflicts that occurred among individuals through participatory approaches—which have often resulted in a short commitment. Not many efforts have been made in this matter by the government either.

**PEACE AND PEACEBUILDING**

Peace is defined as “establishing a relation between individuals, groups and institutions respecting the plural values and encouraging the total human potential development.” This definition is more than what many people understand: peace is a no-war condition.

There are two ways to see peace, negative and positive.

1. Negative peace, which focuses on the absence of war and violence, depends on prevention of punishment and threat toward violence as well as on short-term impacts (“peacekeeping” and “peacemaking”). An example of negative peace is the case of Sri Lanka, where the civil war was over in 2009 but the problem was still there; after the severe win-lose dispute, there was no conflict transformation in terms of reconciliation between the two parties involved.

2. Positive peace focuses on the fundamental change of the community structures that have triggered the existing war. It seeks to solve conflicts in a nonviolent way and is committed to the economic welfare of human beings, social justice, democratic participation, ecological balance, global citizenship, and sufficient protection of human rights.

Based on my experience as a member of the Team for Post-Conflict Community Empowerment (Tim Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Paska Konflik, or PMPK) in North Maluku in 2001–2002, I learned that the community needed to be empowered to develop their capacities to handle conflicts using both the traditional

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11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 14.
reconciliation customs and the method of mediation. In Ternate and Halmahera, which our program covered, a religion-based conflict occurred in certain areas (such as Ternate, Galela, and Tobelo), partly as an induction of the Ambon conflict, while in the areas of Kao and Malifut (central part of Halmahera), the main issue was the geographical boundary.\(^{18}\)

Because of the severe conflict that started in 1999, martial law was declared in the North Maluku Regency (the present-day Province of North Maluku). The military was sent to control and stop the violent conflict between communities.\(^{19}\) The security or negative-peace approach was taken by the central government in order to make peace, and this situation continued for almost one year until obvious violence stopped. Unfortunately, the government did not continue the process of peacemaking and peacekeeping to the point where peacebuilding efforts could be undertaken with a positive-peace approach. This was not uncommon in Indonesia, where most conflicts are resolved but not up to the level of conflict transformation, as mentioned above. However, in the case of conflict in North Maluku, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and several national NGOs in cooperation with a few local NGOs developed some community-based peacebuilding programs that would help empower the community to deal with the past violent conflict and transform it into a reconciled form of relationship.

**PEACEBUILDING AND SOCIAL HARMONY**

Peacebuilding is a process of turning a never-ending multidimensional fight into an effort to change violence into nonviolence. “The Peacebuilding Toolkit, Learning from Good Practice: The Experience of Indonesian Peacebuilding Practitioners” defines peacebuilding as “a framework that can bring together different organizations and individuals who are working to promote peace through a diverse range of actions.”\(^{20}\) In the workshop—which was held by the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in August 2002 and attended by 45 Indonesian peacebuilding practitioners—the core ideas related to the need for peace emerged. The ideas were that equity, justice, tolerance, respect for human rights and life, and prosperity will create a strong civil society with a culture of peace that will then bring harmonious peace to the community.\(^{21}\)

A culture of peace is formed by values, attitudes, and behaviors, as well as by ways of living, which are composed of the fundamentals of nonviolent principles and respect for rights and independence of all human beings. In a culture of peace, power is established through participation, dialogue, and cooperation, which will decrease violence in any form, including war and the culture of war. One of the aims of the culture of peace is to create a community in which members are concerned about each other and protect the rights of marginalized groups, such as children, women, minorities, elderly, or the disabled. In peacebuilding efforts, we have to understand and be aware of the difference between the traditional and the new culture of peace.

A traditional culture of peace is identified by certain characteristics: it exists in an industrial society with an unstable balance between “power and military forces” and focuses not on eliminating wars but on limiting them, without producing actors and institutions that would effectively prevent wars and terrorism.\(^{22}\) A new culture of peace, on the other hand, is a positive peace reflected in modern society as a global information community that “can change our priorities and focus on harmonious peace”\(^{23}\) and requires a fundamental change of the community structure, as has been discussed above.

Therefore, peacebuilding efforts in the community must be based on a comprehensive framework that brings together different actions and actors at different levels through different kinds of strategies to promote conditions of peace and justice. Peacebuilding programs, conducted by either the government or NGOs, are developed with an aim to bring people a harmonious and peaceful social life. We can thus say that peace and

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19 Ibid., 8.
21 Ibid., 8.
23 Ibid., 2.
social harmony are the result of peacebuilding efforts that have been made for creating positive peace, and as I explain further in the following part, Japan is the right model of positive peace.

In his article “A New Culture of Peace from Social Harmony,” Leo Semashko defines social harmony as “an integrative value in a global, information society, which unites in itself” the values of affection, “peace, justice, freedom, equality, [sisterhood,] brotherhood, cooperation, nonviolence, tolerance, humanism and other universal values, and prioritizes children.”24 Harmony is a universal value in both Eastern and Western cultures that can reduce “the clash of civilizations.”25 In addition, Semashko writes that social harmony in the community creates concord and continued peace—“beyond wars, terror and poverty”—which start with gender harmony (between mothers and fathers), intergenerational harmony (between parents and children), and conformity among various classes “through harmonious partnership.”26 In the policy of social assistance for the victims of social disasters, the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs refers to social harmony as “an order of social life grounded on the spirit of respect each other, honor each other among people and inter local community.”27

The following social harmony indicators at different levels should be considered in developing a peacebuilding program.

SOCIAL HARMONY INDICATORS

At an individual level, a peacebuilding process in the community makes people more just, nonviolent, and appreciative. People also learn to respect, love, tolerate, accept, and trust one another, and be more reliable.

At the community level, peacebuilding efforts should help develop social relations, which rely on the following values: justice, tolerance, nonviolence, humanism, mutual respect, solidarity, as well as spirits of togetherness and teamwork to achieve a common goal, and an ability to help and trust each other.

At the state level, the government has to develop systems that commit to people’s economic welfare, democratic participation, ecological balance, respect for human rights, enforcing the law, and establishing a social structure with a vision for long-term positive peace and strive for political stability.

CHALLENGES FOR INDONESIA

Being a plural country is a given condition for Indonesia. As a nation-state with a democratic system, this circumstance needs to be managed carefully and wisely. Otherwise, it might turn into a problematic situation in many aspects and forms.

In terms of conflict transformation and the process of producing a strong civil society with both peacebuilding actors and organizations, there might be some challenges and/or questions for Indonesia as follows:

1. How do we encourage people, even from an early stage of life, to develop their behaviors that are essential in building social harmony at the individual level, as described above? Are the family education and school education system directed toward such behavioral development? Has the government allocated a sufficient budget for education and human resources development as an investment for the future of the nation?

2. How do we establish communities that have strong social relation skills and the values that would help create a nonviolent, humane society with solidarity and mutual trust and respect? Are the family and informal education in the community designed to strengthen these values? How are the local leaders in terms of their roles in helping to transform people’s lives into peaceful and harmonious ones? Have the local wisdoms been maintained by the community through the local informal leaders? Has government

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24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
established policies and programs for the preservation of local discernment practices in the community? Does the school system accommodate these values and practices of local wisdom in its curricula?

3. Has the state been seen as having political will to develop policies and systems that commit to the establishment of social harmony and peace for the people? Is the national leadership strong enough to lead the country in this direction? Do the political leaders really care and strive for the people? How is the issue of corruption handled by the government, since it is a crucial problem in the country?

WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM JAPAN

Living in Japan for two months granted me some knowledge from direct experience and observation on how Japan after World War II constructed a positive culture of peace and how it is reflected in the harmonious daily life. The following are some of the things that I have learned from Japan and thought could particularly contribute to Indonesia.

Minato City, Tokyo

The first lesson I had was when I did my morning exercise on Toriizaka Street, Tokyo. Unintentionally, I found the “Declaration as a City of Peace, Minato City, August 15, 1985” in front of the Minato City Office:

All people are one in wishing to preserve the beauty of the earth and the permanence of world peace. These sentiments will never change. We are working to build a community dedicated to the welfare of its citizens, while striving for true peace and the preservation of our cultural traditions. Our duty to the generations that will follow is to hand over into their keeping a society built on the brotherhood of all people and a natural environment that is flourishing and beautiful. We request our government to abide firmly by the “three non-nuclear principles” (renouncing possession, production and introduction of nuclear weapons) and appealing to all citizens everywhere to seek the abolition of nuclear weapons. As it is our earnest wish for world peace, we hereby declare Minato City to be a City of Peace.

I learned from Mr. Toshinari Yokoo, member of Minato City Assembly, Tokyo, that every year the city government conducts some peacebuilding programs for its citizens, including the students’ visit to Nagasaki and Hiroshima and making welfare services calendars. These are examples of the city government’s political will to develop policies and systems that promise long-term positive peace and democratic participation.

Okinawa

Visits to the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, the Himeyuri Peace Museum, the Sakima Art Museum, and the Haebaru Town Cultural Center taught me how the Okinawans sacrificed their lives in the war. In these places, I also observed how schoolchildren in Japan participate in the peace movement by submitting “origami cranes” and other “peace crafts” they made to be placed in the museums and parks as an expression of their hope for peace. Regarding peace and reconciliation, I learned that Okinawa people do not think of themselves as the only victims of the war; they also think about the non-Okinawans (such as the Korean, Chinese, and Vietnamese) who died in the Battle of Okinawa, and engraved their names on the monument in the Peace Memorial Park. To me this is a positive way to deal with the past: telling the truth.

Furthermore, I read about what is called the “Okinawan Heart” in the peace museum. It is “a human response that respects personal dignity above all else, rejects any acts related to war, and truly cherishes culture.” I believe that the “Okinawan Heart” is not only “a supreme expression of humanity,” but also a true culture of peace.


29 Ibid.
Visits to the Atomic Bomb Museum as well as to the Peace Memorial Park in both Nagasaki and Hiroshima were another learning process about how Japan has built peace and social harmony not only in its society but also across the world. At the entrance of the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, I had the chance to read the “Nagasaki Peace Declaration” signed on August 9, 2011 by Taue Tomihisa, the Mayor of Nagasaki City. This was to respond to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station after the occurrence of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the tsunami in Tohoku area on March 11, 2011. This declaration is a strong reminder to the government of Japan and people all over the world regarding the need to reconsider both the use of nuclear power as a source of energy and the development of nuclear weapons. Part of the declaration states:

We urge once again that the Japanese government act in accordance with the ideals of peace and renunciation of war prescribed in the Japanese Constitution. The government must work on enacting the Three Non-Nuclear Principles into law and establishing the Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone to ensure complete denuclearization of Japan, South Korea and North Korea.

The other paragraph of the declaration reads:

On August 9, 1945 at 11:02 a.m., Nagasaki was destroyed by an atomic bomb. From the ruins, we have accomplished our restoration as a city of peace. We hope that people in Fukushima will never give up and that people in the affected areas of eastern Japan never forget that across the world are friends who will always be behind them.

On October 18, 2011, with three ALFP fellows, I attended the “International Symposium for Peace: Towards the Realization of a Hiroshima for Global Peace” in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. One of the resource persons was Mr. Alex Mejia, Director of UNITAR (the United Nations Institute for Training and Research) Asia-Pacific and Head of the UNITAR Hiroshima office. Under the topic “Hiroshima’s Legacy in the 21st Century,” he expressed that Hiroshima is significant in playing a role as a catalyst for the global peace movement, as well as having the potential to become the global hub for peacebuilding. Furthermore, Mr. Mejia gave several illustrations of the spirit and consistency of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in struggling for world peace—a world without nuclear weapons.

In both cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we also saw many schoolchildren from all over Japan visiting the museums and peace parks; there, they were earnestly taking notes, reading out their promise to promote peace, singing songs in front of the Children’s Peace Monument in Hiroshima, and dedicating the paper cranes that they had made and brought to the monument in the Peace Park. All of these are good examples of peace education for children.

Sakai City, Osaka

This city’s declarations to protect human rights (1980) and to be a nuclear free and peaceful city (1983) show how the local government considered the importance of peace and the value of human rights.

31 Ibid.
Creating Peace Culture after War: Challenges in Sri Lanka and Best Practices from Asia

JEHAN PERERA

One of the biggest difficulties in democracy is to take fair decisions when there are ethnic majorities and minorities. This issue has led to terrorism and internal conflict, even in countries as economically advanced as Spain (Basque) and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland). Democracy is based on majority rule. The assumption is that majorities formed will be political majorities that can shift over time. But when a society has an ethnic majority, it is a permanent majority that does not change with time. The ethnic majority will always win if there is a disagreement with the ethnic minority. In Sri Lanka, the political representatives of the 75% Sinhalese will always outvote the 15% who are Tamil. This is the problem that made a section of the Tamil people take to armed struggle to win their independence.

For over 30 years, Sri Lanka was locked in ethnic war and terrorism that ended only in May 2009 with the government’s military victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The main ethnic community, the Sinhalese, comprises 75% of the population and there are 15 million Sinhalese. The main ethnic minority, the Tamils, accounts for 15% of the population, and there are 3 million Tamils. There are also about 2 million people who are Muslims and form their own community. The root of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is that the government is controlled by the Sinhalese ethnic majority, who can decide by majority rule without obtaining Tamil agreement.

Sri Lanka was a part of the British colonial empire for about 150 years until 1948. The centralized state inherited by the newly independent country in 1948 effectively transferred political power into the hands of the Sinhalese majority. The inability of the political elites belonging to the different ethnic communities to share power equitably among themselves led to a series of broken agreements and to acute mistrust between the communities.

The difficulty of protecting minority interests in a unitary system of government in which majority-minority relations are strained by Sri Lanka’s modern political history. As the Tamils from the north in particular were rarely represented in the higher rungs of the government, they were unable to sway government decisions to take their concerns into account. The inability of Tamil politicians to obtain adequate redress for their grievances eventually led to the buildup of separatist sentiment, militancy, and war.

Between 1979 and 2009, Sri Lanka descended into increasingly brutal warfare between governments that were not prepared to devolve power to the Tamil majority provinces and a Tamil militant movement that wanted nothing short of a separate country. The last phase of the war was one of the most challenging in the annals of modern warfare. It ensured that the Sri Lankan war made the headlines of the international media. The LTTE in its retreat herded the Tamil population of the northern territories it once controlled into a tiny patch of land. Using more than quarter of a million civilians as human shields they sought to keep the Sri Lankan military forces at bay, and buy time for some change to ensure their continued survival. Despite international appeals to safeguard civilian life, the Sri Lankan government sent in the military for the final battle that eliminated the LTTE at a heavy cost of life.

NEGOTIATING PEACE

It is a matter of historical record that five successive governments of Sri Lanka, including the present one, attempted to resolve the conflict in the country through negotiations. Many of Sri Lanka’s past leaders accepted the reality of an ethnic conflict to which there needed to be a political solution based on the devolution of powers and interethnic power sharing. The primary problem in Sri Lanka is its unitary and centralized
constitution that enables political leaders from the Sinhalese ethnic majority to monopolize political power through the democratic process, and either exclude or include the ethnic minorities at their pleasure.

Successful negotiations can lead to outcomes in which all sides gain, rather than one or more sides losing. This is the message of conflict resolution theorists, most prominently Roger Fisher, whose book, *Getting to Yes*, became an international bestseller. But the logic of separating interests from positions, well summarized in the story of the two children fighting over an orange, could not be applied to Sri Lanka. State power is difficult to award to two contestants, as the Sri Lankan experience has shown.

In February 2002, the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement under Norwegian government auspices that appeared to offer the real prospect of a final end to violence as a means of conflict resolution. The ceasefire between the government and the LTTE held for nearly four years, despite significant problems affecting the peace process—problems that led to the LTTE’s withdrawal from the peace talks. However, the ceasefire collapsed in early 2006 with a series of ambushes of government soldiers by the LTTE.

The ceasefire agreement of 2002–2006 facilitated by the Norwegian government and the peace process that accompanied it offered many insights that could be of great value to other societies that are involved in long and intractable conflicts and are seeking peaceful ways to resolve them. The Sri Lankan government appointed a Commission on Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation earlier this year, which has been conducting public hearings in all parts of the country, including the war-affected parts. In the meantime, the submissions made by a wide range of government officials, civic and religious organizations, academics, and war-affected people offer their own insights that are readily available.

EXPLAINING FAILURE

The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission was appointed amid international calls for an independent international commission to investigate the allegations of human rights violations and war crimes committed in the closing stages of the war. In appointing this Commission, the government stated that it was due to “the President’s overriding interest in the need for restorative justice by the Sri Lankan people.”

It said that “its findings will seek to take the Sri Lankan nation towards the common goals of a multi-ethnic polity, in a spirit of cooperation, partnership and friendship, learning the lessons from recent history to ensure that there will be no recurrence of such tragic conflict in the future.”

The National Peace Council (NPC), to which I belong and which is an NGO with a mandate to work for peace and interethnic justice and reconciliation in Sri Lanka, was one of the organizations to give evidence before the Commission. Most of its peace education and reconciliation work has been with grassroots communities. The opportunity to engage with a high-level body such as the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission that can affect national policy on the subject was deemed an opportunity to be grasped.

The NPC’s submissions to the Commission regarding the failure of the peace process can have relevance to other conflict resolution processes and were as follows:

1. AGREED PARAMETERS: Given the fears, suspicions, expectations and positions of the government and LTTE it was important that the parameters of the final settlement be agreed to at the outset, or if not at the outset, at some time at the beginning of the peace process. These parameters ought to have included the unity and indivisibility of the country which the international community as a whole stood by in principle. This was in the minds of those who supported the Ceasefire Agreement and peace process, but evidently not in the mind of the LTTE. This was to be seen in the Interim Proposals they made for an Interim Self Governing Authority, which appeared to be a half way house to a separate state.

2. BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS: The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 was the first attempt to reach a negotiated settlement of the ethnic conflict. This and all succeeding attempts failed in part due to an inability of the government and opposition parties to reach a bipartisan agreement on the envisaged political

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2 Ibid.
reforms. The Ceasefire Agreement and the political negotiations between the government and LTTE proved to be no exception. The government that signed the agreement and attempted to negotiate with the LTTE did so without the support of the opposition. The government was also internally divided on the issue, with the Prime Minister and his government not receiving the support of the President of the Republic who was kept out of the process by the government. As the ethnic conflict is an emotive issue with primordial fears contained in it, there is a necessity for a broad government-opposition consensus for a solution to be developed.

3. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: In a democratic society it is important that the electorate and the population at large be apprised of political developments that matter to them. The issues need to be explained and the consent of the people needs to be obtained. The government had pledged to arrive at a ceasefire in its election manifesto. But once the peace process commenced it did not adequately address the people about the dilemmas it was facing or take them into confidence about the hard choices it had to make. This task was largely left to civil society and NGOs to do, which was insufficient as the government has much more power to reach a mass audience.

4. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: Human rights violations took place during the period of the Ceasefire Agreement. In particular, the LTTE assassinated its political rivals, government intelligence operatives and embarked on large scale recruitment including child recruitment during the period of the Ceasefire. Many national and international organizations concerned with peace were cautious in highlighting these violations on the grounds that this might induce the LTTE to leave the peace process early and re-start the war that had ended and which had already led to the loss of tens of thousands of lives. The return to war was not seen as an option by those who supported the peace process, and the emphasis was on averting a return to war. It was important that human rights be protected in full, and not in part, at every stage of the peace process from beginning to end which did not happen.

5. RESTRICTED INFORMATION: The necessity to fight the war appears to be widely accepted, not only in Sri Lanka but also internationally. However, the human costs of the fighting and the fact that hardly any independent information was available has had an international backlash. Both the international media and international humanitarian organizations only had very limited access to the war zones. As a result it was difficult to obtain independent verification of what was happening in the war zones and the casualties. This may account for international human rights groups and the UN Secretary General taking a focused interest in the last days of the war.3

With regard to the postwar phase, it was observed that:

[1.] POST WAR PHASE: During the last phase of the war it became evident that there would be an influx of internally displaced persons. The government announced that it was setting aside land and putting up shelters to temporarily accommodate these people. But this was not done adequately. When the 300,000 displaced persons crossed over into government-controlled areas, they had very little by way of planned and organized facilities to house them. Preparing the ground for these people to come out would have demonstrated that the government was concerned about their welfare and conducting, along with the war, a humanitarian operation on equal scale on their behalf. This needs to be redressed today by the rapid provision of permanent housing, infrastructure and livelihood.

[2.] NGO ACCESS: There are still tens of thousands of displaced persons remaining in camps, in temporary shelters and with relatives in various parts of the North and also some parts of the East. Women and children are in a particularly vulnerable situation. There are many women-headed households amongst the war victims. At present many of the resettled people have been sent back to totally destroyed and virtually jungle-like

areas to fend for themselves with hardly any resources. While army personnel are assisting the people in their resettlement efforts, they have few resources and need more. NGOs have specialized competencies in the areas of rebuilding communities and reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian life. Restrictions placed on the work of nongovernmental organizations which have human and material resources to offer need to be minimized.

[3.] **DEMILITARISATION:** There is presently a close involvement of the military in the life of the civilian population in the North and East where the military continues to play a role in governance. The fact that the military is engaged in civilian activities may be a result of the government’s desire to utilize the excess manpower for constructive purposes now that the war is ended. However, this should be a temporary arrangement pending the re-establishment of civil administration in those areas. In addition, the ethnic composition of the security forces needs to reflect the ethnic pluralism in society.

[4.] **PEACE EDUCATION:** One of the challenges to national integration and reconciliation will be to give people from different ethnic communities a better understanding of those from other communities. The stance of politicians from rival camps tends to get replicated among their grassroots communities, furthering divide and promoting ethnically polarized voting patterns. The work of politically non partisan civic groups is important to bind up the wounds created in the bid for political power. They should be encouraged not stymied by various government imposed restrictions. There needs to be greater trust built between government authorities and civic groups working for peace and reconciliation through dialogue and not only regulation.4

### JAPAN’S LESSONS

During the ALFP program period, I focused my attention on understanding how Japan transformed itself into a peaceful and cohesive society after World War II. After spending two months in Japan and travelling to Okinawa, Nagasaki, Hiroshima, Kobe, Kyoto, Sendai, Tono, Ishinomaki, Ozuchi, and Tokyo, I believe that Japan has soft power to help healing in divided societies like my own country, and to make our world a better place.

The general impression is that Japan is a homogeneous country. However, it is less well known that Japan has a similar problem of democracy in Okinawa, which it is having to deal with, albeit more successfully than Sri Lanka has handled its own ethnic problems.

The Okinawan people are of different ethnic, linguistic, and cultural background. They account for only 1% of the population of Japan. But they are a majority on the island of Okinawa, where Japanese and foreign immigrants and U.S. military personnel also live. During our visit to Okinawa, we met with several academics, intellectuals, and activists. Most of them told us that they were very unhappy about the presence of U.S. military bases and also with the Japanese government’s approach. They would like to see the bases removed. The problem is that there are 722 members of the Japanese Diet. Okinawa has only 8 MPs. When the issue of Okinawa comes up in the Diet for debate, these Okinawan MPs find themselves to be a very small minority. Now, there are geopolitical and historical reasons why some might think the U.S. bases have to stay. On the other hand, there are reasons why some might think those bases must go. Who is to decide? Is it the people in Okinawa or the government in Tokyo? Or should this be a shared decision?

An ethnic community of people who are always outvoted in Parliament about something they feel is very important will get deeply frustrated. They may one day wish to be independent to decide about what is important to them. At this time, foreign powers may step in to further destabilize and divide the people, as happened in the case of Sri Lanka. When I spoke to Professor Suzuki Yuji of Hosei University, he pointed out that Japan has its own way of dealing with this problem. The first way is through financial compensation. It pays out a lot of money as compensation to enable those on whom decisions are imposed to get something valuable in return. There are large transfers of resources from the central government to Okinawa. This is a best practice that Sri Lanka can learn from Japan.

Professor Suzuki also pointed out another reality. When Japanese people are given the choice of being compensated with money, or having the bad thing in their area removed, they prefer the bad thing to be

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4 Ibid.
removed over getting more money. This is the case with nuclear power plants, nuclear waste disposal, or with American bases. What people want is for their democratic wishes to be part of the decision. They do not want others, who are a majority and far away, to decide for them. This is why political concepts of power sharing and joint decision making cannot be ignored.

According to Professor Suzuki, there is a second way in which Japan deals with the problem of regional issues. This is through the devolution of power to local and prefectural authorities. These local governments are able to use their powers to make progress on the ground. As a result of local government pressure, some of the land taken by the American bases has been returned to the people. There is gradual change that eases the pressure on the political system. This is another positive lesson for Sri Lanka and a best practice. There is a need to devolve powers to local government levels in an effective manner, so that the Tamil people can see progress on the ground in the areas in which they are a majority.

HEALING WOUNDS

In Sri Lanka, there were three decades of internal war. The Tamil rebel group, the LTTE, used terrorism and became described as the world’s deadliest terrorist organization. The government had to resort to the army, navy, and air force to defeat the LTTE with large-scale collateral damage to Tamil civilians. This has generated a lot of negative emotion, such as ethnic nationalism, hatred, and mistrust of each other. We need to address these emotional issues. One of the leading scholars in international peace studies, Professor Johan Galtung, has said there is a difference between negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace is the absence of war, which is the present reality in Sri Lanka.

Positive peace is where there is reconciliation, a change of heart, and a change of political structures that gave rise to war. In this respect, Sri Lanka has to move forward to positive peace. At the present time, the Tamil people continue to vote against the government. At every election after the war, they have voted against the government. The government in turn is increasing the size of the military budget, even though the war has ended. There is continued military domination of the north and east where the Tamil people live and where the 30-year war was fought.

At the peace memorial museums in Okinawa, and also in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I saw a third lesson that Japan can offer to Sri Lanka. Those museums are designed to heal wounds and not to make them worse. In Okinawa, we saw the photographs of all the 200 children who were recruited to the student medical unit of the Japanese army. Most of them died in the fighting, although they never killed or harmed anyone. They reminded me of the children forcibly recruited by the LTTE and who died in confrontation with the Sri Lanka military. They remind the present generation of mistakes that must not be repeated, and of suffering that must not happen again. My colleagues and I saw hundreds of schoolchildren come every day to those museums along with their schoolteachers. They come to learn about a peace culture in which violence has no place.

There is a great potential to set up peace museums in Sri Lanka as part of a system of education that provides a peace culture to the people. It will be harder for us today in Sri Lanka, than it is for Japan today. Sri Lanka’s war only ended two and a half years ago, and so the wounds of war are raw. Peace museums require a nonpartisan approach that is not a tool for one-sided propaganda. But today the government is partisan; the Tamil opposition is partisan. This is where multi-ethnic civil society groups can play an important role in establishing a peace culture.

UNDER SIEGE

There are also other examples of best practices we can take from Asia. In Vietnam, there was also a war between the North and South, but today there is reconciliation and a prime minister who comes from the defeated South. In Indonesia, there was separatist war in Aceh that has ended with a peace settlement and autonomy. In the Philippines, the involvement of civil society in local government has been formalized in the law. In Pakistan, there is a strong civil society movement, led by lawyers and journalists, that has done much to change a dictatorship into a democracy. In China, the abuse of power by government officials is increasingly being challenged by ordinary citizens who use the Internet to inform each other and to protest.
Today, unfortunately, Sri Lankan civil society is facing a challenging situation. All NGOs have to register under the Ministry of Defense, as they are seen as potential threats to national sovereignty. Their links with foreign donors are suspected to influence their activities in unpatriotic ways. Only last week, many news websites were shut down by the government. Even though the government won the war against the LTTE over two years ago, it feels itself to be under continued threat from hostile forces.

For the past 16 years, I have worked for the National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, an organization that is nonpartisan and multi-ethnic. I was part of a group of civil society activists who set up this organization in 1995 to facilitate a people’s movement for peace, in the hope that we could support top-level political initiatives taken by enlightened political leaders if and when they obtained positions of governmental authority.

The National Peace Council is primarily an advocacy and peace education organization that seeks to generate a shift in attitudes amongst the people. We conduct workshops and seminars at the grassroots level and work through the media to take our message to all levels of society. Although we come from different walks of life and ethnicities, there are three basic positions on which all of us who are with the National Peace Council are agreed on. The first of these positions is that the conflict, and the war which took place, was due to an unresolved ethnic conflict. We did not subscribe to the view that the conflict was simply a terrorist problem.

Our second agreed position was that this ethnic conflict needed to be resolved through a process of dialogue and negotiations in which the roots of the conflict were addressed. As the LTTE was one of the main parties to the conflict, we called for dialogue and negotiations that included them as well. Our third position was that the political solution to the conflict should involve the equitable sharing of power within a united country between the ethnic communities that comprise the Sri Lankan people. We held and continue to hold that the devolution of power was an important and indispensable component of such a political solution.

The upright pyramid model of constituencies to be worked with for peace, which was first conceptualized by John Paul Lederach, has been used by the National Peace Council since its inception. In this model, Lederach distinguished three levels of peacebuilding, the topmost level being that of the decision makers, the bottommost being the grassroots communities, and the intermediate level being that of organized groups with access to both the decision makers and grassroots. Over the years, the National Peace Council has worked at all three levels, with its primary focus at the intermediate level of opinion formers.

However, our experience has been that the dissemination of these messages depends for its effectiveness on the attitude of the government. With its ability to control the state apparatus, especially the media, the government has an overwhelming power to shape public opinion relative to civil society groups. Until the advent of the present government, Sri Lanka had governments that adopted an essentially two-pronged approach that entailed both coercive and security focused actions as well as political reforms to address the political roots of the ethnic conflict. This two-pronged approach left space open to civil society to conduct its programs of work in cooperation with some arms of the government. This collaboration legitimized the work of peace builders even when it did not correspond to the favored opinions and prejudices of the majority population.

However, in the present phase, the government has de-emphasized the need for political reform as a solution to the ethnic conflict. Those who continue to advocate political reform are branded as disloyal, agents of foreign powers, and traitors. Sri Lanka’s experience, therefore, suggests that the Lederach model of an upright pyramid of peacebuilding can be misleading if it leads practitioners to believe that a bottom-up approach will suffice. On the contrary, those who are at the top of the pyramid are most able to influence public opinion and therefore need to be an important part of the peacebuilding efforts.

**PEACE CONDITIONALITIES**

Although the open conflict has ceased, the divisions that existed in the past are still very much alive in Sri Lanka today. The violence, suspicion, and segregation of the conflict have become deeply embedded in social and political life. The differences that exist between communities are mobilized by political leaders to further communal agendas. The economic progress taking place in the country can be threatened by instability due to the increased political polarization.

Thus, peacebuilding and reconciliation continue to remain critical needs in this postwar era. The present political circumstances in the country demonstrate the need for a new paradigm of governance that is more appropriate for the plural and diverse society in Sri Lanka. For conflict transformation to truly take place, the centralization and personalization of power in governance that leads to a reliance on military force and
rule by emergency decree needs to yield to decentralization and to a rule of law-based approach to democratic governance.

Although the stalemate is now ended with the elimination of the LTTE, significant obstacles stand in the way of a return to normalcy in the country. This is on account of the nationalist forces on both sides that were unleashed in the course of the war and that cannot be suppressed in the short term. The militarily victorious Sri Lankan government now has the challenge of promoting reconciliation and lasting peace in Sri Lanka.

More than two and a half years after the end of the war, Sri Lanka continues to be governed under Emergency Law. The military budget has grown after the war, not reduced. Underlying the government’s emphasis on security issues is the strong nationalist component in the present Sri Lankan government. This ethnic majority nationalist support was crucial to the government in politically sustaining the war effort despite its high cost. Having collaborated with Sinhalese nationalism, it has been difficult for the government to reverse itself and seek new political allies. Nevertheless, if a break with the past is to be obtained, it is necessary that the government should learn from the lessons of the past and not repeat them.

A civilized society is one that attempts to resolve conflict through peaceful means, and not through violence and war. When a war is fought, it must be seen as a means to an end, not an end in itself. The main purpose of the war ought not to be the vanquishing of the opponent, but rather to open the door to a just solution. The reality is that war unleashes militaristic and nationalistic forces whose existence continues to depend on keeping a war mentality and national security state going, even after the end of the war. It requires an enlightened government leadership to continue to pursue a political solution even after the opposing military forces are destroyed.

The Japanese government provides Sri Lanka with a lot of financial assistance. Japan has been one of the biggest aid donors, if not the biggest, for many years. This aid comes in the form of economic projects to put up buildings, roads, bridges, and schools. These are brick and mortar projects that can be seen, touched, and counted. Most of this economic aid goes to support the government’s budget. Our government and people are grateful for this assistance. But today, this is not what Sri Lanka most urgently needs.

Even without Japan’s assistance to the government, the Sri Lankan economy will grow rapidly now that the war is over. Today, the economy is growing by 8% a year. What Sri Lanka needs is something different. Sri Lanka needs reconciliation between the government and the Tamil people. We are in danger of failing to resolve the root causes of our war and recreating conflict once again. We need a peace culture. As one of Sri Lanka’s long-term friends, Japan can use the example of its own society to create a united society and a peace culture in Sri Lanka. The soft power that Japan possesses, in terms of its know-how regarding creating a peaceful, harmonious, and nonviolent society, and its credibility in practicing what it preaches, will accompany Japanese engagement with the other countries of the world, including Sri Lanka.
Imagining Disaster Resilience in Asia

ELMER SAYRE

When I first received the news about my being selected as an Asia Leadership Fellow Program (ALFP) fellow, my knowledge of Japan was rather rudimentary and revolved around the few war and samurai movies I saw and the few poems I read in high school. I knew of comments about the discipline of the Japanese, their work ethics, and even tried my hand at writing sophomoric haiku but that is all. It was superficial and lacking in depth. So when I was asked to write a discussion paper as part of the requirements for the ALFP, and having very little knowledge about Japan, I chose to write about my own initiatives, activities, and interests, focusing on the aspect that I know best—which is community development and small-scale agriculture as I know and experience in the barrios in Mindanao and in occasional consulting assignments in other places in the Philippines. Little did I know that the two months that I spent in Japan would help me develop propositions for disaster resilience, integrating my experiences in Japan and my work in the Philippines and adding readings about the situation in Asia in general.

The importance of my propositions on disaster resilience is that I am trying to offer a paradigm shift in terms of trying to find strategies to cope with disasters, not only for Japan and the Philippines, but for the rest of the region as well. I say the rest of Asia (and the Pacific), because poor countries in the region, such as the Philippines, are very vulnerable to disasters, especially those caused by climate change, which is creeping and insidious and not as dramatic as those caused by earthquake or tsunami but equally devastating. When it is creeping and insidious, there is a tendency for people and governments to take its effects for granted and thus not act as quickly and efficiently. I think this is the reason why international conferences on climate change are full of sound and little action, with leaders putting off decisive and swift actions for another day. Recently, I saw on TV one example of the impact of climate change and global warming, which is the rising seas in the Pacific destroying agricultural lands, making the lands unfit for food production with saltwater seeping in as the ocean rises. So we see people in Samoa, for example, losing their traditional taro crops to the incursion of the sea. In the Philippines, we observe vast mountain areas with poor soil conditions becoming semi-arid and open grasslands because of lack of rain for agricultural crops to grow profitably and inhabitants in these areas migrating to the cities in search of livelihood, but they clog the cities and become misfits as their skills and expertise are not suited for city dwelling. Thus, we have urban congestion and poverty, people living in hovels and under bridges, and children becoming an eyesore and vagrants, and problems in society.

MY BACKGROUND AND INITIATIVES

Serving as backgrounder for my proposition on disaster resilience is my own life story and how I surpassed poverty by making do and coping, surviving with what little I had and learning to be independent early on and honing my intellect through serious study and diligence. I was able to study in some of the premier schools in the Philippines from college to graduate school by winning scholarships and holding on and then sprinkle this with advanced seminars abroad. After a stint at Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro City as a rural extension officer and teacher for twelve years, I decided to work in grassroots areas where talent and expertise is much wanting and where poverty, social exclusion, and helplessness are daily realities, sometimes exploding into insurgency and mayhem championed by religious fanatics and fueled by social and economic exclusion. Without food and economic security, armed war is the best alternative. I promote activities related to water system development, biodiversity and agroforestry, ecological sanitation, culture of peace, microfinance, and rural organizing with emphasis on the poor and the marginalized.
These initiatives are varied and require much concentration and skill because working with poor and marginal communities is in itself a challenge, but it enriches my mind and forces me to think beyond my own parochial expertise and world view. To date, my work spans three provinces mainly in Mindanao and reaches more than 3,000 families, and my programs on water, agroforestry, nutrition, and development (WAND) won a number of recognitions already. Most notable is the Bill and Melinda Gates competition of which I am the only award winner so far from the Philippines. I also won a first prize award in a major competition held in Israel. My initiative on ecological sanitation is also being picked up by champions in some countries in Asia with similar conditions of poor sanitation as the Philippines.

My argument revolves around the premise that if material poverty among so many is not solved, then we sink together in our one and only earth. If we sink, such as when the earth becomes a little bit hotter because of unabated logging and our conspicuous materialistic consumption and uncaring ways, then we all sink and nobody is exempt; the seas will rise and we go down the way of the dinosaurs. When this happens, we cannot take anything with us except the skin on our backs; forget the beach houses, the fat bank accounts, the cherished titles hanging on perfumed walls or the nice swiveling chairs, for we surely go and go only with the skin on our backs.

My main interests and expertise on which my vision and practical actions for a humane society hinge can be termed broadly as “community development.” I am trying to integrate elements of local empowerment, community education, service to humanity, promotion of the culture of peace, open communication and dialogue, cooperation, and forging networks and bridges among different sociocultural, economic, and religious divides in implementing my approach. In essence, I am working on building disaster resilient local communities that can withstand the onslaught of natural and man-made disasters by building these communities to be self-sustaining and independent of the outside market and social forces but still linked to it. I focus my work on rural (rather than urban) communities because I believe that improving the rural areas and giving people more opportunities mean a balanced national development. The rural areas serve also as food suppliers for the urban population who do not farm and have no access to the land for agriculture.

My “WAND” approach has the following key elements:

a. Subsidies—seedlings, farm animals, training are “pump priming” subsidies without which the wheels of empowerment cannot move forward. These subsidies, rather than being eaten up due to poverty and marginalization, are multiplied several hundred-fold via an innovative microfinancing scheme;

b. Participation—farmers design interventions, decide the mode of cooperation, and select the menu of pump-priming actions;

c. Empowerment—the formation of local interest groups helps farmers to move forward and chart their own destinies;

d. Capacity building—the deployment of farmers as barefoot technicians is able to extend farming techniques to their neighbors, and sharing the inputs means less dependence on center-based “experts” whose knowledge does not reflect the realities in the farms;

e. Technology—low external input farming technologies, such as the use of organic fertilizer, integrated pest management, and hedgerow farming, help improve soil fertility.

Some of my best practices are: (a) rather than providing ready solutions, I provide a menu of inputs involving water, farming development, nutrition, and health for them to select depending on their needs, capabilities, personal choice, budget, and the condition of their farms; (b) the participation and collaboration of many stakeholders ensure that support is generated; (c) eco-sanitation provides cheap fertilizer for farmers and contains the spread of diseases at the same time and weans farmers from dependence on chemical fertilizer; (d) the planting of trees helps improve biodiversity and acts as carbon sink; and (e) the creation of community farmers’ groupings helps ensure sustainability of the practices and integrates it into the cultural fabric of the community.

**SOME LESSONS LEARNED**

a. WAND as an approach is very effective if fine-tuned to the needs and situation of the target groups. The poverty situation involves a mix of lack of resources and powerlessness, poor sanitation and health conditions, as well as lack of access to rural credit and degradation of farms due to mono-cropping. The WAND approach improves the lives of the farmers in the short run (vegetable gardening and animal raising), while
already preparing and planning for the long term (fruit and timber tree production). “The situation in most countryside in the Philippines is very similar (lack of water, poverty, severe erosion, lack of organization) and the concept can be easily replicated in most part of the country. Community organizing and participation of multiple stakeholders contribute to a solid foundation of local empowerment” and community governance.¹

b. The idea of strengthening existing community-based associations is also very much replicable given that these are usually present in most areas in the country and in varying strength and capability therefore the need to strengthen them. The approach of building-up community fund from water user fees and from harvests of fruit/trees is entirely replicable and acceptable.²

c. “The approach of tapping local government units and line agencies as service providers is … replicable given that most of government agencies have the personnel but lack the budget … for field operations and most of the time they stay in their respective offices.”³ These personnel are a reservoir of local talents and expertise waiting to be tapped.

d. The idea of working together in partnership between organizations and local communities helps solve the problem of enmity caused by the lack of dialogue and religious and social misunderstanding. Filipinos are a friendly and peaceful lot but extreme poverty is food to Muslim separatists, who feed on the situation and sow discord and destruction. When people are economically sustainable, they have no time for war and conflict.

e. Resources from donor communities are “pump primers.” Their raison d’etre is to help fuel the economic development of the area. The main challenge is how to keep the resources revolving around the community in a sustainable manner in order to reach out to more beneficiaries. In this case, while the donors are the pump primers, the NGO works as the catalyst and the local farmers are the subject and object of development.

Of course, it is impossible to compare and contrast the results of my initiative to the situation in Japan or any other country, but there are some sensible strategies that can be replicated in community work and disaster rehabilitation actions across cultures and countries. One of these is to focus on short-term doable activities that ensure early success for the community and thus provide people with some sort of confidence for much more complex initiatives. On the whole, I think it is the community themselves who should take up the cudgel of self-development, rather than being dependent on the government or outside helpers. Another strategy is developing NPOs as a vehicle for local-level implementation. I can observe that although NPOs in Japan are easy to organize and register, they are not as vibrant as in the Philippines, and there is a need to learn from the vibrancy of Philippine NPOs. The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, for example, sends their partners from South Thailand to study Philippine NGOs involved in the promotion of the culture of peace. Partnerships, networking, and cooperation are common themes, but implementation approaches and strategies may differ depending on the countries.

MY ARGUMENT ABOUT DISASTER RESILIENCE

During the ALFP final symposium, I asserted that natural and man-made calamities are increasing with climate change and the resulting global warming happening all over the world, and finding strategies to improve the survival of people, especially the most vulnerable, such as the young and the aged, cannot be overemphasized. I also asserted that disasters, whether natural or man-made, affect us all and they cross boundaries, especially in the economic sphere. For example, when the Tohoku earthquake happened, many computer companies around the world, dependent upon parts coming from plants in Fukushima, suffered disruptions in operations due to lack of component parts. When flooding inundated vast swaths of Thailand, car manufacturers in the Philippines and the United States closed down with the same problems—lack of spare parts. Right now as I write this, tons of irradiated debris from Fukushima is travelling to the United States by sea, contaminating vast areas and marine resources of which the ill effects all over the world cannot be determined yet. The irradiated

² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
air in Japan does not stay in Japan but of course will affect vast areas in the planet now and in the near future, and the gravity and extent of the contamination is yet to be understood. This is scary indeed, given that the half-life of some isotopes lasts for 60–70 years.

During my visit to several devastated sites in Tohoku, it was mentioned that without the timely response of the Japan Self-Defense Forces and other actors, the magnitude of the disaster would have been far greater and worse. I have also seen how physical recovery effort was done in an efficient and timely manner. However, one aspect that I think is not given much consideration and which I think is very grave is the psychosocial aspect of disaster recovery. Victims who lost families, jobs, and farms and evacuated from long-time neighbors have little support system for them to cope. I was told that residents from Fukushima who moved to other areas are regarded with suspicion (for fear of radiation contamination) even by their relatives. Children are also shunned in school. In my site visit to the Tohoku region during the ALFP, I can see that trauma and psychosocial support is a grey area, perhaps because the recovery phase is still at an early stage and more importantly, support agencies there (e.g., NPOs, government) are ill-equipped to tackle the unseen dimension of the disaster—which is the mental aspect. The psychological effect is also difficult to treat, because it varies from person to person and is generally hidden, and there are no open indicators. If the latter is the case, then I will say that this will result in multiple disasters when “synergy” of negative psychosocial elements will impact the economy, livelihood, and general well-being of individuals and communities. I think this is true from bits and pieces of evidence. For example, I was told that in the Tohoku area, affected people are prone to suicides and depression. Having been deprived not only of loved ones, but also of jobs and other basic components of life, victims are left with little or no means to rebuild their lives or even go about their daily business, and consequently, some might spend their days at pachinko parlors or turn to alcohol. Some even go back to their farms even if severe restrictions are imposed. There is also the phenomenon of “survivor guilt” or the deep regret of being unable to save loved ones or the feeling of why they are alive and why their loved ones died, and so on.

My assumptions, however, need to be validated more thoroughly, as they are a product of only several hours’ visit and obviously do not do justice to complex reality. The ongoing rehabilitation effort and the presence of multiple actors in Tohoku is a great opportunity, where these assumptions can be compared and described either by on-site actors or by independent researchers working in disaster relief and rehabilitation. In other countries, I posit that the continuing effects of climate change have caused a “steeling effect” among local residents, especially the poor. They are forced to adapt, as there is no other way out; government support is nil and poverty forces local inhabitants to make do. There may also be factors integral to other societies that make them resilient, such as family ties, and cultural aspects, such as the belief that bad things are only passing and that “sunshine” will surely come another day. Barter and the exchange of economic and communal resources also help assuage economic loss.

The reasons outlined above are disparate and mainly speculative, and a product of “common sense” and limited field observations. However, the Tohoku catastrophe provides a singular and very unique window of opportunity for coping mechanisms and disaster resilience to be studied in real time. In a different paper, I have proposed a project that will focus on two things: (1) describe, weave, and integrate the various elements or drivers of disaster resilience as experienced in several countries in Southeast Asia mainly by practitioners working in the field with the end-view of comparing with the situation in Japan and (2) based on these findings, come up with a road map and concrete recommendations for disaster support at the early stages of the disaster and then later on during the longer-term community development stage. The major topics to be studied will include: (a) understanding the risks people face during major disasters; (b) psychosocial effects of disaster and support mechanisms; (c) the role of NGOs, NPOs, civil society, and citizens in disaster resilience; (d) good governance, resilient livelihoods, management of natural resources as drivers of disaster resilience; (e) tapping and mobilizing local resources; (f) national policy and local implementation toward disaster resilience, as well as best practices from the field; and (g) credible, evidence-based benchmarks for disaster resilience. I will try to make this study a follow-through initiative with my initial experience with Japan via the ALFP.

Right now, I can offer some prescriptions of what the Philippines can offer for Japan by way of “steeling” local citizens in the face of disasters:

**Building the “happiness” factor**

A common regret of people when they get old is the fact that they did not pursue happiness hard enough, even in small things. They are too serious about life, even working to their deaths for their jobs and to get a higher
status in society, only to find out that it does not give them happiness in the end and when their health fails them (from overwork) then all that they have saved goes to medical bills. Happiness can be had in small daily things and by all—friends, a good TV show, showing kindness to the lowly, smelling the flowers, and indulging in one’s favorite hobby. The Filipinos, as shown in repeated surveys, are among the happiest people on earth, despite grinding poverty, corruption, the inadequacy of the government, and other negative factors. The Philippines is one big island of Karaoke; one hears singing every now and then. I did not see this in Japan, with people so morose, harried, and too serious going about their own business. I observed too that many people work and stay in the office until 9–10 p.m. and some go to bars after and so the question is, “what about their families?” I maybe wrong and this is surely not a general rule and this is indeed not true in all instances, but how I wish people I saw in Tokyo were more lighthearted and “happy.” This “happiness” factor then or the things that make ordinary Japanese happy beyond material things and technical gadgets—which obviously create happiness too and makes life easier, but if too many serve to clutter the homes—should be nurtured and cultivated. Perhaps the Tibetans’ gross national happiness measurement can be accentuated here.

**Building the religious factor**

The Japanese are truly blessed with many religious traditions, Shinto, Buddhism, Christianity, among others, and many Japanese practice more than one religion (Shinto at birth, Christian at marriage and Buddhism at death). This is a blessing, but also a problem in the sense that practicing many religions can create “unbelief” (coining mine) and people might have a tendency to take religion lightly. I also believe that this predicament will create ambivalence and a sense of little value and dependence on a higher being and so, when disaster strikes, and we come to depend only on our capacities and technical prowess and are bound to be disheartened and disillusioned, realizing our capacities are too small to count in the event of such a horrific disaster as the great earthquake and the ensuing nuclear disaster in Tohoku. For me, there is a need then to build a religiosity that is childlike and trusting so that no matter what, there is a higher being that we can depend upon. In this way, we will be emotionally and spiritually prepared for whatever happens in our lives.

**Family as a refuge**

This is a bit difficult, because the problem of aging and low birth rate contributes to the “fragmentation” of the family. There should be a solution somewhere for this predicament but I am at a loss to even advance some ideas about this. However, this is a problem that the Japanese nation should grapple with and solve for the sake of survival itself.

**PHILIPPINE-JAPAN MUTUAL COOPERATION?**

Finally, in terms of direct assistance to the people of Japan, the Philippines—being so poor ourselves—cannot offer much in terms of material things. However, we can offer lots in terms of manpower and human capital. For example, some of the temporary shelters in the affected areas were prefabricated in the Philippines (Cavite) with Filipino expert craftsmen. Our craftsmanship and attention to detail are among the best in the world. In terms of the care of Japan’s aging population, we are starting to send our nurses and caregivers to Japan and we have the best nurses and caregivers in the world, although the problem is how to surpass the language barrier.

Then yet another one, which I am keen to talk about, is the fact that the Philippines is an eternal paradise with lots of beaches, smiling mild-mannered and beautiful people, given to much religiosity and Christian values of charity and we can establish vacation havens and or gated communities for Japanese wishing to enjoy short vacations and even migrate here. The Koreans are already doing this and there are a lot of Koreans in Cagayan de Oro and they said they like it very much here with cheap food, small expense, nice, slow lifestyle, and good English for the education of their children. Education is also at par with the West. Of course, there is always this negative publicity about kidnappings and criminalities and so on, but this happens only infrequently and in some far-off places in the South.
INTRODUCTION

Higher education in Vietnam since “Doi moi” in 1986 has developed greatly; it has moved from an elite higher education system to a mass higher education to serve the training needs of all youths and people in society. In the framework of the national educational system, higher education contributes to the lifelong learning of those who have received it and helps increase the rights and access to education of all people.

Higher education in Vietnam has played an important and leading role in the preparation and the development of human resources who have not only knowledge and skills, but also cultural values and morality to create a humane society. With the standpoint, “taking the promotion of human resources as a basic element for rapid and sustainable development,” the Vietnamese Communist Party’s Congress No. VIII has recognized human resources’ decisive role in socioeconomic development.

This report refers to the current development of higher education in Vietnam based on the societal needs. The discussion is limited to the issues in the quality of higher education and strengthening of the links between universities and industry, so that graduates can work effectively in the labor market right after graduation.

HIGHER EDUCATION IN VIETNAM

In the school year 2010–2011, Vietnam has had 386 colleges and universities, including 80 private institutions. There are 2,162,106 students and seven disciplines in higher education: technique and technology; natural science; agriculture-forestry-aquiculture; economics; law; medicine-pharmacy-sports; and culture and arts. About 84.5% of the students are studying at public colleges and universities and 15.5% of the students are at private institutions. In 2007, Vietnam had nine community colleges to provide education and training based on community demand, while 187 colleges and universities provided continuing education and helped expand access to education for local people and improve their intellectual standards.

One of the issues in Vietnamese higher education, which does not meet the social needs, is related to its poor quality. The quality of higher education mentioned here refers to the quality of teaching and learning at higher education institutions. It specifically focuses on the quality of curriculum development, teaching and teachers, learning and learners, and teaching aids and infrastructure, as well as the quality of graduates who are accredited and accepted by the world of work.

The quality of education in Vietnam falls behind other East Asian and industrial countries and competitors not only in basic education but also in higher education; the quality of Vietnamese higher education is only higher than that of the Philippines. This gap between Vietnam and East Asian countries in terms of

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education quality is nearly the same as the gap between Vietnam and some industrial European countries (see Figure 1).

Moreover, the availability of Vietnamese scientists and engineers does not reach the standard level of East Asian countries, such as South Korea and Japan (see Figure 2).


6 Ibid.
Vietnamese Society Needs Driven Higher Education

The survey done by the Vietnam Techno-Academic Association at universities (including technical and open universities), of more than 864 students, showed that 69.89% of the students agreed that the training curricula are still backward and some training contents are not appropriate and useful for them; 60.41% of the students also answered that training curricula do not adequately focus on the training of professional skills.

The linkage between Vietnam’s higher education institutions and industries is weak, as the former do not produce a workforce that can meet the needs of the Vietnamese economy and society. According to World Bank studies, in Vietnam,

- Fifty percent of garment and chemistry enterprises are not satisfied with the qualification of trained laborers;
- Sixty percent of laborers from vocational training schools and colleges need to be retrained after joining the labor market;
- Some IT enterprises need to retrain 90% of the new staff after recruiting them;
- In the IT sector, only 14% of the staff meets the international standard.
- Only 10 out of 4,000 registered lawyers can participate in regional and international cases.

As the evidence above strongly indicates, higher education institutions need to be improved and innovated, given the employment changes in Vietnam now (particularly from agriculture to manufacturing), as well as the development of new sectors, such as manufacturing, electricity, gas, water, and trade-oriented sectors, requiring a variety of education fields and strong core skills that can be applied across jobs.

CHALLENGES FOR VIETNAMESE HIGHER EDUCATION

The rapid development of science and technology can create big gaps in economy and knowledge between Vietnam and developed countries. Vietnam faces a high risk of being behind the times. International integration not only provides opportunities for educational development, but also brings dangers, especially the permeation of different cultures and lifestyles, which may erode national characters. Vietnam may import education of low quality from other countries that will cause a big risk to Vietnamese education already burdened with problems, such as weak education management and lack of policies and appropriate measures to lead and closely evaluate educational institutions with foreign investment and management.

Social gaps in the country are increasing; these gaps include social and economic gaps among people and various development gaps among regions and provinces. These gaps may create inequality in education depending on regions and learners’ groups.

Economic development in the future requires human resources not only in quantity but also in quality. Vietnam has to restructure its economy and develop products and services with high value and technology. This, however, requires having manpower with enough qualification and skills; it should also create strong pressures on education and training.

Overall, there are four main challenges that Vietnam’s higher education faces: (1) the quality of higher education and its competition with other countries; (2) the development of qualified teaching staff at universities; (3) financial investment to develop higher education system; and (4) effective management of the higher education system.

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10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
CONCLUSION

Education and training to meet the needs of society and the economy in general require a systematic approach to quality training. It is the mission of the national education system and the responsibility of training institutions, as well as of the line ministries, local governments, community, and the whole society. The state should play a role of coordination, giving directions and promoting multilateral relationships among stakeholders (including higher education institutions, employers, and industry) in order to make supply meet the needs.

For higher education institutions, reforms of curriculum, teaching and learning methods, and the evaluation system require teaching and managerial staff to acquire new technology in education and teach students not only how to learn but also how to apply what they have learned in the workplace. Students and teachers should understand that they are the driving force for education reform and the key players to make education and training meet the quality standards.

At the macro level, Vietnam has been implementing the following seven missions and solutions for the reform of its higher education in the period 2006–2020:

i) training structure and net planning;
ii) contents of curriculums, teaching methods;
iii) capacity building for teaching staff and educational managerial officials;
iv) conducting research activities;
v) mobilizing resources and financial mechanism in higher education;
vi) state management and governance in higher education;
vii) advance the competitive capacity of higher education to deal with international integration.\textsuperscript{12}

Civil Society in China: What Can Japan’s Experience Tell Us?

ZHANG YALI

INTRODUCTION

Over three decades of economic reform, China has been transformed from a state-dominated society to a diverse and plural society. Under the vision of “Small government and big society,” and probably sensing possible benefits from this vision, the Chinese government has over the years gradually transferred part of its social sector responsibilities to the emerging civil society organizations (CSOs). These organizations are now active in a variety of fields, ranging from environmental protection, poverty alleviation, and community capacity building to legal assistance. Growing from zero, the number of CSOs reached 440,168 in 2011. Over 14 million employees are working in public management and social organizations. The partial withdrawal of the state from direct social welfare delivery in the course of China’s economic reform has in fact turned CSOs into China’s third booming sector.

Despite the optimistic trend observed in the past three decades of rapidly growing CSOs, some doubts loom over their sustenance and particularly their impact on policy making. These worries are not entirely unfounded. Some obstacles are impeding the healthy development of CSOs, both external and internal. A rigid regulatory framework, problematic internal governance, and frail finance are the identifiable bottlenecks. Meanwhile, the pattern of concentrating on development activities while limiting advocacy and participation in policy making make the question valid: is there any future for the development and consolidation of China’s civil society as a harbinger of change? Will China’s CSOs remain merely state agencies in fulfilling the state development agenda and never have a role in policy making given the current political system in China? Or will the development of China’s civil society in general and CSOs in particular be simply reversed under the iron fist of an authoritarian regime?

This paper seeks to answer these questions by comparing the development trajectory of civil society in both China and Japan. Even though Japan’s civil societies are long criticized for their weak advocacy capabilities and limited impact on policy making in comparison with their counterparts in Western countries, Japan still boasts strong civic activism, high social trust, and dense social capital, which are usually associated with an active civil society. Associational pluralism has taken deep root in Japan’s society. From tight control by the bureaucracy in the 1920s to the proliferation of CSOs in the late 1990s, Japan’s civil society has become increasingly active in social services delivery as well as in policy making. This observation was borne out by my experience as a Fellow of the Asia Leadership Fellow Program (ALFP) during my two-month stay in Japan.

Despite the different political systems and obviously a different degree of maturity of civil societies between China and Japan, both countries do share similarities in their state-centered development model and their export-oriented economic strategy, which have inevitably left imprints on the pattern of the development of civil society in both countries, namely, a needs-driven and state-led type of development. As a country with a more mature civil society, what will the development of civil society in Japan contribute to the understanding of that in China, a latecomer, and shed light on the prospects for its future?

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1 Civil Society Organizations were totally banned in China’s ten-year Cultural Revolution (1967–1976).
The first part of the paper will introduce the current status of civil society in China. It will first explain the reason why China’s civil society has developed rapidly since the 1970s regardless of an authoritarian regime. It will then point out the factors constraining its development. The second part will delineate the evolution of CSOs in Japan. It will identify the momentum behind the development of Japan’s CSOs.

Ultimately, this paper seeks to argue that the evolution of CSOs is not linear. Faced with a similar international environment and internal dynamics, the development of China’s CSOs may experience hiccups but is unlikely to be totally reversed. As a matter of fact, the Chinese CSOs are pushing the boundaries demarcated by the state. Slowly but surely, the Chinese CSOs are enlarging their footholds in a once state-controlled territory of social services provision as well as in relevant policy making. The dynamic voluntarism observed in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995, which pushed the Japanese NPOs into the public spotlight and finally galvanized momentum to push through the enactment of the watershed NPO Law (the Law to Promote Specified Nonprofit Activities) in 1998 in Japan, was also discovered in the Chinese public during the disaster relief in the wake of the Wenchuan Earthquake in 2008. China’s civil society may have a long way to go to become a well-developed third sector that can supplement and monitor the state, but the political space that has already opened up for its development is simply unlikely to close up. Momentums that have once pushed the development of CSOs in Japan are also at work in China now.

CIVIL SOCIETY IN CHINA TODAY

According to the categorization of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, civil society in China consists of social organizations (she hui tuan ti), private non-commercial enterprises (min ban qi ye dan wei), and foundations (ji jin hui), or the branches of overseas foundations (jin wai ji jin hui dai biao ji gou). In this study, I will refer to the three types of organizations as CSOs in general.

Social organizations are categorized into five broad categories: scholarly or scientific organizations (xueshu xing tuanti), professional associations (zhuanye xing tuanti), trade or industrial associations (hangye xing tuanti), united organizations (lianhe xing tuanti), and fundraising and managing institutions (zijin guanli jigou).6 The fields in which civil society is active include industrial associations, social welfare and services, sports, culture and arts, education, information and technology, public affairs, environment protection, etc.

Civil society in China has grown rapidly since China’s economic reform. Even though CSOs existed before 1949, they were effectively suppressed by the Chinese government until the late 1970s. During the ten-year Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), no CSOs were established. According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, there were 246,000 social organizations, 199,000 private non-commercial enterprises, and 2,243 foundations in 2011.7 Within ten years (2001 to 2010), the number of CSOs in China has more than doubled (see Figure 1).

FIGURE 1. Civil Society Organizations from 2001 to 2010.8

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8 Ibid.
DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY AS A RESULT OF ECONOMIC REFORM

The rapid development of civil society in China is a result of China’s economic reform. In the pre-reform era, Chinese civil society was strongly dominated by a powerful state. Work units (danwei) in urban areas as well as brigades and people’s communes in rural areas were organizations that helped the state to fulfill its production goals, deliver social services, and effectively control society.

Under a planned economy, work units had no autonomy in making production plans or in daily management. They had to finish the production quota set by the state in a national production plan. A tacit social contract was formed: the state would take care of a worker from “cradle to grave,” while workers would remain in a work unit at low wages for their entire life. In addition to lifelong employment, the state would provide benefits such as free medical care, generous retirement pensions, inexpensive housing, and subsidized transportation, etc. (Some work units even expanded into small societies with their own schools, hospitals, and even movie theaters). In exchange, the workers would accept low wages and give up the freedom to choose their own life or move to another work unit. The generous welfare benefits and privileges not available to any other social groups helped to weaken workers’ motivation and capability for mobility. With 99.8% of urban employees working in the state and collective enterprises as well as other state institutions in 1978,9 the state effectively controlled every aspect of the majority of urban residents’ life. Unemployed urban residents had to register in Community Committees (ju wei hui), which would perform similar functions to work units in implementing government policies.

In addition, people were encouraged to join the state sponsored political organizations, such as women’s federations, youth leagues, and trade unions, which were affiliated with work units, schools, and other public institutions. They further strengthened the control of the state through organizing activities and providing entertainment.

The counterparts of work units in the rural area were production brigades and people’s communes to which all rural residents had to belong and which organized agricultural activities and produced agricultural products according to a state plan. Unlike urban workers, however, rural residents did not have any welfare benefits. In order to prevent the mobility of people, particularly the mobility from rural to urban areas, a resident registration system was implemented. In an era of resource scarcity, a person’s resident registration decided where and how he could get his food ration coupons and other meager state subsidies. The resident registration system effectively prevented people’s geographical mobility and created a sharp urban-rural divide.

Through these organizations, the state controlled every aspect of people’s life: work, study, entertainment, etc.

The result of this total state control . . . was a highly homogeneous society, characterized by dull conformity: people wearing similar blue Mao jackets, having similar hair styles (even among women), riding on the same brand of bicycle, receiving similar low salaries from state-owned factories, spending and consuming foods and other goods according to ration coupons or quotas controlled by the government. There were no business advertising, trading, or any other commercial activities in most of the cities.10

Under the iron wrist of the state, there was no space for a civil society. There were only 42 social organizations in the 1950s and 32 in the 1960s.11 Social organizations were totally banned during the Cultural Revolution (1967–1976).

Dysfunctional Organizations

The economic reform started in 1978 and left the organizations that the state had relied on to implement its policies dysfunctional and irrelevant. A household responsibility system was introduced to replace the collective production organized by brigades and people’s communes. Farmlands were contracted to individuals in family units. After selling a certain portion of produce to the state at a state-set price, farmers could keep or sell the rest on the free market at unregulated prices. This policy gave farmers much bigger incentives to improve agri-
cultural productivity and engage in more agricultural activities. A robust free market was developed alongside a state-controlled market.

In addition to agricultural activities, township and village enterprises (TVEs) were developed to absorb surplus labor in the countryside. Their later development, together with a large influx of foreign direct investments (FDI), created China’s thriving non-state sector.

In cities, a manager responsibility system was introduced to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the early 1980s. A series of policies was enacted in 1979, among which “Several Decisions on Broadening SOEs’ Management Autonomy,” “Decision on Profit Retention by SOEs,” “Interim Decision on Taxation on Fixed Assets of SOEs,” and “Interim Decision on Full-Amount Loan of Liquid Funds to State Industrial Enterprises” had tremendously improved SOEs’ managerial autonomy as well as incentives to maximize profits by decentralizing administrative power and responsibilities from the government to SOEs.

The second stage of economic restructuring occurred in the 1990s and witnessed a large-scale downsizing of SOEs because of the policy of “grasping the big and letting go the medium and small-sized SOEs.” Compared with 99.8% in 1978, only 37.3% of urban employees were employed in state and collective enterprises or other state institutions in 2001. Meanwhile, the concurrent welfare reform tremendously retrenched workers’ welfare benefits. Welfare provision was no longer the sole responsibility of the state. Instead, individuals and enterprises took over and shouldered more responsibilities.

Therefore, the economic reforms in both rural and urban areas destroyed the state’s organizational control. Brigades and people’s communes in the rural area were replaced by administrative villages and township governments respectively in 1982. “The land still owned by [an] administrative village was divided into small plots and contracted to households for 30 years.” Even though a “collective economy on the level of the administrative village still existed” after 1982, “in most rural areas (especially in the middle and western parts of China) the collective economy existed in name only because it was often in debt.” In urban areas, the retrenchment of the state sector in the late 1990s sharply reduced the number of state employees. The sheer drop in the number of state workers and the retrenchment of social services they had once delivered rendered work units less powerful in influencing their employees.

With the dysfunction of the organizational control, the state’s tight control of society consequently loosened. From a homogeneous and egalitarian society, China had started to be transformed into a pluralistic and diverse society. Enterprises with different types of ownership appeared. The development of TVEs, foreign ventures, joint ventures, and service industries provided unprecedented job opportunities and choices. The living standards of the Chinese people improved greatly. People became less economically dependent on the state and enjoyed higher geographic and social mobility. The policy of “letting a few get rich first” made China one of the most unequal societies in the world. The Gini coefficient—an economic indicator for economic inequality (a value of 0 suggests total equality and a value of 1 extreme inequality)—reached 0.45 in 2001 and 0.47 in 2010, jumping from only 0.32 in 1980. According to the Human Development Report 2009 published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), with a Gini coefficient of 0.47 China ranked the 36th most unequal society among 152 countries in the world with available data. This new stratified society created diverse social needs and demands.

**The Model of Small Government and Big Society in the Post-Reform Era**

Withdrawing the state from direct involvement in economic activities is one of the stated purposes of the economic reform in China. Except for some key industries and enterprises that have so-called strategic importance, all other state enterprises were privatized. Concurrently, the state also withdrew itself from the direct financing and provision of social services through a series of welfare reforms starting in the 1980s. This government disengagement, along with the demise of the brigades and people’s communes, left rural residents in limbo when it came to social services. The government needed to come up with a solution to be able to provide quality social services and, equally important, to enhance its legitimacy. In the late 1990s, the Chinese government therefore began recentralizing the policy making and management of social services, while at the same time seeking ways to promote societal involvement in this area.

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13 Ibid.
Its first experiment was shequ (community services centers), developed by the government at the grassroots level to take over some of the traditional social services of work units. Implementing the policies made by the city and district governments, shequ provided a variety of services to their community residents, which ranged from Party activity, birth control, safety, and social mediation to cultural and entertainment services. Based on need, “some shequ … also established departments to address specific problems,” such as “a Pensioners Department in Shenzhen and an Economic Department in Chongqing.” The shequ leaders could be appointed, indirectly selected, or directly selected by the residents of communities.

It was obvious, however, shequ alone could not meet all the diverse needs of society, such as poverty alleviation, women’s empowerment, legal assistance to the vulnerable, and social assistance to the needy, etc. To address these needs, the Chinese government opened up the space for the development of a more active civil society. “The state actively creat[ed] and sponsor[ed] NGOs in order to transfer … certain functions which it used to perform itself.”

It is not difficult to see that the development of China’s CSOs since the 1970s is a needs-driven and state-led process. Civil society was under tight state control before China’s economic opening-up. With the withdrawal of the state in social services provision and dysfunction of the state organizations that had once assumed this function, the state had to rely heavily on CSOs for social services delivery. At initial stages, the state even took initiatives to create some CSOs.

BOTTLENECKS OF CHINA’S CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT

Despite the rapid growth, there are many constraining factors impeding the development of civil society in China, both internal and external.

Tight Government Control

This needs-driven and state-led process of development dictates that China’s CSOs could not be fully independent from the state, unlike their counterparts in Western countries. Both the pragmatic purposes for which the Chinese government promoted its very development and the fear on the part of the government that its development might spin out of control to threaten its power left their imprints on the development of China’s civil society.

The control of the government is demonstrated by the fields of work that civil society was allowed to get into and the scope of impact it could exert. For example, religious or human rights organizations were not as welcomed by the government as those that provided social services or poverty alleviation. As Susan H. Whiting rightly points out, the approach that the Chinese government adopts towards civil society is both repression and incorporation. In fact,

the Chinese government has expressed … clearly its desire to control Chinese social organizations and if necessary to use its power to repress those organizations that it sees as dangerous. In a conspicuous example, during the Spring of 1989 the government outlawed all student, worker, and civilian autonomous organizations.

More recently, in April 2010, one of China’s leading independent women’s rights organizations, the Women’s Legal Research and Services Center, was notified that its affiliation with Peking University was being terminated. The founder of the center, Guo Jianmei, was quoted in the Washington Post article … as saying that it was sanctioned because it received substantial funding from the Ford Foundation, took on sensitive cases, and was trying to organize a nationwide network of public interest groups.

The restriction is also evident in unfriendly administrative regulations. Social organizations in China are subject to “dual management,” which means that each organization must be approved by a supervisory unit (yewu zhuguan danwei) before it can be registered in the offices of the Ministry of Civil Affairs at local or national levels. Because there are no laws or regulations governing the way in which a request for approval should be processed, the supervisory units can easily shun their responsibilities and sit on the applications. The result is that many social organizations remain unregistered. According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, there were 435,000 CSOs in 2010. However, the actual number could reach 3 million. The unregistered social organizations do not have legal status and can easily be ordered to shut down by the government. It is not difficult to see that the requirement for dual management allows the government to manipulate the number of organizations that can be registered in any given locality.

Moreover, the policy of not registering two social organizations with a similar mission in the same district also inhibits the healthy growth of a civil society. In reality, this policy benefits those social organizations that are sponsored and supported by the government because they can monopolize resources by reducing rival organizations. The lack of peer competition only renders the registered social organizations less motivated to provide better services to their constituents.

**Frail Finance and Problematic Internal Governance**

China’s civil society is not financially independent from the government. It is estimated that 56% of the funding of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) comes from the government. The institutional boundary between the government and civil society is blurred. Some CSOs are half official and half non-official. “The practice of appointing former government officials, generally from the supervisory units …, to leadership posts in [some] non-government organizations” further blurs the boundary between the two. As a matter of fact, “the most successful of China’s CSOs tend to be those funded by the government.”

The regulation that only authorized CSOs can fundraise has further weakened the financial independence of these organizations and limited their room for development. After the earthquake in Yushu, Qinghai province on April 14, 2010, only 15 CSOs were authorized to fundraise. All other organizations had to turn in the relief funds they had raised to the authorized ones. In addition, the culture to donate to, or trust CSOs for charity, has yet to take root in China. Meanwhile, some recent incidents exposed by the media regarding the irregularities of some foundations further eroded public trust in CSOs.

As a matter of fact, weak finance has taken its toll on the administrative capacities of CSOs. Because of low salaries, working in a CSO is not considered attractive. It is difficult to attract highly qualified people to work in this field. Nascent training and education institutions for CSO personnel simply could not meet the growing needs of CSOs for qualified personnel.

These challenges make the development of China’s civil society a little unpredictable. In particular, the limited space for advocacy CSOs and tight restriction on CSOs working in sensitive fields, such as human rights and religious issues, add to the uncertainty. What is the future of civil society in China? Will it remain merely a state agency for social services delivery without any advocacies? Or will its fate be simply at the mercy of the state so much so that one day its development may be reversed by a heavy-handed authoritarian regime?

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21 Ibid.


23 Ibid.


THE DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN’S CSOS

Before addressing this question, I would like to draw on my observations as a Fellow of Asia Leadership Fellow Program (ALFP) on the evolution of Japan’s CSOs as an illustration. Despite their different political systems, China and Japan share many similarities in terms of the development of CSOs. During the field trip of ALFP to the tsunami-affected Tohoku region in October 2011, we were deeply impressed by the civic activism that we had observed in the area. NGOs and NGO networks initiated by local residents to coordinate relief and reconstruction efforts, activity centers established by volunteers close to the evacuation centers, a large number of CSOs and volunteers engaged in cleaning up debris, and other reconstruction activities were all a clear illustration of the spirit of volunteerism in Japan on the one hand, and the effectiveness of CSOs on the other. From a social-pluralistic perspective, we would say that Japan has a very mature and active civil society that reaches out to people hit by disaster and also works as a helping arm of government agencies. Japan is therefore hailed as a “high social trust” nation characterized by communitarian capitalism.26

Despite the criticism of their limited impact on policy making, Japan’s CSOs had played an important role in joining forces with media and interested political parties to push through the passage of Nonprofit Organization Law (NPO Law) in 1998, which greatly improved the regulatory framework of NPOs.27 Another case in point of active involvement of Japanese CSOs in addressing pressing social issues is the lead role that the Japanese NPOs took in focusing attention on the plight of 250,000 contract workers who suddenly lost their jobs following the 2008 Lehman shock. The campaigns led by the CSOs “spark[ed] national debate about growing disparities in Japan that was a key factor in helping the DPJ [Democratic Party of Japan] oust the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] from power in the 2009 elections.”28 Similarly, when the government tried to pressure the local governments to take nuclear debris from Fukushima, 26 out of 37 local governments rejected the requests because of the pressure by local residents.29 It is fair to say that Japan has an active and mature civil society, which is playing an increasingly important role in advocacies and policy making, even though this may still not be as strong as its Western counterparts.

However, Japan’s civil society did not achieve its current maturity overnight. It is indeed striking to note that Japan’s civil society has evolved over a span of almost 100 years. According to criteria such as the number of CSOs, legal and regulatory framework, and impact of CSOs on policy making, the development of Japan’s CSOs underwent roughly four stages. In the first stage (1920s to 1930s), the state was rather averse to institutionalization of voluntary, society-led organizations. CSOs at that time could only “maintain a de facto existence through social activities alone.”30 At the second stage (1940s to 1960s), CSOs started to gain legal protection and to participate in state decision making and the political process. The third stage (1970s to 1997) witnessed human and women’s rights and environmental protection campaigners became actively involved in decision making, particularly in the formulation of environmental and welfare policies. And the fourth stage (1998 to present) saw the passage of the symbolic NPO Law in 1998, Japan has seen a proliferation of NPOs ever since.31 The incorporated CSOs could operate as a corporation, making contracts as a corporate, opening a corporate bank account, etc.

Examining the development trajectory of the Japanese CSOs, one can easily see a pattern of the gradual easing of regulatory control and an increased role of CSOs in policy making in relevant issue areas. Before the passage of the NPO Law in 1998, the registration of Japanese NPOs was at the discretion of the bureaucracy, easing of regulatory control and an increased role of CSOs in policy making in relevant issue areas. Before the passage of the NPO Law in 1998, the registration of Japanese NPOs was at the discretion of the bureaucracy. In this era, the state was rather averse to institutionalization of voluntary, society-led organizations. CSOs at that time could only “maintain a de facto existence through social activities alone.”30

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The incorporation of CSOs into the regulatory framework allowed them to operate more freely, thus enabling them to play a more active role in policy making. This is evidenced by the CSOs’ involvement in various social issues. In the third stage (1970s to 1997), environmental and women’s rights activists began to actively participate in decision making and policy formulation. In the fourth stage (1998 to present), the passage of the NPO Law in 1998 greatly improved the regulatory framework of NPOs, allowing them to operate more freely and to play a more active role in policy making. This is evidenced by the CSOs’ involvement in various social issues.
rule. With the passage of the NPO Law, the registration and incorporation process for CSOs became quite simple. People who are interested in incorporating NPOs need only to fill out a template prepared by prefectural governments. In particular, the granting authorities must decide on the certification within two months immediately succeeding the two-month period of public announcement.

In terms of types of CSOs, the Japanese CSOs evolved roughly in the order of elite organizations (such as associations and political associations created among the elite), producer organizations (such as labor unions, agricultural cooperatives etc.), then policy pressure groups, and civil advocacy organizations. In the initial stage, most Japanese CSOs were mainly engaged in services delivery with few advocacy activities. Pressure groups, citizen movements, and citizen lobbies appeared only after World War II, that is, during or after the second stage of development. The formation of organizations in the advocacy sector peaked during the period immediately after World War II to 1960, around 1970, and between 1985 and 1995, with a further tendency to increase in recent years.

The development trajectory of Japan’s CSOs illustrates that the development of CSOs is not linear. It may go through a morphing process from purely service delivery to a combination of both service delivery and advocacy organizations. It took almost 100 years for Japanese civil society to achieve its current maturity, during which it underwent ups and downs. For prospects of China’s civil society, we have to put it in a longer time span and give it more time for both development and observation.

Finally, the factors that had once contributed to the historical development of CSOs in Japan in the late 1990s can also be identified in China today. The momentums once driving such development in Japan include endogenous as well as exogenous factors. The former include the consensus reached between and among government agencies, political parties, media, business companies, and CSOs on the importance of a bigger role for civil society in Japan, while the latter involve an international environment in favor of the development of civil society. The following part will illustrate how these factors have interplayed to influence the course of the development of the Japanese civil society.

First of all, the global trend of focusing attention on social issues, such as environment protection and human rights promotion, set the stage for civil society to play a more active role in Japan. For instance, “in the late 1980s, the international NGO movement to address global environmental issues stimulated the founding of many Japanese environmental NGOs.” The development of think tanks also got the momentum from the international trend of engaging “track two diplomacy” and “the international collaborative networks of independent policy research institutions that [were] increasingly pursuing common research agendas.” On the other hand, the surge of overseas investments by Japanese companies since the 1980s has educated Japanese companies about the need to conform to international practices including good corporate citizenship, which helped nurture a partnership between Japanese companies and NPOs later in addressing many social issues. With the trend of deregulation and downsizing of the government, the partnership between the government agencies and NPOs has been growing since the 1990s to address social issues, such as home care for senior citizens, foreign labor, social welfare, etc. Meanwhile, in the course of their increased interactions with international NGOs, Japanese CSOs became gradually aware of the factors inhibiting their growth. Their motivation to work to remove the impediments became a crucial force in exploiting the extant momentums and lobbying for the legislative process of the NPO Law in 1998. In the process, the work of the Coalition for Legislation to Support Citizen’s Organizations (C’s), a coalition of 24 citizens’ groups to facilitate citizen-based activities, is widely recognized.

In sum, the international trend in addressing common social issues, the exposure to standard international practices with Japan’s economic integration with the world, the Japanese government’s desire to embrace the trend, and the advocacy movements carried out by the CSOs themselves combined to have the unfriendly legislation amended and pushed the significant development of civil society in Japan. Against this backdrop, the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake played a catalyzing role in “galvanizing the forces already at work.}

32 Ogawa, 3–4.
33 Yamamoto, 119.
34 Tsujinaka, 99.
36 Yamamoto, 99.
37 Ibid., 99.
38 Ibid., 98–101.
39 Ogawa, 173.
in Japan to bring about an important leap forward for civil society—namely, enactment of the [NPO] law” in 1998. 40 How will this development of civil society in Japan shed light on that in China?

WHAT CAN JAPAN’S EXPERIENCE TELL US?

China had 485 million Internet users by the end of June 2011, more than the combined population of Japan and the United States. Also, 300 million Internet users are registered users of microblog (weibo)—a Chinese social media equal to the American Twitter. 41 Despite tight government control, these microblogs have played an important role in disseminating information, voicing discontent opinions, and criticizing government misconduct. For instance, after two high-speed trains collided in the eastern city of Wenzhou in July 2011, microblog users immediately uploaded photos of the accident at odds with the official version of events, spread commentary, and questioned the government’s handling of the crash. As an interviewee was reported to have said, “the pressure society is putting on the government is huge. Without the Internet, this situation (Wenzhou crash) could easily have slipped by and been forgotten.” 42

Free information flow, which once helped the Japanese civil society to break the information monopoly of the government and to connect with other CSOs with shared values, is taking hold in China despite the government’s attempts to disrupt the process. As some analysts rightly pointed out, the government’s rigid control on information flow could only bring damage to China’s economy and international reputation, 43 which the Chinese government would never want to see or be able to afford. Like Japan in the stage of economic takeoff, China is integrating with the rest of the world. The trend of conforming to international standards and practices will not be restricted only to the economic area. More and more Chinese CSOs have expanded their scope of activities to the international arena. One hundred and sixty-one Chinese CSOs have obtained consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. 44

Already being a helping arm of the Chinese government in delivering social services, the role of CSOs in easing tensions between the government and society is being recognized by society as well as by the government. Examining why the victims of 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake in Sichuan Province had a low evaluation of and high sense of unfairness toward the government relief package, scholars argue that institutionalized participation of the earthquake victims in reconstruction-related policy making and enhanced transparency in the implementation of these policies could have boosted victims’ satisfaction in government-sponsored reconstruction. 45 They observed from their field research that with the involvement of CSOs, disaster victims would tend to accept more easily the same relief policy that they might have otherwise complained about. 46 It is gaining more and more acceptance even among the policy makers that CSOs could help maintain the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party because of CSOs’ role in uniting people with shared values and working for collective goods, which is considered useful in defusing dissident opinions and maintaining social stability. 47 Therefore, even out of its own interests, the Chinese government would be reluctant to completely reverse the development of civil society in China.

Similar to the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake was a watershed event in the development of civil society in China. Because of the active volunteerism, public spiritedness, and charitable giving displayed in the relief activities, the year 2008 was touted by some media reports as the “Year

40 Ibid., 98.
46 Ibid., 114–116.
The earthquake, for the first time, made people realize the capacities and strength of CSOs in disaster relief in particular and social issues in general. Most importantly, “the earthquake has prompted Chinese authorities at both the local and national level to reconsider their views of and policy toward NGOs.”49 The Ministry of Civil Affairs, the supervisory government agency of CSOs, renewed efforts, after the 2009 Yushu Earthquake, to revise the regulations and management of CSOs in China and to lower the threshold for CSO registration.50

It is not difficult to see that those forces that once contributed to the symbolic development of civil society in Japan are also at work in China today: a government seeking international recognition and trying to maintain its legitimacy among its people, an economy extensively integrating with the world, a society with increasingly free flow of information—or a constant tug of war between the government and society if the flow is not full yet—and an increasingly active civil society looking for every opportunity to grow. These observations have given us reasons to hope that civil society in China will continue on its current development path.

Of course, while drawing comparisons between the CSOs in China and Japan, one should not overlook the difference in the political systems of the two countries. The CSO journey in China, for instance, has been slow because of the particular political system. But despite the limited political space, it has made big strides. The sheer numbers are impressive. As pointed out earlier, from being fully banned in the 1970s, to having emerged as the third largest sector at the moment, is reflective of the rapid evolution that CSOs have undergone in China. They have kept pushing the boundaries of the political space allowed by the government. What they need, however, is time. We have to bear in mind that from their initiation to their current status, it has only been three decades.

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49 Ibid., 192.
50 Ibid., 193.
Pakistan’s Geography

IMTIAZ GUL

In his report, Imtiaz Gul focused on how the geography of Pakistan is one of the major reasons why the country, with 64 years of independence since August 14, 1947, is in a volatile situation today. Nationalist Indian political leaders are not reconciled to the idea that Pakistan is carved out of India, and this border region, along with the Kashmir region, is a continuous contention. In the west, Afghanistan and Iran are in conflict with the United States. In the south, there is the Arabian Sea and further down is the Indian Ocean, where a fight is going on between China, India, Pakistan, and the United States for the control of the waterways.

Gul explained the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which comprises seven designated tribal regions in northwest Pakistan and the neighboring country of Afghanistan. The region has been called the center of terrorism or the headquarters of Al Qaeda. In 1893, the British created a border belt between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, the border with Afghanistan, still known as the Durand Line, is not officially recognized. This unsettled status of the border is a big problem between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The area called Baluchistan, which is almost half of Pakistan, is poorly governed because of the border issue and stands as a hot hub of nationalist militancy.

Gul described Pakistan’s area of about 800,000 square kilometers with a population of 180 million people. The major ethnic groups are Punjabi, Sindhi, Balochi, and Pashtoon, and the official languages are Urdu and English. Socioeconomic indicators include GDP worth $165 billion, to which agriculture contributes 22%, industry 23.6%, and services 54.6%. During the fiscal year 2010–2011, Pakistan exported $25 billion worth of goods with a per capita income of about $1,100. Pakistan has developed a niche in textile production that contributes to about 60% of the country’s total exports and has been known as one of the top ten textile-exporting countries. As for the media landscape, particularly since 2002, Pakistan has liberalized communication policies; more than 100 licenses have been issued to private FM channels, 80 of which are currently functional, with 1,200 newspapers and magazines. Over 100 million people have access to phone connections and there are four motorways and an efficient 260,000-kilometer road network, which are deemed as good as in Japan. All of these show the progress Pakistan has achieved since 1947.

Despite all these successes, Gul reported that Pakistan continues to face various conflicts, including the presence of the militant players who have created the current condition of Pakistan. He then briefly explained the history of how the Jihad started in the early 1980s—when the Americans responded to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan—and how it was the Jihad that created Al Qaeda. After 9/11, Americans mounted attacks on the Taliban regime in Kabul, causing Al Qaeda leaders to retreat to the northern tribal areas that had become their hideout. Then Al Qaeda and Taliban reacted to the U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation and offenses in that region, which resulted in a bloody violent campaign inside Pakistan. Consequently, the radicalization of thought took place, with religious seminaries looking up to Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden as icons.

Gul noted that since 2006, there have been almost 300 suicide bombings and killings of several thousands of people. As a result of the military offensive and the reaction by the military forces in different regions, Pakistan has lost 35,000 lives. Hostilities between the militants and the military have become a bloody campaign, and the army has lost more than 3,000 people—which is more than what Pakistan lost in two wars with India in the 1960s and 1970s. Naturally, these crises have sucked away foreign investment, as well as domestic investment, and made Pakistan’s economy stagnant. Since 2001, the cumulative losses to Pakistan in monetary terms come out to about $67 billion. The insecure environment consequently led the country to drop eight places

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1 In Pakistan, the fiscal year starts on July 1 and ends on June 30 of the following year.
in the list of best countries for doing business, according to the reporting by the World Bank and the International Financial Corporation (IFC) in June 2011. The foreign investment to GDP ratio also dropped to some 13%. Most of the investment is taking place in stocks, not in infrastructure that can improve the employment situation. Furthermore, the tourist industry is down to 5% (compared to 2001–2002) according to Pakistan Economic Survey 2010–2011. As a whole, the economy has shrunk and the social sector has suffered more because of this war.

According to Gul, a continuation of the democratic process is probably the fundamental requirement to solve Pakistan’s problems, many of which are caused by the army’s shortsighted tactical policies. What has been important for Pakistan is to gain control in these militant areas, to disconnect Pakistani people, including the militants, from Al Qaeda, and to narrow the space for them and integrate this region into “mainland Pakistan.” Gul stated that there are three major indicators for the revolutionary process, through which he believes Pakistan can get better: (1) there is a grand political consensus against the military takeover; (2) the private media have emerged as one of the strong factors in support of the democratic forces; and (3) the judiciary has realized its power for the first time in the history of Pakistan. Gul also emphasized that corruption cannot be eliminated just through military rule. Likewise, government issues cannot be settled by putting the army in charge of governance; it has to be a process led by the civilians who have the capacity to deal with the gray areas, as opposed to the military that sees things in black and white.

Gul concluded his presentation on a positive note by reporting that Pakistan has the sixth largest population in the world and is the ninth largest English-speaking country with the seventh largest pool of scientists and engineers. He also showed images of K2—one of four out of the fourteen highest peaks in the world that are in Pakistan. Mountaineering used to be a huge industry and brought many people to the country. Furthermore, Pakistan has beautiful lush plains and salt mines that are worth visiting.
Imai Chihiro focused her country report on the demographic changes, which have attracted considerable attention in Japan in recent years. Before touching on the problems, she first talked about where Japan is in terms of aging of society with its ever-increasing percentage of people aged 65 or older in the population. If the percentage is 7% to 14%, it is referred to as an aging society, 14% to 21% as an aged society, and 21% and more as a hyper-aged society. According to this definition, Japan is categorized as a hyper-aged society. When World War II ended in 1945, the median age in Japan was 22, but by 2011, it had risen to 43 years old, almost doubling in just 66 years. The term “hyper-aged society” started in the late 1990s.

In connection with this phenomenon, birthrate decline has also become considerable. Japan’s total fertility rate (TFR) was 4.54 in 1947, and then it dropped to 1.29 in 2004, said Imai. Japan consists of 43 prefectures where Tokyo, the capital, has the lowest birthrate (1.0) and Okinawa has the highest birthrate with 1.7. Based on an opinion poll by Asahi Shimbun on birthrate decline and population problems in 2004, 78% of the population was concerned about the birthrate decline and 74% noted the difficulty of raising children, yet 45% considered having children as joy, while the 44% considered children as a burden. At that time, the poll predicted that population would peak in 2006 and start declining thereafter. Imai argued that Japan should build a society where young people would want to have children.

Imai stated that the characteristic of demographic change in Japan is the combination of low birthrate and high life expectancy (or low mortality rate). The factors that contribute to the trend toward small families include the popularization of higher education (as a result of which, people would go out into the world relatively late), late marriage, parents’ devotion to raising healthy children, increased participation of women in the labor force, limited living space (with Japanese houses being too small to have children), and rising cost of education. Imai reported that in 1993, the life expectancy was 82.2 years for women and 76.4 years for men, which was the highest in the world. The mortality rate of the same year (1993) was estimated to be 7.2% per 1,000 population and the leading causes of death were cancer, heart disease, and cerebral vascular disease, all of which were common in post-industrialized society.

Imai then presented the population projections announced by the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research in 1997 and 2002, which said that the total population of Japan (which is around 127 million, as of 2011) will drop dramatically and decrease to about 100 million in 2050. According to Imai, the general public has been prepared for Japan’s entering the age of shrinking population and the fact that the population growth will be negative for years to come is taken for granted by decision makers and society. Under such a condition, the sustainability of public pension, health insurance, and social security systems has become a major policy concern.

As of February 2011, people aged 65 or over accounted for 23.1% of the total population, while people aged 75 or older took up 11.4%. Five years ago, in 2006, the number of people aged 65 or older was 26.5 million; however, the number grew to 29.47 million by 2011, showing an increase of 11.2%. Imai also shared another projection that said that the percentage of people aged 65 or older will increase up to 40% by 2055. Given this increase of elderly population, there are potential impacts, not only on society in general but also on government spending, that need to be addressed. While millions of dollars are saved every year on education, healthcare, and welfare for children, the amount spent on social welfare continues to increase. In the 1970s, social welfare expenditures amounted to 6% of national income, but in the early 1990s the portion increased to 18% and by 2025, 27% of national income is expected to be spent on social welfare. According to the report by the United Nations Population Division released in 2000, Japan needs to either (1) increase its retirement age to 77 or (2) admit 10 million immigrants annually in order to maintain the same level of worker-to-retiree ratio as in 1995 in the following 50 years.
Also, Imai mentioned the need for the government to help build nursing homes and day-care facilities for the elderly and improve home healthcare programs, as hospitals will most likely be short of beds, given the increasing aging population, and not all working people have time to take care of the elderly.

Imai explained that the increasingly long lifespans are changing all aspects of society in Japan and creating new government responsibilities accordingly. Public discussions on the issues concerning demographic change include how people can maintain the standards of living and social security in a hyper-aged society and how the government should design an effective social policy. Other related issues that need to be addressed are change in gender relations, which is possibly causing late marriage and late childbirth, and the lack of Japanese nurses and doctors, which has led to the acceptance of nurses from Indonesia and the Philippines based on the economic agreement since 2008. However, Imai brought up the question of whether the acceptance of immigrants can help slow the decline in population.

In closing her report, Imai talked about how Japanese people are still trying to pursue happiness and have a good life under the circumstances. While they face the fact that they have limited financial support from the government and fewer people in the labor force in such an aging society, people need to ask themselves what it takes to be happy and satisfied with one’s life and what determines quality of life in the end.
Miryam Nainggolan began her report with general information about Indonesia. The red and white of the Indonesian flag symbolize courage and honesty, respectively. “Bhinneka Tunggal Ika,” which means unity in diversity in old Javanese, is Indonesia’s motto. The capital city is Jakarta, with a population of more than 10 million people. The official language is Indonesian, which originates from the minority Malay (Melayu) language and is taught in all schools starting from kindergarten. The world’s largest population of Muslims lives in Indonesia; however, it is not an Islamic State. The country gained its full independence from the Dutch after 350 years of colonial rule and then from Japan after the end of World War II. Independence was declared on August 17, 1945, but acknowledged by the international community on December 27, 1949.

Indonesia has 1,919,440 square kilometers of land and is considered the 16th largest country in the world (as of fall 2011). Based on the 2009 census, the population was estimated at 238 million and ranked as the 4th biggest population in the world. GDP per capita in 2010 was estimated at $4,379. Approximately 13.3% of the population lives in poverty. The country consists of more than 17,000 islands. However, over 7,000 of these islands are uninhabited, and it has been a challenge for Indonesia to protect particularly the outer islands that border the Philippines, Timor Leste, and Malaysia.

Indonesia is divided into 33 provinces with 5 big islands, namely Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan (Borneo), Sulawesi (Celebes), and Papua. The main islands have 300 big ethnic groups with their own traditions, customs, and languages. However, some of the languages are under threat of vanishing if the government does not protect them, said Nainggolan. Java Island consists of 5 provinces, namely West Java, Central Java, East Java, Special Area of Capital Jakarta, and Special Autonomy of Yogyakarta. Bogor, where Nainggolan was born, is located in West Java province, 60 kilometers from Jakarta. Bandung is the capital of West Java. Papua, another island, is facing issues of separation because of the violence from the military toward the Papua civilians. Timor Leste, formerly East Timor and a province of Indonesia, was separated from Indonesia after a referendum in 1999. Bali and Lombok Island are famous tourist destinations.

Aceh was directly affected by a massive tsunami in December 2004. The damage extended to certain areas in Thailand and Sri Lanka. The Pulih Foundation, with which Nainggolan is affiliated, opened an office in Banda Aceh to help the survivors recover from their trauma and trained the locals as field workers, as well as area coordinators, for sustaining psychosocial empowerment in the community.

The 1945 constitution assures that every person has a right to have a decent wellbeing, proper housing, healthy environment, and education, as well as the right to achieve equality, justice, security, and to develop themselves based on social, economic, and political rights. Nevertheless, that is not what Indonesians have in reality, said Nainggolan. Some of the major challenges faced by Indonesia include poverty (especially the poorest of the poor), unemployment, massive corruption, weak law enforcement, neglected children and elderly, internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to natural disasters, violation of the right of minorities to practice their religions, and migrant workers.

President Soeharto’s authoritarian regime lasted over 30 years, from 1968 to 1998, during which most of the political leaders were appointed from the military, and he had a strong, successful dictatorship. Nainggolan added that, during the Soeharto regime, law existed only as a tool to oppress people and disregarded their freedom of expression. The released political prisoners who were accused of being activists of the communist party had to have special ID cards, which violated their human rights. In addition, the Soeharto government accepted only five religions, including Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism, and placed them under the control of the Ministry of Religion.
Soeharto’s downfall in May 1998, known as the reformation period, followed after several years of civil society movements for democracy in the country. Nainggolan reported that after the resignation of Soeharto, there were some improvements from a human rights perspective. However, those who have been working on sensitive issues, such as corruption, gender and LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender), freedom of religion, and security and defense reform, continue to face difficulty expressing themselves and defending human rights. The government has also been applying regional autonomy; yet, the problem is that they have given little guidance and monitoring. Nainggolan added that with the strengthening of the fundamentalist group, some local autonomies and authorities try to implement part of the Sharia law.

Nainggolan ended her report by describing the current situation wherein the religious fundamentalist group attacks religious minorities and human rights defenders (HRD) of the LGBT and religious and indigenous freedom. Unfortunately, some of the police enforcers do not protect the minorities and the HRD because they support the fundamentalist group. While it is clearly stated in the constitution that the state protects all citizens, some upcoming laws and local regulations are endangering the HRD and religious minorities. In particular, the bill on national security strengthens the potential of military authority against the HRD. There are some initiatives by human rights advocates in Indonesia who have given reports to the international community on many occasions to improve the situation. For instance, every year at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, civil society in Indonesia is represented. According to Nainggolan, human rights principles have been implemented in Indonesia, as the country ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the Civil and Political Rights and the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
According to Jehan Perera, the most important thing in a country is its people. However, that is something that the Sri Lankan government sometimes seems to forget, since they put great importance on the territory, and saying that the country is territorially united has mattered more than the reality or the will that people are united in their hearts and minds. Perera expressed his concern over how, for the government and many people, the unity of the country is the unity of the territory, and not necessarily the unity of the people.

Sri Lanka’s population is about 20 million, of whom 75% are Sinhalese, and approximately 25% are Tamils and Muslims. In terms of religion, about 70% of the population is Buddhist, and all Buddhists are Sinhalese, 14% are Hindus who are all Tamils, and 9% are Muslims who consider themselves as a separate group. Christians consist of both the Sinhalese and the Tamils and account for 7% of the population. With reference to the population growth, Sri Lanka has a population growth of less than 1%, with a relatively young population. The land area is 65,000 square kilometers, located 30 kilometers below India, and is about 50 times smaller than India.

Perera reported that Sri Lanka’s economy has been growing, with an annual growth rate of 8% in the past several years, especially after the war ended, and based on government statistics, the per capita income is over $2,000, which puts Sri Lanka in the category of a low middle-income country. The country’s tea export is well known; yet, the agriculture sector, including tea export, only contributes about 11% to GDP, while the services sector (which includes tourism, transport, telecom, and financial services) contributes 59%. Perera said that changes are taking place, with new sectors growing, partly as a result of globalization, but problems still remain. One problem is that nearly 10% of Sri Lankans are working abroad in the hope of earning good salaries; however, many of them are women going to Middle Eastern countries with little protection and they often come back having been abused and exploited.

Perera then talked about Sri Lanka’s geopolitical situation. With the country’s location close to India, Sri Lanka undermines India’s control of the Indian Ocean. There is also some speculation that China is building a harbor at the southern tip of Sri Lanka not only because Sri Lanka wanted it for trading purposes, but also because China will use it for military purposes in the future. This harbor would also guarantee China the security of its sea routes in bringing oil from the Middle East. Perera added that Sri Lanka’s location has become important because of China and India playing off against each other for resources. However, this has led to Sri Lanka’s vulnerability; within the range of political and military concerns, Sri Lanka can be a possible threat to India while it has also been undermined by India. Another issue that bears upon Sri Lanka’s relationship with India is the memory of ancient immigrations and invasions that came from India, given the proximity of the two countries.

Perera then talked about the conflict that Sri Lanka has faced internally. Perera said that what Sri Lanka has is ethnic conflict that has arisen from people of two or more communities sharing one territory. Although the war is over, the problem remains and there is only negative peace in the country. Perera believes that the conflict is about power sharing within the communities, and with regard to the Sinhalese and Tamils in particular, they both feel insecure and thus lack a sense of generosity toward each other. While the Sinhalese account for 75% of the population of Sri Lanka, they do not see themselves as a majority in the region where the Tamils are a regional majority (consisting of 3 million Tamils in the North of Sri Lanka and 80 million Tamils in India). The Sinhalese have developed a sense of fear of a possible takeover by the Tamils as happened in the past. However, the Sinhalese also have an ancient history that says that they were chosen by Buddha to protect the Buddhist religion in Sri Lanka. Including the Muslims, no ethnic group wishes to be dominated by the others, and so long as they are all unwilling to be generous to each other, conflicts continue to exist.
Perera reported that the second problem is majority rule, which is the reality in a democracy. Normally, democracy is based on the ideology of a shifting political majority; however, in the case where ethnic majority is served, the problem is that ethnic majority is an unchanging, permanent majority, and it will lead to a tyranny of the majority. The Sinhalese argue that the Tamils have to learn to live with the fact that they are a minority. Perera further pointed out that the Sinhalese have always had their way, and under their majority rule, whenever the Tamils asked for what they thought was right, it was never agreed to.

Another issue, according to Perera, is citizenship. Some of the Tamils whose ancestors were brought from South India to work in the British tea estates in Sri Lanka 150 years ago were deprived of citizenship and lost their right to vote. The politicians then became no longer interested in those Tamils without voting rights, and consequently, they became poor. In the 1980s, they finally got citizenship rights; yet, while some ended up going back to India, many remained in Sri Lanka and are still the poorest group in the country. Despite the support they had given to the Sri Lankan Tamils in the past, India did not want to divide Sri Lanka and tried to put pressure on the Sri Lankan government to make some adjustment for the Tamils who were fighting for their political right.

Perera reported that while the war is over, the main challenges Sri Lanka faces today stem from the old issue of centralization of power. People envision a strong and good central government. However, in early 2011, the government passed the 18th amendment, which removed the term limits to the presidency and gave the president the power to appoint all the top officers of the state. Perera reported that this has not only impaired the system of checks and balances but also led to impunity. Furthermore, a culture of fear in opposing the government has emerged among the people who are interested in politics and changing the systems. Today, the country has a popular government that defeated the Liberal Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and won the war in 2009. However, the centralized government is facing one big problem, which has no answer: how to respond to the demand by the international community concerning the crimes against civilians that the Sri Lankan government may have committed in the last phase of the war, and ultimately, how to bring reconciliation among its ethnically divided people that is based upon an acknowledgment of what happened in the past.
Elmer Sayre commenced his presentation with a background of Philippine history and geography. Having been a Spanish colony for more than 300 years and under 45-year American rule and Japan's brief occupation during World War II before the attainment of independence in 1946, the Philippines is a country of multicultural, mixed identities.

The Philippines is about a 300,000 square kilometer archipelago, consisting mostly of mountains that extend to a coastline of 7,107 islands with a tropical marine climate as well as with northeast and southwest monsoons. Because of its location in the typhoon belt, the Philippines has an average of 15 typhoons per year. The Philippines is rich in terms of natural resources, such as timber, nickel, petroleum, cobalt, gold, salt, and copper. Agricultural crops include sugarcane, coconuts, rice, corn, bananas, cassava, pineapples, and mangoes. There are also other products that support people's livelihoods, such as pork, eggs, beef, and fish. Sayre reported that coastal, marine, and forestry resources are either lost or declining because of illegal operations. Electronics assembly is mostly done by the Japanese and Chinese settled in the Philippines. Other industries that are thriving include garments, pharmaceuticals, wood products, and petroleum refining.

The population is 80 million and the population growth rate is estimated at 1.9% in 2011. Cities like Manila, Cagayan de Oro, and Cebu constitute almost half of the total population. In terms of religion, about 81% of the Filipinos are Catholic, 5% Muslim, and 14% other Christian denominations. Approximately 33% of the labor force in the Philippines is engaged in agriculture, 15% in industry, and 52% in the services sector (2010 est.). Based on a government report in 2010, unemployment rate was 7.3%, but Sayre said that it must have been higher because millions of Filipinos live below the poverty line. Furthermore, 50 million Filipinos who are living below the poverty line contribute to the doubling of population growth in the belief that children are gifts from God. Sayre recommended population control without the interference of the Catholic Church, given the limited resources in the country.

Sayre then discussed political leaders, starting from Ferdinand Marcos, whose 20-year dictatorship until 1986 weakened the economy and placed the Philippines at the bottom of the list among the Asian countries, while the change of administration by Corazon Aquino brought in several coup attempts that prevented a return to full political stability and economic development. Fidel Ramos, a former army general, was elected president in 1992 and managed to build a good administration marked by increased stability and progress in economic reforms. However, the next president, Joseph Estrada, was perceived as inept and corrupt, and was impeached in 2001. Likewise, the administration of Gloria Arroyo was marred by several corruption allegations in 2010, although the country had survived the global financial crisis in 2008. The current president, Benigno Aquino III, who was elected in May 2010 only because of the popularity of his mother—the Philippines' former president, who was seen as an icon of Philippine democracy—is being criticized for his manner of governance.

Sayre next explained the problem of the Filipino diaspora. There are about 10 million out of the 80 million Filipinos, including nurses, caregivers, and teachers, working in Hong Kong, the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, and other countries. According to Sayre, the problem is that the best and brightest of the Philippines tend to work abroad. Furthermore, the Filipino diaspora fragments the family, since many of those working abroad are women who serve as breadwinners and leave their husbands and children behind, and this can further result in marital problems and children's rebellion.

While Filipino is the national language, there are many regional dialects or different languages, and this regionalism contributes to cultural misunderstandings and quarrels between the North and the South. According to Sayre, the same kind of issue is apparent among Muslim ethnic groups in Mindanao. Likewise, corruption is seen at all levels, and the lack of resources is one of the causes for criminality to spread in both the urban
and rural areas. Sayre also pointed out another issue—urban sprawl, which is occurring because of an increased number of migrants to urban areas. Sayre said that about half of the Philippine population is eager to move to urban areas, as they have been influenced by the media. However, those who have migrated from rural areas continue to live in subhuman conditions without jobs and sufficient education. Sayre is also concerned about the inability of development donor communities to understand the situation of the poor, as well as about the fact that development aid is not provided directly to the poor; it only goes to the consultants. As a result, the helpless and voiceless poor tend to be exploited by the rich and the powerful while social and economic services are not readily accessible to them.

With these crises in mind, Sayre coined the term “social volcano” to describe the current Philippines that is simmering like a volcano. He then raised questions of how to harness not only the power of the poor but also the power of the rich or the middle class along with the power of the civil society to create a just and humane society. Other questions Sayre raised include the significance of development—whether it means modernization, and if so, whether modernization is making a difference to people’s lives—while bringing out the paradox of the Philippines being a consumerist society where the meaning of “quality of life” is being reassessed. Sayre added that in order to make society just, humane, and sustainable, the Philippines needs to figure out how to act local and think global, as well as how to make the distribution of resources more equitable.
Vuong Thanh Huong started her report by explaining the geography and demography of Vietnam. Vietnam, with a total area of 331,698 square kilometers and a 3,260-kilometer coastline, is located at the center of Southeast Asia and is surrounded by Thailand, Cambodia, and China. Two thirds of the country is mountains and hills. The total population is 90 million, and according to a projection, the population will reach 100 million in 10 years. The mortality rate of children under the age of 5 was 5.8% in 1990; however, it had fallen to 2.5% by 2010, and is expected to continue to fall below 2.0% by 2015, owing to the improvement of the healthcare system.

Vietnam has 62 provinces and 5 centrally managed cities with a GDP of $106 billion. The country’s per capita GDP is $1,168. There are 54 ethnic groups, including the Viet (Kinh) group occupying 85% of the population, and 53 ethnic minorities occupying 15% of the population. In terms of religion, there are 10 million Buddhists, 6 million Catholics, 1 million Protestants, and 60,000 Muslims, and those who have faith in other local religions.

Vuoi then talked about Vietnam’s economy, which had rapid growth rates of 7.5% from 2001 to 2005 and 6.9% from 2006 to 2010. Since 2010, Vietnam has become a middle-income country. The main source of economic growth consists of telecommunications, IT (information technology) services, education and training, and financial services, as well as of other business services, including environmental and health services. According to Vuong, Vietnam wants to develop its tourism; however, it faces many challenges. In the agricultural and natural resources business sector, Vietnam produces 40 million tons of rice and exports 6 to 7 tons to other countries, including the Philippines and Africa, every year. Vietnam is also a big exporter of rubber, tea, coffee, cashew nuts, pepper, fish, and shrimp. Vuong says that the country is currently in the process of industrialization, and industry contributes 41% to GDP while the services sector contributes 38% and agriculture 21% to GDP. Given that Vietnam’s economy used to depend mostly on agriculture, having the services and industry sectors account for more than two thirds of GDP means change and growth in the economy. Vuong also mentioned that since 1990, half of the country’s enterprises have been privatized, with an aim to encourage both local and foreign investors, as long as they meet the government’s requirements. Despite these developments, there still remain challenges that Vietnam faces. For instance, climate change continues to affect Vietnam’s infrastructure; particularly, hydroelectric dams have been constructed in many parts of the country to cope with the problem of flooding.

Vuong then discussed Vietnam’s educational system, which is divided into five levels: pre-primary, primary, intermediate, secondary, and higher education. Formal education consists of a total of 12 years of basic education, with 5 years of primary education, 4 years of lower secondary education, and 3 years of upper secondary education. According to Vuong, Vietnam’s national education system is relatively complete, consistent, and diversified in terms of training levels and approaches. She reported that there are 11,444 kindergartens and preparatory schools, 27,595 primary, lower, and upper secondary level schools, 322 universities, 636 schools for continuing education, 8,359 community learning centers, and 750 institutions centering on foreign languages and informatics education. Students in secondary level learn not only English but also Japanese and French; Chinese is planned to be included. The literacy rate (as of 2008) is 96% in the urban area and 92% in the rural area. The literacy rate in the age group of 10 to 40 is 96%, and the rate is equal for both males and females. While more than 80% of 14-year-old children have completed the primary curriculum, Vuong said that Vietnam accomplished the goal of universal primary education based on national standards. Vuong added that Vietnamese can also pursue vocational training, through which they learn IT literacy, if they wish. However, children in the mountainous areas do not necessarily have the same opportunity or access to higher levels of
education, such as college and university, because the level of education they receive is relatively low and many also drop out of school after receiving lower secondary education and directly enter the labor market or help on their family farms.

Lastly, Vuong touched on the issues concerning education and training for those who will enter the workforce in Vietnam. Even though labor training is provided for technical workers at primary and vocational levels, the labor force is still inadequate. Moreover, there is an imbalance in the distribution of trained workforce among different regions. Human resources are mostly allocated in 3 areas comprising approximately 70% of the country, and this leaves the rest of the country with insufficient numbers of trained workers with certificates and degrees. In terms of the satisfaction of employers with their employees, 50% of the employers in the garment and chemistry enterprises, for instance, are not satisfied with the quality of their employees. Moreover, 60% of the graduates from vocational training schools and colleges need to be retrained after joining the labor market in order to meet the needs of the job and international standards. Only 10 out of 4,000 registered lawyers can participate in regional and international cases. With those problems in mind, Vuong turned her attention to the role of education and training and specifically noted the need to reexamine the curriculum development, school facilities, and qualified teaching staff in Vietnam.
Zhang Yali began her report by describing China’s geographical location and territory. China has an area of 9,596,960 square kilometers with a population of 1.3 billion, notwithstanding the one-child policy implemented in the 1970s. It is a multiethnic country, and the five largest ethnic groups are Han, Zhuang, Hui, Manchu, and Uygur. According to the 6th National Census of 2010 of the People’s Republic of China, about 1.2 billion people are Han, accounting for 91.51% of the total population, while the rest of the 55 ethnic groups account for 8.49%. China has 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang Uygur, Guangxi Zhuang, Ningxia Hui, and Tibet), and 4 municipalities or provincial-level cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing), which enjoy the favorable conditions given by the government. Taiwan is considered part of China. In October 1971, the People’s Republic of China replaced Taiwan (officially the Republic of China) in the United Nations. Furthermore, there are two special administrative regions, namely, Hong Kong and Macau, which were returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 and 1999. China has the National People’s Congress (NPC) as a legislative branch with almost 3,000 seats, which is responsible for enacting and legislating laws. Its judicial system is composed of the Supreme People’s Court, Local People’s Courts, and Special People’s Courts. The administrative organ includes the State Council (also called the Central People’s Government), under which there are 25 Ministries and Commissions in addition to other organizations and institutions.

According to Zhang, China’s current state would be difficult to understand without discussing China’s economic reform that began in 1978. She explained that the economic reform started in the rural areas and gradually expanded to the coastal areas and then to key sectors—industrial sectors. As the household responsibility system was introduced in the rural areas, all land was distributed to households depending on the number of household members. This system proved to be efficient and gave the farmers incentive, for it allowed them to keep the remaining products and sell them in the free market after turning in the quota assigned by the government. Within five to six years, the overall living standards in the rural areas greatly improved without any food shortage. As a result, in 1984, the central government decided to expand the economic reform from the rural area to the city and introduced a manager responsibility system to enterprises in cities to make management responsible for how much profit the company is making and return a portion of the profit to distribute to the workers as benefits. Zhang indicated that decentralization was one of the main characteristics of the economic reforms in both the rural and urban areas where individuals assumed more responsibility in production.

As people’s lives improved owing to the reforms, welfare spending kept climbing. However, given the decentralization of power, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in particular were now responsible for all of their funding, including the pension of their retirees, and belonged to the government in name only. Thus, the constant increase of welfare spending became a big burden for these individual enterprises while the number of retirees increased in those enterprises with the aging of the population, said Zhang. In the 1980s, China carried out welfare reform, which entailed all enterprises to pay for their employees’ benefits. By 1996, the situation had become unsustainable, and all the SOEs had begun to lose profits, partly due to the increasing welfare burden. In 1997, the second stage of economic reform began when the central government initiated a policy of maintaining only key strategic and important industries, such as electricity and railways, and letting go of small and medium-sized enterprises.

The third stage of economic reform has taken place since 2002. It has aimed to diversify ownership structure by separating the executive power of the central government from the enterprises. According to Zhang, the social implications of the economic reform are xia-gang (laid-off workers). There have been debates on the

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difference between the official figures of *xia-gang* and the actual number of those who have been laid off, as well as on the question of who are, or should be, counted as laid-off workers in the first place.

Zhang then cited the effects of economic reform, such as the continued increase of annual income, living standards, and material benefits for the ordinary people. She also pointed out the approach taken in the non-state sector, which was liberalized by allowing people to have their own small businesses to sell their products. These people became the first group of people who prospered. This gradually gave rise to the township enterprises in the villages and coastal areas. Furthermore, there has been an embrace of liberal ideology, by which people believe that in order to get paid more, one has to work hard and compete with others, rather than waiting for government support. This resulted in popular support for the reform.

However, along with economic progress comes economic inequality, Zhang stated. According to the Human Development Report 2009 by the United Nations Development Program, China ranked the 36th most unequal society among 152 countries with available data in the world. Farmers without sufficient land to farm or those in the countryside who cannot generate enough income, for instance, become so-called mobile workers and move to the city out of necessity and do the most dangerous and dirtiest jobs in the city. Zhang also discussed the dissatisfaction and confrontations that exist between and among social groups as China tries to regulate the market. In a survey by the Chinese Social Academy, over half of the respondents considered that the two social groups benefitting most from the economic reform are government officials and owners of private enterprises. Farmers and workers, who used to make up the biggest social group in pre-reform China, have now become the last two social groups. Another survey conducted in 2003 by the Chinese People’s University’s sociology department showed that officials and ordinary people are predicted to be the first two groups to have a confrontation, while the rich and the poor will most likely be the next two groups.

Finally, Zhang discussed how corruption has become one of the biggest problems in China since 1990. The corrupt officials could easily flee to Canada or the United States as long as they have the financial resources. According to a survey by China Daily, ordinary people feel that corruption erodes the national image of China and is one of the causes of social unrest. Government officials also recognize the seriousness of the corruption problem, but they do not have a concrete plan to solve it. Zhang shared that the Internet is playing a bigger role for both the government and the civilians in addressing these social unrest issues.
Seminars by Resource Persons/Workshops
Japanese Politics and Diplomacy after the March 11 Earthquake

MIURA TOSHIAKI
Editorial Writer, Asahi Newspaper

The aim of Mr. Miura Toshiaki—with his twenty-seven-year career in journalism focusing on domestic politics and experience covering foreign policy and security issues—was to present a general picture of what has been happening in Japan and what Japanese people have been discussing since March 11. First, he talked about Japanese politics and then the role of media and public intellectuals.

Mr. Miura’s first observation of March 11 earthquake was to compare it with the September 11 terrorist attack. When the earthquake happened, what was Japanese politics like? Japan’s Democratic Party (DPJ) came into power in 2009 after a long, fifty-year rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Many Japanese welcomed this power shift, and there were many expectations not only from the journalists but also from the general public. However, this new ruling government has ended up making a series of blunders and mistakes. Hence, the people’s approval rate came down to almost less than 20% when the earthquake hit the Tohoku area.

Before the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the United States was also deeply divided and nobody thought that George W. Bush would make a strong president. After the terror attack happened, however, Bush’s approval rate rose up to 90%. What particularly caught Mr. Miura’s attention was the strong message Bush delivered to the American audience, as well as the message of unity sent together by Bush and the leader of the Democrats, during a plenary session held by the U.S. Congress on September 20. Mr. Miura believes that this unity lasted at least for several months. After the March 11 earthquake in Japan, Mr. Miura thought that there would be the same kind of political unity and even a strong collaboration between LDP and DPJ as well, but it did not happen owing to several factors. One was the difference between terror and natural disaster, and another factor was the Japanese politics itself, which had been in disarray since before March 11. Pointing out how little the prime minister did or could do to repair the malfunction and also questioning the legitimacy of the democracy that Japan has had thus far, Mr. Miura further talked about the Japanese political system.

Particularly since the increase in political scandals in the early 1990s, Japanese people began to talk about the need of a political reform—a reform that would bring about a fundamental change in government and help make Japan a full-fledged democracy. Until then, the Japanese lacked confidence as to whether or not Japan was a truly advanced democracy, as regarded by other countries, because of the long rule of the same party (LDP). However, any of the changes (including the change from a middle-sized constituency to a single-sized constituency, as well as the major power change from the LDP to the DPJ in 2009) did not change the nature of the government, and Mr. Miura explained some of the reasons why Japan has not been able to have the change it has needed. One reason is the lack of fundamental difference in policies between the major political parties (namely DPJ and LDP) as they are kind of “catch-all” parties, trying to appeal to every section of society, unlike political parties in the United States or in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, compared to these two countries in particular, where there are divisions within society that are not only geographical, ethnic, and religious, but also political and ideological, Japan is a more egalitarian, conformist society without a sharp demarcation line within society. Thus, even if the DPJ won the majority on their platform, they could not go as far as to bring about changes to the government. Another reason is the way in which democracy has worked and been understood in Japan for the last five decades or so. Mr. Miura particularly pointed out how in every advanced democracy, people have begun to talk about the malfunction of democracy, the problem of leadership, and that of representative governments. Many of them have reached the conclusion that democracy is no longer a panacea or the sole solution to the problems. Yet, in Japan, people had thought that the whole problem was the absence of political power shift and expected that they will have a true democracy when the DPJ won. However, the DPJ’s victory eventually taught the Japanese that there are problems with their democracy.
Mr. Miura then talked about the need for a strong leadership in modern era. That is what former Prime Minister Koizumi had, which was an exceptional case in Japan’s politics. He was the only one who held more than five years of office. Hatoyama Yukio tried to respond to Okinawa base issue by finding other solutions but failed. Next, Kan Naoto tried to rebuild and completely change the energy policy but was strongly criticized. Now, what Prime Minister Noda is doing is safe driving, as he is trying to keep unity within the party and reach some compromise with bureaucrats, but this has made his policy stance vague. Mr. Miura further shared his concern that the hope people had two years ago when they voted for the DPJ along with an expectation for new changes had been lost. Given the way in which the LDP used to run, going back to the LDP would not simply solve the problems either. Having considered all these things, Mr. Miura stated that Japanese politics is now at a crossroads—whether the DPJ could carry out alternatives and show that there could be a healthier form of government, or they would just stick to safe driving by restoring to the old “catch-all” party system.

Lastly, Mr. Miura touched on the role of media and public intellectuals, which he thought was vital; yet, both have not performed their proper function in this political turbulence. Media has leaned more toward a populist approach. However, while sensationalism has become an easy way to sell journalism, Mr. Miura is concerned about the influence that the current form of media can have on the government in particular when it is unstable and keeps collapsing one after another. He then talked about the image of public intellectuals or that of elites in Japan. Thirty or forty years ago, the image was relatively good; however, it is no longer positive these days. Today, if someone calls himself elite, he is recognized as someone who looks down on others. Likewise, to call oneself a public intellectual sounds self-arrogant. Those nuances are strong in Japan. Yet, the images are perhaps different in other societies. If someone is an elite or public intellectual, he has the credentials and achievements and cannot deny himself as such because he is expected to pay for his responsibilities. However, in Japan, one does not proclaim himself as an elite or a public intellectual because it is an egalitarian society that has gone to some kind of extreme. Mr. Miura ended his presentation by asking the fellows what the role and image of public intellectuals are in their countries.

**POINTS OF DISCUSSION**

- Things that had been expected from the DPJ but remained unfulfilled: the Okinawa base issue, exercise of political leadership, breakdown of bureaucracy, and proper funding for different institutions.
- Bureaucracy’s influence on Japanese hierarchy system.
- How different kinds of media are used to form public opinions.
- Comparison between Japanese press club and foreign press.
- The presence of the small number of Japanese women in politics.
This year’s Nitobe Kokusai Juku participants, or jukusei, are mainly composed of young leaders, professionals, and civil servants, some of whom have experience working for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Based on the professional experiences, backgrounds, and interests of the ALFP fellows and the jukusei, they were divided into three groups to discuss one of the following three themes: (1) culture and values; (2) politics and diplomacy; and (3) economy. During the group discussion, the fellows shared their views on Japan’s current situation and discussed with the jukusei the impact that the current situation of the countries where the fellows come from might have on Japan. Each group also discussed the following agendas from the perspective of their given theme: what Japan can contribute to Asia, as well as what Japan and Asia together can contribute to the global community, and what would be the challenges Japan and Asia might face in realizing their contribution and the measures they can take to achieve such a goal. After the group session, each group presented points of their discussions.

The first group gave a presentation on the theme of culture and values in Asia. The common values in Asia that the group identified are respect of community, social harmony, modesty, and empathy. The group then talked about the values that people in Asia may share because of the impact of globalization. These values include consumerism, materialism, and individualism, as well as human rights and democracy. The group also discussed some of the values shared by Asian countries that they thought should be kept beyond globalization including spirituality, emphasis on family connections, respect for diversity, and sense of responsibility. Furthermore, respect for the community, empathy, placing importance on extended family, sense of unity, and social justice are strong Asian values and/or customs that can be shared with the rest of the world to give a positive impact onto the global community in the 21st century.

Jehan Perera, the fellow from Sri Lanka, presented for the politics and diplomacy group. While Sri Lanka’s government is powerful, the country’s civil society is divided. Civil society in Sri Lanka is also weak for three criteria: (1) it is not represented in the government decision-making body; (2) the public voice in civil society is not much heard because the media does not cover it well; and (3) its ability to mobilize people of the street is relatively low. The Japanese government, in contrast, has in a sense been seen as provider of what people have needed, and civil society has not needed to express itself. However, the situation changed after the earthquake disaster of March 11, when the need for greater capacity to respond to people emerged and civil society began to mobilize people.

Perera then shared the conclusions that his group came up with. One is that civil society should play as a watchdog and a monitoring function in society and it should be strengthened in all countries. The important thing, however, is that civil society’s voices are not just based on emotions but on analysis and research with the assistance of technical skills and expertise. As for how Japan can contribute to the international community, Perera first shared his thoughts on the importance of equally applying universal values to all people across the world and said that Japan should be a country that is consistent in its approach to universal values, such as human rights, and should support other countries without double standards. He also explained how Japan, being a nonmilitary power, could make a unique contribution. Finally, Perera said that Japan should play a role in peacebuilding on the global scene, and, in particular, it should help sustain and improve the economic life of the affected countries and stand for the rights of minority people.

The economy group lastly gave a presentation on the roles of government, companies, and civil societies in Japan, China, and Pakistan. In Pakistan, there are a lot of companies that are state-owned and they are controlled by the government, whereas in Japan and China, most companies that were state-owned in the 1980s became privatized in the 1990s, except for strategic industries. While there are more opportunities for companies to
operate in foreign countries today, the business environment varies in each country. For instance, in Pakistan, where some Japanese automobile companies (including Toyota, Honda, and Suzuki) are operating, there are security problems, such as those related to Taliban, and the situation is different from its neighbor India, which is a popular market for Japanese companies these days. The role that civil society plays for economic development has been little. Yet, civil society in China is growing nowadays. In Japan, the economic recession has worsened people’s anxiety for future for over two decades, and especially people are now facing pension fund and low birthrate problems. One solution that the group briefly mentioned during their presentation for Japan’s economic recovery was the so-called “packaged infrastructure export,” which is one of the government policies promoted recently. Japan and China also share similar challenges, such as social welfare and aging population, and thus the two countries might be able to exchange ideas and seek solutions together.
Professor Takenobu Mieko talked about the Japanese employment system and how it has not only affected the way in which people get into the workforce, but also created problems, such as economic and social disparity among people, over the years. She first explained how the workers in Japan are categorized into two kinds: regular workers and irregular workers. The former refers to full-time company workers who earn a regular salary that most likely increases year by year and who are entitled to benefits like insurance. In many cases, regular workers are under the lifetime employment system. In contrast, irregular workers are those without an assurance of lifetime employment. They may be part-timers and dispatched workers under a short-term contract, and their income does not usually increase and they do not get as many benefits as regular workers.

One of the problems Professor Takenobu noted is that there are income differentials between regular and irregular workers. While the income of the latter is low and the number of irregular workers continues to increase, Japan's relative poverty rate keeps getting higher and higher. In 2006, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) announced that the relative poverty rate of Japan was the second highest among developed countries. This surprised even the Japanese, because they had thought that Japan was an equal society where most people belonged to the middle class.

Professor Takenobu brought up another problem concerning the income gap that has also existed among Japanese men. She specifically talked about the close correlation between the marriage rates and annual income of young men, who are usually expected to be breadwinners in Japanese society. One study showed that marriage rates are higher for bachelors in the 25-34 age group who have higher annual income than for those in the same age group with lower annual income. However, this does not apply to those who earn between 7,000,000 yen and 9,990,000 yen annually; these men most likely work longer hours than those who earn less. Yet, the problem is that there are an increasing number of bachelors in this particular income bracket who stay unmarried. Based on this study, in short, Professor Takenobu gave two reasons why Japanese young men do not or cannot marry: either because they have insufficient finances or because they work so hard that they do not have any chance to meet potential life partners.

The average working hours of workers in Japan have decreased yearly, notably because of the rise in irregular workers. Professor Takenobu, however, said that this does not necessarily mean that the working conditions have improved either for regular or irregular workers. There still remains a division in the workforce. While irregular workers face disadvantages, such as lack of insurance and that of wage increase, regular workers may suffer from other problems, including work-related mental illness and death from overwork and pressure to work long hours to the point of losing one's work-life balance.

Women's working situation depends on the choices they make: whether they choose career over family, or family over career. Approximately 73% of women have a career before they have their first child. However, only about 32% of them return to work after giving birth. Furthermore, in spite of the one-year maternity leave, 52% of women with children say that they voluntarily quit their job in order to focus on childbearing. About 81% want to continue their career but have to leave work because of the difficulty in balancing their job and household responsibilities. Inevitably, more women opt to become irregular workers even though their income would be much lower than that of regular workers.

Japan recognizes equal opportunity in employment. Nonetheless, women generally do not get paid as much as men do, nor do they get full support from companies for child care. Some women choose to delay marriage and having children for their career advancement, given the difficulty of having both at once and/or balancing their career and family life. Only a small number of women are able to have helpers to raise their children and earn as much as men while having children. Consequently, Japan faces such problems as aging of society and
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low birthrate. Taking these matters into consideration, Professor Takenobu pointed to the malfunction of the current system in the workplace—how the system itself is for male breadwinners. Yet, while many of the married women have to depend on their husbands as breadwinners, there are an increasing number of cases where men are not earning enough. According to Professor Takenobu, Japan is still at a crossroads in converting itself to a society in which both men and women can work and get paid equally.

POINTS OF DISCUSSION

• Poor distribution system of subsidies and benefits.
• Difficulty to improve the current system due to the lack of people’s awareness of the problems, including the growing poverty and economic and social disparity in Japan.
• Japanese labor law and Japanese people’s unaccustomed participation in the labor union.
The Involvement of International Cooperation NGOs and Their Future Agendas in the Great Tohoku Earthquake

OHASHI MASAAKI
Chairperson, Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC)

Professor Ohashi Masaaki opened his presentation by identifying what NGO and NPO are in Japan. An NGO is a nonprofit, civil society organization that primarily works and cooperates internationally on global-scale issues, such as poverty, natural disasters, discrimination, human rights violation, peace, and environmental problems, while an NPO is a nonprofit, civil society organization that is active in solving domestic issues. In general, NPOs are smaller than NGOs, in terms of the size of operations and finance. However, there is no clear-cut distinction between NGOs and NPOs, neither is there any definition of NGOs or NPOs by law. Nonetheless, for the convenience of categorization, NGOs are usually categorized into three types in Japan: (1) international cooperation organizations dealing with poverty and disaster; (2) organizations dealing with peace and human rights; and (3) organizations dealing with environmental issues. As Japan recognizes the freedom of association and there is no uniform registration method, it is difficult to accurately count the NGOs that exist in Japan. But if we have to count them, there are roughly 400 to 500 NGOs. As for NPOs, there are about 43,000 NPOs, according to the NPO registration law. The Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC), which Professor Ohashi heads, is the biggest NGO network in Japan with about 100 NGO members.

Professor Ohashi then briefly covered the history of NGOs in Japan. The establishment of NGOs in Japan only started in the early 1980s, when the Vietnam War ended and many young Japanese tried to help the Indochina refugees, mainly those from Cambodia. Another boom of NGOs took place in the early 1990s, when the Japanese government established channels of financially supporting NGOs. Yet, Japanese NGOs still face the lack of resources, including donations. The areas where Japanese NGOs operate have centered on Asia because it is nearer and cheaper, in comparison to the operating cost in Africa. However, the number of NGOs involving Africa (where aids are most needed) is gradually increasing. According to Professor Ohashi, civil society organizations in Japan are still in the process of developing.

Professor Ohashi then talked about the involvement of international cooperation NGOs in disaster relief activities as well as the government mechanisms in case of major disasters. But before getting into the topic, he briefly explained the Great Tohoku Earthquake of March 11, 2011—the scale of the disasters, including the tsunami, and the number of victims—in comparison to the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995 and the Sumatra-Andaman Earthquake of 2004 and how the Japanese government and NGOs reacted to the March 11 disasters.

There are three levels of administration in Japan: (1) central government; (2) prefectural government; and (3) municipal (i.e., village, town, and city) government, with a disaster response unit (DRU) at each level. The central DRU is located at the prime minister's office. In general, if a disaster occurs, prefectural DRUs are responsible to supply food and other essentials. However, since the March 11 disaster took place in wide areas, the prefectures could not function well. Thus, the central government took the lead in supplying essentials to the evacuees and those who needed aid for the first few weeks. In principle, prefectural DRUs would inform the central DRU of how much supply they needed, and their requests would be relayed to private food, garment, and transportation companies, which would then deliver the requested supplies to the prefectures. While the prefectural DRUs were the focal point of assisting municipalities, the municipal DRUs were the ones directly managing the evacuation centers and making sure that the supplies were distributed to those in need. Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) also played an important role: they mobilized 100,000 members out of 240,000 for rescue, transportation, supplying food, clearing wreckage, and so on.

Another important unit Professor Ohashi mentioned was the Disaster Volunteer Cooperation Room (DVCR), which was established on March 15, a few days after the disasters occurred, as the primary window for NPOs, NGOs, and volunteers to discuss with the government concerning the disaster relief activity. According to Professor Ohashi, this unit had its pros and cons. Since this was the first time that a unit like the
DVCR was established, no one knew its role, power, or authority. However, what the establishment of the DVCR meant was that NPOs, NGOs, and volunteers were recognized by the government; after the disasters, the government acknowledged that there would be a lot of volunteers who want to support the victims and thought that they needed a coordination unit and founded the DVCR.

Professor Ohashi stressed the importance of having coordination units for volunteers in relief activities for the Tohoku victims. The Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995 was the first time that Japan saw not only the emergence of a great number of volunteers but also the occurrence of many problems with those volunteers. For instance, some volunteers went to the affected areas without being properly equipped and ended up hurting themselves. Many of the volunteers also expected to be provided with food and accommodation while they were in the affected areas, or initiated something that they thought could support all the victims but ended up creating burdens instead. These problems were not exclusive to the disaster relief activities after the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake; they occurred every time a disaster took place. That is why the opening of Disaster Volunteer Centers (DVCs) by local Social Welfare Councils (SWCs) soon after the disasters took place in Tohoku was crucial. Professor Ohashi further emphasized that it was the mandate to coordinate the volunteers who wished to support the affected. However, challenges have still remained. Although there were funds and special trained personnel prepared through the Disaster Volunteer Support Project (Support-P) to assist DVCs, the affected area of the March 11 disaster was so enormous and the duration of relief and recovery was so long that the system became exhausted after a few months. Professor Ohashi said that we need to prepare more for future disasters.

Out of 500 international cooperation NGOs in Japan, 60 NGOs have been active in the recovery efforts in Tohoku (as of September 2011). Professor Ohashi pointed out the fact that this was the first time in Japan that as many as 60 NGOs started relief activities immediately after disasters. He noted three reasons that these NGOs were able to respond quickly: (1) some of them had certain ideas and previous experiences of emergency relief activity; (2) some were well prepared for this kind of natural disaster, as they had done drills every year; and (3) some had funds specifically saved for emergency relief. While these 60 NGOs feel that they should operate wherever there are people in need, whether international or domestic, the rest of the NGOs think that their mission is to help people in developing countries where people’s condition is often severe in a silent manner. Despite this division of ideas, Professor Ohashi realized that disaster relief activities in the Tohoku area were similar to the activities conducted in developing countries. In both cases, those who are engaged in support activities should not play as the owner of the operation; the ownership of the local people must be emphasized. Professor Ohashi further stressed that the capacity building of local organizations is critically important.

Lastly, Professor Ohashi briefly mentioned the two challenges NGOs have faced in terms of funding. Since a lot of money is needed for recovery in the Tohoku area, the Japanese government has begun reducing Japan’s official development assistance (ODA) money toward other countries. However, Professor Ohashi believes that Japan was able to get a lot of assistance from other countries after March 11 as a result of its continued support for them in terms of ODA and NGO operations, and thus cutting back ODA money would not do good for Japan or others. Likewise, NGOs are concerned about the possibility of receiving fewer donations to operate in other countries, as people are already donating for the recovery effort in Tohoku. Since operations of NGOs at home and abroad are both important, Professor Ohashi stated the need for NGOs to explain the accountability of their activities and to negotiate with the government to increase subsidies. In addition, he emphasized that Fukushima needs more attention and that we have to prepare for the next disaster(s) in Japan.

POINTS OF DISCUSSION

- Lessons learned from the Great Tohoku Earthquake: NGOs play a part in the rescue and should be recognized by the government as an independent sector in order to be more prepared for future disasters. They should also receive and share more information to learn how to deal with disasters, especially nuclear disaster.
- Preparations necessary for future disasters of a similar scale as the March 11 earthquake and tsunami include the construction of buildings or homes on elevated areas and the training of people through education on how to respond to disasters.
- How local, private organizations and enterprises should be involved in the recovery effort.
- How community and people should respond to the first tsunami alert.
The Culture of the Tohoku Area

AKASAKA NORIO
Professor, Gakushuin University

Professor Akasaka Norio introduced The Legends of Tono and shared what he saw and heard at first hand in the post-March 11 Tohoku region in order to give the fellows a better understanding of the culture of the Tohoku area, which could be relevant to the way in which people in other countries embrace and carry on their own culture.

The Legends of Tono was written in 1910 during the Meiji period (1868–1912) and continues to be read as a modern classic today while most of the books published at that time have been forgotten in people’s mind and history. The significance of the book can be further understood by looking at the way in which it was written, the conditions surrounding Japan when the book was published, and what kind of person the author, Yanagita Kunio, was. According to Professor Akasaka, 1910 was a transition point for Japan, as there was an incident that led Japan to the direction of the state control of people’s ideology. With the state’s intention to keep people from criticizing the administration of the government in particular, people’s freedom of speech was suppressed and the kind of information that could be more public was controlled. This was during the period when Japan was exposed to a great pressure by western countries and had to search and establish its identity as a nation. Japan had also started to look at Asia as a potential target for colonialism, and in 1910, it conducted the annexation of its neighboring country, Korea.

Professor Akasaka believes that many of the Asian countries today (where the ALFP fellows come from) are facing the same challenges Japan faced in the Meiji period—the modernization of one’s country and creation of a people’s state—and that The Legends of Tono might give us food for thought in looking into what roles the stories, which ordinary people have carried on as legends or folktales, may play in this milieu. The author Yanagita was one of the high-ranking bureaucrats involved in the formulation of the legal aspect of the annexation of Korea to Japan in the early 1900s. What should be noted is that Yanagita was in the midst of a large political movement and dedicated himself to running the new country that was just born, while, at the same time, he absorbed himself in the tales, legends, and oral storytelling of Tohoku region.

Professor Akasaka further talked about the historical context in which The Legends of Tono was written. At the early period of Meiji, there were about 70,000 villages (mura) across the country. The government realigned all these villages and merged small ones together to reduce the number of local communities. Until this realignment of local villages, which began about twenty years before The Legends of Tono was written in 1910, people lived among different gods that they believed existed in all aspects of nature—the mountains, fields, rivers, and the ocean. Each village generally had a shrine that people would visit to pay their respects and to be recognized by the god of the shrine as a member of the community, especially after one was born. Most of the stories in The Legends of Tono take place in these villages where the relationship of humans or the villages with the nature was important, and that is why a feeling of animistic world can be found in the stories. However, through the realignment of villages, which also integrated all of the shrines, people lost their gods, and losing gods meant losing the very foundation that supported their identity.

The Legends of Tono was written at such a large turning point in Japan’s history. Many people had begun to move away from their villages into large cities, and modernization and urbanization started to rock the foundation of the existence of these villages. In the meantime, those who became detached from the villages they were born in and had to move into large cities were the ones who discovered the meaning or the concept of furusato (their home or hometown). During this volatile transition stage of the state, some intellectuals felt a sense of crisis and wanted to keep records about the way Japanese people lived, alongside their interactions with different gods and nature. The significance of The Legends of Tono is that the stories were written down when there were people who were actually living among small gods and passing tales by word of mouth from
generation to generation. Professor Akasaka emphasized that *The Legends of Tono* is the only book that has such records in Japan.

After explaining the location of Tono and how it was affected by the earthquake and tsunami of March 11, Professor Akasaka introduced one of the stories from *The Legends of Tono*, which talked about a man who lost his family in a tsunami and was revisited by his wife's spirit. Then he talked about the project he launched after March 11, which was to gather stories from people in the disaster-hit areas, such as Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima Prefectures and make them into a book. He believes that this would be the very first step to console the souls of the dead. He emphasized that the important thing is not to forget the disaster, and in order to do so, we need to keep records of the event, including stories gathered from the survivors, to pass them onto the next generation.

Lastly, Professor Akasaka talked about another ongoing project—to gather 1 million books from across the country to help rebuild or reopen the libraries in disaster-hit areas. This project has been launched for the purpose of cultural reconstruction (*bunka fukko*) that is to be originated from Tono City, not only for the disaster-hit areas but also for other regions that had been relatively poor before March 11. Professor Akasaka believes that unless the cultural environment of the whole region is improved, more people will leave this region and undermine and destroy the community in the future.

**POINTS OF DISCUSSION**

- The purpose of collecting personal stories of the Tohoku disaster is to keep people's memory alive. It can be a national project. By having the records collected from the people open to the public, they can be shared and utilized by researchers. These records can be especially useful not only for the Japanese local governments to help communities, but also for other countries, as we live in an era of natural disasters.
- The Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995 occurred in an urban area, and thus the type of devastation was different from that of March 11. The importance of gathering and keeping recorded information, building of user-friendly temporary housing for evacuees, and having a long-term vision and preparation for the next disaster were some of the issues that were overlooked in the 1995 earthquake. Forming a permanent organization and an archive is important as they can serve both as a think tank and as a center for research during natural disasters.
Mr. Miyaji Yusuke, a local of Fujisawa, Kanagawa, has a family-owned swinery business called Miyaji Pork and is the founder of Nouka no Kosegare Network, an NPO that helps network young sons and daughters of farming families.

Mr. Miyaji first explained how he and his family run their swinery, which is about half the size of average-sized swine farms in Japan. One of the characteristics of Miyaji Pork is that they grow a limited number of swine in a farm that is spacious. In terms of promotion and distribution, Miyaji Pork holds barbecue (BBQ) events where they invite people through e-mails and have them taste Miyaji Pork’s pork. If people like the pork, then they will be asked to purchase it online or pass the information on to restaurant(s) that might be looking for good pork. In this way, the pork is sold by word of mouth. Mr. Miyaji calls this the “BBQ marketing method.” It is a unique way of engaging in agriculture. Usually, farmers would hand over all of their produce to the so-called market and let the market sell their produce. In case of Miyaji Pork, the farmers would engage in the whole process; they would promote their produce through BBQ events and communicate with potential consumers. According to Mr. Miyaji, this approach works effectively because there is nothing more influential than word of mouth. Top-notch restaurants that are looking for excellent ingredients would directly contact Miyaji Pork for inquiries and purchase. While it would normally cost some money to find potential customers, Miyaji Pork would make a profit out of their BBQ events and get new customers at the same time.

The Miyaji Pork is fortunate that through word of mouth, they have been able to attain their status as a top brand in Kanagawa Prefecture over a period of two years. Mr. Miyaji, however, believes that offering tasty pork is not the only key to success. His approach to agriculture is based on what he calls the 3K principle, which can be translated into English as follows: “the primary industry should be cool, inspiring, and money-making.” While farming has become a crucial matter not only for farmers but also for everyone else including consumers in present-day Japan, Mr. Miyaji’s 3K principle has been widely resonated with many people, and that is why Miyaji Pork has been able to grow to their current level.

After briefly explaining how he came to take over his family swinery business, Mr. Miyaji talked about the two problems that he encountered when he was studying various aspects of farming and agriculture in Japan. The first problem is that farmers do not have the power to decide on the price of their own produce; usually, when produce is handed over to the market, the price is settled depending on the balance between supply and demand, as well as on the market rate and its standard in terms of size and shape. The second problem is that when farmers ship out their produce to be put on the market, they do not put their names or their company names on their produce as a rule, and, naturally, they would not have the means to receive feedback from their consumers. Mr. Miyaji then shared his thoughts on the issue many farming families in Japan are said to have faced over two decades—that they do not have anyone to take over their family business. Mr. Miyaji believes that the problem is not the lack of people to succeed, but the system of agriculture industry itself that discourages people from engaging in the farming business. Through the experiences of receiving feedback directly from consumers at BBQ events, Mr. Miyaji realized that farmers should be part of the whole process and know how their produce is being consumed by consumers, instead of only producing and shipping their produce out to the market. He emphasized that the primary industry would be attractive if one engaged not only in the production, but also in the distribution, sales and marketing, product development, and so forth.

After briefly introducing how he started his business with the help of his father and younger brother, Mr. Miyaji described the situation in which most Japanese farmers are today, along with the changes in society, and then talked about his business vision. He believes that the fastest way to achieve change in the Japanese agriculture industry is to have sons and daughters of farmers, who may be doing non-farming job outside their
hometown now, to go back to their homes and take over the family business. While there are systems by which the government supports those who are interested in starting a farming business as new farmers, Mr. Miyaji pointed out the hurdles they would most likely face as they start their own farm, such as obtaining a piece of land, blending in with the new community, getting necessary equipment, considering the type of crops suitable to the given climate, and distributing produce. Compared to sons and daughters of farmers, who already have what is listed above to do farming right away, new farmers would have to start almost from scratch even if they have some experience of working as a farmer before. In light of this view, Mr. Miyaji established an NPO (Nouka no Kosegare Network) to encourage the children of farming families who are currently working in Tokyo to return to their homes to do farming. His NPO also facilitates the networking of young farmers all around the country and helps create place(s) for test marketing for farmers and their children.

Lastly, Mr. Miyaji talked about the approaches and efforts he has made to revitalize not only the agriculture industry but also local communities. He believes that the revitalization of the agriculture industry and that of local communities are to progress together, like car wheels. Thus, he does some consulting work to help communities, such as giving lectures to young people about entrepreneurship, organizing a tour to bring his customers from Tokyo to local communities, creating a business plan contest, and opening agriculture schools for business-persons. However, he believes that it is far more effective to establish a network of farmers and people from different fields (such as restaurant owners, editors of magazines, and product development experts) throughout the nation than him functioning as a consultant and visiting each farmer to help solve the problem he or she may be encountering individually. He believes that in this way, farmers can talk to people in their own community or network about their challenges and new ideas and have a greater chance of making successful cases. That is why Mr. Miyaji created an NPO to connect sons and daughters of farmers while hoping to bring new perspectives to the agriculture industry.

**POINTS OF DISCUSSION**

- How passion is most needed in order to overcome the multiple challenges that one might face in starting a business, according to Mr. Miyaji.
- Direct dialogue between producers and consumers is necessary to conquer the fear of radiation problem in agriculture that has been brought in by the Fukushima nuclear accident.
On Japanese Religion

KENNETH TANAKA  
Professor, Musashino University

Professor Kenneth Tanaka commenced his presentation by briefly explaining his background of being born in Japan but brought up in California. Because of his Japanese-American background and education, his perspective is from the outside while he understands the Japanese way of doing things.

Professor Tanaka proceeded to ask the fellows what activities or phenomena they had seen that they considered religious in Japan. One of the fellows mentioned the visit he saw Japanese people making to a shrine in Atami. Fellows also expressed how they were curious to know the belief system and the difference between Shintoism and Buddhism in Japan. Professor Tanaka said that one difference, which can be witnessed in visits to shrines or temples, is that people clap their hands twice at shrines in order to wake up the Gods, whereas they do not at temples. Yet, for many Japanese, it does not matter if it is a shrine or a temple when they go to pay respect, and especially young people are not aware of the difference between shrines and temples. Professor Tanaka added that while Buddhism and Shintoism have their own history and practice, respectively, and there were times when one was dominant over the other, in a long history of 1,500 years (since the introduction of Buddhism to Japan, where Shintoism had already been practiced), the two religions have come to coexist.

Based on a survey conducted on Japanese religious attitudes, about 30% of Japanese have faith or are religious, while 70% responded that they feel religious spirit (shukyoshin) is important. Professor Tanaka further talked about the relationship between Japanese people and religion, which he described as interesting. Japanese believe that religion is important even though they may not be involved personally. In France and England, the majority of people also do not practice religion on a regular basis and remain secular, whereas in the United States or other Asian countries, 80% of people would consider themselves as believers. However, when the number of Japanese people who are affiliated with religious institutions in some way or another is added up, there are 200 million people, which is more than Japan’s total population. Professor Tanaka explained that many people belong to more than one affiliation, such as Shinto and various sects of both traditional and new schools of Buddhism, although this does not mean that they are believers.

Professor Tanaka further explained that most Japanese families are connected to Buddhism or Buddhist temples through the so-called ancestor veneration practices, including funerals and memorial services. Yet, some of the people do not regard ancestor veneration as religious but as part of the Japanese culture. The New Year’s visit to shrines or temples from December 31 to January 3, known as hatsumode, is another occasion when people become directly connected to temples and/or shrines. Yet, while visiting temples and shrines may most likely be seen as a religious practice from a Western perspective, it is rather regarded as a custom in Japan. At their visits, many people hope and wish for good fortune, longevity, health, and prosperity. People also visit shrines and temples to experience the presence of something greater and more sacred and express gratitude, which continues to be the core belief and attitudes of Japanese religiosity.

According to Professor Tanaka, there are three major religious traditions in Japan: Buddhism, Shintoism, and Confucianism. Christians only account for less than 1% of the Japanese population, yet, many non–Christians choose to get married in a Christian church often because they like the fashion, including wedding gowns. These people may not believe in Christian God, but they still consider God sacred and express respect to Him. However, when a baby is born, the parents would take their baby to a shrine to receive blessings. Funerals for most Japanese (excluding Christians) would take place at Buddhist temples where they have their ancestors at the gravesite. Confucian values can be seen in people’s relationships in Japanese society. Professor Tanaka said that this kind of mixed practice shows part of the openness and tolerance of Japanese people to all religions.

Professor Tanaka then explained some differences between Japan and the United State, in terms of how religion plays a part in each society. In Japan, family takes on a religious dimension and makes one feel part of
the family’s long traditions, whereas in the United States, where individuality is valued, the Church functions to provide a sense of belonging and stability, as well as that of history. For immigrants, churches have served as a stepping stone from which they could move on to general society. According to a survey, 57% of Americans go to religious institutions at least once a month and close to 45% once a week. In Japan, the most popular activity by which people connect to Buddhist temples is visiting one’s ancestors’ grave, while a small percent of people are interested in religious teachings. Professor Tanaka reemphasized that religion in Japan is mainly of ancestor veneration and does not necessarily play the same role as in the United States.

Professor Tanaka concluded by discussing the Yasukuni Shrine, where the souls of war dead, especially of those who died in World War II, are enshrined. The Yasukuni Shrine has become controversial because of the visits of politicians to the shrine to pay their respects—which have not only caused controversy in its neighboring countries, such as China and Korea, but also given Japanese citizens an impression that the government favors one religion, Shinto. Professor Tanaka pointed out that while constitutionally there is a separation of church and state, religion plays a part in nationalism and patriotism in Japan, as is the case in other countries.

POINTS OF DISCUSSION

• How there is a complete freedom among Japanese in what religion they choose.
• Role of religiosity in the face of disasters.
• How Buddhism in the West is not a religion of belief but a religion of reawakening.
Ms. Sato Maho presented peacebuilding security issues as one of the program priorities of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF), a Japanese private foundation established in 1986. When she joined the foundation in 2008, she was appointed to design a program for peacebuilding. In 2009, she conducted a survey of former and ongoing conflict areas in Asia, including Mindanao, Aceh, Timor-Leste, southern Thailand, and Sri Lanka, in search of a niche area for the SPF to work on. She found out that not many donor organizations were working for southern Thailand, known as the Deep South, where violence that resulted from an ethnic dispute between the Siam state and Patani state from medieval times has intensified since 2004.

Ms. Sato then described the geographical and historical background of the Deep South—three southernmost provinces of Thailand: Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. This region is bordering Malaysia with a population of about 2 million, of which around 90% are Muslims. However, according to Ms. Sato, these people have different identities from Muslims in other parts of Thailand. While the Muslim people in Bangkok are mostly migrants from South Asia, the people in the Deep South consider themselves as descendants of the Malay Muslim kingdom called Patani Kingdom, which was prosperous during medieval times. Because of the historical relationship between Siam and Patani after 17th century, Patani became a semi-tributary state to Siam and finally was incorporated to modern Thailand at the beginning of 20th century.

Ms. Sato reported that the majority of Thai people are Buddhists and they comprise over 94% of the population, and while Muslims account for 4.6% of the population in Thailand, 75–80% of them are living in the Deep South. She emphasized that among 2 million people living in the Deep South, there are also Buddhists, and people lived harmoniously in the past. However, 200,000 Muslims fled to Malaysia as illegal migrants. In 2004, the resurgence of violence started in the Deep South, and especially the Krue-ze mosque incident and Tak Bai incident gained international attention. The martial law and executive decree that had been issued in the Deep South resulted in the security forces arresting local people without warrant and committing human rights abuses and tortures. After these two major incidents (Krue-ze mosque and Tak Bai), insurgency movement, which had been weak and disorganized, gained more support from the local population, and violence became more intensified. According to Deep South Watch, a local monitoring online media, more than 4,600 people have died since 2004. Due to the conflict situation, the GDP of this region is one-fifth of the national level.

Ms. Sato then talked about the nature of violence in the Deep South, including terrorist attacks by insurgency movements, flow of weapons by paramilitary, and criminalization of violence associated with drug deals and trafficking. Besides military and police, Buddhist schoolteachers are the target of violence, and more than 100 teachers have died since 2004. Ms. Sato noted that the conflict in the Deep South continues to be unsolved because the government in Bangkok does not have strong will to solve the issue and has little control over security forces in the country, and according to the local researchers, the palace, especially the Queen, has made the situation worse by expressing ethnocentric views and distributing arms to the Buddhist communities to protect them. Ms. Sato added that the problem with insurgency groups is the absence of a clear political agenda, and there is no coordination among the rebel groups themselves or with the local population in terms of their political demand. Moreover, the Thai government has done little to solve the conflict situation because of lack of international attention. Also, given the power dynamics of Malay Muslims at the regional level—how the Malay Muslims are the majority in Southeast Asia—the Thai government is unwilling to improve the situation in the Deep South.

Ms. Sato then discussed the political agenda of the Malay Muslims in the Deep South on the basis of the Deep South Watch surveys and series of forums conducted to collect the voices of local people. They demand recognition of their identity as Malay Patani and want their local language, Melayu, to be included in Thai
universal education. Furthermore, while local governors are more often appointed by the central government than elected, Muslims in the south demand the election system of local government to be strengthened. They also feel a need for an integration of the educational systems of public school, Islamic private school (which has originated from pondok but has accepted government funding to incorporate the secular education program), and pondok. The Malay Muslims also demand that the Islamic family and inheritance law be applied not only to the southern provinces, but also at the national level for those who marry Buddhists or for Muslims from other parts of the country. In addition, they seek truth and justice for the past human rights abuse cases in southern Thailand.

In conclusion, Ms. Sato explained three pillars of the SPF program: (1) the development of a “peace media network”; (2) the strengthening of the international network of Deep South civil society; and (3) the expansion of the support base outside the Deep South. Since civil society is still undeveloped in the Deep South, the SPF is currently working with Deep South Watch to develop a “peace media network” for the local media, and, as a result, they reached the conclusion that the problem in the Deep South is the lack of mechanism to represent local people’s voices. Thus, with key activists, they established a Deep South civil society council. Other initiatives by the SPF include the establishment of a peace journalism school, building a network of photojournalists, sending journalists and media practitioners from the Deep South to conferences outside the country, and sending interns from southern Thailand to an NGO in Mindanao (Initiative for International Dialogue) for them to have training in English and engage in skill building. In terms of the expansion of the support base outside the Deep South, a discussion program was held in July 2011 in Kyoto, where politicians, journalists, and religious leaders from the Deep South had the opportunity to meet with Bangkok-based media people and intellectuals for the purpose of capacity building. The SPF hopes that people in the Deep South will be able to bring their political agenda to the central government in the next few years. Moreover, the SPF is currently trying to organize more meetings to strengthen the network of Deep South opinion leaders with intellectuals or politicians in Bangkok so that they can prepare a better environment to start peace talks in the near future.

POINTS OF DISCUSSION

- How the impact of peace media network has ignited the international media to follow the southern Thailand’s conflict. Besides media, dialogue among the academicians, historians, and intellectuals of peace studies at universities in Thailand is also possible.
- How southern Thailand needs a mechanism to govern itself and to determine whether autonomy or decentralization is appropriate for them.
Mr. Suzuki Tatsujiro presented facts of what happened in the Fukushima nuclear accident following the March 11 earthquake and tsunami and what the current status and major issues are. The Fukushima accident is an unprecedented accident in history with three core meltdowns in one site and four possible hydrogen explosions caused by external natural hazards combined with human factors. More than 80,000 to 100,000 of those who have been forced to evacuate are still unable to return to their homes. Securing safety as well as maintaining welfare of those people is one of the challenging tasks and priorities. The site is still in the phase of decommissioning and clearing up so people can go back; however, this will take at least 10 years or probably even more. Another big challenge is how to make a plan and finance all the operations necessary to finish decommissioning and decontamination.

In terms of the energy policy after the accident, Mr. Suzuki explained that the first thing that needed to be done was to secure the safety of existing nuclear power plants. There are 54 nuclear power plants in Japan, and as of October 2011, only 11 of them are operating. The remaining 43 power plants are shut down either because of the tsunami or for maintenance, and it is difficult to restart them since the public is concerned about the safety. As far as the short-term energy policy is concerned, all nuclear power plants in Japan will be shut by April or May next year. Also, there are 430 nuclear reactors operating around the world, and people outside Japan want to know what happened to Fukushima and make sure that their plants are safe. Mr. Suzuki said that it is the responsibility of Japan to share the information about the accident with the public and the rest of the world.

In the longer term, the government decided to reduce Japan’s dependence on nuclear power. Before March 11, Japan was expanding its nuclear power program. The plan was to build 14 more reactors, and the nuclear power share was supposed to reach 50% of total electricity generated by 2030. However, given the impact of the accident and the government decision to reduce the country’s dependence on nuclear power after March 11, Japan now has to find alternative energy sources. According to Mr. Suzuki, the most significant impact of the accident, besides technical challenges, is the public—how the public trust was lost. It is now difficult to resume operations at nuclear facilities with the consent of the local public. Globally speaking, one big issue to be concerned about is nuclear terrorism surrounding nuclear power plants in Fukushima, since it has become relatively easy for terrorists to get information of the site, including detailed layout of the power plants. Another thing Mr. Suzuki mentioned as a long-term project and a top priority for Japanese government was the reconstruction of Fukushima. After referring to how Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the victims of nuclear bombs, have become the symbols of peace, he said that the same thing could be achieved for Fukushima. If Fukushima can recover from this nuclear disaster, then the voices of the citizens will have a big implication for the future of nuclear energy. The reconstruction and recreation of Fukushima can also be a symbol of such efforts.

After sharing the above messages with the fellows, Mr. Suzuki explained the roles of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) and its purpose, and further talked about the nuclear accident in Fukushima in detail from various perspectives. He first explained exactly how the accident happened on March 11 and the consequences that followed, and presented some of the problems regarding the way in which the government responded to the accident and handled the information that was available then to protect the people in the affected area. Mr. Suzuki also touched on the issues regarding the radioactive waste and contaminated seawater, as well as on the problem of compensation, as to who should be paid by whom, and the role of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its advice to Japan. Moreover, Mr. Suzuki covered the problem of Japan’s nuclear safety regulatory agency not being independent from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which has been promoting nuclear power, and why the public trust was lost after the accident. Now, there is a need to create a new, independent nuclear safety regulatory agency, which the public can trust.
Lastly, Mr. Suzuki briefly talked about how local governors have different positions concerning the restart of the nuclear power plants they have in their prefectures. However, who is going to judge the safety of nuclear power plants is the problem Japan currently faces, since the public does not trust the nuclear safety regulatory agency or the new safety standards that are being prepared by the existing nuclear safety commission. Based on public opinion polls conducted by media in May 2011, the majority is in favor of phasing out nuclear power. Yet, according to Mr. Suzuki, complete removal would be difficult; it will most likely be a gradual “phase out.” What is clear now is that there will be no more expansion of nuclear power plants. Mr. Suzuki closed his presentation with the message “Fukushima should become a symbol of recovery from nuclear accident.”

POINTS OF DISCUSSION

- Japan’s plan to increase the use of renewable resources to reduce its dependence on nuclear power. These energy sources may include coal, natural gas, wind, and sun.
- How energy demand in Japan was already reaching its peak before March 11. Although electricity demand may still grow until around 2020, there will not be a crisis as far as Japanese energy situation is concerned, and 20% energy cut is not unachievable, given that the Japanese population is not increasing anymore.
- The need to have an accurate contamination map so that the government and people all know the contamination level in each area and can discuss what needs to be done. However, even if some areas are less contaminated and safer than the others within the same village, without the reestablishment of social infrastructure, people will not be able to come back and live a normal life in the long run.
My Experience in NGO Management:
Pitfalls, Tips, Lessons, and Implications for Asia

ELMER SAYRE
ALFP 2011 Fellow

Elmer Sayre shared his experience of managing NGOs in the Philippines and talked about what other Asian countries, particularly countries with the same situation as the Philippines’, could learn from them. NGOs in the Philippines have several meanings. They can be civil society organizations or grassroots NGOs. There are also political NGOs organized by politicians, and congressmen have their own NGOs based on the funds allocated for development and projects of their own. Their NGOs are called CONGO, and according to Sayre, CONGO destroys the image of good NGOs in the Philippines. Moreover, there are international NGOs (INGOs), such as Oxfam and Red Cross, which are mostly based in Manila.

Based on his 30-year experience in NGOs, particularly in the small grassroots NGO he is familiar with, Sayre described the challenges in starting and sustaining an NGO. These challenges include recruiting and maintaining good staff members, funding, deciding on which programs to implement, making local and international partnerships, developing good projects and proposals, and having best strategies. The culture of an NGO or its working mechanism is another thing that is significant. Sayre also talked about the importance of development of human resources, as well as of cash flow management in order to sustain NGOs; without leaders to lead and trained personnel to take over the leadership position when necessary, NGOs cannot continue functioning. Sayre believes that organizing a small, functioning NGO is the same as organizing a big company, given the types of issues faced by both NGOs and enterprises.

Sayre then talked about two management styles: traditional and adaptive. The traditional management style is written and can be learned from books, while the adaptive management style includes the use of technologies such as cell phones and social networking services, including Skype and Facebook, to give advice and communicate with one another in real time. Sayre also shared two paradigms for social development of NGOs: (1) crying effect and (2) best practices. Crying effect stimulates sympathy for the poor, malnourished, or dying, whereas best practices are found by taking pride in one’s work. Sayre stressed that combining these two is possible, yet, he leans more on the latter paradigm while he receives support from agencies and partners that are also proud of the good work and accomplishments of his NGO.

Sayre next discussed the sources of funding. These include donors, competitions, endowments, the government, individuals, special events, business, consultancy, and trust funds. According to Sayre, donors in the Philippines are dwindling, and countries in Africa, Somalia for instance, have a better chance of receiving funds than the Philippines because of its greenery environment, which could make the Philippines look less in need of aid. However, since the Philippines has little endowment available, entering competitions is one way to get funds. In fact, Sayre’s work on ecological sanitation received recognition and won an award from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Sayre said that while fund-raising endeavors may be made, given that NGOs are supposed to be nonprofit, questions occasionally emerge on how funds are generated. Sayre also shared information on some of the funding organizations, such as United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and GlobalGiving, that he has found useful.

Sayre then talked about how to write grant proposals. One thing he emphasized was how the writer or the proposer should try to keep them short and simple, as people do not have the time to read long proposals. More specifically, he said that, like an elevator pitch, one should be able to summarize in two paragraphs or within one minute what he or she is doing, why he or she is qualified to do it, and what his or her metrics, evaluation, and outputs are, and one should practice to be able to do so in both writing and speaking. Likewise, proposals need to be one page long unless the funders require more information. It is also important to make one’s ideas clear, as well as to update the use of current language or terminologies.
Lastly, Sayre talked about his approach to sustainability and explained how Water, Agroforestry, Nutrition and Development (WAND) Foundation, which he heads, functions and generates funds to sustain its activities and other smaller organizations. Based on data over the past years, Sayre said that a small NGO can survive with 600,000 yen through micro-financing services, such as building toilets, cultivating small animals and vegetables, making handicrafts, etc. Currently, WAND has small NGOs with compact management styles and operations in three provinces. Sayre also talked about the composition of staffs, including the so-called core, second-liners, and multipliers, and the importance of selecting good staffs, given the limited number of posts available. All staffs are expected to work hard and to be trained in agriculture, leadership, community development, and so forth. So far, Sayre’s NGO has sent its staffs to Canada, Puerto Rico, or the United States for training, and plans to send some local people abroad as well in the future. WAND’s innovative ideas include farming coffee and malunggay or moringa, as well as producing a movable dry toilet system, which has won a technology award in Silicon Valley for using local resources to develop a low-cost composting toilet for communities without such basic needs. In conclusion, Sayre indicated the importance of having spiritual strength in order to keep going and closed his presentation by his favorite word from the Bible: “love all, serve all.”

**POINTS OF DISCUSSION**

- The utilization of media to broadcast NGOs’ ongoing projects and achievements and to show their legitimacy to others.
- Current situation and problems of NGOs in the Philippines with regard to NGO registration, proposal writing, securing of financing, sustaining projects, and training second-liners to delegate and empower other people.
Ten Years after 9/11: What Have We Gained and What Have We Lost?

ISEZAKI KENJI
Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

With Professor Isezaki Kenji’s extensive experience in disarmament and conflict resolution, he affirmed that we lost and we are losing in the war against terror. He said that from his experience, he will describe where the current situation is leading.

Afghanistan is a landlocked country; therefore, logistical support is mostly done by road through Pakistan, which makes it strategically important for the United States. Civil wars in Afghanistan were neither ethnic nor religious, which means the Taliban were not the instigators of these wars, since the Taliban are a religious group with dreams to make Afghanistan a purely Islamic nation. The war in Afghanistan is mainly a warlords’ war. Warlords, unlike the Taliban, are not religious, but they are basically politicians or similar to mafias. They were temporarily united because they found a common enemy, first the Soviet Union, and this anti-sentiment turned into a global jihad. After that, there was a civil war, and during this turmoil, the Taliban movement occurred. Ordinary citizens who were tired of warlords’ civil war and corruption in the government supported the Taliban in the beginning. That is the reason why the Taliban became stronger and also because they controlled the opium poppy production, which was a big source of income for the country. The Taliban, though they were not democratic and used fear to control, had more governing skills than warlords.

The U.S. military cannot retaliate against Al Qaeda since it is a criminal organization, so they found an excuse to go to war by going against the Taliban regime. The War on Terror by the United States was made on one assumption: the Taliban and Al Qaeda, though they were allies before, could be separated, since their interests were different. Al Qaeda is fighting for global jihad but the Taliban’s interests are confined within Afghanistan and their interests are different. But when Osama bin Laden was killed, the two became more connected.

Practitioners view that the killing of top leaders does not weaken their organization but creates more problems and confusion in the chain of command in a terrorist organization, consequently narrowing chances for future political negotiations. In summary, the Taliban hosting Al Qaeda was controlling Afghanistan, 9/11 happened, and then the United Islamic Front known as the Northern Alliance, the United States, and the United Kingdom fought against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, so they had to escape to the borders of Pakistan. After this, it was supposed to be the beginning of the reconstruction of Afghanistan, but civil war started again in Afghanistan.

After ousting the Taliban, there was an interim government made in Bonn, Germany. This Bonn process could not be called a peace accord because the losers were not included. It would have been better to have included the Taliban in this process because now they were gaining power.

At that time, Japan’s government was under the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) headed by Prime Minister Koizumi. Professor Isezaki was asked by his government to go to Afghanistan to lead the Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process and investigate if Afghanistan could secure loan from Japan for a 5-year development plan, which was disapproved.

Professor Isezaki, leading the DDR’s disarmament campaign, was aware that the Northern Alliance’s total forces would be numbering from 50,000 to 60,000; however, during the eight months between the Taliban defeat and disarmament, the Northern Alliance troops increased from 50,000 to 250,000. In the end, the forces did not exceed beyond 60,000, which means that the Northern Alliance was trying to make a bargain about dismantling their weapons. The Afghans were favorable to Japanese and listened to what the Japanese said, and DDR was able to disarm 98% of heavy weapons, which was their main target. After this, they were able to hold a general election in 2004.

However, there was a big problem that Professor Isezaki and the warlords worried about and that came true. After the Northern Alliance was dismantled, the Taliban regime came back, and the main reason for that was that DDR did not make alternative measures to bridge the security gap or power vacuum created by
disarmament. If it was the UN, they would send a peacekeeping force. But here UN presence was very small. The only way to deal with this power vacuum was to have NATO to extend its troops beyond Kabul and ask the United States to bomb, which the United States refused. The only option left was to have a good army in place, but to train a new country’s army and police quickly was extremely difficult. Because of this, Professor Isezaki wanted to disarm the soldiers slowly, but that was not possible because they had to hold a general election quickly. If they delayed the disarmament, the election would also be delayed automatically, which was opposed by the United States because they also had their own presidential election. The United States tried to mass-produce the police force to pave the way for elections and gain the international community’s support, enforcing safety for the ballot boxes, though the DDR group had only just started disarmament. Currently, it is said that the Taliban controls 80% of Afghanistan. From the military point of view, Taliban is not so strong because they only have small weapons, but they are in the hearts and minds of the people. Only the DDR was completed but we re-invited the Taliban into power, so it was a failure.

After ten years, generation in power has changed in Afghanistan. The Taliban now is more difficult to deal with. The old Talibanis were all educated and had much exposure to the outside world, but now the younger generation only knows how to fight and are only educated in their fundamental concept. So if war is further prolonged, it is going to be more complicated. Although most Americans opposed it, President Obama sent more U.S. troops when he assumed office, as an opportunity to symbolize withdrawal of U.S. troops and for political gain. However, sending additional troops did not raise the voting rate in the second election in Afghanistan. The Taliban has a longer perspective and interest to stay in Afghanistan, so it is difficult to defeat them.

A few months ago, President Karzai realized that they cannot sustain U.S. troops and the Obama administration started reconciliation talks with the Taliban, and not Al Qaeda. But this was actually done by Mr. Karzai before that. With a policy shared with the Obama administration, the Taliban was categorically divided into two categories: foot soldiers and higher cadres and commanders. Foot soldiers will be given individual package, and higher cadres and commanders be given political reconsiderations. The problem is nobody will reconcile in the higher cadres, only just local command officers if we give money to them. But the real hard-core Taliban will not. So without political reconciliation, what is left for the international community and Karzai government is just to deal with foot soldiers, and they even asked the Japanese government to donate funds for that. But only dealing with foot soldiers means that they will pretend that they have reconciled but they will go back to being soldiers later, which means all the money will end up back with the insurgency.

When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power in 2009, Professor Isezaki was requested by DPJ to undertake something different from LDP so that the United States would recognize Japan as an equal power. However, Professor Isezaki believes that while political reconciliation can be done, political settlement sometimes cannot be achieved. Though in the name of peace, cease-fire does not do good for everyone. Political reconciliation does not always bring good results, and the Taliban has a different idea of human rights; this makes reconciliation more difficult. If reconciliation is used for political purposes like the United States did for their election, it may give more power to the enemy. This is the reality and dilemma of war and reconciliation. And bottom-up reconciliation will only benefit terrorist insurgency.

Finally, Professor Isezaki emphasized that Pakistan should not be considered as a problem for terrorist area and Afghanistan should be dealt with care and not be isolated.

POINTS OF DISCUSSION

- Nothing has moved forward between 2004 and 2011 and is going back to the same situation as before because the former warlords have become leaders and have armies themselves, thereby operating with the Taliban. It is unimaginable to pursue reconciliation while having the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
- Reconciliation between Afghanistan and the Taliban is possible but whether the Taliban considers Afghanistan as counterpart for negotiation is questionable.
- DDR was established in haste for the election in 2004.
- Professor Isezaki is looking at Kashmir, India, as a “global war antenna,” which somehow resonates to conditions in Afghanistan and Pakistan, so he is establishing and extending his academic network there.
Miryam Nainggolan, who is the current chairperson of the Pulih (means “recover” in Indonesian) Foundation, presented their post-disaster projects. As a nonprofit organization established on June 4, 2002, and recognized for dealing with psychosocial issues in Indonesia, the Pulih Foundation has two offices in Jakarta and Banda Aceh, which opened right after the tsunami in December 2004. Its mission is to empower groups, families, and communities that are victims of conflicts and disasters to live productive and meaningful lives. Some programs and services include clinics, and the organization’s psychological approach is to serve people with very minimum charge and some fully without charge, thereby helping the community, particularly women and children who are victims of domestic violence. Moreover, assistance of psychological experts is available in court in the form of “affidavit” (expert witness written testimony) for women and victims of domestic violence. Likewise, the organization promotes psychosocial empowerment and recovery of community from conflicts and disasters. They also have programs for survivors of torture and victims of terrorist bombings, as well as a program called “Care for Caregivers” for humanitarian workers and human right defenders who occasionally experience burnout from work. They promote advocacy and networking through publications, website, newsletter, social network, as well as distribution of psychoeducational models and instruments for emergency response and psychological first aid for the victims.

One program that the Pulih Foundation did recently was community-based psychosocial activities in West Sumatra. Due to the massive earthquake of magnitude 7.6 that struck West Sumatra on September 30, 2009, the Pulih Foundation, in cooperation with JICA, launched a community-based psychosocial recovery and capacity-building project for children and youth at the Sungai Geringging south district in Pariaman in January 2010. The severe impact of damage and sense of loss deeply affected the children, who now feared that another big earthquake might hit, and the elderly, who felt guilty and disheartened to accept the reality. Thus, they needed help to regain confidence and security and overcome their fear and anxiety. The project’s intervention was not through individual counseling but a more viable community-based approach that would involve and empower the whole community. Activities and programs were developed for children to enjoy and benefit from, while involving adults, parents, teachers, and key stakeholders to normalize children’s behavior in the post-disaster area. In addition, the intervention was targeted to build disaster-resilient communities among children, adults, and the elderly. They lived normally but some manifestations in their behavior needed help. The project’s goal was to strengthen individual family groups, with priority in community participation and community resilience. The objective was the recovery process for the children’s post-disaster psychosocial well-being and, through modules and structured group activities, to restore and enhance their feelings of trust, security, and comfort, thereby ensuring the sustainability of community activities. The Pulih Foundation’s evaluation of the development of post-disaster lessons learned and best practice on psychosocial assistance for children was significant to the organization, because they had already worked with other communities, and hence documenting each program was facilitated. During the program, psychoeducational materials, leaflets, and brochures related to the situation in the area were developed. One of the outputs was enabling the community with the organization’s staff to plan children’s activities for their psychosocial recovery. The youth successfully developed their ideas, wrote scripts, and made audiovisual presentations, such as a short film about the community’s traditions, customs, and wisdom that reflected their attitude and behavior in anticipating disaster in earthquake-prone West Sumatra.

Before the activities, the organization first selected and trained a group of people from the community, referred to as cadres, who would later on serve as partners for capacity building to continue the children’s psychosocial activities. After the earthquake, many children showed sadness, anger, fear, and anxiety through...
their behaviors and did not want to go out and play because they became afraid of wind and other things that would remind them of the earthquake and preferred to stay indoors. Psychologists claimed that psychological structured activities in the form of recreational activities, such as games, painting, drawing, and socio-drama, as well as religion-based exercises could help the children regain their confidence and happiness. Adults conducted psychoeducation through community organization and activities. The programs ended in December 2010 and were followed by program evaluation, identifying lessons learned, report writing, and documenting the audiovisuals that targeted on children, parents, community leaders, and members.

POINTS OF DISCUSSION

- The video was disseminated not only in the community but also in Jakarta. The participants were very excited and happy to see the program. Furthermore, sharing this through networking is to impart knowledge to other organizations dealing with psychosocial programs.
- The Pulih Foundation cooperated with the District Department of Education, JICA, and the head of the south district to get permission to work in the area.
- Through focus group discussions, the Pulih Foundation was able to identify the behavior and emotional conditions of the community. Although their program was only until December 2010, they hope that the community would continue the activities even without the foundation.
- Providing a learning space for children would be the best entry point where the Pulih Foundation’s staff and cadres are also present. If certain activities like singing and playing games were found enjoyable for the children, these could be included in their routine. The foundation’s project staff lived in the community for the duration of the program.
- The Pulih Foundation’s approach is not experimental but relies more on evaluation based on their objectives and behavioral criteria. Even though not all of the outputs were achieved, it would take some time to see the results.
- Although there are national agencies for disaster and Ministry of Health for medical assistance and emergency aid, there is a lack of psychological support for victims of disaster in Indonesia.
Introduction to *Manga*-Anime Studies

**SHIRAISHI SAYA**

*Professor, University of Tokyo*

Professor Shiraishi Saya began her presentation by briefly introducing various styles of comics in the world, such as American comics and French *bande dessinée*, and quoted Scott McCloud’s definition of comics. According to McCloud, comics are “juxtaposed pictorial and other images in deliberate sequence, intended to convey information and/or to produce an aesthetic response in the viewer.” Professor Shiraishi, however, claimed that she differentiates comics from the post-World War II Japanese comics (which she calls *manga*), particularly the style of comics called “story *manga*,” which has had a great impact on the development of comics among all different styles of comics that exist in Japan today. Professor Shiraishi defined this “story *manga*” as “a style of visual narration, in which the picture has taken the central position.” She added that “the pictures no longer simply illustrate the voices or language that were the primary storytellers before. In *manga*, the pictures tell the story.” She further explained that picture and voice may contradict each other, or voice may illustrate the picture that tells the story. In addition, while the language does not necessarily need to tell the story, it can play with the picture.

After explaining how *manga* was a new narrative style evolved from comics, Professor Shiraishi talked about the history of *manga*. She stated that *manga* was a postwar innovation made and developed by the young postwar generation in Japan who witnessed the massive destruction of their homes, buildings, and cities by America’s bombings and experienced loss of families, friends, and neighbors during the war. Accordingly, *manga* grew out of Japan’s devastated land, which became a liberating space for postwar Japanese literature, especially for the visual narratives. In this space, the old structure of authority, moral values, and beliefs were destroyed, and without a strict censorship that used to exist before and during the war, one could see the so-called original experiences and pictures in postwar *manga*. The sight of devastation became a proof and a sign of Japanese failure and defeat.

Professor Shiraishi then discussed how essential *manga* literacy is for the readers to understand *manga*, especially when it is read abroad. Without *manga* literacy, the readers may not be able to follow the story in sequence, as there are diverse approaches to the frames in which the story unfolds, or they may not understand each context that can be direct or indirect. Furthermore, since postwar Japanese *manga* is still a new medium, *manga* artists continue to experiment different methods to make frames in each page, express the passing of time, depict characters’ psychology or inner thoughts, and so forth.

According to Professor Shiraishi, *manga*-anime industry in Japan can be divided into three stages: (1) *manga* magazines; (2) *manga* series published in book form; and (3) serialized TV animation. *Manga* magazines serialize more than twenty stories of *manga* and are sold weekly, monthly, and in many other kinds to a wide target market ranging from children to adults. They serve as a base of the entire *manga* industry, as magazines are where the first work of any *manga* artist would appear for the public to read. After a *manga* becomes popular for three consecutive months in *manga* magazines, the publishers start publishing the *manga* in book form called *tan-ko-bon* (independent comic book). If, on the other hand, a *manga* turns out to be unpopular, then the publishers would conclude the series at the end of three months. Top ten magazines sell more than one million every week, and competitions are severe. Serialized TV animation is then created from among popular *manga* series.

However, when Japanese *manga*-anime goes abroad, it is in the form of TV animation that foreign audiences are first introduced to the story. After they become familiar with the TV animation, the *manga* (based on which the TV animation was created) will be translated and become available in comic books. And through this process of watching TV animation and then reading the translated comic books after they have become familiar with the story, the foreign audiences acquire *manga* literacy, which enables them to read other *manga* as well. In such a context, TV animation is more important than theater animation because the former is more likely
to become a habit. Professor Shiraishi said that in order for manga and anime to go overseas, especially in Asia, new urban affluent middle-class families who have TV sets were the key; without TV sets, people would have little chance to watch TV animation, and this would then reduce the chance of comic books getting published. Today, with the advancement of the Internet, more people have access to animation. After manga-anime was globalized and accepted as a popular culture outside Japan, the Japanese government recognized its significance and began to internationalize it as Japan’s soft power.

Professor Shiraishi ended her presentation by showing clips of postwar Japanese animation films, including Mighty Atom, Sailor Moon, Doraemon, Grave of the Fireflies, Mobile Suit Gundam, Akira, and My Neighbor Totoro, and briefly explained what is depicted in each film and the messages that the creators might have intended to convey through their works. She stressed that although manga and anime creators do not fully claim that their works are social reflections, the Japanese have appreciated and have grown with this popular culture, which may have subconsciously served as a coping mechanism for people’s self-healing process, not only in the postwar era, but also in the post-disaster periods.
The Af-Pak Region: Why Is It Complicated?

IMTIAZ GUL
ALFP 2011 Fellow

Imtiaz Gul commenced his lecture by asking students of Waseda University what they knew about Pakistan. Then he stated basic facts and geography of Afghanistan and Pakistan, followed by questions why these locations hold a dangerous impression. Afghanistan, which is landlocked, is where the bases for the Taliban regime and Al Qaeda led by Osama Bin Laden, who planned the 9/11 attacks, were posted. Then Afghanistan was targeted in October 2001, forcing Al Qaeda to move into the border area of Pakistan territory for shelter. Consequently, Americans demanded Pakistan to move against this group, which had begun attacking the Pakistani police and army too.

What is the outcome of this to Pakistan? This is the Afghan–Pakistani border, where around 75% of cargoes of food, medicine, and ammunition for the foreign troops in Afghanistan pass through. Militant groups and terrorists groups are against this cargo going through Pakistan, so they sometimes hijack these containers and put them on fire. As a result, there is a lot of political instability and political insecurity in Pakistan. Hence, Pakistan is also considered a dangerous country at present.

This complicated picture seems to be the issue. It is generally felt (in Europe and the Americas) that Pakistan is not doing enough. The U.S. government and the U.S. media complain of Pakistan playing a double game. There are people and groups in this region that are getting support from Pakistan military or Pakistan intelligence, which is deemed partially true because the troops operating there have friends and relatives in this side of the border.

These troops are likewise fighting in Kashmir, which is the core source of dispute between India and Pakistan. Some of the groups fighting against foreign troops in Afghanistan are also fighting in the Indian part of Kashmir. India rules about two-thirds of that state. The Indian government wants Pakistan to stop supporting groups training in this border region because these groups come to the Indian Kashmir attacking police and military. Pakistan has a double problem: conflict with Afghanistan and the United States because of the troops operating and training in the border region. Pakistan has a problem with India because of the attacks on the Indian army police in Kashmir.

Pakistan also has a good relationship with China. The Chinese view this region as an energy corridor with the Indian Ocean located further down and the Gulf area rich in oil. Basically, China wants to operate here given these resources, while Americans are also interested in this port, from where they can easily monitor Iran.

U.S. forces number almost 90,000 in Afghanistan. Now, coincidentally, Washington has a conflict with Iran (over the nuclear issue), which is friendly with Pakistan. Iran, like Pakistan, has nuclear weapons. It is sandwiched between conflicting interests of different countries. Gul thinks it is difficult to sort out problems inside the country due to external geopolitical factors.

Pakistan is confronted with conflicting opposing interests of Iran, the United States, and China. The United States considers China as a strategic competitor. While China and Iran are neighbors of Pakistan, the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan is still to be resolved. The United Nations has resolutions from 1948 to 1949, including an order for a referendum in Kashmir to enable Muslims of Kashmir to decide if they want to be a part of India or Pakistan. This outstanding issue has also caused three wars between the two.

Pakistan army intelligence and government are concerned about growing India-Afghanistan cooperation since Pakistan is in conflict with India. India is now training Afghan police for special police intelligence services. In two years, the United States and other countries like Italy and Germany will hand over training of the Afghan army to India, which could pose a problem in Pakistan. In addition, India is investing in $2 billion worth of 6–7-year infrastructure projects like hospitals, institutions, schools, and roads. As a result, Pakistan is also interested in training Afghan soldiers.
Before 9/11, Pakistan never had army deployed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) regions, but currently it has 150,000 army troops. It appears that once the Americans leave, Pakistan will also pull out its troops. Thus, keeping these troops on the western border has become a financial burden for a poor country like Pakistan. Pakistanis want to become a part of the training of the Afghan army, which has become a conflicting interest.

Predominance of the security establishment in political governance is another problem for Pakistan. Pakistanis, however, hope that in the coming years, the civilian government will have more clarity and control over the foreign policy, so that they can improve their relations with Afghanistan and India. Gul assumes that the civilian government has control over the foreign policy and hopes that relationship with the United States will also improve.

Other than these external problems, there is also an internal problem: the religious militant groups, which the army establishment used in the past, were supported in Kashmir and in Afghanistan, and have now grown in numbers and their followers. Theoretically, more than a million, who are probably hard-core militants, are now affiliated with or inspired by Al Qaeda. They are against the state of Pakistan since they are believers of the Al Qaeda ideology. Moreover, Al Qaeda and its local supporter groups believe the United States is even supporting Israel. They believe that any country supporting the United States is also not neutral. Thus, Pakistani militant groups recognize that the Pakistan government and army are also not neutral, resulting in many attacks in the last 10 years on the army, police, women, and children, in markets and schools all over Pakistan. They are attacking the interests of Pakistan so that these militant groups with interests of Al Qaeda are tracking Pakistan wherever possible. Gul realizes that this is a challenge for Pakistan—the internal enemy. Pakistanis would like civil society members to support the Pakistan government to deal with this internal issue—focusing more on the economy, just like what Japan did after World War II. This is what Gul also wants for his own country.

POINTS OF DISCUSSION

- Foreign policy-making must be within the civilian sector. Gul asserts that the quest for and the growing need for energy basically will force these countries to solve political conflicts and forge an alliance that will help import gas from Central Asia.
- People of Pakistan cannot wish the military away. However, international circumstances have forced the military to be on the defensive in issues such as Osama Bin Laden’s assassination. Gul hopes that the military will stay in the background and accord more space to the civilians.
- Legal needs are important to make the northwestern areas called FATA a part of Pakistan in order to track down illegal groups, and the military has to decide that Pakistan will not defend or protect non-state activities any more.
- Fighting U.S. information machinery is difficult for the image control of Muslims.
Retreat
A weekend retreat was organized in Atami, Kanagawa, at the beginning of the program to highlight the Fellows’ current research interests. They exchanged views among themselves and with several intellectuals who are based in Japan.

SPECIAL SESSION:

Evolution of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Hasegawa Sukehiro
Professor, Hosei University
UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Timor-Leste (2004–2006)

First, Professor Hasegawa Sukehiro pointed out that immediately after a conflict a “primordial leadership” is needed: a leader who can incorporate universal norms and standards but into the local context and digest it in a pragmatic way. He defined peacekeeping as an operation aimed at maintaining peace and stability. It is in the form of a third-party intervention designed to sustain a cease-fire accord or a peace agreement reached by parties in conflict. A peacekeeping mission is there merely to manifest presence without being active. Peacebuilding, on the other hand, is an operation aimed at preventing any post-conflict or conflict-prone countries from relapsing into conflict, by resolving root causes of conflict that are political, economical, social, and cultural.

The United Nations Security Council is recognized as a mediator between states and authorizes peacekeeping operations that have several phases. The first generation peacekeeping observes three basic principles resulting from operations during the Cold War: consent of parties in conflict, impartiality of the interveners, and minimum use of force only for self-defense. Furthermore, the consent of the Security Council relies on credibility, competency, and legitimacy. The second generation peacekeeping consequently has missions that require “humane, but more proactive, concept of operations,” meaning they must be ready to respond to force when necessary but only minimally to control the situation. The third generation peacekeeping involves a growing number of peacekeeping operations that started undertaking multidimensional tasks along with changes taking place in the aspects of peace and security. There is a Responsibility to Protect (RTP) within the international community. The fourth generation peacekeeping operations are characterized as peace enforcement operations, wherein peacekeepers are often given the ability to use armed force in the protection of civilian populations. In addition, the fourth generation peacekeeping operations may take on state-building or capacity-building initiatives. However, because of the complex operational requirements, they often rely on tens of thousands of military troops and civilian administrators. Furthermore, sustainable capacity-building most likely require tremendous amounts of time and money.

During the round table discussion, the Fellows raised thought-provoking questions. Professor Hasegawa believed that a global matter of concern, such as the Fukushima accident, should be made a global crisis. He said that people should not take the task onto themselves but should share with others for everyone to live in harmony. Both justice and truth, according to him, contribute to peace and reconciliation. What happened in the past—the war—should not be repeated and nations should just move forward.
Pakistan: A State Mired in Multiple Crises

Intiaz Gul (Pakistan)

Intiaz Gul commenced his report by presenting Pakistan’s geography, basic facts, and its multiple crises. The crisis of (in)security consists of the attacks on mosques, schools, shrines, and the security forces, and the targeting of prominent personalities because of the 115 major military operations, 300 suicide bombings, the loss of 3,800 army personnel, CIA attacks, and the close to 300 terrorist attacks as reaction to the Al-Qaeda–Taliban issue. The crisis of governance includes Pakistan’s railways and airlines, the sloppiness of the state’s preparedness for natural crises, lack of tactics and intensity of its response to security crises, and the top-heavy government’s multi-party alliance. The crisis of the economy has cumulative losses of up to $67.93 billion since 2001 that consequently removed Pakistan from the list of best countries for doing business and resulted in the slowdown of the tourism industry. The country’s economic stagnation also made its foreign investment to GDP ratio drop to some 13%.

Although Pakistan has been considered the epicenter of terror and the most dangerous country due to its multiple crises, Gul sees a light at the end of the tunnel. He recommended an improvement of government through grand political consensus, including a legal and corrective constitution, against a takeover by the army. An independent judiciary system along with independent private media is necessary. He said nobody talks about corruption in Pakistan even though he thinks corruption is a part of life and the certainty of punishment is missing. One dilemma for Pakistanis, according to Gul, is the buzz about corruption without reference to names. Pakistan’s politics is dysfunctional due to corruption, inefficient capabilities, and lack of motivation. He suggested a radicalization of thought through education to spur further intellectual interventions.

Assistance for the Enhancement of Local Capacity:
Challenges of Working with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

Imai Chihiro (Japan)

Imai Chihiro discussed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) as a new form of Peace Keeping Operation (PKO) established in November 2002 to provide reconstruction assistance in response to Afghanistan’s unique security situation. As of June 2011, 28 PRTs have been deployed. She mentioned that the key concept of PRT initiatives is to forge a partnership between civilian personnel responsible for governance and development, and military personnel in charge of security.

Imai described how she became interested in PRTs when she was working for the mission of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan. She conducted a comparative research through a series of interviews and discovered similar and varied perspectives on PRTs. Based on her research, PRT leads nations that have the need for clear Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) guidelines, PRT exit strategy, assistance corresponding to the local capacity, strategic integration with national development plan, and efficiency of PRTs’ civilian component. She further explained PRT activities focusing on security, reconstruction and development, and confidence building. This is how she described Ghor Province, which is recognized as a “forgotten province” in Afghanistan, since the government has never paid attention to this area, making it one of the poorest provinces. Imai mentioned the Japanese Civilian Office’s approaches as follows: to respect the initiative and ownership of the provincial government and local people; to coordinate with the civilian section of other countries and PRTs’ CIMIC section for the effective implementation of reconstruction and development projects; to maintain neutrality, impartiality, and transparency in the process of project formulation; and to take a practical approach for a quick and visible response to the community.

With donations, efforts, and support from donor countries, the global community has been criticized for failing to stabilize Afghanistan’s politics and economy through security and humanitarian assistance. Imai realized that the coordination mechanism should improve through joint assessments, sharing objectives, providing resources, information sharing, and decision making among central, provincial, and district levels. And by discussions with the Fellows, Imai hopes to learn what kind of role the donor community can play for the local post-conflict government to enhance their own administration.
**Sri Lanka's Challenge: Achieving Reconciliation after War**

Jehan Perera (Sri Lanka)

Jehan Perera stated that the peace that has been achieved in Sri Lanka is negative peace from his perspective, since it only means there is an absence of war. But the peace he thinks his country needs is more than that, and must also include truth, justice, and reconciliation.

He said that one bearing factor to the conflict in Sri Lanka is the population of about 20 million, of whom 75% are Sinhalese, and 25% are Tamils and Muslims. Moreover, 70% of the population is Buddhist, and all Buddhists are Sinhalese, 14% are Hindus and are Tamils, 9% are Muslims who consider themselves as a separate group, while 7% are Christians divided among the Sinhalese and the Tamils. This population composition creates a problem of the ethnic majority being able to dominate the minorities.

Another important factor for Sri Lanka is its geographical location. Sri Lanka gets a large part of the Indian Ocean and this serves as a security threat to India. Sri Lanka, therefore, interferes with India’s dominance of the bottom part of the Indian Ocean. Also, Sri Lanka may lend one of its ports to countries, such as the United States and China, and this becomes strategically significant.

Sri Lanka is close to India with a historical memory. Tamils live in the northern part, which is close to India, and there are many Tamils living in the southern part of India, which becomes a perceived threat to the Sinhalese. Though the Sinhalese are a majority in the island of Sri Lanka, they will be minorities in South Asia when the Indian Tamils are put together with the Sri Lankan Tamils. The Sinhalese are a majority with a minority complex, which blocks the Sinhalese-led government from being generous to the Tamils even after the war.

How do you find a solution in these cases? Maybe through economic development if that will make the minorities less concerned about their rights? Sri Lankans also remember the history of colonialism. The British favored the Tamils and did the “divide and rule campaign” and the Western powers could be seen as still doing the same by bringing in “human rights.” This is the mindset of many Sri Lankans. So if you speak about human rights in Sri Lanka, you may easily be accused of being a traitor.

The problem with the democracy in Sri Lanka is that the majority never changes. There is no shift in power. The most obvious solution is that of federalism, but the Sinhalese are afraid that federalism means regional governments, and because the northern part is a Tamil majority, it will be ruled by the Tamils. There will not be any power sharing. Another challenge is the growing centralization of power. There is impunity for those in power and a culture of fear among people who are interested in politics and changing the system. Lastly, Perera raised a question: what can we learn from our experience?

Perera agrees with Akashi Yasushi (Chairman, International House of Japan) that national character can change. Finally, he emphasizes the significance of the media and alternative discourse, given that the middle class is not so vocal, while the government declares that they are one people.

After the war, according to Perera, the government would not allow NGOs to maximize their capacity building. They are worried that the Tamil people will once again be given ideas about their rights and encouraged to try and separate. The government and the Sinhalese majority did not want Tamils to be empowered as a nation, given that the Tamil nationalist mindset was very strong.

For the free discussion of the first session, the Fellows were asked if they could have peace with military occupation or intervention. According to Gul, the main problem is that in Pakistan, the military together with the CIA fought the USSR in the 1980s, but the United States and the international community overlooked the Indo-Pakistan conflict. He said they could lead the peace process and armies could never write the constitution. The civilians, however, should write the constitution. Perera believes this is possible, as long as there is democracy. The best of civil society is to keep the alternative voice alive so that the NGOs will not back out.

Professor Hasegawa shared his views on the components of justice: transitional justice and running a society as legitimately recognized through the expectations of the people, such as security and economic welfare. He further explained this through John Locke’s definition of justice. He stressed that if people want more justice, power has to accommodate that by adjusting. With this in mind, the Fellows and other intellectuals came up with a formula in which truth, justice, and reconciliation that center on power can lead to peace.
Conflict Transformation, Peacebuilding, and Social Harmony: Challenges for Indonesia

Miryam Saravasti Nainggolan (Indonesia)

Miryam Nainggolan talked about conflict transformation and unity in diversity in Indonesia by describing the history of recent social conflicts in Indonesia. During Soeharto’s regime from 1966 to 1998, there was the New Order’s authoritarianism, so conflict could not be publicized and corruption was widespread. There was political transformation after Soeharto started the process of power decentralization and an increase of interaction for the role of civil society in peacemaking. But because of the conflict in Aceh, the Indonesians are now required to have special identity cards to show they are loyal to the state. The conflict in Ambon, on the other hand, has transformed military power toward the civilians. Nainggolan covered the main sources of conflicts in Indonesia from 2002 until 2007: separatism, intra- and inter-religion and ethnicity, local politics, local and national elections, natural resources, and land disputes. Although the police handle practical conflicts, she presented two categories of conflicts: the horizontal, which refers to intergroup conflicts in the community, while the vertical is the conflict between the community and authority or government.

Nainggolan discussed her reflections on the challenges for Indonesia, such as encouraging people through education to develop behaviors that reflect justice, non-violence, and respect; establishing communities to have strong social relation skills with values of humanism, solidarity, and trust; and finally, the state seen as having political will to develop policies and systems that commit toward people’s economic welfare, democratic participation, ecological balance, human rights, and just social structure, while envisioning long-term peace and political stability.

Vision and Practical Action for a Just and Humane Society

Elmer Sayre (Philippines)

Elmer Sayre focused on vision and practical action for a just, humane society supported by a lively presentation of interesting photographs of him in his NGO activities. He introduced the concept of a “social volcano” that does not appear warlike at all but seeks solutions at the grassroots levels. He suggested solutions such as the integration of water and agriculture, ecological sanitation, utilization of water buffalo for harvesting, promotion of local products like coffee, thereby developing local economy as well, and gardening in small spaces. His vision is to build and share local products. He added that even starting small could make a difference; the media play an important role in convincing people to buy the products, while finding financial assistance from overseas donors.

Sayre’s work ethics revolve around his coined term “accordion approach,” wherein he collaborates and meets his people in the middle. With regard to the conflict between the Muslims and Christians, according to him, they do not want to make war, but because of limited access, they go to war. One of the intellectuals asked him where he got his inspiration and he proudly answered, from his innate spiritual beliefs as a Catholic.

Political Space for a Civil Society in China

Zhang Yali (China)

Zhang Yali described the current status of NGOs in China as a result of the civil society in the pre-reform era. There were only 42 social organizations in the 1950s and 32 in the 1960s. From 1967 to 1976, during the Cultural Revolution, social organizations were totally banned. The reasons for their slow development during the pre-reform era were the strong state and its tight control over civil society. Moreover, there were work units and their affiliations (e.g., women’s federations, youth leagues, and trade unions) in the urban areas, as well as brigades and people’s communes in the rural areas. There were also other institutional measures to prevent the mobility of the people. Small government and big society in the post-reform era paved the way for the development of civil society and its effects to encourage societal involvement, such as the establishment of shequ (community services centers). Based on the categorization of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the civil society in China consists of social organizations, private non-commercial enterprises, and foundations, or the branches of overseas foundations. Zhang categorized the development of NGOs as top-down, which includes officially organized NGOs, and bottom-up. Restrictions of the government revolve around selective support and a dual management system. Furthermore, no
two social organizations can have the same mission in the same district and no regional branches are allowed. The impact of these restrictions on NGOs included the difficulty to register. Non-registered NGOs do not have a legal status and, therefore, have a tendency to be shut down, whereas the registered NGOs have direct access and their taxes are regulated.

Zhang stressed that although the development of civil society in China is still constrained by government policies, the proliferation of shequ and civil society organization, which both involve societal participation, will undoubtedly nurture a political culture that encourages political participation in China.

Challenges of Vietnam’s Higher Education in the 21st Century
Vuong Thanh Huong (Vietnam)

Vuong Thanh Huong’s presentation focused on university education, since, in Vietnam, higher education has played an important and leading role in preparation and development of human resources, not only in knowledge and skills, but also in cultural values and morality. By 2020, Vietnam envisions to have produced 20,000 professional doctors. The main challenge for higher education in Vietnam is as an incubator of technical progress. Vietnam is still behind other East Asian competitors in areas related to research and development. In part, this is due to a higher education system that is still not a source of technical innovation as it is in other upper- or middle-income countries. Insufficient priority for research in Vietnam universities is also visible from the low revenue share directed to R&D. The next challenge is higher education as a provider of higher-level skills. The demand for skills has been significantly increasing due to a combination of inter-industry employment changes, particularly from agriculture to manufacturing. Another challenge is expanding the higher education system to respond to the increasing demand, so that it is accessible to a large percentage of the population, such as women, various social classes, and ethnic minorities.

Finally, to adopt and solve these challenges in the higher education system, Vuong stated that Vietnam will implement seven missions and solutions in the plan for renovation of Vietnam’s higher education in the period from 2006 until 2020: (1) training structure and net planning; (2) contents of curriculums, teaching methods; (3) building capacity for teaching staff and educational managerial officials; (4) conducting research activities; (5) mobilizing resources and financial mechanisms; (6) state management and governance in higher education; and (7) advancing the competitive capacity of higher education for international integration. Unfortunately, the transition from students to national leaders is slim because of the low salary, and today’s younger generation has changed its mind-set on globalization. Nevertheless, Vuong modestly affirmed that Vietnamese are diligent, good mathematicians, and an asset to the labor market.
Field Trips
Field Trip to Okinawa
October 10–14, 2011

From October 10 to 14, the Fellows went as a group on a five-day trip to Okinawa, organized around their suggestions and common interests. The purpose of this field trip was to supplement the lectures and seminars that the Fellows attended throughout the two-month program and to provide them with an opportunity to learn more about Japan’s history and culture. The Fellows visited various places and met people who have impacted Japan’s historical and social communities.

DAY 1: OKINAWA PREFECTURAL PEACE MEMORIAL MUSEUM AND HIMEYURI PEACE MUSEUM (OCTOBER 10)

On their first day in Okinawa, the Fellows visited the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum and the Himeyuri Peace Museum. The Fellows mainly raised questions on Okinawa’s economy, family relations, U.S. bases, and migration.

According to a local Okinawan, Okinawans do not want to leave the island, even though the economy is currently not doing so well. They do not have controversial problems, but they always talk about the economy. The economic situation affects the number of crimes, especially robbery. There is a small percentage of robbery in resort places. Criminal cases in Naha City (Okinawa’s capital) are mostly from the young generation, such as a high school gang.

Okinawans have a deep sense of good and close family relationships and have the highest birthrate in Japan. Based on Confucian beliefs, families have to meet once or twice a year. Although the economy is unstable, family members take care of each other through financial support. Generally, they rely on government subsidies, like social welfare.

The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, located on the hills of Mabuni, displays photos and personal testimonies of Okinawans as remembrance of the brutality of war. The U.S. army that landed at the central part of Okinawa had mass power and resources. It was evident that the Japanese lost their last battle line for the Japanese army. The bombings victimized the Okinawa residents. A Cornerstone of Peace was erected outside the museum fronting the ocean to mark the 50th anniversary of Okinawan Memorial Day on June 23, 1945, the end of the Battle of Okinawa and World War II. Names of all the 200,000 people who lost their lives in the Battle of Okinawa in fighting for their nation are inscribed on the stones. Based on research on the victims, there were unidentified Koreans, Taiwanese, and U.S. allies who had also perished, and the search for their names is still ongoing. There is actually a database where the victims’ names are listed. They are prayed over for peace and for peace to be passed on to the next generations. Many students who visit the museum come to realize and appreciate the importance of peace. This is a core remembrance of their history not only for the Okinawans but also for the world. Many public officials and famous figures, such as Dalai Lama, have visited the museum, which is now a significant landmark in Okinawa.

The Fellows met with Ms. Shimabukuro Yoshiko, the curator of the Himeyuri Peace Museum, who is an 82-year-old survivor of the Battle of Okinawa. She gave the Fellows a tour of the museum. The photos of teachers and student troop members who survived and died during the war were displayed. They included 15- to 16-year-old course high school students aspiring to be teachers. Ms. Shimabukuro belonged to the teacher-training course and was 17 years old at that time. The senior students were 19 years old.
On the late night of March 23, 1945, 222 schoolgirls and 18 teachers from the Female Division of the Okinawa Normal School and the Okinawa First Girls’ High School were inducted as nurses into units at the Okinawa Army Field Hospital in Haebaru, about 3 miles southeast of Naha. They had to constantly look after the injured, secure water, carry in food for the patients and hospital staff, and dispose of the corpses in the middle of the battle.

The U.S. army landed in the central part of Okinawa on April 1, consisting of two groups who invaded the northern and southern areas. The school was located at Asato in Shuri Island. Two hundred of the students moved to higher areas together with the teachers. The U.S. troops reached their area, with power gradually declining until June 21.

The army hospital, which was built inside the caves, was stationed in Haebaru until May 25. In the hills, the army built tunnels inside the 30 to 40 caves. There were room numbers for the hospital where they worked. The battle ended on June 18; the nurse troops were suddenly dismissed and almost all caves were restricted because of the strong bombings and shootings. Those who were in the first and second surgery units tried to escape, but many were shot, while others committed suicide to avoid being captured by the Americans. This memorial marks the site where the third surgery unit hid. According to Ms. Shimabukuro, they did not surrender because they truly believed that the support groups were coming.

Although the exact date and the location where those nurse troops perished could not be determined, the search continued. Still, there are 40 uncertain casualties and 240 bodies unidentified. There was a film showing of testimonies of survivors, some of whom have passed away. The Himeyuri Peace Museum was established to make an appeal for world peace as a way to console the souls of the schoolgirls and teachers.

The Fellows were moved to see and hear the actual stories narrated by Ms. Shimabukuro, and they were amazed how she could exude inner strength and how she had survived that battle in Okinawa at such a young age.

DAY 2: TSUBOYA YACHIMUN POTTERY STREET, SHURI CASTLE, HAEBARU TOWN CULTURAL CENTER, AND SEMINAR ON OKINAWAN LITERATURE AND ARTS (OCTOBER 11)

The Fellows went for a sunny morning stroll on Tsuboya Yachimun Street, which is a shopping area known for its pottery and a reminder of the past, because it is different from the fashionable Kokusai Street and Heiwa Street. Approximately 300 years ago, the Ryukyu administration gathered many pottery kilns and artists scattered around Okinawa, which has been known as a pottery town. The main street, paved with Ryukyu limestone, is filled with about 20 ceramic art workshops, stores, and galleries. Besides being a quaint shopping district with ancient kilns and old time scenery, Naha City’s Tsuboya Pottery Museum can be found there. Some of the Fellows bought a good deal of tasteful handicraft items.

Next, the Fellows visited Shuri Castle, which was partially restored in 1992 from its construction around the 14th century. They were in awe of the castle painted in brilliant vermillion with its magnificent decorations representing the rebirth of the history and culture of the Ryukyu Kingdom. It can be said that the Shuri Castle is the symbol of Okinawa and proves to be deserving of its designation as a World Heritage Site.

The Haebaru Town Cultural Center in Haebaru Town, which is adjacent to Naha, contains items dedicated to the local culture and relics from the Battle of Okinawa. The reproduction of Haebaru’s military hospital as one of the exhibits retells and spurs the Fellows’ imagination on how the war impacted the lives of the people in this flourishing town. Although it was raining that day, the Fellows did not hesitate to visit the caves where the military hospitals were actually situated during the war.

After having visited various historical places, the Fellows were further educated about Okinawa by attending a seminar on Okinawan contemporary literature and arts at the University of the Ryukyus. The speakers were Professor Yamazato Katsunori (Professor, University of the Ryukyus), Mr. Oshiro Sadatoshi (writer), and Mr. Koki Ryoshu (Artistic Director, National Theatre Okinawa). The Fellows’ second day concluded with an interaction with the speakers over dinner near the university.
DAY 3: SAKIMA ART MUSEUM, U.S. BASES, AND OTA PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (OCTOBER 12)

The Fellows began their third day in Okinawa with art appreciation and met with Mr. Sakima Michio, the owner and director of Sakima Art Museum. The theme of the collection was life and death, suffering and salvation, humanity and war. The museum was opened on land reclaimed from the U.S. military on November 23, 1994, with the aspiration of Mr. Sakima, who had discovered the power of art and has been collecting art works of Georges-Henri Rouault for 20 years, to “make a place for meditating.” The work, “Map of the Battle of Okinawa,” considered by the victims as an art propaganda and drawn by Maruki Toshi and Maruki Iri who also painted murals and panels that depicted the bombings of Hiroshima and Okinawan war, is exhibited to express the truth of war. The stairs built on the rooftop of the museum building are designed to remind the visitors of June 23, the Memorial Day for the Battle of Okinawa, and the whole Futenma Air Station can be seen from the roof.

After lunch, the Fellows, with a briefing by Professor Gabe Masaaki of the University of the Ryukyus, climbed to the highest tower overlooking Okinawa near the U.S. bases. Okinawa, a chain of islands, is situated near Taiwan and the Philippines and is 10,000 kilometers from Kyushu Island. Okinawa was strategically important for the U.S. forces during World War II to enable them to contain Japan and move to other Asian countries, such as Papua New Guinea and the Philippine Islands. However, there was a British-American agreement that let British forces control other Asian countries such as Singapore. In contrast, mainland Japan had a different status at the beginning of the postwar era and forced Okinawa to receive the airfield. Now Okinawa has three big airfields: the Naha airport, the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, and the Kadena Air Base, which is the biggest airfield in Asia.

Approximately 90 U.S. military facilities, including major military bases, are stationed throughout Japan with 26,000 U.S. troops. The major U.S. bases in mainland Japan comprise Misawa airbase in Aomori, Yokota Airbase in Tokyo, Yokosuka naval base and Atsugi base in Kanagawa, Iwakuni marine base near Hiroshima, and Sasebo naval base in Nagasaki. And in Okinawa alone, there are 37 military bases with 23,000 U.S. troops that are sometimes discreetly deployed to Sulu, Philippines. The difference between U.S. bases in mainland Japan and Okinawa is the location—the U.S. bases in mainland Japan are spread out in Honshu and Kyushu but in Okinawa, Futenma Air Station in particular is located close to residential areas. Big joint housing facilities are provided inside the base constructed by the Japanese government. Operating cost is from the U.S. government but other facility costs are borne by the Japanese government. The military bases hire almost 20,000 Japanese employees who number 9,000 in Okinawa alone; however, the Japanese government pays the labor cost or the so-called sympathy cost that includes allowance and fringe benefits. Most of the annual cost of the U.S. forces station is about $10 billion, of which the Japanese government contributes about $6 billion. The U.S.-Japan treaty has agreed that the U.S. bases could utilize the facilities owned by Japan.

After the Fellows had a close look at the U.S. bases and got oriented with the overview, they moved onto a seminar on the solution to the problem of the U.S. airbase by former Okinawa governor, Mr. Ota Masahide, who is currently the director of Ota Peace Research Institute and the author of more than 70 books on Okinawa and peace. The Fellows had the honor of receiving an educational lecture on Okinawa’s sociopolitical condition.

DAY 4: SEIFA-UTAKI AND KUDAKA ISLAND (OCTOBER 13)

The Fellows had a grasp of Okinawa’s history and current issues by staying at its main city, Naha. On their last two days, they embarked on a trip to the mystical areas in Okinawa guided by Mr. Takara Ben, a native Okinawan award-winning poet. Although there were brief rain showers, they first visited a World Heritage site, Seifa-utaki, which is considered to be a sacred place since ancient times and believed to have been built by Amami-kiyo, the god in Ryukyu mythology who founded Ryukyu. According to Mr. Takara, corals, waves, and salt are deemed to ward off evil spirits and are all connected to the sea. Men were prohibited from entering
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this sacred site during the Ryukyu Kingdom. The lush subtropical forests and two massive rocks that symbolize Seifa-utaki produced an awe-inspiring and forbidding atmosphere along with the solemn air and panoramic view of Kudaka Island from Seifa-utaki.

The Fellows got on an hour’s ferry ride to Kudaka, a small island with a circumference of 7.5 kilometers, located about 5 kilometers from Chinen Peninsula. Kudaka is said to be the first island Amamikiyo made when she descended from heaven. Hence, Kudaka is called the “island of the gods.” It is also the land where five grains originated and where religious ceremonies were held in Ryukyu Kingdom times. Historically, a pilgrimage to Kudaka Island was obligatory for Ryukyu kings. The Izaiho, a festival held every twelve years in the year of the horse, survives here unchanged from the distant past. Kudaka is a significant island in the folk customs of Okinawa, because this festival is representative of the islands’ ancient mystical rituals.

As soon as the Fellows arrived at Tokuji Port in Kudaka Island, they went on a car tour of the island, guided by Mr. Takara. They learned that people on the island are not allowed to buy or sell but respect an equal distribution of the lands they are given. Young men aged from 15 to 50 own the rights to manage and farm pieces of land. Surprisingly, World War II did not affect the island, because after firing six cannonballs, the Americans thought the island was isolated and left.

Locals on this island have an indigenous belief system which places importance on the veneration of the gods and spirits of the natural world and ancestors. On the east side of the island facing the Shuri Castle is Hubo-utaki, the most sacred place for rituals headed by nores (senior priestess), where the gods of nature and ancestors are worshipped. Moreover, on New Year’s Day it serves as a festive place for dancing with fans as props and drinking. The idea is to attract power from the sun and the moon.

On their night in Kudaka Island, the Fellows had an opportunity to taste homemade local cuisine at a family-owned restaurant, observe a sanshin (Okinawan musical instrument that has three strings) class at a nearby school, and enjoy a nightcap of awamori, a local Okinawan brandy.

**DAY 5: SUNRISE AT ISHIKI BEACH AND KUDAKA RYUGAKU CENTER (OCTOBER 14)**

The Fellows started their last day in Okinawa with a morning stroll to Ishiki Beach to witness the sunrise. Nirai Kanai, referred to as a mythical place where all life originates, is situated in the west and the Fellows marveled at both the gradual rising of the sun over the horizon and the disappearance of the moon at the opposite side of the sky. It is believed that Nirai Kanai is where all spirits are brought back, like a rebirth.

As the Fellows headed back to Kudaka Koryukan where they were staying, they observed farms and agricultural crops near the beach. They noticed that most of the crops, such as bitter gourd, were similar to their hometowns’ agricultural crops.

After an early breakfast, the Fellows walked to nearby Kudaka Ryugaku Center to attend a seminar on Japanese education as seen from Kudaka Island by Mr. Sakamoto Seiji who founded the center in 2001 as a special venue for Japanese dropout students. The students in this center are educated through communal life, interactions with one another, and cultivation of a healthy lifestyle through agriculture.

The Fellows departed Kudaka Island by ferry on a clear, sunny day and had a last taste of Okinawan fusion cuisine for lunch in Naha, before proceeding for a return flight to Tokyo.
Because of the massive destruction brought by the March 11 earthquake, the Fellows decided to visit the Tohoku region to observe at first hand the current conditions of the affected areas and to learn what various organizations have been doing. The highlights of the Tohoku trip involved a briefing by a staff member of Japan Platform on post-disaster activities, meetings with the director-writer of Ishinomaki Hibi Newspaper, Vice Principal of Ishinomaki Hebita Elementary School, and leaders of Tono Magokoro Net, a visit to the tsunami afflicted areas in Ozuchi Town where the Fellows saw volunteer activities and personally met the victims, sightseeing at Haruizumi Temple, and finally, volunteer work in Tono City. These activities helped enrich the Fellows’ practical knowledge of how Japanese independent NGOs for emergency relief and aid function.

**DAY 1: JAPAN PLATFORM (OCTOBER 26)**

On their arrival in Sendai, the Fellows visited Japan Platform (JPF)’s office and had a meeting with Mr. Kodama Mitsuya, a JPF staff member, who had a background in community health focusing on malaria and who joined JPF a month ago. He was previously connected with International Finance Corporation (IFC) in Haiti. Being Japanese, he wanted to help Japanese affected by the disaster on March 11.

He explained what JPF is and its activities for the Tohoku disaster. Their head office is in central Tokyo. Established in 2001, JPF is an international emergency humanitarian aid organization with equal partnership and cooperation of 35 emergency NGOs, the business community, and the Japanese government. Their mission involves the improvement of quality humanitarian aid through Japanese NGOs, aid implementation for victims of natural disasters and conflict areas and finally, contribution to a more peaceful world. JPF has had 46 programs in other countries and its revenue comes from public and private funding and donations from business community and citizens. Hence, JPF provides NGOs expenditures for initial response to emergency aid and directly to the site.

Basically, JPF collects money from the government and business community and allocates them to 35 NGOs who have submitted proposals for helping conflict areas. After funding the NGOs, JPF monitors and then evaluates the NGOs’ activities centering on relief, medical treatment, water sanitation, livelihood recovery, and psychosocial care for the refugees and victims of natural disasters and conflicts. Another activity is matching the goods and services of private companies and NGOs’ needs. In the Tohoku operation, not only did they fund NGOs but also devised a new funding system called co-existence fund for the local NGOs that are monitored with emphasis on coordination. For the Japanese disaster, the collection amounted to 6.5 billion yen, approximately $87 million. Distribution is already done for about 70% of the fund, which is equivalent to $60 million, to the 33 NGOs working in the Tohoku area. The biggest fund component is the food aid supply worth 2.6 billion yen, and the other areas for funding are community reconstruction, medical sanitation, and educational support.

In the first stage, JPF makes an assessment. A map was created for the 35 NGOs that have worked yearly, including Fukushima and Iwate Prefectures. Some big organizations request JPF’s assistance on a part of their activities, while other organizations solicit funding for all their activities. Many Japanese companies offer goods to match and allocate to level communities. Immediately after the earthquake, international organizations
came to Japan for assistance, but the Japanese government refused because Japan did not have enough capacity for such a contingency. In the field after the tsunami, there was no meeting or coordination held; hence, JPF realized the significance of a coordination body, even though some prefectures did not see such need. JPF then initiated meetings regarding food supply, shelter, and other necessities like heaters and coordinated them with private and public sectors, including the central government, prefectures, local government, NGOs, and volunteers. As a result, JPF gradually formed a coordination body to assist and follow up activities for the aged and the children, among others, and equally share information to fill the gaps and prevent duplication. The exit strategy for NGOs to accomplish their projects is about 3 to 5 years.

Challenges in the efforts of recovery in the Tohoku area involve the following: handling of the victims’ psychological state with 3 reported cases of suicide among men who lost their families and homes, the Japanese government’s crisis management to address various needs and issues, and the NGOs’ lack of recognition in Japan. Hence, JPF advocates and explains to the local government what NGOs are. The government department or sector then is assigned depending on the NGOs concerns and issues they are specializing in, such as child education and health. JPF, as the umbrella NGO, first and foremost, does not represent the NGOs but acts as a co-existing partner. Anyone can volunteer, but if there is no communication with the victims or local government, it can lead to conflict.

DAY 2: ISHINOMAKI HIBI NEWSPAPER AND ISHINOMAKI HEBITA ELEMENTARY SCHOOL (OCTOBER 27)

After lunch, the Fellows met with Mr. Takeuchi Hiroyuki, the director-writer of Ishinomaki Hibi Newspaper, and were given a tour of the printing site. The word *hibi* means every day in English, so the newspaper’s name means daily newspaper of Ishinomaki, which has a population of about 160,000. Ishinomaki Hibi Newspaper has been in the business for 99 years (as of October 2011) and the next year will be their 100th anniversary.

Mr. Takeuchi narrated in detail his personal experience and described exactly what happened there on March 11. He said the magnitude level was 9 but comparatively, the shaking was felt more strongly in the coastal areas. The holes, wall cracks, and broken windows can still be seen in their office building. Usually when an earthquake occurs, it lasts for a minute, but the one on March 11 lasted for three minutes. It felt longer so the staff hid under the desk and stayed on the ground because of the strong shaking. The computers on the desk and shelves fell, and the site became smoky and dusty. Immediately after the earthquake, there was some broadcast news and then emergency silence, after which a big tsunami alarm came—driving the office workers and other people to evacuate to the hills. However, Mr. Takeuchi, the company president, and three other staff members remained in the office and waited to see what would happen next. After an hour, they received information from their mobile phones about how strong the tsunami was. They could not escape any more, as the tsunami hit the front building, and thought their lives would soon be over. The tsunami came about seven times back and forth until 8 o’clock in the evening. Soon right after, there was fire on the east side and only 300 meters from their office, a town was massively destroyed. On the road, debris, wreckage of houses, piles of cars, and dead bodies could be found. It seemed like the tsunami was chasing many people who wanted to escape by car but did not make it because of heavy traffic. Mr. Takeuchi confirmed that the big concern was to learn how to escape from the tsunami and where to go by car. On the other hand, there was a pile of snow and it was freezing cold that day, so even if the people survived the tsunami, they may have lost their lives because of the weather. He could not believe he would witness such a tragic sight in the 21st century.

The computers and printing machines in their office were destroyed and since there was no water and electricity after the earthquake, it was impossible to publish the newspaper. They had to discuss how to deal with this situation. Their president said that if nothing was done when such a horrible disaster occurred, their raison d’etre as media would be questioned. Therefore, they had to do something—to report what happened in their area. Since there was no electricity, they imagined how reporting was done during World War II and how the journalists then would have handled the situation. Then they realized that using pen and paper to make newspaper would be enough. The next day, they produced 6 copies of newspaper with the same contents written by hand with the headline: “Among the largest quake and tsunami disaster in Japanese history: Act on accurate
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information!” For six days from March 12, they did the same thing until electricity was restored on March 17 and by March 19, they could distribute newspaper by printing. They took pride in their ability to continue producing the newspaper and disseminate information under such extreme circumstances and even on Sundays, they went to evacuation shelters and distributed 6,000 copies free of charge until the end of April. The contents were mainly about their experience of the massive earthquake and damage. Because of history and knowledge of the earthquake, there was a tendency for exaggerated news and rumors to spread. Hence, Ishinomaki Hibi Newspaper focused on reporting accurate and practical information, as well as collecting information from the victims, and matching them with the government’s information. At that time, they figured out what kind of news the local people needed, such as how to survive and get aid supplies.

Mr. Takeuchi noted that broadcasting is only one-way; good information is good knowledge, so in their experience for the past 8 months they realized that both the sender of information and the recipient are necessary to build trust. He mentioned they had to memorize, record their experience, and then report this historical moment for the future of their children so that they can prevent such kinds of disaster, which is estimated to happen once in a thousand years.

After their visit to Ishinomaki Hibi Newspaper, the Fellows had the opportunity to visit Ishinomaki Hebita Elementary School. The Fellows first viewed a video of the aftermath of March 11 disaster in Ishinomaki, featuring elementary school students, survivors’ testimonials, and damage in the industrial area and the fishing industry. Mr. Yokosuka Jun, the Vice Principal of Ishinomaki Hebita Elementary School, then explained their school’s efforts related to the disaster relief.

When the earthquake hit, the students at first evacuated to the ground floor until they got a warning about the tsunami to move up to higher floors of the school. The school officials contacted the parents to pick up their children but the nearby narrow roads caused traffic jams, so they decided to let the students stay in school until they were released the next morning. Luckily, the school was not damaged, so it became an evacuation center, but water and food arrived only the following day. Fifty-nine elementary school students from other areas came to their school until they moved to temporary housing.

There were still evacuees even though they started their semester on April 21. Some students had lost their parents and family members mostly in their working place. When the semester started, very few students mentioned the earthquake and tsunami, but in June and July, they gradually started to talk about the loss of their grandparents or relatives and their experience of the tsunami. As a part of the school’s research on how to deal with the students’ mental care, a survey was conducted and 707 students answered. Based on the results, 130 students were suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, insomnia, sensitivity to sound, fear of being alone, dependency on their parents, irritation, and an increased miscommunication among students. They also found out that students who lost close family member(s) they had lived with were more stressed, and the most traumatic feelings that were repressed would come up later like a flashback. The teachers supported the students to identify, realize their feelings, and finally, accept their loss. As a result, the school had to go to the right channels to request professional support, such as doctors, nurses, psychologists, and specialists who can work in their school and supervise the students’ psychological care.

In September, the students learned to hang around and laugh with friends while studying. However, they did not disclose their worries and concerns about their parents losing their jobs to their parents themselves, but to their teachers. Moreover, on the 11th of every month, the students are reminded and haunted by the thought of the horrible disaster of March 11. Mr. Yokosuka said that it would be difficult to overcome the day of the earthquake next year. Therefore, they are planning psychological care programs on stress management and peer counseling and support, as well as reeducating the students to be themselves and the meaning of precious life. Three professional counselors from Chiba implemented a skinship program that would stimulate spontaneous reaction to remind the students that they are not alone and not to be ashamed of their experience, and cry if they have to release their emotions. However, the once a month visit of professional counselors from other parts of Japan is not enough so they have to have their own initiatives. They also give psychological support to school staff and teachers who get advice from professional counselors. Mr. Yokosuka said that it would take 20 years to rebuild their area, but the school strives to help the students appreciate once more the beauty of nature and return to their normal life. He concluded that the students have become hopeful because of the messages of encouragement they have received from overseas, which allow them to recognize their connection to the world and attachment to their families as significant in their growth.
DAY 3: TONO MAGOKORO NET (OCTOBER 28)

The Fellows had an opportunity to meet Mr. Tada Kazuhiko, director and a co-founder of Tono Magokoro Net (hereafter referred to as Tono) and Mr. Sato Shoichi, representative of Tono, which is an independent volunteer team consisting of citizens of Tono City and NPOs. Tono was launched on March 16 for the benefit of disaster victims, and to gather information as well as communicate with other organizations, since individual support did not work effectively. Its vision is to support reconstruction toward a sustainable community that links people together and builds bridges between people and nature, and in which nature and industry can coexist. Tono, with revenue resources from membership fees, donations, and government subsidies, functions as both a coordinating agency and direct service to the affected. Although Tono is not satisfied with the government’s slow response due to lack of vision for recovery and review analysis of the Hanshin earthquake, Mr. Tada said they are satisfied with Tono’s activities while envisioning that they will join forces with the government and the private sector in the future. They first make an assessment of the area then support to clean up the debris and garbage. They also provide life-sustaining support consultation and mental health care through casual gatherings and events that they hold regularly. This is to prevent cases of suicide and hikikomori (social withdrawal) in temporary housing. Mr. Sato said that they try to listen to victims’ silent voices and verbalize their hidden issues to reach specific organizations in the government.

Tono does not believe in borders or territories that are declared by the government or the private sector to support afflicted areas. Thus, they welcome volunteer teams and individual volunteers to join their activities from anywhere. Their volunteers comprise various ages from elementary school students to 82-year-olds, foreign students before they leave Japan, and foreigners from more than 10 countries, including France, Germany, Turkey, China, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, among others. Individual volunteers can stay in the gym free of charge and are provided with bus transportation to coastal areas. Some volunteers work for a day while others stay for two to three months. Mr. Sato affirmed that the foreign volunteers do not need to speak Japanese because their presence is already enough and provides some sort of healing for the victims.

Tono holds daily meetings to discuss what they have accomplished and what they are going to do the next day, and to follow up and figure out the issues and problems. One of their achievements in their meetings is how the volunteers effectively take note and verify the evacuees’ needs, such as rice and blankets, among others, and share this information to support the organization. One of the main functions of Tono is to gather and disseminate information to their network of 57 NPOs. Recently, the collection of debris has been done to some extent, so they are shifting their focus to mental care for those living in temporary housing. Since winter is coming, Tono is preparing heaters and warm clothes for them. Tono has had 48,000 volunteers but the number of volunteers has been decreasing. Tono’s advocacies are to invite more people to do volunteer work, maintain their network, and at the same time, prepare for future disasters by first reviewing what was not done enough with past projects before going to the next.
Public Symposium
The 2011 ALFP Public Symposium capped the Fellows’ two-month sojourn in Japan, where they engaged in active intellectual exchange with Japanese resource persons, including intellectuals and leading figures, from academia, NPOs, and NGOs, in the formal setting of seminars, lectures, workshops, field trips, and volunteer experience. Mr. Shimizu Junichi, Director, Japanese Studies and Intellectual Exchange Department of Japan Foundation, gave the opening remarks. Professor Suzuki Yuji of Hosei University and ALFP Advisory Committee member, acted as the moderator. Focusing on this year’s symposium theme, “Beyond Conflict and Disaster: The Role of Civil Society in Asia,” the presentations were divided into two sessions, as follows.

SESSION I: ROADBLOCKS AND CHALLENGES

1. “Global Geopolitics: Roadblocks and Challenges for Civil Society”
   - Imtiaz Gul (Pakistan), Executive Director and Founder, Centre for Research and Security Studies
2. “Report from Afghanistan’s ‘Forgotten Province’: Challenges to Reconstruction and Governance”
   - Imai Chihiro (Japan), Former First Secretary at the Embassy of Japan in Afghanistan
3. “Reconciliation after the War: Challenges in Sri Lanka and Best Practices from Asia”
   - Jehan Perera (Sri Lanka), Executive Director, National Peace Council

The first session addressed how to overcome the challenges inherent for civil society in Pakistan, reconstruction and governance of a province in Afghanistan, and reconciliation after the war in Sri Lanka. Imtiaz Gul’s presentation endeavored to look at the possibilities of the civil society’s role from two angles: (1) the ability of non-governmental, professional organizations to act as supporting arms of the government in times of natural disasters and (2) to weigh the constraints that states’ interests place on civil society organizations when it comes to dealing with the consequences of conflicts generated by internal political dynamics, or those triggered by bigger powers in the name of their national interests. He stated that the cases of Western intervention that the United States has led have unleashed unprecedented sociopolitical dynamics, brought more violence, caused instability, and divided societies into pro- and anti-Western groups. He stressed that the geopolitical interests of bigger states, therefore, are major roadblocks in the way of civil society organizations and also constitute the core challenges to the nongovernmental organizations, as well as to media and other professional bodies. To overcome these hurdles, according to Gul, the role of nations such as Japan and other Southeast Asian countries is important. He also stated the importance of strengthening of civil society in regions where conflict or security crisis largely stems from the Western powers’ quest for political influence and material resources, such as hydrocarbons and other precious mineral resources. Lastly, Gul emphasized that although Pakistan’s government is weak, civil society is strong, and hence, should act as an agent of change.

Imai Chihiro gave the background of how the Afghanistan war does not have a military solution led by the United States. Then she discussed the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) with the goal of supporting remote government in Afghanistan and an overview of Japan’s humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, which is significant in maintaining peace with the Afghanistan government. She described how such efforts had helped the underdeveloped infrastructure, economy, and human resources of Ghor, a forgotten
province in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the PRT concept has a fundamental weakness while working with provincial governments and local NGOs that do not contribute much to the strengthening of technical and financial capacities of Afghan institutions. Although the PRT institution was controversial, Imai thought of what kind of role can be played by the civilian team for confidence building between PRT and the local people. She suggested that Japan, as a soft and middle power, should assist Afghanistan from the aspect of human resource development and capacity enhancement of local people and should not be at the mercy of Western countries with militarized mindset.

Jehan Perera stated that one of the biggest dilemmas of democracy is how to take fair decisions in countries where there are ethnic majorities and minorities. Sri Lanka is a case study where a failure led to 30 years of ethnic war. He highlighted how Japan has a similar problem of democracy in Okinawa. The general impression is that Japan is a homogenous country, but Okinawan people are of different ethnic, linguistic, and cultural background. He addressed how Japan deals with its Okinawan minority through financial compensation and by devolution of power, which enables gradual progress on the ground. Then he explained that Sri Lanka needs to move forward to reconciliation and to structural change of justice. He believes that the peace museums in Okinawa, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki are best practices of peace culture that civil society can take up. Furthermore, he noted that Japan could shift from brick and mortar projects and refocus on exporting its know-how in promotion of social cohesion and nonviolence in partnership with civil society. He ended his presentation by making an appeal that what Sri Lanka most urgently needs is reconciliation between the government and Tamil people, and requests that Japan help create a united Sri Lanka. After spending two months in Japan, he firmly believes that Japan has soft power to make the world a better place.

SESSION II: HOPES AND POSSIBILITIES: ANY HOPES?

1. “Reciprocity, Resilience, Survival and Sustainability of Local Communities: The Case of the Philippines and Lessons for Japan”
   – Elmer Sayre (Philippines), In-House Adviser, Water, Agroforestry, Nutrition and Development (WAND) Foundation

2. “Strengthening the Role of Civil Society in Indonesia after Disaster and Conflict”
   – Miryam Saravasti Nainggolan (Indonesia), Board Chair, Pulih Foundation; Center for Trauma Recovery and Psychosocial Empowerment

   – Vuong Thanh Huong (Vietnam), Senior Researcher, Director of Center for Education Information, Vietnam Institute of Educational Sciences

4. “China’s Civil Society: What Can Japan’s Experience Tell Us?”
   – Zhang Yali (China), Research Assistant, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

The second session revolved around the theme of the roles and lessons learned from various sectors of society. Elmer Sayre posits that multiple adversities in the Philippines have caused a “steeling effect” amongst its people and local communities. Comparatively in Japan, this “steeling effect” was palpable after the war, when adverse conditions galvanized Japan to rise up and shine economically, surpassing neighboring nations. However, Sayre argued that although the Tohoku earthquake brought in triple disasters, there is a far greater and continuing disaster within this disaster, which he termed “synergy of disasters.” His thesis is that affluence makes Japan vulnerable to disasters and perhaps not resilient enough. He presented some indicators that support his thesis, such as the government handling of the Fukushima accident, the government’s recognition of NPOs’ effectiveness as a minor power, shrinking labor market, lack of religion or spirituality, materialism, and low birthrate as well as the aging society. Hence, Sayre stated the lessons the Philippines could offer: the significant function of community and society, social as well as economic change, the role of religion and culture versus materialism, NPOs’ partnership with the government and as a purveyor of alternative education, revival of traditional culture that goes hand in hand with popular culture to communicate positive values, and finally, the role of women in the workforce.
Miryam Nainggolan introduced Indonesia as a plural and multicultural country that is vulnerable to natural disasters. She illustrated the post-disaster psychological aid activities and the need for Civil Society Organizations’ (CSOs) involvement in post-conflict and -disaster recovery efforts both in Soeharto’s and the reformation eras. In addition, she reported how the government, private sector, and donors perceive CSOs in Indonesia. Nainggolan tackled how Indonesia can learn from the Philippines’ Law of Local Government Code. Based on her volunteer experience in Tohoku, coordination for efficiency, discipline, and the local people’s initiatives are the areas of improvement that are necessary for Indonesia’s CSOs.

Vuong Thanh Huong’s presentation provided a general understanding and analysis of civil society in Vietnam. She briefly discussed the history of civil society in Vietnam and its status quo with broad types of organizations and initiatives that relate to focus on women’s unions. Although Vietnam’s CSO is broad and voluntarism is high, it is not comprehensive, and poor in quality. She mentioned that participation should be seen as a kind of democracy. Moreover, she pointed out civil society’s weaknesses based on structure, environment, values, and impacts. Then she talked about the valuable role of education for building a civil society. Lastly, she explained the lessons learned from Toho Mogokoro Net’s voluntary activities and the coordination of umbrella organizations, such as Japan Platform, that can be applied to Vietnam’s CSOs.

Zhang Yali described civil society in China as both social and private enterprises. It has been growing rapidly, while promoting societal involvement in social service provision. As a result, the government in the course of economic reform and recentralization of policy-making envisions a “small government and big society.” The challenges faced by China’s civil society consist of institutional barriers (dual management), lack of legislation (regulation and administration), fragile finance (reluctant charity), capacity constraint (just past 30 years and a phenomenon to people, training in schools), and problematic internal governance (irregularities and public trust). Zhang then related China’s civil society to Japan’s civil society’s size and number, which is relatively large, and its highly organized and active civic activities. Nonetheless, the development of Japan’s CSOs also underwent stages of elite organizations, then producer organization, pressure groups in the producer and social service sectors, and finally, the citizen movements and public interest. Hence, whether CSOs could perform their role as a third sector to supplement as well as balance and check the state and market sector depends on the space that is allowed, its need, and the capacity of the CSOs. Zhang concluded that the development of CSOs is non-linear, and the relationship between the government and CSOs in service provision could be maximized through collaboration and cooperation, as observed in the post-March 11 disaster relief in Japan and post-earthquake in China in 2008.